Mbang Burkomanda I: Bagirmi's 17th Century Rise in Sudanic Context

 

Lancer of the Sultan of Begharmi.

          Investigating the history of Bagirmi before the 19^th century is an arduous task. Due to the lack of detailed sources on the history of this part of the Chad Basin before the 1800s, Bagirmi receives less attention than its more famous neighboring polities, Kanem and Borno. Moreover, the 19^th and 20^th centuries provide far richer source materials, consisting of travel reports, al-Tunisi’s account of Sabun’s invasion of Bagirmi, and a plethora of colonial-era publications and reports. This material, naturally, makes it far easier to research Bagirmi in the 1800s whilst its earlier period remains somewhat shadowy. In an attempt to explore early Bagirmi history, this brief article will analyze the reign of mbang Burkomanda I of Bagirmi, whose reign has been tentatively dated c. 1635-1665 by Gustav Nachtigal. In spite of the paucity of written sources from this time, one can triangulate various traditions from Bagirmi, Wadai and its neighbors to create a fuller narrative of Burkomanda’s reign. Moreover, Burkomanda I’s reign was part of a much larger trend of dynamic political leadership across much of the Chad Basin and the Central Sudan in the 1600s. Indeed, Burkomanda’s reign overlapped with a period of political change and unrest to the east of Lake Chad, one which Bagirmi endeavored to profit from through far-flung raids and political interventions. Symbolically and materially, this was represented by the erection of brick walls around the palace in Massenya, cementing the ascent of the mbang in the wider region.

A Commentary on the Sources

          Whilst a few important works have been written by Anglophone and Francophone scholars on Bagirmi’s royal genealogy, much remains to be done. Even so, studies of the kingdom’s cosmological symbolism, political structure or its model of predatory accumulation have been produced. Still, little has been done to advance the study of pre-1800 Bagirmi. John Lavers, in a brief essay published in Annals of Borno tentatively sketched this lengthy period of Bagirmi history (c. 1500-1800), but largely repeated Nachtigal. Besides Lavers, of course, many colonial-era writers wrote studies on Bagirmi kingship, history, the Barma language, or the specific Melfi district. But few have been able to advance beyond this due to the contradictions in the oral traditions, which all the sources ultimately rely upon. In other words, unless new textual sources come to light, historians will not progress from Nachtigal’s schematic view of Bagirmi history.[1] Indeed, some scholars, such as Viviana Pâques, have even gone as far as to challenge simple assumptions of linear historical narratives in the oral materials. In a move that recalls the ways in which Zuidema interpreted the Spanish cronistas on the history of the Incas, Pâques seems to believe that much of what is reported in the traditions reported to Nachtigal, Barth, and others is ultimately tied to a mythological and cosmological order of thinking.

            However, close examination of the various 19^th century and colonial-era reports and texts can be triangulated for a deeper understanding of Burkomanda I’s reign. For instance, the various lists of Bagirmi kings produced by Nachtigal, Escayrac de Lauture, Barth, Lanier, and Palmer can be subjected to greater scrutiny. This can unveil commonalities and patterns.[2] Using Henri Carbou’s writings on the Bulala and Wadai, as well as al-Tunisi, highlight some of Wadai’s traditions as relevant for reconstructing Bagirmi history. Abadie, Palmer, Tubiana, Barkindo, and Hagenbucher on the history of Bagirmi’s neighbors and rival polities can shed further light. For example, a number of Bagirmi-oriented sources allude to ephemeral reigns of Wadai kings usually omitted from the Wadai kings lists. By using the general dates for Wadai, the Bulala sultans in Fitri, Mandara, as well as Kanem and Borno, one can better contextualize the events associated with Burkomanda’s reign. In addition, utilizing these sources permits a likely more accurate reading of Bagirmi’s attempts to assert itself in a politically dynamic Chad Basin and Central Sudan during the 1600s.

Mbang Burkomanda I’s Rise to Power

          Although little is known of Burkomanda’s early life, he is intriguingly remembered by the name of his mother, Aisa Bele. Furthermore, he was reportedly the son of Omar, who reigned from c. 1608-1625 in Nachtigal’s chronology. Surprisingly, Burkomanda was tchiroma during the reign of his uncle, Dalai (r. 1625-1635).[3] One can surmise from this that Burkomanda’s mother may have hailed from a powerful faction or family in Bagirmi, if Burkomanda’s maternal kin helped him succeed his uncle.

          Burkomanda also benefited from the political reforms and accomplishments of Abdallah (r. 1568-1608). This powerful mbang promoted Islamic reforms in Bagirmi’s state structure and created several powerful posts held by individuals of slave origin. Indeed, Nachtigal seemingly believed that the powerful military officer, the fatsha, was held by a slave since the time of Abdallah. This may have been done to weaken the influence of brothers, uncles and other relations in Bagirmi’s royal disputes and military leadership. Abdallah was also believed by Nachtigal to have completely reversed the tributary relationship with the Bulala sultans, too. By 1608, this seminal Bagirmi ruler was allegedly responsible for imposing a small tribute on Middogo and receiving annual presents from the Bulala, Logon, and Kousseri.[4]

          In short, Bagirmi had already demonstrated signs of greater political centralization and expansion during the reign of Abdallah. Indeed, this may have triggered a campaign from Borno’s Idris b. Ali (r. 1564-1596) which led to his death.[5] Undoubtedly, Burkomanda benefitted from the reforms of his grandfather and may have sought to surpass his predecessor, Dalai, who was less successful in his military raid against the Musgo (Musgun).[6] Burkomanda later succeeded in expanding the scale of military actions, intervened in Fitri, and even struck Borno territory in Kawar.

Raiding Far and Wide for Three Years

          Believed to have begun a long series of campaigns soon after his reign began, Burkomanda led his troops far and wide. Targeting Burlum, Bayo, and Bolongo districts, Burkomanda threatened the Kenga. Crossing to Middogo and Fitri, Burkomanda went even further afield. His troops crossed Batha and the Bahr el-Ghazal to Kanem, then moved to the Karka region. Then, Bagirmi raiders struck Borku and Kawar, before passing to the south and plundering the Shuwa in the Kotoko principalities. This was followed by another attack, this time against Mandara. Fellata to the south of Mandara were also targeted before Burkomanda camped his troops in Musgo territory. Due to the wishes of his soldiers to return, Burkomanda eventually agreed.[7] Given that tradition remembers this taking place over the course of three years, one must ask why the ruler of Bagirmi was eager to launch several punitive raids and actions against Bagirmi’s neighbors. Given the volatile conditions in Kanem around this time and the formation of Wadai, perhaps in c. 1635 (to use Nachtigal’s chronology), one can best interpret Burkomanda’s actions as an attempt to profit from and exert Bagirmi’s status as a regional power.

Beginning with Kanem, a political vacuum made raids and possible expansion attractive. The Bulala sultans were defeated by the Tunjur and were no longer relevant here. Borno, whose ruler, Umar b. Idris, likely appointed Dala Afuno to oversee Kanem around this time, relied on the alifas to ensure the tribute from Kanem. However, Dala Afuno was remembered in Kanem for having to wage war on various groups to receive any tribute. Indeed, Dala Afuno had to fight the Tubu, Daganas, El-Lassalas, Shuwas and Koukas to the west of Lake Fitri to pay tribute.[8]

Besides trouble receiving tribute, conflict with the recently arrived Tunjur, migrating after Wadai’s foundation in c. 1635, soon arose. Tunjur tradition, according to Gros, remembers conflict between the Tunjur and Bulala occurring at Mao during the time of Dawud’s grandson, Smain. While the Tunjur eventually seized Mao, Tunjur tradition specifically named their leader, Ramadan, as dying in conflict with the Dala Afuno.[9] In other words, Kanem during the 1630s was politically volatile and unstable as the first alifa sent by the Sayfawa was engaged in conflict with various groups refusing to pay tribute. Sensing this insecurity and instability, Burkomanda may have viewed Kanem as relatively easy to raid. This would explain why he was able to reach beyond to Borku and Kawar.

