Mbang Burkomanda I: Bagirmi's 17th Century Rise in Sudanic Context

 

Lancer of the Sultan of Begharmi.

          Investigating the history of Bagirmi before the 19^th century is an arduous task. Due to the lack of detailed sources on the history of this part of the Chad Basin before the 1800s, Bagirmi receives less attention than its more famous neighboring polities, Kanem and Borno. Moreover, the 19^th and 20^th centuries provide far richer source materials, consisting of travel reports, al-Tunisi’s account of Sabun’s invasion of Bagirmi, and a plethora of colonial-era publications and reports. This material, naturally, makes it far easier to research Bagirmi in the 1800s whilst its earlier period remains somewhat shadowy. In an attempt to explore early Bagirmi history, this brief article will analyze the reign of mbang Burkomanda I of Bagirmi, whose reign has been tentatively dated c. 1635-1665 by Gustav Nachtigal. In spite of the paucity of written sources from this time, one can triangulate various traditions from Bagirmi, Wadai and its neighbors to create a fuller narrative of Burkomanda’s reign. Moreover, Burkomanda I’s reign was part of a much larger trend of dynamic political leadership across much of the Chad Basin and the Central Sudan in the 1600s. Indeed, Burkomanda’s reign overlapped with a period of political change and unrest to the east of Lake Chad, one which Bagirmi endeavored to profit from through far-flung raids and political interventions. Symbolically and materially, this was represented by the erection of brick walls around the palace in Massenya, cementing the ascent of the mbang in the wider region.

A Commentary on the Sources

          Whilst a few important works have been written by Anglophone and Francophone scholars on Bagirmi’s royal genealogy, much remains to be done. Even so, studies of the kingdom’s cosmological symbolism, political structure or its model of predatory accumulation have been produced. Still, little has been done to advance the study of pre-1800 Bagirmi. John Lavers, in a brief essay published in Annals of Borno tentatively sketched this lengthy period of Bagirmi history (c. 1500-1800), but largely repeated Nachtigal. Besides Lavers, of course, many colonial-era writers wrote studies on Bagirmi kingship, history, the Barma language, or the specific Melfi district. But few have been able to advance beyond this due to the contradictions in the oral traditions, which all the sources ultimately rely upon. In other words, unless new textual sources come to light, historians will not progress from Nachtigal’s schematic view of Bagirmi history.[1] Indeed, some scholars, such as Viviana Pâques, have even gone as far as to challenge simple assumptions of linear historical narratives in the oral materials. In a move that recalls the ways in which Zuidema interpreted the Spanish cronistas on the history of the Incas, Pâques seems to believe that much of what is reported in the traditions reported to Nachtigal, Barth, and others is ultimately tied to a mythological and cosmological order of thinking.

            However, close examination of the various 19^th century and colonial-era reports and texts can be triangulated for a deeper understanding of Burkomanda I’s reign. For instance, the various lists of Bagirmi kings produced by Nachtigal, Escayrac de Lauture, Barth, Lanier, and Palmer can be subjected to greater scrutiny. This can unveil commonalities and patterns.[2] Using Henri Carbou’s writings on the Bulala and Wadai, as well as al-Tunisi, highlight some of Wadai’s traditions as relevant for reconstructing Bagirmi history. Abadie, Palmer, Tubiana, Barkindo, and Hagenbucher on the history of Bagirmi’s neighbors and rival polities can shed further light. For example, a number of Bagirmi-oriented sources allude to ephemeral reigns of Wadai kings usually omitted from the Wadai kings lists. By using the general dates for Wadai, the Bulala sultans in Fitri, Mandara, as well as Kanem and Borno, one can better contextualize the events associated with Burkomanda’s reign. In addition, utilizing these sources permits a likely more accurate reading of Bagirmi’s attempts to assert itself in a politically dynamic Chad Basin and Central Sudan during the 1600s.

Mbang Burkomanda I’s Rise to Power

          Although little is known of Burkomanda’s early life, he is intriguingly remembered by the name of his mother, Aisa Bele. Furthermore, he was reportedly the son of Omar, who reigned from c. 1608-1625 in Nachtigal’s chronology. Surprisingly, Burkomanda was tchiroma during the reign of his uncle, Dalai (r. 1625-1635).[3] One can surmise from this that Burkomanda’s mother may have hailed from a powerful faction or family in Bagirmi, if Burkomanda’s maternal kin helped him succeed his uncle.

