The Fazzan and Kanem

A view of Traghen included in Despois's study of the Fazzan's human geography in Mission scientifique du Fezzan.

One aspect of the medieval history of Kanem which has yet to be satisfactorily analyzed is the extension of the state to the Fazzan. Said to have begun during the reign of Dunama Dibalemi in the 13th century, scholars disagree on when Sayfawa rule this far north came to an end. Similarly, there is a debate about the Kanemi provincial ruler, based at Traghen, becoming autonomous and thus ending direct rule from Kanem sometime in the 14th century. Even as direct rule faded, Kanem’s institutional and cultural legacy endured well into the medieval and early modern periods. The evidence suggests that Kanem’s political and cultural influence persisted at least into the late 14th century and provided the foundations for later dynasties such as the Awlad Muhammad. This brief excursion will explore this theme through the brief external written sources, oral and written traditions of Borno, and the traditions of the Fazzan. 

Since written sources from the Fazzan during this period are scarce and external sources from Kanem-Borno and North Africa are largely silent on it, scholars have come to rely on oral traditions recorded in the 19th and 20th centuries. The general narrative suggests a ruler of the Fazzan installed by mai Dunama Dibalemi at Traghen. Remembered in the region as the Banu Nasur, they appear to have become largely autonomous or semi-autonomous. Then, at some indeterminate time, another ruling group, the Banu Khorman, are said to have defeated the dynasty of Kanem origin. The new rulers reestablished their capital at Zawila but appear to have lost effective authority sometime in the 15th or early 16th century. The dynasty which finally reestablished order and survived until the 19th century, the Awlad Muhammad, appear to have established themselves in the Fazzan by the mid-16th century. Their descent from a sharif from Morocco or Mauritania and the importance of the Fazzan as a crossroads for pilgrimage and trade may have made the founder of the dynasty a convenient figure to restore order. 

Much of the above overview of the history of the Fazzan is based on traditions that are actually contradictory. For example, J. Despois, in his "human geography" of the region in the Mission scientifique du Fezzan, was told that the Guend er Roum fortress near Traghen was used by the Banu Khorman before Kanem's conquest of the Fazzan (Despois 96). But Henri Duveyrier, who traveled in the region during the 19th century, was told the Traghen fortress ruins were associated with the Banu Nasur dynasty from Kanem (276). Does this mean the area's fortifications predate Kanem's northward expansion in the 13th century? And were the Banu Khorman also present in this part of the Fazzan so early? Similarly, J. Chappelle, whose study of the Tubu populations, Nomades noires du Sahara is an important work, suggests that Dunama Dibalemi installed a Tubu lieutenant to oversee the Fazzan at Traghan in c. 1258 (50). Once again, this is contradicted by the best chronology for the Sayfawa dynasty, Lange's, which indicates Dibalemi's reign likely ended by c. 1248. Furthermore, Ahmad b. Furtu's chronicle of Idris Alooma's Kanem campaigns referred to hostility between Dunama Dibalemi and the Tubu. Although apparently based on oral tradition, Ahmad b. Furtu's informants spoke of a war between the Tubu and the ruler of Kanem that lasted 7 years, 7 months and 7 days (Palmer 50). Consequently, it seems rather unlikely that Dibalemi would have appointed a Tubu leader of the Fazzan at Traghen. The sources are not adequate to answer the question, but the frequent Kanuri toponyms in Traghen may be a more reliable indicator of a Kanembu governor posted there. Clearly, there is a problem in the early scholarship on this period. Assuming Dunama Dibalemi had to have been the one who ordered the killing of Qaraqush's son in Waddan and then established Kanem's hegemony in the Fazzan in 1258 cannot sustain critical analysis.

What do the few textual sources on this period tell us? The earliest, the geographical text of Ibn Sa'id, was based on a lost account by Ibn Fatima. In his account, which is largely based on Ibn Fatima's descriptions of Kanem during Dunama Dibalemi's reign, the Fazzan is included in the domains of the Sayfawa (Levtzion & Hopkins 188). This same source, however, repeated the notion that Zawila was the capital of Fazzan (194). If so, one wonders if the decision to move the Kanemi capital to Traghen was made after Dunama Dibalemi's reign, perhaps when Kaday occupied the throne (1248-1277). Alternatively, Zawila may have continued to occupy an important position as the commercial capital while the official appointed by the Sayfawa was based in Traghen. It is unclear exactly how administrative arrangements functioned and where, but Ibn Sa'id implied Kanemi domination during the reign of Dunama Dibalemi. Furthermore, Ahmad b. Furtu and the Diwan reveal this mai owned tens of thousands of horses. It is difficult to imagine Kanem obtaining so many horses for military purposes without importing at least some of them through the Fazzan. Thus, it is possible Kanem's sway over Fazzan began sometime during Dunama's reign. Additional Arabic sources affirm Kanem's intervention in Waddan by the 1250s. According to al-Tijani, the king of Kanem intervened in Waddan and had a son of Qaraqush killed in 1258 for causing discord in the land (215). 

Ibn Khaldun, for his part, wrote of a gift of a giraffe from Kanem to the Hafsid ruler of Tunis in 1257. Ibn Khaldun is too brief in his description, yet he refers to the king of Kanem also as the ruler of Borno and locates their domains to the south of Tripoli (337). It is unclear if he meant the domains of the Sayfawa still extended into the Fazzan in his time or if he was referring to the period in question, but he writes in the present tense. Another 14th century writer, al-Umari, apparently had access to independent sources of information about Kanem. For instance, he relies on the authority of Abu Abd Allah al-Salaliji who personally met the ascetic shaykh, Uthman al-Kanimi (260). This source, whose nisba points to Morocco, presumably met the ascetic shaykh in Egypt or North Africa. Moreover, al-Umari described Kanem's domains stretching to Zalla in Libya (260). If al-Umari had access to informants who spoke with Kanemi ascetics and pilgrims, one may be able to surmise that his information on the borders of the state were at least partly updated. The lodge in Cairo where Kanemi pilgrims and students stayed was still active at this time, too (261). Therefore, it is not inconceivable for al-Umari's information on Kanem's border to be current. Lastly, al-Maqrizi also implied Kanem's continued domination of at least parts of the Libyan Sahara. According to him, Barqa was a northern neighbor of Kanem. This author, who lived from 1364-1442, possessed a surprisingly detailed amount of knowledge on Kanem, Borno, and neighboring regions. Indeed, from his use of Kanuri words like Afnu to refer to the Hausa and various peoples or regions in the Lake Chad area, al-Maqrizi must have had access to other sources of information on this part of Africa (354). Either through lost Arabic sources or from contact with pilgrims or students from Kanem-Borno, al-Maqrizi should be taken seriously. In contrast to el-Hesnawi, who was inclined to discount the writings of al-Umari and al-Maqrizi on Kanem's rule of the Fazzan lasting a long period, we believe the question is still debatable (El-Hesnawi 320). Certainly by 1463, however, the qaid of Tripoli received tribute from the Fazzan that was then sent to the Hafsids (322).