As for the raids on Borku and Kawar, one sees another aspect of Bagirmi’s long-term regional aspirations. Due to its geographic position, the kingdom lacked direct access to towns in the southern Sahara used for profitable trans-Saharan trade. Bagirmi needed access to these to become less dependent on Borno for North African, European, and other goods. Thus, it is likely Burkomanda envisioned long-term acquisitions to the far north.[10] Lavers was correct to note this possible motive for Burkomanda’s actions, perhaps aiming to maintain Kanem’s openness for commerce or to assert Bagirmi control over routes to the north.[11] The ultimate failure of this strategy may be explained by the distance involved and the eventual restoration of Sayfawa authority in Kanem through the consolidation of the alifas. Nonetheless, memories of this Bagirmi raid in Bilma were vivid enough when Maurice Abadie reported it. In Kawar tradition, however, the Bagirmi attack which resulted in a massacre of the town’s population was the result of a Bulala attack.[12] This may have been a result of Burkomanda’s close relationship with the Bulala sultans in Fitri, particularly as his sister, Zara, was married to the Bulala ruler.

Afterwards, Burkomanda’s forces moved south and west. Attacks against the Shuwa certainly included many cattle and horses among the booty. The assault directed against Mandara, which may have been ruled by Abale at the time, was probably inspired by Mandara expansion into the Musgo (Musgun) territories. Burkomanda’s goal was undoubtedly intended to minimize the expansion of rival polities into Bagirmi’s own raiding zones and tributary regions. Mandara, at the time not yet Islamic, was possibly also attacked by Borno during the reign of Ali b. Umar (c. 1639-1677). This suggests that Mandara’s rulers were expansionist at this time or threatening its peer polities. In fact, according to Barkindo, Bagirmi’s attack “appears to have had the purpose of checking Wandala expansion into what was assumed by Bagirmi, to be her own area of influence.”[13]

Lastly, Burkomanda’s whirlwind campaigns included the Fitri region for an important reason. Heading toward that direction was important for the alliance between the Bulala sultans and Bagirmi at this time. Sealed through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to the Bulala sultan, this seemingly developed after the Bulala already established the dynasty in the Fitri region, after defeating the Kuka. Bulala oral traditions attribute this to a half-Tubu Bulala prince, Djil Esa Tubo, or Djili Esa Toubo. According to traditions not cited by Carbou, this Djil Esa Tubo actually lived in Bagirmi with his mother for some time. If so, it is no wonder that Djil Esa Toubou was likely the Bulala ruler who married Burkomanda’s sister. He was already raised there and probably connected to Bagirmi elites.[14] Carbou, presumably drawing on oral traditions as well as the earlier work of Nachtigal, provides strong evidence for a Bulala-Bagirmi alliance around the time of Burkomanda, confirmed through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to Djil Esa Tubo. This, in turn, explains why Burkomanda may have included the Fitri area in his lengthy military excursions during his reign.

By contextualizing this seemingly random series of attacks within the wider political changes affecting Kanem as well as the foundation of Wadai to the east, one can perceive how Bagirmi’s actions were likely done in response to a politically volatile moment. Burkomanda sought to strengthen his position within the Central Sudan through raids, political expansion, and achieving long-term economic goals through access to Kawar and Borku. Attacking Mandara due to the latter’s expansion into Musgun lands was designed to ensure Bagirmi’s own sphere of influence there and source of captives. Bagirmi interests in Fitri were tied to their relationship with the Bulala and, perhaps, a desire to keep an eye on developments further east in Wadai.

The Later Years of Burkomanda I

Unfortunately, the remainder of Burkomanda I’s reign becomes much harder to contextualize. Besides campaigns against the Sarua and Ndamm about 3 years later, little else is known, except for a war with Wadai. Nonetheless, one can detect Burkomanda’s continued interests in expansion and promoting his own position across the region with brick walls for the palace. A later war with Waday suggests Bagirmi was, at this time, still a stronger power.

 Nachtigal, one of the better sources, wrote of subsequent campaigns led by the mbarma and fatsha. Directed against the Sarua and Ndamm, they were not especially successful.[15] Burkomanda’s later execution of his fatsha and mbarma due to a small offense is not explained by Nachtigal but may be connected to this. Perhaps their failure to achieve success like Burkomanda’s earlier campaigns aroused his anger. Or the two were involved in a plot. Given the vast military authority these figures held, it is difficult to imagine Burkomanda ordering their execution on a simple offense. Lack of success in military ventures or a political conflict may have been part of it.

Developments in architecture or the material expression of royal authority also occurred at this time. Burkomanda appears to have been the first to construct a brick wall for the palace in Massenya. According to Nachtigal, at least.[16] The use of brick for royal or elite structures has a longer history in Kanem and Borno, areas which influenced the development of the Bagirmi state. To see them used here in Burkomanda’s reign must be interpreted as an expression of the state’s political ascent in the Central Sudan. After all, besides Bagirmi, the use of fired-brick had been practiced by the Bulala and Sayfawa, rival dynasties which had once dominated Burkomanda’s polity. By employing them in his own palace, Burkomanda demonstrated Bagirmi’s ascending status as a Sudanic power.[17]

Finally, Bagirmi’s war with Waday during Burkomanda’s reign raises more tantalizing questions. Sparked by Waday’s attacks on the Bulala state in Fitri, which led to the capture of Burkomanda’s sister, they clearly indicate the importance of the Fitri area for Wadai and Bagirmi. Nachtigal wrote that Burkomanda freed his sister after a battle at Rabbana on the west bank of the Fitri.[18] Carbou, on the other hand, saw a possible Kuka role in fostering a Waday attack in Fitri, perhaps to force the Bulala sultans out of the region.[19]

With Lanier, likely drawing from Escayrac de Lauture, one learns more about Wadai’s leader during this war. Apparently, Wadai’s troops were led by a king named Mohamed ez Zaouni, who supposedly attacked twice. In the second attack, at Middogo, Wadai forces captured Burkomanda’s sister. But Burkumanda was able to “refouler les Ouadaiens.”[20] In Escayrac de Lauture’s version of events, Burkomanda’s victory against Wadai took place at a place called Sadao. His version emphasized that after the capture of Wadai’s Mohammed-Zaouni, “qui avait occupé le trône pendant six mois,” Wadai replaced him with a king named Issa. But, tellingly, any war with Bagirmi was finished by an unspecified epidemic.[21] In other words, Bagirmi not only captured the Wadai king, but the conflict continued until an outbreak of disease or pestilence forced an end.[22]

Unfortunately, none of the Wadai king lists mention this Mohammed-Zaouni or Issa, but Lauture’s list of Wadai rulers places them after Abd el-Kerim and a king named Edris (Idris).[23] As it appears quite likely that the standard lists of Wadai kings tend to omit names of rulers who only lasted briefly on the throne, Mohammed-Zaouni and Issa may have been very brief rulers sometime in the 1650s or 1660s. Indeed, Lauture’s list places Issa right before Saleh-Dered, clearly omitting many Wadai kings of the 1700s. Another writer, Carbou, likewise noted at least one king often not included in the Wadai kingslist: El Djezam, who succeeded Kharif.[24] If, as Lauture indicates, Mohamed-Zaouni and Edris ruled for less than a year while Issa reigned for under 2 years, it is possible they briefly occupied the throne after c. 1655, when Abd el-Kerim likely died (according to Nachtigal’s chronology).[25]

Undoubtedly, much of Burkomanda’s relatively long reign of 30 years has not survived in traditions. Nevertheless, the later annals of his reign included the use of brick walls, the victory against Wadai, and Burkomanda’s actions regarding the Surua and Ndamm. Of course, the executions of his fatsha and mbarma raise a number of tantalizing questions, too. The victory against Wadai raises important manners related to the known chronology and list of kings of this state in the 17^th century. Despite the unexplained factors in the rest of his reign, the use of brick attests to a regional aspiration to status and power in the Central Sudan. Likewise, the ruler’s continued interest in Bagirmi’s expansion and influence in neighboring peoples demonstrates an ongoing interest in “predatory accumulation.”