          Burkomanda also benefited from the political reforms and accomplishments of Abdallah (r. 1568-1608). This powerful mbang promoted Islamic reforms in Bagirmi’s state structure and created several powerful posts held by individuals of slave origin. Indeed, Nachtigal seemingly believed that the powerful military officer, the fatsha, was held by a slave since the time of Abdallah. This may have been done to weaken the influence of brothers, uncles and other relations in Bagirmi’s royal disputes and military leadership. Abdallah was also believed by Nachtigal to have completely reversed the tributary relationship with the Bulala sultans, too. By 1608, this seminal Bagirmi ruler was allegedly responsible for imposing a small tribute on Middogo and receiving annual presents from the Bulala, Logon, and Kousseri.[4]

          In short, Bagirmi had already demonstrated signs of greater political centralization and expansion during the reign of Abdallah. Indeed, this may have triggered a campaign from Borno’s Idris b. Ali (r. 1564-1596) which led to his death.[5] Undoubtedly, Burkomanda benefitted from the reforms of his grandfather and may have sought to surpass his predecessor, Dalai, who was less successful in his military raid against the Musgo (Musgun).[6] Burkomanda later succeeded in expanding the scale of military actions, intervened in Fitri, and even struck Borno territory in Kawar.

Raiding Far and Wide for Three Years

          Believed to have begun a long series of campaigns soon after his reign began, Burkomanda led his troops far and wide. Targeting Burlum, Bayo, and Bolongo districts, Burkomanda threatened the Kenga. Crossing to Middogo and Fitri, Burkomanda went even further afield. His troops crossed Batha and the Bahr el-Ghazal to Kanem, then moved to the Karka region. Then, Bagirmi raiders struck Borku and Kawar, before passing to the south and plundering the Shuwa in the Kotoko principalities. This was followed by another attack, this time against Mandara. Fellata to the south of Mandara were also targeted before Burkomanda camped his troops in Musgo territory. Due to the wishes of his soldiers to return, Burkomanda eventually agreed.[7] Given that tradition remembers this taking place over the course of three years, one must ask why the ruler of Bagirmi was eager to launch several punitive raids and actions against Bagirmi’s neighbors. Given the volatile conditions in Kanem around this time and the formation of Wadai, perhaps in c. 1635 (to use Nachtigal’s chronology), one can best interpret Burkomanda’s actions as an attempt to profit from and exert Bagirmi’s status as a regional power.

Beginning with Kanem, a political vacuum made raids and possible expansion attractive. The Bulala sultans were defeated by the Tunjur and were no longer relevant here. Borno, whose ruler, Umar b. Idris, likely appointed Dala Afuno to oversee Kanem around this time, relied on the alifas to ensure the tribute from Kanem. However, Dala Afuno was remembered in Kanem for having to wage war on various groups to receive any tribute. Indeed, Dala Afuno had to fight the Tubu, Daganas, El-Lassalas, Shuwas and Koukas to the west of Lake Fitri to pay tribute.[8]

Besides trouble receiving tribute, conflict with the recently arrived Tunjur, migrating after Wadai’s foundation in c. 1635, soon arose. Tunjur tradition, according to Gros, remembers conflict between the Tunjur and Bulala occurring at Mao during the time of Dawud’s grandson, Smain. While the Tunjur eventually seized Mao, Tunjur tradition specifically named their leader, Ramadan, as dying in conflict with the Dala Afuno.[9] In other words, Kanem during the 1630s was politically volatile and unstable as the first alifa sent by the Sayfawa was engaged in conflict with various groups refusing to pay tribute. Sensing this insecurity and instability, Burkomanda may have viewed Kanem as relatively easy to raid. This would explain why he was able to reach beyond to Borku and Kawar.

As for the raids on Borku and Kawar, one sees another aspect of Bagirmi’s long-term regional aspirations. Due to its geographic position, the kingdom lacked direct access to towns in the southern Sahara used for profitable trans-Saharan trade. Bagirmi needed access to these to become less dependent on Borno for North African, European, and other goods. Thus, it is likely Burkomanda envisioned long-term acquisitions to the far north.[10] Lavers was correct to note this possible motive for Burkomanda’s actions, perhaps aiming to maintain Kanem’s openness for commerce or to assert Bagirmi control over routes to the north.[11] The ultimate failure of this strategy may be explained by the distance involved and the eventual restoration of Sayfawa authority in Kanem through the consolidation of the alifas. Nonetheless, memories of this Bagirmi raid in Bilma were vivid enough when Maurice Abadie reported it. In Kawar tradition, however, the Bagirmi attack which resulted in a massacre of the town’s population was the result of a Bulala attack.[12] This may have been a result of Burkomanda’s close relationship with the Bulala sultans in Fitri, particularly as his sister, Zara, was married to the Bulala ruler.