As the few external Arabic sources seem to suggest, Kanem's authority over the Fazzan persisted at least until the end of the 14th century. This would imply that, despite conflict within the Sayfawa ruling house and wars with the Bulala and Sao, the rulers never completely lost sight of the important commercial route that linked them to the larger Islamic world. If the oral traditions in the Fazzan are accurate, however, things began to fall apart sometime in the 1300s or 1400s. Duveyrier repeated traditions of the Banu Khorman defeating the local Kanem administrators (Duveyrier 277). Gustav Nachtigal, also drawing from tradition, argued that the Banu Nasur dynasty in Fazzan became autonomous (Nachtigal 103). Some period of lengthy conflict ensued in the Fazzan, for Despois reported similar traditions on the foundation of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty. Apparently, the Awlad Muhammad founder sought to unite groups in dispersed gasr fortifications due to endemic conflict among the Banu Khorman, Nasur, and Jahma (Despois 108). If this tradition is a reliable indicator, the Awlad Muhammad concentrated people at a Nasur gasr and gradually reestablished a unitary state for the Fazzan. This may explain why political titles of Kanuri origin were adopted by the Awlad Muhammad rulers, since their rise to power may have been through an alliance with remnants of the local Kanemi administration. Intriguingly, J. Lethielleux reported that the people of the Wadi al-Ajal sent a deputation to Borno after the fall of the Nasur dynasty due to the incessant conflict with nomads (Lethielleux 17). If so, there may have been elements in the Fazzan who solicited the aid of the Sayfawa for restoring order. It was ultimately achieved by the Awlad Muhammad, who may have accomplished it with what was left of the Banu Nasur. 

Nevertheless, some of the traditions are contradictory about the legacy of Kanem's rule. To Despois, who was told of Kanem forces allegedly destroying Brak el Afia and the village of Maafen, the blacks of Kanem had a bad reputation (Despois 61). Lange, however, has proposed that Brak was attacked by Idris Alooma of Borno in the 16th century, not the period of Kanem's rule. Lange based this on Ahmad b. Furtu's chronicle of Idris Alooma's Borno campaigns, referring to an episode in which the mai returned from the hajj and attacked a place called Burak. This Burak was likely the Burak in the northern Fazzan where traditions recall a place destroyed by Kanem (Lange 117). Lange even goes so far as to suggest Borno may have retained or reinstalled a garrison at Traghen in the 16th century, from which the attack against Burak was launched (118). Further evidence of this is required, but it would affirm the idea of a more positive or at least neutral view of Kanem's authority in the 13th and 14th centuries. In truth, El-Hesnawi himself was told a tradition by a Fazzani elder of Aqar which reflects a more positive view of Kanem's period of rule. According to this informant, a large delegation of Fazzanis, from 6 nomadic groups, arrived in the capital of the ruler of Kanem to ask for Kanemi families to revive agriculture (El-Hesnawi 318). This problematic account could be referring to the settlement of slaves to work in the date-groves of the Fazzan. Alternatively, it may contain a kernel of historical veracity on the large-scale movement of free people from Kanem into Fazzan during the 13th and 14th centuries. Either way, it represents a positive tradition of Kanem for its settling of 6000 men and their families into the Fazzan and a revival of agriculture after the politically tumultuous years following the fall of the Banu Khattab of Zawila in the late 12th century. The shared tie of Islam also paved the way for peaceful communication since the Fazzani delegation was initially assumed to be invading infidels by Kanem. Fortunately, "But when the Kanemis saw the Fazzanis camped near their capital, performed the daily prayers and showed no signs of hostility, they recognized them as Muslims creating no danger" (318). Ultimately, the annexation of the Fazzan under Dunama Dibalemi may have been welcomed for providing political stability, security, and the revival of the economy.

But what was the nature of the Kanemi authority of the Fazzan? Some possible clues may be seen in the political structure of the Sayfawa state. Lamentably, our sources are richer for the Borno phase of this dynasty. Nonetheless, we have noted the survival of Kanuri political titles under the Awlad Muhammad sultans. Thus, they too had a yarima, kaigama, and galadima. It is possible that the local Kanemi administration used such titles like the Sayfawa court within the Fazzan. It is also possible that the idea of a dignitary whose title followed a cardinal direction may have been in place. The Awlad Muhammad, for instance, posted a brother of the sultan at Traghen as "Sultan of the East," or "Sultan el Shirghi" (Lyon 207). Furthermore, the local administration may have utilized the chima system for land grants and tribute collection on date-groves and gardens. The Banu Nasur may have also successfully, for a time at least, rebuilt or maintained gasr fortifications at key sites in the Fazzan. Traghen, their political capital, certainly benefited from this. Zalla and other important sites for the trade and pilgrimage traffic through the Fazzan would have necessitated security. Lyon, when traveling in the Fazzan in the early 19th century, heard the story of 500 donkeys who perished during the construction of Traghen's citadel (207). Undoubtedly, the large-scale immigration of people in conditions of security must have been the greatest contribution to the region's prosperity. With security for trade routes, free and enslaved people could move to or through the Fazzan, restore and expand oasis settlements. This may be the origin of the Oualad Kassoun of Traghen, a group Despois identified as the most ancient lineage there (Despois 250). Such families with deep roots in sites like Traghen also reshaped the towns and villages of the area based on their town and villages in Kanem and Borno. Clearly, this would explain the preponderance of Kanuri terms for castles, wells, springs, and other place names. Or the appearance of a dendal at Murzuk. Further ties to Kanem and Borno may have developed through the Tura traders holding the position of Zeilama, who may have contributed to the growth of the trade in horses for Kanem's military expansion in the 1200s.

In summation, we have presented evidence for the survival of Kanem's rule in the Fazzan into the late 14th or early 15th century. The administration at Traghen likely mirrored aspects of the Sayfawa court, and it is possible that the Awlad Muhammad partly borrowed Sayfawa court titles via the example of the Banu Nasur dynasty. Exactly when they became autonomous is ambiguous, but a breakdown of state authority must have occurred by the early 15th century. Due to distance and the frequent conflicts of the Sayfawa with the Sao and Bulala in the 1300s, the Kanemi official posted at Traghen was perhaps autonomous. His position may have been similar to the later galadimas of Borno who possessed great local autonomy on Borno's frotier. Then, the enigmatic Banu Khorman, who may have been of Berber or Arab extraction, were said to have defeated the Banu Nasur and made Zawila their capital. Traditions collected by Despois, however, hint at a possible alliance of the Awlad Muhammad and the Banu Nasur. The period of Kanem's rule in the Fazzan may have also facilitated economic growth with immigration and increase in trade through this vital trans-Saharan route. The oral traditions, sadly, are contradictory. Despite their limitations, they do provide evidence for a relatively durable Kanemi government which shaped the subsequent Fazzani regime, the Awlad Muhammad. The few external Arabic sources on Kanem during this era likewise affirm a long-lasting Kanemi influence in the Fazzan. 

Bibliography

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Hopkins, J. F. P., and Nehemia Levtzion (editors). Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2000.

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Lange, Dierk.  A Sudanic Chronicle: The Borno Expeditions of Idrīs Alauma (1564-1576) According to the Account of Aḥmad B. Furṭū : Arabic Text, English Translation, Commentary and Geographical Gazetteer. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1987.

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Lange, Dierk, and Silvio Berthoud. “Al-Qasaba et d’autres Villes de La Route Centrale Du Sahara.” Paideuma 23 (1977): 19–40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40341580.

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Ancient Ghana and Mali

Although somewhat outdated, Nehemia Levtzion's Ancient Ghana and Mali remains the best introductory overview of 2 of the early major kingdoms of the Western Sudan. Gomez's African Dominion reflects more recent scholarship and advances in archaeology for the region, but suffers from a more hermetic nature, inaccessible style, and questionable attempts at integrating race and gender into the topic. Much of Gomez's text also degenerated into lengthy analysis on Songhay of interest only to specialists while neglecting some of arguments of other scholars. Levtzion's book, on the other hand, represents a fine, albeit dated, synthesis of oral traditions and textual analysis on the development of kingdoms, the spread of Islam, and trans-Saharan trade. Unfortunately, we just do not have enough sources on early Ghana or the early Malinke chiefdoms. In addition, perhaps inclusion of early Songhay history and the Kawkaw state would have been a good addition to encapsulate the entirety of the 3 "empires" of the Western Sudan from c.500 to c.1500.