Conclusions on Bagirmi in the Pivotal 17^th Century

Despite the limited written sources for this period in Bagirmi history, deep investigations into the earlier centuries of Bagirmi’s political history are feasible. Endeavors to make sense of the contradictions must keep in mind the importance of looking to traditions from neighboring societies and rival polities, too. Whilst some contradictions and gaps will remain unresolved, one can approach a holistic view of pivotal Bagirmi mbang reigns prior to the 19^th century.

This tentative analysis of Burkomanda I’s reign was an attempt to do so. By contextualizing what is reported about Bagirmi’s neighbors and rival states in the middle decades of the 17^th century, one can make sense of (or at least approach a reasonable interpretation) how Bagirmi, for some time during the dynamic 17^th century, asserted itself as a major state in the Central Sudan. This was accomplished or attempted through military raids and wars, the adoption of brick buildings, interventions in Fitri and Kanem, and Bagirmi success against Wadai. Future scholarship on this period of Bagirmi history must examine more closely the question of religion, particularly in the aftermath of Umar b. Idris of Borno’s termination of the first Kalumbardo. Subsequent research must thoroughly revisit the list of kings for Waday, the Bulala in Fitri, the alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur to better understand how the Bulala sultans losing Kanem led to Bagirmi’s attempt to fill a political void.

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[1] Of course, Nachtigal’s retelling of Bagirmi history was based on what may have been relatively informal conditions in the 1870s. His claim to have spoken with multiple descendants of elite lineages in Bagirmi who could recount specific details of various campaigns their forebears participated in throughout Bagirmi history is undoubtedly useful. However, like Sarmiento de Gamboa, whose interviews with various panaqa Inca descent groups was methodogically sound, descendants of different branches of the royal family and elite groups can disagree on many relevant historical questions. One wonders if, despite Nachtigal’s travels to Bagirmi predating European colonialism, his elite informants told him contradictory narratives about their past or the larger history of the Bagirmi royal dynasty. If so, Nachtigal’s retelling of it is far too “neat” and free of contradictions.

[2] See Alain Vivien, “Essai de concordance de cinq tables généalogiques du Baguirmi (Tchad)” in Journal de la Société des Africanistes, 1967, tome 37, fascicule 1. pp. 25-40.

[3] See Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 405. In other kings lists of Bagirmi, Burkomanda I is not listed, or he is conflated with Burkomanda Tad Lele, who reigned in the 1700s. See H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Bagirmi” in Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française 35, 1925 for an example of Burkomanda possibly listed as Osman, succeeding Omar (Oumar) and reigning 1612-1631. Escayrac de Lauture also evinced signs of confusion in his list of Bagirmi kings. For instance, his list of Bagirmi kings places Bourkoumanda, or Osman, after Abdala (Abdallah), and only assigns him a reign of 9 years. Yet his informant, presumably the Shaykh Ibrahim he met in Cairo who was believed to be a relative of the Bagirmi royal line, reported to him that Burkomanda defeated Wadai and captured their king. See Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, géographie naturelle et politique, histoire et ethnographie, moeurs et institutions de l'Empire des Fellatas, du Bornou, du Baguermi, du Waday, du Dar-Four, rédigé, d'après des renseignements entièrement nouveaux et accompagné d'une esquisse du Soudan oriental, 74-75.

[4] Ibid., 328, 403-404. For a different perspective on Bagirmi-Bulala relations, see Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Premier Tome, 298. In Carbou’s mind, it was the Kuka who once imposed tribute on the Fulani in what became Bagirmi during the 1400s. However, given the likely Fitri origins of the Bulala sultans ruling Kanem, they too may have exercised a loose suzerainty or influence on the Kuka state in the 1400s and early 1500s.

[5] John Lavers, “An Introduction to the History of Bagirmi,” Annals of Borno 1, 31.

[6] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 404.

[7] Ibid., 405.

[8] See Landeroin, “Notice historique,” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 380.

[9] See Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries,”  https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html. Tunjur traditions in Kanem suggest conflict with the Dala Afuno and Ramadan occurred in c. 1735, which is likely a century too late. A c. 1635 date is more plausible given the genealogy of the Kanem alifas based in Mao.

[10] See Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries (1890), 86.

[11] John Lavers, “An Introduction to the History of Bagirmi,” 34.

[12] Maurice Abadie, Afrique centrale: la colonie du Niger, 133. This could also be possible evidence of Bagirmi’s forces incorporating additional soldiers from their Bulala allies.

[13] See Bawuro M. Barkindo, The Mandara Sultanate to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 107, 111-112.

[14] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 307-308, 311. While Hagenbucher’s “Notes sur les Bilala” is essential reading, he dates Djil Esa Tubo to c. 1536 based on a problematic Bulala royal genealogy. Hagenbucher’s dates are too problematic and difficult to reconcile with the wider regional history of Fitri, Kanem, and Bagirmi during the 1530s. Instead, Djil Esa Tubo was more likely to arrive in the Fitri area during the 1630s, which matches the general c. 1630 dating for the arrival of the Tunjur in Kanem. After their defeat at the hands of the incoming Tunjur, the Bulala may have spent some time in Massoa, to the east of the Bahr el-Ghazal, before moving to Fitri. Whether or not the Bulala were asked to intervene there against the Kuka is unclear, but it could very well have involved Bagirmi military assistance. As for the question of Bagirmi interests in Kanem possibly being related to their ties to the Bulala sultans, the question remains ambiguous. Bagirmi sources certainly suggest the Bulala were reduced to vassals or tributaries, so it would seem Bagirmi’s actions in Kanem and Kawar were not motivated by a desire to restore the Bulala sultanate in Kanem. For a reference to Bagirmi’s overt conquest of the Bulala, see H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” 460. According to Lanier, who confused Burkomanda I with Burkomanda Tad Lele, “Il fit la guerre au sultans des Boulalas, conquit son pays, le soumit et donna à son nouveau vassal une de ses soeurs en mariage.” Either way, Burkomanda exerted some degree of influence over the Bulala in Fitri.

[15] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 405.

[16] Ibid., 406. For a speculative attempt at contextualizing the usage of bricks in Massenya, see Behique Dunama, “Speculating on Massenya and Bricks in Bagirmi,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/12/speculating-on-massenya-and-bricks-in.html.