Afterwards, Burkomanda’s forces moved south and west. Attacks against the Shuwa certainly included many cattle and horses among the booty. The assault directed against Mandara, which may have been ruled by Abale at the time, was probably inspired by Mandara expansion into the Musgo (Musgun) territories. Burkomanda’s goal was undoubtedly intended to minimize the expansion of rival polities into Bagirmi’s own raiding zones and tributary regions. Mandara, at the time not yet Islamic, was possibly also attacked by Borno during the reign of Ali b. Umar (c. 1639-1677). This suggests that Mandara’s rulers were expansionist at this time or threatening its peer polities. In fact, according to Barkindo, Bagirmi’s attack “appears to have had the purpose of checking Wandala expansion into what was assumed by Bagirmi, to be her own area of influence.”[13]

Lastly, Burkomanda’s whirlwind campaigns included the Fitri region for an important reason. Heading toward that direction was important for the alliance between the Bulala sultans and Bagirmi at this time. Sealed through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to the Bulala sultan, this seemingly developed after the Bulala already established the dynasty in the Fitri region, after defeating the Kuka. Bulala oral traditions attribute this to a half-Tubu Bulala prince, Djil Esa Tubo, or Djili Esa Toubo. According to traditions not cited by Carbou, this Djil Esa Tubo actually lived in Bagirmi with his mother for some time. If so, it is no wonder that Djil Esa Toubou was likely the Bulala ruler who married Burkomanda’s sister. He was already raised there and probably connected to Bagirmi elites.[14] Carbou, presumably drawing on oral traditions as well as the earlier work of Nachtigal, provides strong evidence for a Bulala-Bagirmi alliance around the time of Burkomanda, confirmed through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to Djil Esa Tubo. This, in turn, explains why Burkomanda may have included the Fitri area in his lengthy military excursions during his reign.

By contextualizing this seemingly random series of attacks within the wider political changes affecting Kanem as well as the foundation of Wadai to the east, one can perceive how Bagirmi’s actions were likely done in response to a politically volatile moment. Burkomanda sought to strengthen his position within the Central Sudan through raids, political expansion, and achieving long-term economic goals through access to Kawar and Borku. Attacking Mandara due to the latter’s expansion into Musgun lands was designed to ensure Bagirmi’s own sphere of influence there and source of captives. Bagirmi interests in Fitri were tied to their relationship with the Bulala and, perhaps, a desire to keep an eye on developments further east in Wadai.

The Later Years of Burkomanda I

Unfortunately, the remainder of Burkomanda I’s reign becomes much harder to contextualize. Besides campaigns against the Sarua and Ndamm about 3 years later, little else is known, except for a war with Wadai. Nonetheless, one can detect Burkomanda’s continued interests in expansion and promoting his own position across the region with brick walls for the palace. A later war with Waday suggests Bagirmi was, at this time, still a stronger power.

 Nachtigal, one of the better sources, wrote of subsequent campaigns led by the mbarma and fatsha. Directed against the Sarua and Ndamm, they were not especially successful.[15] Burkomanda’s later execution of his fatsha and mbarma due to a small offense is not explained by Nachtigal but may be connected to this. Perhaps their failure to achieve success like Burkomanda’s earlier campaigns aroused his anger. Or the two were involved in a plot. Given the vast military authority these figures held, it is difficult to imagine Burkomanda ordering their execution on a simple offense. Lack of success in military ventures or a political conflict may have been part of it.