While the scholarly consensus of today rejects the Almoravid "conquest" of Ghana, Levtzion's study demonstrates how the Western Sudan became increasingly incorporated into global medieval exchange and cultural development. The gold of the Western Sudan was pivotal for Mediterranean and European monetary systems and political transformations from the Italian trading centers to Fatimid expansion in North Africa. Trans-Saharan trade also reached the forest belt and coastal regions of West Africa as the gold fields of today's Ghana fed into the trading system of Mali. Local transformations with the spread of Muslim Dyula traders and Malinke warriors to the south and east, plus Islamic conversion of local rulers in more regions of Africa led to new developments, tastes, spiritual expression and trade between Western and Central Sudan. After all, the Wangarawa were in Hausaland by the 14th century and the Diwan of Kanem-Borno mentions Mali clerics coming to Kanem by the 13th century. 

These early contacts between the Western and Central Sudan unfortunately do not appear in much of the external Arabic sources. An early trade route connecting Egypt and Ghana went through Kawkaw (Gao), and Tadmekka traded with Ghana and Kawkaw. Through Air and the early Hausa states, people from the Middle Niger and Kanem likely interacted as copper, salt, gold, textiles, and slaves were exchanged. Sadly, learning of what kinds of relations existed between Ghana or Mali and Kanem is difficult to uncover. Nonetheless, we would hazard, based on Levtzion's mention of intersecting trans-Saharan routes and the evidence of some cultural ties in other sources, that Kanem and the Central Sudan must have interacted through trade, religion and migration. After all, by the late 11th century, the ruling elites of Takrur, Ghana, Kawkaw (Gao), and Kanem were Muslims This convergence of Islamization in the most important kingdoms of the Sudanic belt in the Western and Central Sudan must have favored or fostered ties, diplomatic relations, and movements of Islamic clerics, as mentioned in the Diwan and Kano Chronicle. The two major "commodities" exported by the Western and Central Sudan, respectively, were gold and slaves. The lack of competition over the principal exports to North Africa and Egypt plus the development of textile industries in each region likely fueled exchange between the two zones.

Takrur and the Coast?

One of the early West African states whose rulers converted to Islam at an early date was Takrur, located in the Middle Senegal Valley. Takrur became so well-known in Egypt and the Middle East that the name of their kingdom became a common appellation for the entirety of the "Western Sudan." Yet, despite Takrur being well-known to informed persons in Egypt, Syria, and North Africa from at least the 11th century onwards, surprisingly little is known of it. Prior to al-Bakri there does not appear to be any extant Arabic records that explicitly allude to the kingdom of Takrur. Yet archaeological evidence suggests the rise of polities along the Senegal River by the 500s, with ties to long-distance trade, iron metallurgy, riverine resources, and salt. Evidence of camel remains in the Senegal River Valley also suggest possibly ancient forms of trans-Saharan contact, or at least movement of peoples and goods from the southern Sahara to the Sahel and savanna. This period, perhaps corresponding with the early Jaa Ogo dynasty of Takrur, may have consolidated through iron metallurgy and this intra-regional trade. 

Part of the problem for Takrur may be Ghana overshadowing it, despite Takrur's conversion to Islam before Ghana. Ghana was mentioned first in external Arabic sources, and although Takrur was never subdued by Ghana, the latter kingdom may have been the more powerful with better connections to the sources of gold used in trans-Saharan contact. One also suspects that Takrur, located on the western end of the Sudanic region, may have suffered from its more peripheral location with regards to the movement of goods from West Africa to the Maghrib and Egypt. Takrur, and other parts of the Senegal River Valley, would also later fall under the domination of Mali, and may have been important for access to sea salt as an additional source besides Saharan mines. Unfortunately, the number of primary sources which could shed light on the nature of Takrur and its trading partners is restricted to the external Arabic sources which point to ties with the "Lamlam" (victims of Takrur slave raids), Awdaghust, Awlil, and traders from the east and north (Arabs and Berbers were also active in towns under Takrur, including the eponymous capital and Silla. 

However, surprisingly, little attention has been paid to Takrur's access to sea salt and coastal trade with North Africa. Due to the paucity of sources, one cannot ascertain to what extent this actually occurred, but Takrur was intimately linked to Awlil and, presumably, the island of Ayuna, a source of sea salt, ambergris, and turtle meat located somewhere on the mouth of the Senegal River or Mauritanian coast. Since Takrur was known for the export of gold and slaves, one would think some of these exports would have traveled west along the Senegal River to Awlil, where ships from the Maghrib were said to have visited. Indeed, Arabic sources allude to Awlil as the last point ships from the Maghrib traveled to, implying it was a well-known anchorage and presumably engaging in trade with the local Banu Gudala Berbers. For example, the Kital al-Istibsar of the 12th century makes this clear:

There is a salt mine also in the land of the Gudala at a place called Walili on the coast of the Ocean and from there it is carried by caravan to the neighboring countries. Near Walili in the sea is an island called Ayuna. At high tide it may be reached only by boats, but at low tie it may be reached on foot. Much ambergris is found there. The people there mainly live on the flesh of turtles, which are very abundant in that place and are so extremely large that a man may get into the shell (mahar) taken from a turtle's back and go fishing in the seas, as in a boat (Corpus of Early Arabic Sources, p. 142).

This same source mentions the island of Ayuna as "the farthest point reached by ships and the last anchorage in the Maghrib." And while it points to the salt from "Walili" being traded overland, earlier sources, mainly al-Idrisi, point to the use of river boats to transport salt: 

The Island of Awlil is in the sea near the coast. The famous salt deposit is there. No other salt deposit is known in the land of the Sudan. The salt is carried from there to all the towns of the Sudan. Boats come to this island, and the salt is loaded on them. The boats then go to the mouth of the Nil, which is one day's run from the island. They then proceed up the Nile to Sila, Takrur, Barisa, Ghana, and the other towns of Wanqara and Kugha as well as to all the towns of the Sudan" (Corpus of Early Arabic Sources, p. 106-107).

While secondary sources seem to disagree on when or if Takrur ever directly seized control of Awlil, al-Idrisi places the town of Awlil in the lands of the Maqzara of the Sudan. Ibn Sa'id also quoted al-Idrisi's statement, indicating the use of ships to carry salt from Awlil up the Senegal River. Of course, al-Idrisi's conception of every West Africa town lying along the "Nile" was incorrect, but he was probably correct in the use of ships from Awlil to carry salt directly to the "Land of the Blacks," which would have required it to pass through lands controlled by the kingdom of Takrur, which dominated Sila, Barisa, and, by the 13th century, Qalanbu (possibly the ancient kingdom of Galam), a well-known river port. One would assume the ancient town of Sanghana, consisting of two towns on both banks of the Senegal River, and said by al-Bakri to be closest to the Banu Gudala territory, fell under the rule of Takrur. 

One would think the rulers of Takrur would have endeavored to benefit from a coastal trade route to their west as well as the more well-known overland routes to Awdaghust and beyond. Al-Bakri and others mention Awlil as a source of salt for Awdaghust's trade with the lands to the south, and probably the source of Awdaghust's ambergris trade. Why not also trade gold, slaves, ivory, cotton, and other commodities along the Senegal River, dominated by Takrur, to the west to Awlil, where ships from the Mediterranean could transfer goods to the Maghrib and beyond? This would have allowed Takrur access to goods from the north without relying solely on Awdaghust or Ghana and its trading network to the east. Moreover, it may have increased the reputation of the kingdom as a source for gold from Bambuk and other lands without the costly trans-Saharan journey. 