[17] Religion may have provided an additional avenue for Bagirmi to assert its position within the Sudan. Umar b. Idris (c. 1619-1639) of Borno’s destruction of the first Kalumbardo forced Shaykh Waldede to flee for his life, returning to Bagirmi where the town of Bidderi had a long history of ties to Islamic scholarship (and the rulers of Bagirmi). See Behique Dunama, “Umar b. Idris (r.1619-1639) and the First Kalumbardo,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/umar-b-idris-r1619-1639-and-first.html. Though Nachtigal and other sources do not mention this in the context of Burkomanda’s reign, it would be interesting to explore how Umar b. Idris’s assault against the first Kalumbardo may have had political repercussions in Bagirmi. After all, if Waldede came from Bagirmi and had long-established ties to Bagirmi, including one associated with designing the palace, would Bagirmi’s rulers continue to look positively upon the Sayfawa? In terms of their own state’s Islamic legitimacy, they may have began to harbor more animosity against Borno’s ruler. Even more intriguing in this context is Wadai tradition linking the founder of the state, Abd el-Kerim, with Kalumbardo’s other leader as well as Bidderi in Bagirmi.

[18] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol 3., 405.

[19] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 312.

[20] Henri Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” 460.

[21] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 74-75.

[22] The only reference to anything close to a plague early in Wadai history is a cattle pestilence and drought during the reign of Ya’qub Arus (1681-1707, in Nachtigal’s chronology). See Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol. 4, 208.

[23] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 77.

[24] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 111.

[25] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 77.

Thoughts on Lebeuf's Les principautés Kotoko: essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité

Les principautés Kotoko: essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité by Annie M.D. Lebeuf is rather difficult to "use" for those interested in the relations of the Kotoko states and Kanem-Borno. Despite Lebeuf's (and that of Griaule and her husband) work on both ethnographica and archaeological studies of the Lake Chad Basin, oral traditions are sadly vague on any kind of chronological precision. Consequently, Lebeuf engages in a deep discussion of myths heard in various Kotoko states, seeking to identify the symbolic meanings of these mythic origin tales. Doing so allows some insights into the nature of Kotoko cosmology and socio-political organization in the various principalities or states, like Logone-Birni or Makari. 

Unfortunately, this approach means that one is entering a terrain in which more exact notions of the historical development of the Kotoko states are elusive. The "Sao" period remembered as preceding the states as we know them is recalled through myth. Likewise, the long lists of names of Sao and post-Sao rulers of different Kotoko towns are just that, a list of names. Most, at least as understood by Lebeuf, have little or nothing specifically remembered about them beyond their names. As a result, Kotoko royal genealogies and oral traditions sadly cannot fill in much of the gap in the history of relations between the states of the Sayfawa (Kanem, and then Borno) and the so-called "Sao" or Kotoko principalities. 

Nonetheless, one can gleam some useful nuggets of information from Kotoko traditions. The royal families of Makari and Afade, for instance, were said to be of Kanuri Muslim extraction. Indeed, the first Muslim ruler of Afade, Assana or Meskeri Tchigo, was said to be the brother of Ousseini of Makari. To what extent they actually were of Kanuri origin is unclear, but Lebeuf's ethnographic observations often found foreign maternal ancestry among the Kotoko princes of recent times. More intriguing is the claim to Bulala origin of the first Muslim king of Goulfeil. Even if not entirely accurate, it attests to an instance of Bulala interest and possible expansion into this region south of Lake Chad, presumably during the 1300s-1500s.  Likewise, the Babalia ties of Gawi and through them to Yao in the Lake Fitri region is another interesting tradition, although difficult to place chronologically.  One can certainly detect the use of Kanuri titles and influences in some of the Kotoko states, perhaps beginning or expanding after the rise of Muslim dynasties. For instance, the possible Kanuri influence in Makari and Afade was certainly established by the 1500s, although Borno traditions point to contacts by the 1300s (see H.R. Palmer's work for the relevant traditions). This influence even affected Kotoko myth to some extent, with the bull, turtle, and primordial waters story appearing here. But Kotoko traditions remain very ambiguous when it comes to the specific details of relations with their northern neighbors from Kanem and Borno. 

In other respects, there are broadly shared regional commonalities among the Kotoko states, Bagirmi, Wadai, Kanem and Borno. For example, the central role of the nguva, or dendal, is shared between the Kotoko towns and cities of Borno. The centrality of the palace is also important, although in this region the Kotoko masons did not apply brick. Instead, their palace complexes and monumental gudu or guti were made of earth. Nonetheless, the emphasis on monumental architecture that, to Lebeuf at least, symbolized the meeting of the sky and the earth, could match the role of monumental mosques used in Wadai, Borno, and Bagirmi. To what extent moieties and quarter systems seen in Kotoko towns correspond with similar notions in Kanem, Borno, Wadai and Bagirmi is a topic we shall have to explore in the future.

What of the Kotoko states themselves? To Lebeuf, analysis of myths of origin and their symbolism provide the key. The foundation myths often refer to hunters and fishmen, the fusion of distinct populations in one region, and the sacrifice of children by representatives of the two populations. Animal symbolism is also key here, with the varan and serpents or other animals often appearing in tales. The "Sao" are accorded an important place here in these origin stories, often associated with the founders of towns like Makari. Over time, larger towns existed as agglomerations of communities walled their settlements after unifying. The Kotoko princes, to use Lebeuf's vocabulary, were sometimes seen as descendants of outsiders who forged alliances with the local people. This is perhaps why the gumsu was often chosen from among the descendants of the first families of a town or city, to maintain this pact between the dynastic line and the original settlers. Interestingly, however, succession in the Kotoko states usually passed to sons of slave women. Complex age grades were used as well as the moieties or quarter system to organize the people of the towns themselves. 

Over time, some began to increase their power over their neighbors, but the Kotoko states were never unified into a single polity. Instead, 3 broader sub-regions appear, with Makari as the dominant state in Mandague, Mser led by Kousseri, and Lagouane under Logone-Birni domination. This was not always the case, since Houlouf was remembered as once being a powerful state. A close study of references to the Kotoko states in Bagirmi, Bulala, Borno and Mandara traditions and chronicles will undoubtedly shed more light on this.

Overall, Lebeuf's work remains important for attempting to center Kotoko myths, symbolism and ethnographic fieldwork. Undoubtedly, archaeology will remain central for understanding the deep history of this region and the so-called "Sao" often associated with the early period of the Kotoko states. Nonetheless, a thorough examination, comparison and analysis of references to the Kotoko states in the historical traditions of its neighbors can shed more light. Sadly, Lebeuf scarcely attempted this. Except for some more recent history still partly recalled in Kotoko traditions on the expansionist activities of Logone-Birni by the 1760s, little else is remembered specifically. Future research on this region must include attempts at triangulation of disparate traditions as well as a  reexamination of all the relevant written sources from neighboring states. 

The Dagachi of Kano: Elite Exiles, Political Centralization, and Kano-Borno Relations

 

The Gates of Kano City (Studies in the History of Kano). KofarWambai was once associated with the Dagachi.