Developments in architecture or the material expression of royal authority also occurred at this time. Burkomanda appears to have been the first to construct a brick wall for the palace in Massenya. According to Nachtigal, at least.[16] The use of brick for royal or elite structures has a longer history in Kanem and Borno, areas which influenced the development of the Bagirmi state. To see them used here in Burkomanda’s reign must be interpreted as an expression of the state’s political ascent in the Central Sudan. After all, besides Bagirmi, the use of fired-brick had been practiced by the Bulala and Sayfawa, rival dynasties which had once dominated Burkomanda’s polity. By employing them in his own palace, Burkomanda demonstrated Bagirmi’s ascending status as a Sudanic power.[17]

Finally, Bagirmi’s war with Waday during Burkomanda’s reign raises more tantalizing questions. Sparked by Waday’s attacks on the Bulala state in Fitri, which led to the capture of Burkomanda’s sister, they clearly indicate the importance of the Fitri area for Wadai and Bagirmi. Nachtigal wrote that Burkomanda freed his sister after a battle at Rabbana on the west bank of the Fitri.[18] Carbou, on the other hand, saw a possible Kuka role in fostering a Waday attack in Fitri, perhaps to force the Bulala sultans out of the region.[19]

With Lanier, likely drawing from Escayrac de Lauture, one learns more about Wadai’s leader during this war. Apparently, Wadai’s troops were led by a king named Mohamed ez Zaouni, who supposedly attacked twice. In the second attack, at Middogo, Wadai forces captured Burkomanda’s sister. But Burkumanda was able to “refouler les Ouadaiens.”[20] In Escayrac de Lauture’s version of events, Burkomanda’s victory against Wadai took place at a place called Sadao. His version emphasized that after the capture of Wadai’s Mohammed-Zaouni, “qui avait occupé le trône pendant six mois,” Wadai replaced him with a king named Issa. But, tellingly, any war with Bagirmi was finished by an unspecified epidemic.[21] In other words, Bagirmi not only captured the Wadai king, but the conflict continued until an outbreak of disease or pestilence forced an end.[22]

Unfortunately, none of the Wadai king lists mention this Mohammed-Zaouni or Issa, but Lauture’s list of Wadai rulers places them after Abd el-Kerim and a king named Edris (Idris).[23] As it appears quite likely that the standard lists of Wadai kings tend to omit names of rulers who only lasted briefly on the throne, Mohammed-Zaouni and Issa may have been very brief rulers sometime in the 1650s or 1660s. Indeed, Lauture’s list places Issa right before Saleh-Dered, clearly omitting many Wadai kings of the 1700s. Another writer, Carbou, likewise noted at least one king often not included in the Wadai kingslist: El Djezam, who succeeded Kharif.[24] If, as Lauture indicates, Mohamed-Zaouni and Edris ruled for less than a year while Issa reigned for under 2 years, it is possible they briefly occupied the throne after c. 1655, when Abd el-Kerim likely died (according to Nachtigal’s chronology).[25]

Undoubtedly, much of Burkomanda’s relatively long reign of 30 years has not survived in traditions. Nevertheless, the later annals of his reign included the use of brick walls, the victory against Wadai, and Burkomanda’s actions regarding the Surua and Ndamm. Of course, the executions of his fatsha and mbarma raise a number of tantalizing questions, too. The victory against Wadai raises important manners related to the known chronology and list of kings of this state in the 17^th century. Despite the unexplained factors in the rest of his reign, the use of brick attests to a regional aspiration to status and power in the Central Sudan. Likewise, the ruler’s continued interest in Bagirmi’s expansion and influence in neighboring peoples demonstrates an ongoing interest in “predatory accumulation.”

Conclusions on Bagirmi in the Pivotal 17^th Century

Despite the limited written sources for this period in Bagirmi history, deep investigations into the earlier centuries of Bagirmi’s political history are feasible. Endeavors to make sense of the contradictions must keep in mind the importance of looking to traditions from neighboring societies and rival polities, too. Whilst some contradictions and gaps will remain unresolved, one can approach a holistic view of pivotal Bagirmi mbang reigns prior to the 19^th century.

This tentative analysis of Burkomanda I’s reign was an attempt to do so. By contextualizing what is reported about Bagirmi’s neighbors and rival states in the middle decades of the 17^th century, one can make sense of (or at least approach a reasonable interpretation) how Bagirmi, for some time during the dynamic 17^th century, asserted itself as a major state in the Central Sudan. This was accomplished or attempted through military raids and wars, the adoption of brick buildings, interventions in Fitri and Kanem, and Bagirmi success against Wadai. Future scholarship on this period of Bagirmi history must examine more closely the question of religion, particularly in the aftermath of Umar b. Idris of Borno’s termination of the first Kalumbardo. Subsequent research must thoroughly revisit the list of kings for Waday, the Bulala in Fitri, the alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur to better understand how the Bulala sultans losing Kanem led to Bagirmi’s attempt to fill a political void.