Unfortunately, none of the Arabic sources are sufficiently clear to establish a regular coastal trade at Awlil that linked Takrur to the Mediterranean. Indeed, some of the sources suggest a possible pre-Islamic trade that connected Takrur to the mysterious Qamnuriya "Sudan" to the north, using ancient overland trade routes. Besides, other accounts of shipwrecks of mariners from the Mediterranean along the western coast of Africa seem to indicate that it was not very common for mariners to travel beyond southern Morocco. If, indeed, they regularly visited Awlil by the Senegal River, one would assume more sources could attest to this. Perhaps archaeological excavations in the region will shed light on this, as well as more research into the Banu Gudala. For instance, one of the tales of lost sailors mentions Banu Gudala, who did not seem too shocked by the presence of sailors on their coast. Moreover, a mention of "Tochoron" in a 14th century Iberian book on the known kingdoms of the world mentions travel to the West African coast from North Africa, to reach the "River of Gold" (the Senegal and Niger rivers, which were believed to be connected to the Nile). While the text describes a fictional journey around the known world, its author was clearly well-informed, and perhaps was not entirely fabricating details about West Africa, the Senegal River and trading ships. "Tochoron" or 'Takrur does appear in the text, but the narrative describes an overland route to get there across the Sahara. Nevertheless, Takrur should still have been a leading power along the Senegal River Valley, and probably closely linked to any trading activities at the mouth of the Senegal River or nearby coastal regions, which might explain why "Tochoror" appeared on European maps as early as 1339. 

Tarikh al-Sudan

Due to our recent readings of Redhouse's dated English translations of two chronicles by the imam Ahmad Ibn Furtu or Borno, we at the blog have decided to tackle Hunwick's translation of the chronicle Tarikh al-Sudan by Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'di. Unfortunately, Hunwick did not translate the entirety of the chronicle written by our Timbuktu author, skipping 2 chapters on Moroccan politics and later chapters on events after 1613, with the pasha administration and post-Songhay Middle Niger politics. That era, after 1613, when effective Songhay resistance was largely over and fewer large-scale empires operated in the "Western Sudan",  was for obvious reasons quite distinct from the "imperial" era of Songhay, Mali, or Ghana. 

As the general narrative of the Songhay Empire or the Western Sudan owes so much to al-Sadi and the Tarikh al-Fattash, reading this chronicle was basically an exercise in seeing how so many historians and documentarians have borrowed this or that idea, characterization, or plot point in their depiction of Songhay rulers like Askia Muhammad or Sunni Ali. We have read select chapters of the two surviving Timbuktu chronicles in the past, for our earlier projects on Ghana and pre-imperial Songhay history, so the early chapters were nothing new. As recent scholarship has shown, an overreliance on the Timbuktu tarikhs is problematic, as the authors had various political, ideological, and religious motives at play, and were relying on oral traditions for much of the earlier history of their region. For instance, today's scholars have called into question the idea of Ali Kulun and the Sunni dynasty of Songhay rulers, pointing to the alarming parallels with Tuareg oral traditions and folklore. Mande, Berber, Songhay, and Islamic influences intersect and shaped how Timbuktu chroniclers like al-Sadi perceived the Middle Niger and the "land of the Blacks" in surprising ways, and not always in what modern secular readers considered to be historically accurate style or methodology. 

Thus, one must use these sources very carefully while also coming to see something of the interplay or oral and written traditions in West African literature. One can read these chronicles and see commonality with the oral epics of Sunjata, or the oral epics of the Bamana people of Segu. For al-Sadi and his audience, chronicling the great past of his region while endeavoring to avoid offending the Pasha administration relied on portraying the later Songhay Askia dynasts as corrupt and decadent, yet celebrating the security, Islamic scholarship, and cosmopolitan ties of Timbuktu and Jenne in the Songhay Golden Age (scholars who traveled to Mecca, Egypt, North Africa or corresponded with illustrious figures from Cairo). Moreover, while the author was of "Berber" descent, he also mentions a Fulani ancestor, and probably possessed other West African non-Berber forebears. Clearly, he was a man of Timbuktu and identified with the region and its peoples, and Islamic devotion filtered the lens through which he viewed West Africa. In that respect, he resembled Ahmad Ibn Furtu, the chief imam of the mosque in Borno's capital during the reign of Idris Alooma. Like Ibn Furtu, his historical chronicle sought to stress the proper and just Islamic devotion of his class and preferred rulers. For al-Sadi, this seems to have been Askia Muhammad I and Askia Dawud, and one of course must question the portrayal of these rulers in the chronicles. 

It is also clear that the text pointed to the corruption and in-fighting among various siblings and cousins of the Askia royal family over the course of the 16th century as a cause for the empire's decline and relatively quick fall to the invading forces of Morocco. How the Songhay went from being able to raid Moroccan territory in the Dar'a Valley under Askia Dawud to being quickly routed by a relatively small Moroccan force armed with muskets in 1591 is difficult to conceive. Unless the Songhay state was already weakened by problems with succession that weakened its ability to maintain central authority and military capacity, muskets should not have been enough to topple Songhay. Unfortunately, al-Sadi has little to say about the slaves, artisans, and laborers, and little to say about the influence of women among the Songhay. The so-called subaltern groups were probably not seen by al-Sadi as significant historical actors, but glimpses of their role in the economy, political conflict, and marriage alliances of the Songhay rulers clearly emerge. Artisans, such as tailors and shoemakers, hardly appear in chronicle, despite the several workshops in Timbuktu run by tailors who were sometimes scholars themselves. We learn they had a quarter in Gao, created by Askia Dawud, which may also be a veiled reference to artisans as a casted group. 

A Focus on Kanem

Kanem c. 1100, according to Yves Urvoy. While his chronology is questionable and his study of Kanem-Borno reflects the colonial era in which it was produced, it remains an important source. The "Bagama" were the "Black Berbers" of al-Bakri, but some of the other named peoples or kingdoms in this map may not have existed in 1100.
 

One of the well-known polities of medieval Africa that, surprisingly, seems often overlooked, is that of Kanem. Take the recently published African Dominion by Gomez, for instance. His study of the famous civilizations that existed in the "Western Sudan" region along or near the Niger only references Kanem a few times. Sure, Kanem was part of the "Central Sudan" and probably culturally (and linguistically) different from most of the peoples to their west (with the possible exception of a few Nilo-Saharan speakers like the Songhai). But one would think the early conversion of Kanem's royalty in the 11th century and their state's longevity (or at least the longevity of the Sefawa dynasty of Kanem and Borno) would attract more interest. Is it, perhaps, due to the ignominious "honor" of Kanem's alleged reliance on the slave trade for its trans-Saharan economic relationships? Or, is it due to the general ignorance of most Westerners of the regions between the Niger and the Nile? Or is it partly a result of the questionable reliability of the Girgam and chronicles of Kanem-Borno, surely reflecting a pro-Sefuwa outlook? Surely, the Borno state of the Sefawa dynasty, which relocated to the areas southwest of Lake Chad by the late 14th century, has attracted much attention from scholars, particularly on the topics of Islam, diplomatic ties, trans-Saharan and trans-Sudanic links, and regional economies in the "Central Sudan."