            Uthman b. Dawud, a Sayfawa ruler of the early fifteenth century, is notable less for his brief reign than for his later career in Kano. Unique among the Sayfawa, Uthman b. Dawud (reigned c. 1421, according to Lange’s chronology) moved to Kano after his deposition, where he became an important official.[1] In addition, his descendants continued his legacy of significant wealth and influence in the Kano kingdom, eventually culminating with their fall from grace and disappearance in historical traditions.[2] Despite the limited sources, the period reveals important developments in state consolidation in the Central Sudan. In the case of Borno, the Sayfawa would eventually consolidate their state as Ali b. Dunama (c. 1465-1497) of the Idrisids defeated the Dawudid branch of the dynasty. Likewise, Muhammad Rumfa initiated several political reforms which strengthened central authority and the role of Islam in the state. The career of Uthman K.l.n.ma, or Uthman b. Dawud, encapsulated this era of contestation as elite lineages competed with the rise of more centralized administrations in both Kano and Borno. Indeed, as an elite political exile forced out of power by a kaigama and yerima in Borno, his own descendants became a threat to the Rumfawa of Kano. Through an alleged revolt which nearly brought Borno and Kano into conflict during the reign of Idris b. Ali (r. 1496-1519), the Dagachi’s descendants became a threat to royal authority. This illustrates how both Kano and Borno navigated the thorny issue of political centralization over the course of the 15^th century. This essay argues that the career and legacy of Uthman b. Dawud (the Dagachi) illustrate how Sayfawa elite exiles shaped political centralization, economic development, and interstate relations in Kano, while also becoming threats to emerging centralized authority. Beginning with an overview on early Hausaland-Borno relations, the essay shall then examine the Dagachi’s arrival in Kano and the growing power of this official. The final section shifts attention to the revolt plotted by the Dagachi and how it relates to Kano-Borno relations as well as political centralization.

Kano and Borno Relations Before Uthman b. Dawud

            Unsurprisingly, the Hausa kingdom of Kano and Kanem-Borno had relations long before Uthman b. Dawud’s arrival in the 1420s. This background is necessary for understanding why Kano emerged as an attractive destination for elite Sayfawa exiles such as Uthman b. Dawud, as well as how they attained significant authority there. Due to the nature of the surviving sources, however, this can only be partially addressed.

The exact timing of Kano’s early relations with Borno is unknown, but scholars such as John Lavers have sought to identify the word afuno or afunu with the Hausa of Kano. Extant medieval Arabic sources first use the Kanuri word for the Hausa during the 1400s, in the writings of al-Maqrizi. However, contacts between Kanem-Borno and parts of Hausaland began by the 1200s or early 1300s. This is not surprising given the extension of Sayfawa rule into Borno by the 1200s during Dunama Dibalemi’s reign. A hint of Borno and Hausa trade may be seen in the travelogue of Ibn Battuta, too. According to this renowned traveler, Takedda and undoubtedly other Sahelian trading centers were linked to both Borno and Gobir.[3] The interests of the Sayfawa in Kawar, the Fazzan and relations with Tuareg groups in Aïr by the 1200s likely involved Gobir and early Hausa states, too. Lamentably, the exact nature of early Hausa state formation and its connections with trans-Saharan trade awaits further archaeological research.[4] But the little data collected so far points to possible links between Marandet (the Maranda of medieval Arabic sources) and the Lake Chad region.[5] In short, relations between Kanem-Borno and the area of Hausaland began in this period.

Lavers, whose admittedly speculative analysis of the topic of early Borno-Kano relations remains the most substantial, even proposed an earlier military engagement between Kano and Borno during the reign of Idris b. Ibrahim (c. 1342-1366).[6] Unfortunately, the narrative reported by P.A. Benton, which must be derived from oral tradition, named the mai in question as Iderisa Arrimi (Idris b. Ali). According to this tradition, Idris b. Ali sent his kaigama, Dalatu, to make war against Kano, eventually subduing and destroying it.[7] The narrative is linked with the folk etymology for the Kanuri term designating Hausa people, afunu. Intriguingly, the tradition also portrayed the people of Kano as Muslims who fasted and prayed (yet still wore arse cloths).[8] This is rather ambiguous but could be an oral tradition of the confrontation between Borno and Kano during the reign of Idris b. Ali (r. 1497-1519) or Idris b. Ibrahim.[9] In fact, an extant mahram dated to the reign of Idris b. Ali refers to a witness named Dallatu Abdullahi. Yet the kaigama who was named as a witness was Mommad ibn Sugu.[10] This may reflect confusion in the tradition regarding Dallatu Abdullahi and the actual kaigama of Idris b. Ali?

Even more baffling, the question of which polity in what would later become the united kingdom of Kano first formed relations with Borno is unknown. Lavers, borrowing from the tentative theories of Murray Last, has suggested that the Afnu king of al-Maqrizi, Mastur, was perhaps the ruler of Santolo or Santoro.[11] This early Kano polity or chiefdom was the original Afnu from the perspective of Borno. But the evidence for this is lacking in the Kano Chronicle. And if the Sayfawa were allies of the ruler of Santolo before the leaders at Dala who later became dominant in Kasar Kano, there is no mention of this in the chronicle.[12]

Furthermore, evidence derived from the history of titles in Kano support an earlier Sayfawa link with the Dala rulers who consolidated their state against Santolo. C.L. Temple’s research on the history of Kano included mention of the title of Dan Kade. According to Temple, this post was given to sons of the ruler of Kano, but was named after a “dan Sarki” of Borno who fled to Kano in the early days.[13] This figure was certainly Kaday Afnu of the Sayfawa, a son of Idris b. Ibrahim who died in war with the Bulala. Using Lange’s chronology, Kaday Afnu’s brief reign as mai was in c. 1388.[14] Kaday Afnu’s predecessor was possibly a usurper, Sa’id, and before him ruled Umar b. Idris (c. 1382-1387), a brother of Kaday Afnu. It is possible that Kaday Afnu fled to Kano during the reign of Sa’id or that of his brother, Umar. Alternatively, he may have fled to Kano when Dawud b. Ibrahim (c. 1366-1376) or another Dawudid held the throne. He possibly arrived in Kano as early as c. 1366, perhaps predating Sarkin Kano Yaji’s victory against Santolo.[15]

In summation, the story of early relations between Kanem-Borno and Hausaland is a field awaiting much further research. What seems clear is the relationship between Kasar Kano and Borno by the 1300s. This included a possible Sayfawa prince who arrived in Kano sometime after c. 1366. The later legend involving Bayajidda and interpreting Hausa states’ origins regarding Borno may obfuscate the more complicated question of early trade, migration, conquests, and cultural exchange. Nonetheless, even before the Sayfawa relocated to Borno for good by the reign of Umar b. Idris, Kano may have been the part of Hausaland with closest ties to Borno. This history of close ties elucidates why Kaday Afnu was comfortable fleeing there at an indeterminate period. It also indicates why Uthman b. Dawud later moved to Kano after his deposition.

Uthman b. Dawud’s Arrival in Kano

The Kano Chronicle, our main source on Uthman b. Dawud (or Uthman K.l.n.ma), refers to him as a “great prince” who came from South Bornu with many men and mallams. In addition, “He brought with him horse-drums, and trumpets and flags and guns. When he came, he sat down at Bomfai.”[16] Ignoring the anachronistic allusion to firearms, the chronicle sadly omits any reasons for why this elite figure from Borno moved to Kano. However, his use of royal regalia and large retinue, including mallams, suggests he was no ordinary person. Reading between the lines of the chronicle and the Diwan, it is possible to reconstruct some of the context for his coming to Kano during the reign of Dauda b. Kanajeji.

First, Uthman b. Dawud’s Borno context. Ascending to the throne in c. 1421, Uthman K.l.n.ma was a son of Dawud. In the words of the Diwan, “Il fut chassé du pouvoir par le kayghama Nikale, fils d’Ibrahim et le yarima Kaday Ka’aku. Il mourut à Afnu Kunu. La durée de son règne fut de 9 mois.”[17] In other words, he was in power for less than a year before the powerful kaigama and a yarima overthrew him. His descent from Dawud may have been an additional factor in his deposition as his two predecessors and successors were both descendants of Idris. But this was not merely part of the contested succession of the houses of Idris and Dawud. The kaigama was frequently involved in depositions and civil wars during this troubled era in the annals of the Sayfawa. Barth even proposed that the kaigama remained very powerful until the rise of Ali b. Dunama. Moreover, if the kaigama was already based in Borno before the Sayfawa maiwa abandoned Kanem to the Bulala, they may have had tremendous advantages in local ties and alliances. That advantage enabled them to frequently intervene in the internecine wars between the Dawudids and Idrisids.[18] Clearly, the yarima (a position given to princes, too), was also involved in the fall of Uthman in c. 1421-1422.