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[1] Of course, Nachtigal’s retelling of Bagirmi history was based on what may have been relatively informal conditions in the 1870s. His claim to have spoken with multiple descendants of elite lineages in Bagirmi who could recount specific details of various campaigns their forebears participated in throughout Bagirmi history is undoubtedly useful. However, like Sarmiento de Gamboa, whose interviews with various panaqa Inca descent groups was methodogically sound, descendants of different branches of the royal family and elite groups can disagree on many relevant historical questions. One wonders if, despite Nachtigal’s travels to Bagirmi predating European colonialism, his elite informants told him contradictory narratives about their past or the larger history of the Bagirmi royal dynasty. If so, Nachtigal’s retelling of it is far too “neat” and free of contradictions.

[2] See Alain Vivien, “Essai de concordance de cinq tables généalogiques du Baguirmi (Tchad)” in Journal de la Société des Africanistes, 1967, tome 37, fascicule 1. pp. 25-40.

[3] See Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 405. In other kings lists of Bagirmi, Burkomanda I is not listed, or he is conflated with Burkomanda Tad Lele, who reigned in the 1700s. See H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Bagirmi” in Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française 35, 1925 for an example of Burkomanda possibly listed as Osman, succeeding Omar (Oumar) and reigning 1612-1631. Escayrac de Lauture also evinced signs of confusion in his list of Bagirmi kings. For instance, his list of Bagirmi kings places Bourkoumanda, or Osman, after Abdala (Abdallah), and only assigns him a reign of 9 years. Yet his informant, presumably the Shaykh Ibrahim he met in Cairo who was believed to be a relative of the Bagirmi royal line, reported to him that Burkomanda defeated Wadai and captured their king. See Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, géographie naturelle et politique, histoire et ethnographie, moeurs et institutions de l'Empire des Fellatas, du Bornou, du Baguermi, du Waday, du Dar-Four, rédigé, d'après des renseignements entièrement nouveaux et accompagné d'une esquisse du Soudan oriental, 74-75.

[4] Ibid., 328, 403-404. For a different perspective on Bagirmi-Bulala relations, see Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Premier Tome, 298. In Carbou’s mind, it was the Kuka who once imposed tribute on the Fulani in what became Bagirmi during the 1400s. However, given the likely Fitri origins of the Bulala sultans ruling Kanem, they too may have exercised a loose suzerainty or influence on the Kuka state in the 1400s and early 1500s.

[5] John Lavers, “An Introduction to the History of Bagirmi,” Annals of Borno 1, 31.

[6] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 404.

[7] Ibid., 405.

[8] See Landeroin, “Notice historique,” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 380.

[9] See Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries,”  https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html. Tunjur traditions in Kanem suggest conflict with the Dala Afuno and Ramadan occurred in c. 1735, which is likely a century too late. A c. 1635 date is more plausible given the genealogy of the Kanem alifas based in Mao.

[10] See Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries (1890), 86.

[11] John Lavers, “An Introduction to the History of Bagirmi,” 34.

[12] Maurice Abadie, Afrique centrale: la colonie du Niger, 133. This could also be possible evidence of Bagirmi’s forces incorporating additional soldiers from their Bulala allies.

[13] See Bawuro M. Barkindo, The Mandara Sultanate to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 107, 111-112.

[14] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 307-308, 311. While Hagenbucher’s “Notes sur les Bilala” is essential reading, he dates Djil Esa Tubo to c. 1536 based on a problematic Bulala royal genealogy. Hagenbucher’s dates are too problematic and difficult to reconcile with the wider regional history of Fitri, Kanem, and Bagirmi during the 1530s. Instead, Djil Esa Tubo was more likely to arrive in the Fitri area during the 1630s, which matches the general c. 1630 dating for the arrival of the Tunjur in Kanem. After their defeat at the hands of the incoming Tunjur, the Bulala may have spent some time in Massoa, to the east of the Bahr el-Ghazal, before moving to Fitri. Whether or not the Bulala were asked to intervene there against the Kuka is unclear, but it could very well have involved Bagirmi military assistance. As for the question of Bagirmi interests in Kanem possibly being related to their ties to the Bulala sultans, the question remains ambiguous. Bagirmi sources certainly suggest the Bulala were reduced to vassals or tributaries, so it would seem Bagirmi’s actions in Kanem and Kawar were not motivated by a desire to restore the Bulala sultanate in Kanem. For a reference to Bagirmi’s overt conquest of the Bulala, see H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” 460. According to Lanier, who confused Burkomanda I with Burkomanda Tad Lele, “Il fit la guerre au sultans des Boulalas, conquit son pays, le soumit et donna à son nouveau vassal une de ses soeurs en mariage.” Either way, Burkomanda exerted some degree of influence over the Bulala in Fitri.