So, let's shift our focus back to Kanem, its obscure origins, and the foundations of the well-known Borno empire of more recent centuries. It is difficult to trace the origins of Kanem, as the earliest Arabic references to it are probably from the 7th or 8th centuries. Arabic external sources allude to it as a kingdom of the "Zaghawa" people, which is probably a reference to a plethora of nomadic "black" Saharan and Sahelian populations north and east of Lake Chad (Tubu, Zaghawa, Teda, ancestors of the Kanembu and Kanuri peoples). However, there may be references to groups related to the founders of Kanem from the time of Herodotus and Antiquity. For instance, the "Ethiopian" troglodytes hunted by the Garamantes, according to the "father of History," may very well have been ancestors of the Tubu peoples, who are known to have resided in caves of the Tibetsi region during winter months. It is also likely that the carbuncles used by pharoanic Egypt and traded by the Garamantes came from the land of the Tubu peoples, who very well could have become part of the Garamantian trading network in the Fezzan and central Sahara. Additional obscure references to the lands north of or near Lake Chad may be the account of Julius Maternus's trip to Agisymba with the king of the Garamantes in the first century of our era. If "Agisymba" was a province of the Garamantian network or subject kingdom that rebelled, perhaps in the vicinity of Lake Chad, as suggested by Lange, then it could very well be an early example of long-distance trade networks across the Sahara between what would later become parts of Kanem and the Libyan Fezzan. Since little is known about the Garamantes themselves, perhaps some of their population or at least trading partners were the forebears of groups like the Goran.

While the nature of contact between the Garamantes and the peoples to their south remains a topic of debate, it is likely that the Garamantes were known to the nomadic or semi-nomadic populations north of Lake Chad. Indeed, the very name Kanem points to the region as the "south," with a founding dynasty likely from lands further north. Perhaps the Garamantes and groups who were ancestors of the Tubu, Zaghawa, Kanembu, and related peoples collaborated through trade. The question of the origin of the Garamantes themselves may point to ancient intermarriage with Saharan populations akin to Tubus, perhaps resulting in "mixed-race" populations similar to those existing among some of the Tuareg and Saharan or Sahelian populations of today. While the Tubus were nomadic groups, a relationship based on trade or mutual interest could have aligned them with sedentary groups like the Garamantes, who relied on intensive irrigation as the basis for their towns and villages in the Fezzan's oases. Perhaps they provided captives to the Garamantes for agricultural labor, too, raiding their neighbors for slaves to incorporate in their own society and to sell to the north.

It is possible a similar dynamic existed with peoples to the south, who may have come to rely on nomadic Nilo-Saharan speakers to protect their villages and trading caravans, provide cattle or watch livestock and establish, if possible, direct ties with the Fezzan and areas to the north and east. This could explain why Leo Africanus and others claim the kings of Borno, the Sefawa dynasty, were descendants of the Berdoa of Libya, probably a reference to the ancient northern origins of the Kanem-Borno kings among the nomadic groups of the Central Sahara and their trading allies to the north. Indeed, references to Christianized populations in the Tibetsi area in external Arabic accounts may also reflect a close relationship between the Garamantes and Goran, allegedly converted to Christianity in the second half of the 6th century. Palmer's Sudanese Memoirs also include origin stories in which the people of Borno claimed descent from Christian Aksum, which Palmer believed was a reflection of the Christian past of some of the early contributors to the making of the Kanuri peoples. Of course, there is no evidence for any Christian origins of early Kanem, but nomadic groups whose people contributed to the confederation or alliance of clans that ruled during the so-called Duguwa dynasty reflect matrimonial alliances between the ruling Magumi clan and Tubu-Deza peoples (as well as the Zaghawa). They also would have likely encountered Christians in the Fezzan and Nubia, which might explain place names like Qasr Umm Isa. Clearly, the origins of Kanem, in part, owe much to nomadic populations to the north, unlike the mostly sedentary populations of the Soninke who developed Wagadu/Ghana to the west.

Of course, any attempt at elucidating the origins of Kanem-Borno must take into consideration proto-urban and urban sites south and east of Lake Chad. With increasing signs of social complexity and ironworking around Lake Chad from 500 BCE to 500 CE, the peoples of the lands south of the nomadic peoples were also transforming their settlements and social organization. Sites like Zilum, for instance, were walled settlements with thousands of inhabitants, showing evidence of craft specialists and, perhaps, cultural influences from afar. For instance, Koro Toro pottery, said to resemble Meroitic pottery, (maybe only through the use of geometric designs) in Chad very well could reflect a movement of ideas or cultural exchange with Nubia. The horses and donkeys used in the Lake Chad basin region probably also came from Nubia or Egypt. The use of fortifications at sites in the Lake Chad basin also point to conflict, perhaps between early city states (the so-called "Sao") possibly in conflict over resources or trade, or with incoming herders from the north. But relations between nomads and sedentary farmers were not always based on conflict, and early Kanem was a multiethnic state consisting of farmers as well as pastoralists. The ultimate origins of Kanem, probably by the 7th or 8th century, lay in a union of herders, farmers, and nomadic peoples who may have continued trade and social relations that first developed from the time of the Garamantes and likely connected the region to lands to their east and north. 

With the rise of the Duguwa dynasty, said to have begun under King Dugu in the 700s or 800s, the so-called "Zaghawa" rulers of Kanem, identified in external Arabic sources, ruled over a multitude of peoples in what was probably a decentralized state. It may have been similar to that of states ruled by other nomadic peoples in the Saharan region, like the Sanhaja confederation to the west. Unlike Saharan Berbers, however, early Kanem appears to have resisted conversion to Islam until the 11th century, when a few of the Duguwa dynasty leaders, according to the Girgam, converted. The ruling dynasty probably intermarried with women from different clans among the nomadic sub-groups, if Lange is correct, and likely drew revenue from tribute, raids, wealth in livestock and fees on trading caravans. Close ties via marriage between the ruling dynasty and various nomadic groups was probably key to ensuring their loyalty and protecting trade interests. Kanem was a significant trading partner for the provision of slaves to Ibadite Muslim traders based at Zuwila in the Fezzan, and, according to al-Bakri, included Muslims among their subjects at least since the fall of the Ummayad caliphs. A group of refugees of the Umayyads supposedly resided in the lands of Kanem, if al-Bakri's to be trusted. Intriguingly, stories of Umayyad refugees seeking succor in Nubia but failing to find it appear in histories of Nubia. Perhaps some of the Ummayads who sought refuge in Nubia made it to Kanem, possibly traveling west from Nubia or south from Libya? Early Kanem's kings, said to wear silk and woolen garments and possess no towns until the 10th century, may have been quite mobile, moving around their vast domains while ruling over a loosely structured state that protected trade interests and organized raids. They imported textiles, cloth, and other manufactured or luxury goods from the north in exchange for slaves. 

Kanem's early kings, said by external sources to be "divine" to their subjects, and often secluded, were probably expected to redistribute some of their wealth to their dependents, and often counted their wealth in terms of livestock or camels. The state's dependence on slave trading likely necessitated some form of military organization, probably based on cavalry, camelry, and the archers mentioned in the Arabic sources. As the "Zaghawa" eventually were living in between Kanem and Nubia, and supposedly at conflict with Nubia, one would not be surprised if Kanem and its vassal states or peoples were raiding and trading far and wide between the Niger and Nile, perhaps playing a pivotal role in the development of trade routes or towns in the Darfur region by the 12th century, if al-Idrisi is reliable. Unlike the states to the west, such as Ghana and Kawkaw (Gao), al-Bakri's and al-Idrisi's descriptions of Kanem seem to indicate it was less known, perhaps received fewer visitors and traders. Al-idrisi's description of Manan and Njimi, two of Kanem's towns, suggest little commerce and wealth. The "Zaghawa" town to the east, en route to Nubia, however, was surrounded by villages and possessed some commerce, perhaps pointing to trade contacts with Egypt and Nubia and some kind of tributary or trade partnership with Kanem. 