With the return to descendants of Idris to the throne after Uthman b. Dawud, one may surmise that the loyal followers and court of Uthman were supporters of the Dawudian house. Why Kano appealed to the deposed mai as a place of exile is not clear in the sources. But he certainly knew of the Idrisid Kaday Afnu who spent time there some decades before him. Kano in the 1420s was also increasingly Islamic. For instance, “The Song of Bagauda” referred to Sarkin Kano Umaru as “one learned in Islam, he it was who escaped (Hell-fire); He lit a fire which defied extinction.”[19] Likewise, the Kano Chronicle describes Umaru (r. 1410-1421) as abdicating to pursue a life of Islamic piety. More importantly, his friend, Abubakra, left for Borno during his reign.[20] Perhaps the reputation for piety achieved by Umaru and the time spent in Borno by Muslims affiliated with Kano’s court appealed to Uthman b. Dawud and his retinue.

Upon arrival, Uthman b. Dawud was appointed to the position of dagachi. Conventionally spelled dagaci (dagatai, plural) in Hausa, this is usually translated in English as village head.[21] But the responsibilities and power of the dagaci in this context was much more than a simple village ward head. More recent evidence from the political history of Kano, for example, reveals that the rulers of Gaya, Rano, Karaye and Dutse, powerful chiefs of areas within the kingdom, were given the title of dagaci. M.G. Smith argued that these officials exercised wider territorial authority than the hakimai and appointed their own dagatai.[22] It is very likely that the Dagachi from Borno exercised similar authority. The Kano Chronicle reports that the Dagachi settled with his large following at Dorai. He also acted as regent for the ruler of Kano when he left for 5 months to campaign against Zaria. This period of 5 months coincided with an increase in the wealth of the Dagachi.[23] Later, either during Uthman b. Dawud’s tenure or that of his progeny, the Dagachi was likewise powerful and wealthy during Abdullahi Burja’s reign (1438-1452).

Indeed, by this period, there was an increase in the scale of commerce in Kano that connected it with Gwanja, Asben, Borno, and beyond. The Dagachi’s followers also built homes from his own palatial estate to Salamta, thereby proving growth of this ward. The Chronicle similarly reports the Dagachi’s role in founding the market of Karabka.[24] Though not stated in the chronicle, one can surmise that the Dagachi enjoyed a role in the market taxes and the increased commercial activity across the region. Meanwhile, Kano appears to have gained a substantial captive population settled in various villages during this time. A galadima named Dauda was said to have established 21 towns with 1000 slaves each.[25] Notably, this same galadima had a daughter married to the ruler of Kano. Is it conceivable that the increase in commerce and slaving was another source of wealth for the Dagachi, whose market may have been a center for this trade? Besides the Dagachi, Uthman b. Dawud or his unnamed heir, only the galadima Dauda appears to have shared his power and influence.

Thus, the Dagachi from Borno rose from political exile to a post of great wealth and standing in Kano. This undoubtedly reflected the reputation of the Sayfawa dynasty across much of the region. The Dagachi’s arrival also occurred simultaneously with an increase in trans-Saharan and West African trade in Hausaland. The Wangara influence from the West and the trade in salt, kola, slaves, textiles, and the exchange of information and learning unquestionably shaped this context. Even a deposed Sayfawa mai brought royal rituals, regalia, and practices from a more established Islamic dynasty. It was perhaps no coincidence that Kano began to send “gifts” to Borno during Abdullahi Burja’s reign, too. The Dagachi’s presence in Kano could have been connected to this sending of “gifts” for blessings to the ruler of Borno and the maintenance of cordial relations.[26] As a result of the great privileges extended to the Dagachi for decades, his royal Sayfawa origin is rather probable. It likely contributed to the cultural and political exchanges between Kano and Borno during the 1400s.

Revisiting the Attempted Revolt of the Dagachi

Unfortunately, the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud later lost their power and privilege. During the reign of Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509), the son of Muhammad Rumfa, deposed the Sayfawa-descended Dagachi and gave the title to a slave. This episode, poorly explained in the Kano Chronicle, triggered an invasion from Borno (then ruled by Idris b. Ali, 1497-1519). Various authors have proposed alternative and sometimes illogical interpretations of this episode. Exploring the theories propounded by Yusufu Bala Usman, and M.G. Smith, this section shall endeavor to elucidate the conflict in terms of Kano’s political centralization and consolidation of Queen Hauwa’s descent group.

Beginning with Usman, one can see how torturous and questionable readings of the Kano Chronicle can lead one astray. Usman, wisely wishing to avoid reading the history of relations between Borno and Hausaland solely through the lens of empire or military conquests, tries to shift attention to other factors. For him, the burning question of internecine conflict within the Sayfawa branches claiming descent from Idris and Dawud was a factor. Purely speculating, Usman proposes that the intervention of Idris b. Ali during the planned revolt of the Dagachi was meant to neutralize the threat of a Dawudid Sayfawa descent group ruling Kano.[27] This view is quite unlikely based on a close reading of the English translation of the Kano Chronicle. In the Chronicle, it is clearly stated that Kano’s king waited for Idris b. Ali to leave Guduawa and return to Borno before he “beguiled” the Dagachi into submission. In the words of the Chronicle, “As soon as he was gone, Abdulahi beguiled Dagachi into submission and then turned him out of office and gave his own slave the title.”[28] If the ruler of Borno was opposed to the Dagachi, why would Kano’s king wait until he left before “beguiling” the Dagachi and then replacing him with a slave? Clearly, Idris b. Ali’s attack was coordinated to support the Dagachi who had been “prevented” from revolting due to Hauwa’s intervention.

Another view, explored by M.G. Smith’s Government in Kano, 1350-1950, suggests that the Dagachi probably did not intend to revolt. Instead, the Dagachi may have reported the actions of Kano’s ruler against Zaria and Katsina to Borno. Assuming Kano’s attacks on Zaria and Katsina were viewed as disloyalty by the ruler of Borno, Idris b. Ali consequently led an army against Kano. Smith is agnostic on the matter for he also suggests that the Dagachi may have been attempting to contest the throne of Kano with Abdullahi. Alternatively, they may have sought the throne due to the reforms of Muhammad Rumfa. Since conflict between Hausa states was perennial and it is unclear to what extent if any Borno sought to intervene in Kano’s wars with Zaria and Katsina. Nonetheless, Smith’s theory is plausible but cannot be demonstrated with any evidence from the Bornoan side. Idris b. Ali was certainly an active ruler on the military front, besting the Bulala in Kanem in two campaigns and was potentially more active in the west, too.[29] Since the reign of Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509) witnessed Kano’s victory against Katsina and Zazzau, Kano’s actions could have triggered alarm in Borno. The possibility of Kano upsetting the balance of power among the Hausa states may have been a sincere concern.[30] Of all Smith’s theorizing, the question of Rumfa’s reforms and changes in the state remains the most compelling theory, though a mixture of factors were probably relevant.