Unfortunately, without substantial advances in archaeological work in the Kanem region, which might one day identify Manan, Tarazaki, Njimi (the capital after Manan, when the Sefuwa dynasty took power) and other sites described in external Arabic sources, much of early Kanem remains shrouded in mystery. Their early towns were said to be constructed with reeds, so early Kanem towns probably did not use brick, clay, and mud-brick. But were their towns walled? Did their small towns have a separate quarter for Muslim traders? Were "casted" groups of blacksmiths already in existence? Did climate change place additional pressure on Kanem to move further south, perhaps contributing to the eventual relocation to Bornu? Was there a feudal-like system in place in which the king appointed officials or subordinates as local rulers over conquered territories in exchange for tribute? And was early Kanem's expansion tied to the appointment of relatives of the king  to high positions in the court and provinces, paving the way for dynastic succession struggles?

One would assume the transition to Islam did not shatter or transform the foundations of the state, as the style of kingship and continued marriages with nomadic groups persisted under the Sefuwa rulers. Indeed, various descriptions of Kanem's kingship from medieval Arabic sources resonate with late 18th century accounts of Borno provided to Descourtilz by "Beurnon" Africans in Saint Domingue. Indeed, one of the reasons Borno kings sometimes took the effort to become learned was the association of education with supernatural powers, again connoting kingship with supernatural authority. It is possible the Kanembu and Kanuri were practicing their own form of a deeply ancient form of sacral kingship, common among Nilo-Saharan groups who were present in Sudan as well as Chad. It is possible that the prominence of queen mothers in the Borno girgam is also a legacy of past traditions of matrilineal descent, something found among the Tuareg as well as Nubia. While it is unlikely that the "divine" or sacral kingship of Kanem really was indebted to Nubia or ancient Egypt, but Lange has argued that the mysterious mune opened by a 13th century Muslim king, Dunama, may have been Amun. Palmer's Sudanese Memoirs also claimed that one of the mythical ancestors of the Kanembu clans was a man named Mune. And the term mani among "pagan" Zaghawa and Beli peoples was a "ram" kept in a cave with other sacred objects. Perhaps the mune opened by Dunama was something akin to a ram, which may have been deeply rooted in Nilo-Saharan pastoral sacral kingship, connecting the mai to ancient cattle cults? Either way, one suspects the king was associated with divine authority in some form. He was said to eat alone, only drink in the presence of high nobles, and speak to subjects through an interpreter while seated behind a screen or in a cage. Intriguingly, the "Duguwa" name survived after the Sefuwa came to power, but arguably became associated with a casted group, blacksmiths. Ethnographic studies complicate any simple association of the Duguwa with casted blacksmiths and hunters in Kanem today, but it does raise some possibilities. Perhaps the origin of the divine or semi-divine kingship of Kanem-Borno may derive from an early association of chiefs and kings with control of metal, forgers, and the "mysteries" and social separation of blacksmiths. Thus, the seclusion of the king may have had distant origins in the control of iron weapons, tools, and metals, indispensable for economic and military development that may have given the Duguwa dominance over other clans. An association of the king with both livestock and metals may have combined as sources of royal legitimacy and mystical meanings.

While the kings of Kanem adopted a fabricated Yemeni origin and became Muslims, many of its subjects were not Islamized until several centuries later. An Islamic superstructure was probably added to the state, and Islam and literacy may have led to the early development of schools and a limited bureaucracy. Kanem's relations with Muslim rulers in Egypt and the Maghreb were aided by the ruling dynasty's conversion, and the various pilgrimages undertaken by Kanem's mais undoubtedly put Kanem on an international scale. For example, the presence of a Kanemi poet at the court of the Almohads already suggests a degree of education and international connections. Dunama Dibalemi, the same Islamic king whose reign was described by Ibn Said al-Andalusi in the 13th century, wanted a reputation as an Islamic reformer and jihadist, ruling over a Muslim state while raiding pagan neighbors on the southern shores of Lake Chad. Among his other subjects were Berbers, supposedly Islamized by Dunama and used in his raids, according to Ibn Said. It was also during his reign that one finds the earliest references to Bornu and subject or vassal provinces along the shores of Lake Chad, as well as royal farms of the mai where sugarcane and other crops were cultivated. Although Ibn Said does not tell us if the laborers were royal slaves, it is likely the case that by the 1200s, Kanem's rulers owned vast estates of land worked by slaves of the crown. Indeed, even pre-Sefuwa rulers, such as king Arki in the 11th century, was said to have sent slave colonies to various sites in the Kawar region (perhaps for extracting salt?). If true, this may have been an early Kanem variant of the slave plantations of the kings of Songhai, or the plantations of 19th century Sokoto.

Ruling over a vast territory, directly or indirectly, required at least some degree of rudimentary bureaucracy. While Scott MacEachern argues for understanding the states of the region as concentric circles, with a primary core, tributary secondary circle, and an outer sphere of lands available for plunder or raids, is probably apt, it is possible that some of the titles and administrative functions of the Borno state were already practiced in Kanem. For instance, military commanders, feudal-like fiefdoms, and aspects of a regional economy based on the exchange of salt, textiles, slaves and ivory were probably already in place by the 1200s, and surely established by the 1400s when the Bulala usurpers (aided by the Tubu) drove the Sefuwa out of Kanem. Kanem's military organization may have been more efficient by the 13th and 14th centuries, including canoes or pirogues for use on Lake Chad as well as, perhaps, 100,000 soldiers. Kanem's kings had already extended dominion over the Fezzan and key trading posts of the Central Sahara by the 1200s, and were engaged in commerce and diplomacy with a variety of powers in North Africa and Egypt. The question of possible commerce and trading ties to Christian Nubia and the Red Sea may likewise indicate another dimension of the state's eastern extent, perhaps even explaining the origin of brick architecture for royal palaces, elite homes, and mosques. It is possibly the case that Kanem was also producing textiles for export to its Sudanic neighbors, as well as using bits of cloth for currency.

Thus, by the 13th century, Kanem was a vast state, probably decentralized and requiring some form of administrative organization that was likely the model for the Borno state of the Sefuwa in the 1400s and 1500s. One can assume some of the social and economic organization of Borno can probably be traced to Kanem, including its forms of social stratification, the differences between the peasantry and nobles, the role of the state in trade and production, and the organization of craft specialists in towns. It is probably the case that the brick architecture of Borno owes its origins to earlier uses of the same construction material in Kanem, perhaps originating in an attempt to architecturally mark the distinction between the homes of elites and commoners. Whereas in the past, when Kanem's king and subjects were said to live in homes of reeds, it is possible that successors to Dunama initiated brick walls and construction to further accent their differentiation. It also suggests they were no longer living a "nomadic" lifestyle of their forebears, preferring established residences that may have contributed to their declining control of nomadic subjects like the Zaghawa in the east or Tubus in the north.

Naturally, there is a danger in the using the ethnographic presence and historical evidence from the Borno period to reconstruct Kanem. But evidence of the breakdown of alliances with nomadic groups to the north can be found in the Tubu alliance with the Bulala in the 14th century. Additional evidence of friction from the Tomagra migration to the Tibetsi from Kanem in the 16th century similar points to conflicts within the original clans of Kanem. The question of Islam and religion may have played a role in this as many of Kanem's population were not Muslims, or only superficially so. The movements of populations from Kanem to Borno, probably part of state policy, also led to the creation of new ethnic groups like the Kanuri, who nonetheless can also be found in oasis towns and villages to the north (again, part of state policy). Clearly, conquests and intermarriage between Chadic-speakers around Lake Chad and Nilo-Saharan groups occurred, and may have contributed to the dynastic conflicts in Kanem after Dunama's reign, when descendants of various lines of the Sefuwa battled over the crown. The state's policy of granting mahrans to learned Muslims and awarding a great deal of autonomy to them during the Borno period may have already contributed to a weakening of state authority in Kanem over some of its provinces, just as ambitious officials and claimants to the throne also vied for authority. Of course, it could also very well be the case that the decline of Kanem in the 1300s owed more to over-expansion and reliance on a feudal-like structure of fiefdoms, which encouraged breakaway provinces or vassals as well as direct challenges to the authority of the king. Moreover, the opening of the mune may have further diminished the legitimacy of the Sefuwa in Kanem, perhaps explaining why former allies like the Tubu supported the Bulala.

Overall, the question of Kanem and its early origins remains a tantalizing subject. There is much speculation and, possibly, over reliance on external Arabic sources and the Girgam. While they help piece together some of the early history of the region and its socio-political organization, additional knowledge attained through archaeology is indispensable for gaining a fuller picture. Undoubtedly, this post itself has repeated or created some of its own speculative claims about Kanem, even suggesting that some of the features of Borno as described by Barkindo almost surely applied to Kanem by the 1100s or 1200s. However, re-reading the corpus of Arabic sources on West Africa, as well as "Oriental" sources on Nubia, point to interesting potential ties and relationships based on trade, commerce, ideas, and military conflict. Like the Gao state's wars with Kanem or possible conflict between Christian Nubia and the Zaghawa near the Chad-Sudan borderlands, there is so much to uncover in the history of the Lake Chad region. These undoubtedly help provide a fuller picture on the nature of the so-called Sudanic state and the impact of trans-Saharan and trans-Sudanic networks in African history.

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Vantini, Giovanni. Oriental Sources Concerning Nubia. Heidelberg: Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1975.

Romans in "Sub-Saharan Africa"

 

Although scholars still debate the nature and scale of trans-Saharan trade and contacts in antiquity, one cannot help but wonder. Surely, the Garamantes were engaged in contacts with groups both within and south of the Sahara, but what about others? Was Agisymba in the Lake Chad region? If so, what does it suggest about the possible origins of long-distance trade before Kanem in the "Central Sudan" region? Was the Meroitic state also a player here, perhaps trading goods of Mediterranean origin to lands further west?

Empire du Ghana Speculations

 

Sometimes Youtube can be useful. Like in this case, where this young lady's basic overview of the ancient kingdom (empire) of Ghana indicates someone who actually did their research. I have spent much of the last 48 hours going over secondary sources on this kingdom, the Soninke people, and English or French translations of Arabic sources on the history of the region. Even with advances in West African archaeology in Mali, Mauritania and nearby regions, I am amazed by how little we still know about Ghana (or, Wagadu), at least for eras prior to the rise of Islam. Can one really trace the origins of the state to agropastoralist stone masonry villages in Dhar Tichitt and related Mauritanian sites? There does seem to be evidence that some Mande groups once lived further north before the progress of the desert. Further, the evidence of Ghana itself, although more archaeological work remains to be done in the Awkar and nearby regions, do suggest a plausible origin sometime from the 4th to 6th centuries. Either way, by the time of the 8th century, Ghana was probably already the main source of gold for Sijilmasa, and the institutions associated with such a trade would not have appeared overnight.

But when going through the Arabic sources, one does arrive at some interesting theories of Ghana's origins. When used carefully with oral sources, they provide a picture of sorts of Soninke origins. The Timbuktu chronicles like Tarikh al-Fattash and its other Timbuktu counterpart suggest Ghana's existence predated Islam by at least a few centuries, and they attribute the origins of the kayamaga dynasty to "white" origin. This may reflect the fact that a 12th century king of Ghana, according to al-Idrissi, claimed descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. Or, it could indicate some degree of ancient intermarriage between Berbers and proto-Soninke peoples in the ancient past. Intriguingly, in the 11th century, al-Bakri mentioned at least two groups of "whites" living under the suzerainty of Ghana who were described as following their religion ("idolatry"). In one case, the "El Honeihim" whites were sent to the "land of the blacks" sometime after the Arab conquests in the Maghreb, but its possible the other group, identified as El Faman, may have been established in the region before. In addition to "whites" described as residing in the "Sudan," the Soninke kingdom of Ghana appears to have dominated the predominantly Berber and Arab trading entrepot of Awdaghust for some time in the 10th and 11th centuries, revealing the interest of Ghana in controlling the Saharan and Sahelian networks in trade to Sijilmasa and other parts of the Maghreb. If al-Bakri is to be trusted, the Berber and Arab residents of Awdaghust did not get along, so the representative of Ghana may have served as an intermediary between Berber, Arab and "Sudanese" residents in that bustling commercial town.

Clearly, there were "whites" (presumably Berbers) who were assimilated into local West African cultures, albeit one is described as endogamous in their marriage customs.  This shows that any "whites" who were involved with the origins of Ghana were likely people who adopted aspects of local culture rather than initiating centralized kingdoms of states. They may have been descendants of the cultural syncretism that some archaeologists argue appeared in Mauritania after 500 BC, when the Libyco-Berber presence is attested in the Dhar Tichitt, Walata, and associated areas. The old-fashioned Hamitic Hypothesis has been disproved countless times, but there likely was some degree of cultural exchange and influences between sedentary agriculturalists and pastoralists in Mauritania and Mali before Ghana's emergence.

Moreover, al-Bakri's account of Ghana's monarch and religion does not indicate any sort of "white" origin. Certainly, there is even far less evidence for Delafosse's "Jewish" theory of the origins of Ghana. If Jews from Cyrenaica had settled in the Awkar or other heartlands of the Ghana empire ca. 150-200 AD, establishing the kingdom by the year 300, one would imagine they would have left behind evidence in terms of synagogues, inscriptions, religion, or ritual objects in the Sahel or southern Sahara. Jewish populations were definitely present in the region several centuries later, after the increase in the scale of trans-Saharan trade. Another fanciful theory might attempt to link the origins of Ghana to Egypt or Nubia, but one would think evidence of such contacts should appear in the archaeological record. However, al-Bakri's description of royal funerary customs and the discovery of elite burials in the forms of tumuli in Mali and Senegal do suggest kings were buried with their possessions and some of their human servants, a custom that appeared on the Nile Valley thousands of years previously. This in itself proves nothing, however, and one finds no indication of Egyptian or Nubian deities in the territories associated with Ghana. 

Last, but certainly not least, one has the problematic origin theories of Frobenius, who saw a connection to the lost civilization of Atlantis in ancient "Black Africa." Through stories like "Gassire's Lute" and Frobenius's influential writings, he appears to have invented the idea of an epic cycle of stories of the Soninke, and wishes to connect them to his wider theories. While the Legend of Wagadu does indeed exist among Soninke populations dispersed across a large swathe of West Africa, and some of the oral traditions clearly reflect Islamization in their desire to trace the origin of Dinga to the Middle East, there is no evidence for an epic tradition akin to Frobenius's description. Undoubtedly, there is no evidence for ancient Atlantis or much of any contact between the Soninke and the Mediterranean world before the 8th century. 