What were the changes in Kano’s administrative structure during the lengthy reign of Muhammad Rumfa? Why did they potentially lead to an attempted revolt by the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud? According to the Kano Chronicle, Rumfa (c. 1463-1499) was responsible for a number of reforms. These included the appointment of eunuchs to political office.[31] Besides constructing the palace used by subsequent Kano kings, Rumfa remodelled kingship based on Borno (at least in the eyes of M.G. Smith). This included the creation of a Council of Nine supposedly inspired by Borno’s royal court.[32] The nine principal officials around the sarki in subsequent centuries included the Galadima, Madaiki, Wombai, Makama, Sar. Dawaki, Sar. Bai (a slave), Ciroma, Dan Iya, and the Sar. Dawaki Tsakkar Gidda, also of slave origin.[33] The exact composition during the reign of Rumfa was probably slightly different, but one can note the influence of Borno through titles such as ciroma. At the same time, one also notes the influence of slave officials. By creating a new palace and redesigning the administrative system with more enslaved officials loyal to himself, Rumfa was able to centralize authority more successfully than his successors. Also important was Rumfa’s establishment of the Kurmi Market and initiated the use of ostrich-feather sandals, kakaki instruments, and other signs of royal authority.[34]

Consequently, one no longer reads of overwhelmingly powerful galadimas who effectively ruled Kano during the reign of Bugaya (c. 1385-1390) and the galadima entrusted with the affairs of Kano after Umaru (c. 1410-1421) abdicated.[35] The position retained its significance in future centuries of Kano history, even manifesting in Hauwa and Guli’s attempts to shape Kano politics long after Rumfa’s demise in the 1500s.[36] In short, the reforms of Rumfa increased the presentation and authority of the rulers of Kano through a new Borno-inspired court. With the enhancement of royal authority both visually and politically, the Dagachi may have felt threatened, or perceived a threat to Borno’s influence in this part of Hausaland.

But, the question of Rumfa hardly explains it all. After a lengthy reign terminating in c. 1499, the Dagachi may have represented another faction in Kano politics opposed to Hauwa. The wife of Rumfa, this remarkable woman shaped the next several decades of Kano politics through her influence on her son, Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509), and her grandson. In the context of Abdullahi’s reign, however, Hauwa sought to consolidate power for her descendants by sidelining other contenders supported by the Dagachi’s faction. Additionally, the Dagachi may have initially perceived Abdullahi as a much weaker ruler than his father who instituted several reforms and held the throne for a lengthy period. Hauwa, however, may have come from a powerful chiefly lineage within the Kano kingdom that was seeking to increase their influence in the royal court. Hence, her brother, Guli, was also a key ally in this process. Barkindo, citing a local Kano chronicler, has suggested Hauwa could have been the daughter of the Gaya king.[37] Hauwa’s strong role in the reign of Abdullahi can be seen in her suppression of the alleged revolt of the Dagachi whilst her son was away on campaign. Meanwhile, she promoted the interests of Gaya in court. This may have been a factor in the Dagachi’s plan to revolt, an ill-fated attempt to weaken Hauwa’s influence while also intervening to either supplant or replace Abdullahi.

Regrettably, we are indebted to the Kano Chronicle as the sole source on the Dagachi’s revolt. This imposes severe limitations on any attempt to reconstruct what transpired. Reading between the lines, however, one can generate a rough outline of what occurred. It is known that the Dagachi plot was scheduled for a time when Abdullahi was away, so the Dagachi must have planned and waited for an opportune time to strike. But Hauwa outmaneuvered him, preventing serious trouble from the Dagachi. One is apt to suspect the ruler of Borno was already aware of the Dagachi’s plot. But, by humbling himself with mallams by his side, Abdullahi convinced Idris b. Ali to return to Borno. Then, and only after the mai was no longer an immediate military threat, did Abdullahi trick the Dagachi into submitting to his authority. Afterwards, by replacing him with a slave, Abdullahi removed a powerful noble lineage as a threat to the state.[38] This revolt, which represented the final attempt by the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud to preserve their power and privilege, concluded with their demise in the face of Kano political centralization and a powerful queen-mother.

Elite Political Exiles and Sayfawa Influence Beyond Kanem and Borno

As the above endeavor to analyze the influence and legacy of a deposed Sayfawa mai in Kano illustrates, elite political exiles exerted tremendous authority and power in their new homes. In the case of Uthman b. Dawud and his descendants, they represent a product of the descendants of Dawud who were deposed by overly powerful officials of noble origin. Ironically, the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud were later deposed and replaced by slave officials, just as the Sayfawa accomplished against the kaigama during the reign of Ali b. Dunama and his successors. Much more remains to be said on this episode and the larger question of Kano-Borno relations, but it shows how even a branch of the Sayfawa could shape political culture and economics in areas on the periphery of Borno. Elites, bringing with them the Sayfawa state structure, a retinue, and Islamic scholars, nonetheless profoundly shaped their new locations. The example of the Dagachi serves as one example of this.

Looking beyond, to Darfur, for example, descendants of Dawud and other Bornoans claiming Magumi origin were able to achieve similar levels of influence. This promoted an image of Borno and the Sayfawa as ideal Islamic rulers across a vast expanse of the Sudanic belt, from the Niger to the Nile. Their cultural influence was compounded by an increase in trade, religious ties, pilgrimage routes, commerce, and official relations with Borno. In the case of Dagachi, this overwhelming power was considered a threat by a centralized Kano court with a possibly close tie to a Gaya-backed faction eager to consolidate their influence with Rumfa’s son. And while conflict erupted between Borno and Kano after Abdullahi’s reign, one can conclude that Borno’s cultural influence did not exclude military clashes or raids. Yet the type of regional politico-cultural hegemony achieved by the Sayfawa was undoubtedly aided by Sayfawa elite exiles and envoys. Perhaps more importantly, the Dagachi of Kano also serves as an example of how elite migrants and exiles affected state formation in the Central Sudan.

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[1] As always, we prefer Dierk Lange’s chronology for the annals of the Sayfawa. It has not yet been superseded, despite its occasional contradictions. See Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808).

[2] Although he has not presented sufficient evidence to support his interpretation, Murray Last has suggested the Dagachi was actually a prince from Mandara. This seems highly unlikely, however. Last’s reasoning is based on the name of the mother of Kano king Dauda, Mandara. Apparently, this was implausibly linked to the kingdom of Mandara on the basis of the name of Dauda’s mother. On the other hand, Abubakar Dokaji’s chronicle of Kano’s history presents the Dagachi as a warrior. See discussion in Bawuro M. Barkindo, “Kano Relations with Borno, Early Times to C. 1800” in Bawuro M. Barkindo (editor), Kano and Some of Her Neighbours, 151. Of course, when one consults the translation of a kings list for Kano by John Hunwick, the name of Dawud’s (Dauda’s) mother is Manduna. See John Hunwick, “Not Yet the Kano Chronicle,” 106. As for Dokaji’s theory, one must wonder why a warrior had a large number of mallams in his party. The large number of dependents, mallams, and possibly slaves who accompanied the Dagachi to Kano suggest someone of great wealth and status, not a mere warrior.

[3] Ibn Battuta in J. F. P. Hopkins and N. Levtzion (editors). Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History, 281, 302. Ibn Battuta’s reference to Gobir, whose ruler was not Muslim (if the sons of the ruler were killed and buried with their father, this would imply the people of Kubar (Gobir?) were still non-Muslim. Overall, Ibn Battuta’s brief report, recorded from a Masufa interlocutor, is indicative of an early Hausa state engaged in trans-Saharan trade.