As for the Arab ancestry of the 12th century Muslim king of Ghana identified by al-Idrissi, that is clearly a significant change from the "pagan" kings described in the 1000s. According to al-Bakri, kings like Basi and Tunkamenin were friendly with Muslims and included them in the royal administration. But besides the mention of one of Basi's son possibly being a Muslim, there is no evidence of significant penetration of Islam among the royalty of Ghana in the 11th century. Silla, a town identified by al-Bakri as resisting Ghana and having a Muslim king, may point to another example of a Soninke ruler converting to Islam. A century later, however, the kings of Ghana were affiliated with Islam and, per al-Idrissi, claimed descent from the Prophet's family. However, claims of sharifian descent are not unheard of among converted peoples. It only reveals the extent to which the king of Ghana and his Muslim contemporaries saw him as part of Islam.

However, the interplay of oral and written traditions of the Soninke and local chronicles do support some of the Arabic sources from al-Bakri onwards. For instance, one of the named kings of the 11th century, Tunkamenin, suggests a Soninke origin for the ruling dynasty. The title tunka among the Soninke signifies royalty, perhaps indicating al-Bakri combined the Soninke title with the name of the king. Soninke oral traditions also speak of a serpent associated with the fortune of the kingdom. Al-Bakri describes such a custom among an affiliated group in the Ghana kingdom (perhaps a Soninke sub-group). Furthermore, many of the towns along the Senegal, Faleme, and Niger rivers identified in the medieval Arabic sources appear in Soninke oral traditions of their dispersal from Wagadu. The patronymic clan names, serpent Bida, and other oral sources attest to the veracity of some of the North African, Iberian, and Middle Eastern geographies and reports. 

Moreover, the Timbuktu chronicles suggest the fall of the kayamaga (one of the titles of the rulers of Ghana after conflict with a group affiliated with a lower caste, servile origin, or ignoble roots. This may indicate the fall of the kayamaga after conflict with one of the "slaves of the state" lineages or caste groups. Perhaps the fall of the so-called Cisse dynasty represents the end of a non-Muslim line of kings, assuming the oral traditions are reliable on this point. But the line of kayamaga identified in the Tarikh al-Fattash suggest an end of their dynasty around the 7th or 8th century, identifying their last prince as Kanissa'ai. If true, were the kayamaga identified in the chronicle an early dynasty that was replaced by the Cisse? If the kayamaga line ended by the 7th or 8th century, they were certainly non-Muslim and perhaps the usurpers may have been of a servile lineage or caste group who decimated the old aristocracy.  

Although very limited and relying on oral sources to describe events centuries before their 17th century context, the Timbuktu chronicles do give us the capital of Ghana (Kumbi) and point to some type of conflict that may have reflected the impact of new ideas or intensified social relations (slavery, Islam, Mande caste systems, an expansion of Soninke trading diasporas?). Tamari's essay on the origins of the Mande caste system argues that it emerged among the Malinke peoples prior to the Soninke, appearing among the former by the 13th century. I would argue that it's probably older, and if the example of Ghana was a model of sorts to successor empires, there probably was some form of occupational castes among the Soninke during the period of Ghana. The caste system and Soninke social structure of the ethnographic present might demonstrate that Ghana's social structure consisted of free-born nobles, warriors, chiefs, traders, farmers, caste groups, and slaves. Perhaps the predecessor to the marabouts in pre-Islamic times were the priests of the "traditional" religion, associated with the "idols," ancestor veneration, secret societies, divination and rites. If the kayamaga line ended in the first century of Islam,  there may have already been dynastic change before the appearance of Ghana on the world scene, caused in part by servile populations such as the Kusa (slaves of the state) or conflict over control of the expanding trans-Saharan trade.

What this tells us about Ghana before the 8th or 9th century, I am not sure. Yet, the pre-Islamic foundations of the state appear quite clear, even predating evidence for trans-Saharan trade. It is only in the 12th century when evidence for Muslim kings among the royal dynasty appear, although some of the royalty and chiefs may have converted in the 11th century. Of course, the cousin of Tunkamenin identified as a ruler of Alouken, said to be a Muslim, had to hide his religion from his subjects. If true, this suggests that the Soninke rulers had to, at least publicly, support the "traditional" religion. But in order to control the distribution of gold from the south, impose a system of taxation, and demand tribute from subject towns or polities under its hegemony, there must have been political, economic, and social organization of some magnitude. By the 11th century, literate Muslims were involved in the administration, but one can surmise there already was something akin to Mande occupational castes for ironworkers, leatherworkers, and other occupations on the village level. Presumably, masons, weavers, craftsmen and other groups existed in the towns to produce the stone buildings in the royal city, but they might not have been organized into caste groups, if Djenne and Timbuktu exemplify a regional trend.

There probably were slaves of the king who may have served as local administrators or agricultural workers, while the majority of the population would have been "free" farmers or cultivators. Soninke traders must have also been on the move in southeastern Mauritania, the lands along the Senegal River, and the Inland Niger Delta relatively early on to ensure the distribution of gold from alluvial deposits in the south. Since Ghana did not directly control gold production, it is difficult to say who the people panning for gold were. Seasonal workers? As for the military of Ghana, al-Bakri's mention of 200,000 soldiers is impossible to verify. It also conflicts with his statement the land of Ghana was poorly peopled, unless the bulk of the soldiers came from lands further south among tributary towns. However, it does indicate the likely power and military might of the state, even if it was probably not a standing army. Either way, this military apparatus would have depended on an adequate supply of food, horses, arrows, spears, and other weapons, suggesting some degree of centralization to ensure distribution and security along trade routes.

Since the royal town, perhaps Kumbi, was affiliated with the "traditional" religion of "idolatry," ancestor veneration, sacrificial offerings, massive groves, and the massive mound burials of the royalty, religion must have played a role in legitimating the king's authority. According to ak-Bakri, the ruling king before Tunkamenin was blind, but had to hide it from his subjects. This could reflect a belief in the king's body as sacred or infallible. The Islamic influence prior to the 12th century must have been mostly concentrated in the towns and cities, but it is possible that Islamic-derived divination practices may have already exerted some influence on local practices among the Soninke. Some of the trading diasporas of the Soninke (Wangara?) may have been early converts to Islam, too. Whether or not the religion had any appeal to commoners or rural areas is unknown, but may have coexisted rather peacefully with local religions. If the conversion of some of the ruling elite to Islam weakened the dynasty's authority, it may have paved the way for factional conflict by the time of the Almoravid dynasty, and eventual fall ca. 1203 to the Sosso. It certainly would have required an adaptation or modification of earlier notions of royal authority, but the later Mali kings of the 13th century and 14th century appear to have combined local sources of royal authority with their Muslim religion. Indeed, if the Arabic sources can be trusted, an early Muslim king of Mali went so far as to destroy the idols of his "pagan" subjects, but retained his royal position.

So, what do we really know about early Ghana? It is likely that there was some connection to the Tichitt Tradition in prehistoric Mauritania, but Iron Age sites further south in Mali could prove to be the real origin of the state. There is no evidence whatsoever for a "Hamitic Hypothesis." Nor can one attribute the rise of Ghana to the stimulus of the trans-Saharan trade, although it definitely shaped later developments. The chronology of the ruling dynasty (or dynasties) is also uncertain, but the Soninke are unquestionably tied to it. What "Soninke" meant over 1000 years ago is of course not the same as our modern conception of it, naturally. Identities and languages were presumably fluid, and general similarities in conceptions of the world or social organization among Mande peoples probably indicate a degree of cultural similarity between differing ethnic groups. Ghana's significance as an empire comprised of different states and peoples is a testament to the cultural mosaic of the Sahel, and developments in Ghana also paved the way for transformations that altered the rest of West Africa.

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