[4] For one speculative look at Sayfawa intervention in the affairs of Aïr in the late 1100s or early 1200s, see Behique Dunama, “Kanem, Kawar and the Tuareg in the 12th Century,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/kanem-kawar-and-tuareg-in-12th-century.html. For another speculative interpretation of early Gobir, see Behique Dunama, “Gobir and the Copts,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2024/06/gobir-and-copts.html. Also worth considering is the possible connection between the Kanawa and the people of the Sosebaki states. According to Landeroin, the subjects of the Sosebaki rulers were Kanawas of Kutumbawas like the people of Kano. Oral traditions from the early 1900s indicated that about 800-900 years ago, a prince named  Mohammed Nafarko arrived in the region from Borno (Landeroin, “Notice historique” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 425-427). Additional oral traditions on the foundation of Birni Gazargamo also link the Sao leader, Dala N’Gumami, with Kano. See Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs Vol 2, 67. Interpretation of these disparate traditions require much closer analysis but imply connections between peoples in Kano and Borno specifically long before the 1400s. Also worth noting is the name Dala, used by Ahmad b. Furtu during Idris Alooma’s reign to refer to Kano (the city). See Lange, A Sudanic chronicle: the Borno Expeditions of Idrīs Alauma (1564–1576 according to the account of Ahmad b. Furtū. Arabic text, English translation, commentary and geographical gazetteer. Also, note the genealogy of the alifas of Kanem as reported by Landeroin in “Notice historique.” The founder of their dynasty, Dalatoa Afuno, was allegedly of Magumi descent and from a village in the Kano kingdom. The name Dalatu may be a reference to Kano.

[5] See Sonja Magnavita and Juan-Marco Puerta Schardt, “Tracing connections: Exploring links between Marandet (Central Niger) and the Chad Basin through pottery provenance analysis using pXRF,” Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports 67 (2025).

[6] John Lavers, “A Note on the Terms “Hausa” and “Afuno,”’ Kano Studies 2 (1) 1980, 116.

[7] Intriguingly, there may have been a kaigama named Dalatu in the 1300s. According to the Diwan, Bir b. Idris, whose reign stretched from c. 1389-1421, engaged in war with a kaigama named Muhammad b. D.l.t. See Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 77. The title of kaigama was perhaps not inherited through direct succession but Muhammad’s father may have held the title sometime during the reign of Idris b. Ibrahim. For evidence of the title of kaigama once being the domain of elites whose children were considered princes, see Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries Vol. II, and Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A Study of the Origin, Growth, and Collapse of a Dynasty (891-1846), 93. For an opposing view, see Lange, “Preliminaires pour une histoire des Sao,” Journal of African History 30, no. 2 (1989), 209. Lange’s perspective, however, is contradicted by Palmer, Barth and Nur Alkali.

[8] P.A. Benton, The Languages and Peoples of Bornu, Vol 1., 25. Benton’s report also indicates that the chima of Kano was the mulima of the kaigama. This connection with the kaigama may stem from the earlier territorial domains of the kaigama, which, according to Nachtigal, encompassed the lands stretching from what was the Sokoto Caliphate to Logon, including Daia, Gujeba, Mabani and Bulgoa (Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. II, 249). The title may also have some connection with Kagha, possibly an earlier capital of Borno under the administration of the kaigama. See Djibo Hamani, Quatorze siecles d'histoire du Soudan Central: Niger du VIIè au XXè siècle, 110.

[9] Oral tradition conflating the reigns of different maiwa with the same name is likely.

[10] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 29. One is also tempted to consider later maiwa such as Idris Alooma as a possible candidate for the ruler of Borno recounted in Benton’s tale. However, based on the chronicle of Ahmad b. Furtu, we know that the kaigama was named Muhammad Kaday (at least for the Sau-Gafata campaign). See Lange, A Sudanic Chronicle, 49.

[11] John Lavers, “A Note on the Terms “Hausa” and “Afuno,”’ 115.

[12] Although it is possible the Wangarawa traders whose arrival in Kano during the late 1300s is probable supported one local group whilst Borno lent its aid to the other?

[13] Paul E. Lovejoy, Abdullahi Mahadi, and Mansur Ibrahim Mukhtar, “C.L. Temple’s Notes on the History of Kano: A Lost Chronicle of Political Office (1909),” Sudanic Africa 4 (1993), 76.

[14] Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 77. Lamentably, the Diwan does not provide many details on the political turbulence within the Sayfawa state during the 1300s and 1400s. Besides allusions to conflict with the Bulala and Sao or civil wars with kaigama officials, it is difficult to reconstruct in greater detail the possible alliances of elite officials or competing branches of the Sayfawa which made this an unstable era, politically.

[15] See H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 38 (1908), 72.

[16] Ibid., 74.

[17] Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 77.

[18] To properly understand the period stretching from c. 1389-1459, recall that there were 12 Sayfawa rulers, 6 each from among the descendants of Dawud and Idris. Frequent contestations of succession or civil wars may have given the kaigama officials tremendous power to shape events to their favor. See Jean-Claude Zeltner, Pages d'histoire du Kanem, pays tchadien, 82.

[19] Mervyn Hiskett, “The ‘Song of Bagauda’: A Hausa King List and Homily in Verse—II,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 28, no. 1 (1965), 116.

[20] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 74.

[21] Roxana Ma Newman, An English-Hausa Dictionary, 296.

[22] M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350–1950, 73.

[23] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 75. This suggests that despite his humble title, the Dagachi was actually one of the most powerful or important titleholders in Kano. Before the Dagachi’s regency, only the galadima appears similarly influential and powerful, including acting as regent or deposing kings.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., 76.

[26] Kofar Dagachi, for instance, was an important gate that opened on the road to Kazaure, Hadejia and beyond. Is there any chance this was linked to trade with Borno from Kano? More investigation is needed into the possible role of branches of the Sayfawa from the Dawudid branch in other lands despite ongoing hostilities between Dawud’s descendants and those of Idris. For more on the gate of the Dagachi, see Bawuro M. Barkindo, “Gates of Kano” in Bawuro M. Barkindo (editor), Studies in the History of Kano, 18.

[27] Yusufu Bala Usman, “A Reconsideration of the History of Relations Between Borno and Hausaland Before 1804” in Yusufu Bala Usman & Muhammad Nur Alkali (editors), Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno, 182.

[28] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78.

[29] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs Vol 1, 17.

[30] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78.

[31] Ibid.

[32] M.G. Smith, “Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 6, no. 2 (1964), 168.

[33] Paul E. Lovejoy, Abdullahi Mahadi, and Mansur Ibrahim Mukhtar, “C.L. Temple’s Notes on the History of Kano: A Lost Chronicle of Political Office (1909),” 50.

[34] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78. The state-sponsored establishment of a market, perhaps several years after the Dagachi had sponsored one, is a sign of state support for commerce and likely a greater role for the government in taxation and long-distance trade.

[35] Ibid., 73-74.

[36] Ibid., 80.

[37] Bawuro Barkindo, “Kano Relations with Borno, Early Times to c. 1800” in Kano and Some of Her Neighbours, 156. The unlikely theory of Murray Last on a royal Songhay origin for Hauwa is derived from Leo Africanus, a questionable source on the details of Kano during this era. As for Hauwa’s Gaya origins, the ruling lineage there were noted in the Kano Chronicle to have come to the capital during the reign of Yakubu (1452-1463). Was Hauwa a daughter of Agalfati? If so, she was a descendant of the ruling line of Machina, whose local dynasty were close with the Sayfawa. See H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 76.

[38] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78.