[15] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 405.

[16] Ibid., 406. For a speculative attempt at contextualizing the usage of bricks in Massenya, see Behique Dunama, “Speculating on Massenya and Bricks in Bagirmi,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/12/speculating-on-massenya-and-bricks-in.html.

[17] Religion may have provided an additional avenue for Bagirmi to assert its position within the Sudan. Umar b. Idris (c. 1619-1639) of Borno’s destruction of the first Kalumbardo forced Shaykh Waldede to flee for his life, returning to Bagirmi where the town of Bidderi had a long history of ties to Islamic scholarship (and the rulers of Bagirmi). See Behique Dunama, “Umar b. Idris (r.1619-1639) and the First Kalumbardo,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/umar-b-idris-r1619-1639-and-first.html. Though Nachtigal and other sources do not mention this in the context of Burkomanda’s reign, it would be interesting to explore how Umar b. Idris’s assault against the first Kalumbardo may have had political repercussions in Bagirmi. After all, if Waldede came from Bagirmi and had long-established ties to Bagirmi, including one associated with designing the palace, would Bagirmi’s rulers continue to look positively upon the Sayfawa? In terms of their own state’s Islamic legitimacy, they may have began to harbor more animosity against Borno’s ruler. Even more intriguing in this context is Wadai tradition linking the founder of the state, Abd el-Kerim, with Kalumbardo’s other leader as well as Bidderi in Bagirmi.

[18] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol 3., 405.

[19] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 312.

[20] Henri Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” 460.

[21] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 74-75.

[22] The only reference to anything close to a plague early in Wadai history is a cattle pestilence and drought during the reign of Ya’qub Arus (1681-1707, in Nachtigal’s chronology). See Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol. 4, 208.

[23] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 77.

[24] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 111.

[25] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 77.

Das Reich Bornu

 

Whilst revisiting various sources on Bagirmi and Wadai, we were reminded of a German article by Ulrich Seetzen. Based on interviews with natives of Waday in 1808 who passed through Cairo, Seetzen's informants provide a glimpse of parts of Sudanic Africa not well known in Europe. One of his informants, Hassan, helped Seetzen "map" out the larger region as he conceived it. Intriguingly, this Waday native seems to place Sennar, Fez (Morocco), and various other places within a larger Borno "empire." Clearly, as late as 1808, the stature and reputation of the Sayfawa across much of the African continent was still recognized, even from tributary or vassal states which were striking against Borno.

Thoughts on Lebeuf's Les principautés Kotoko: essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité

Les principautés Kotoko: essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité by Annie M.D. Lebeuf is rather difficult to "use" for those interested in the relations of the Kotoko states and Kanem-Borno. Despite Lebeuf's (and that of Griaule and her husband) work on both ethnographica and archaeological studies of the Lake Chad Basin, oral traditions are sadly vague on any kind of chronological precision. Consequently, Lebeuf engages in a deep discussion of myths heard in various Kotoko states, seeking to identify the symbolic meanings of these mythic origin tales. Doing so allows some insights into the nature of Kotoko cosmology and socio-political organization in the various principalities or states, like Logone-Birni or Makari. 

Unfortunately, this approach means that one is entering a terrain in which more exact notions of the historical development of the Kotoko states are elusive. The "Sao" period remembered as preceding the states as we know them is recalled through myth. Likewise, the long lists of names of Sao and post-Sao rulers of different Kotoko towns are just that, a list of names. Most, at least as understood by Lebeuf, have little or nothing specifically remembered about them beyond their names. As a result, Kotoko royal genealogies and oral traditions sadly cannot fill in much of the gap in the history of relations between the states of the Sayfawa (Kanem, and then Borno) and the so-called "Sao" or Kotoko principalities. 

Nonetheless, one can gleam some useful nuggets of information from Kotoko traditions. The royal families of Makari and Afade, for instance, were said to be of Kanuri Muslim extraction. Indeed, the first Muslim ruler of Afade, Assana or Meskeri Tchigo, was said to be the brother of Ousseini of Makari. To what extent they actually were of Kanuri origin is unclear, but Lebeuf's ethnographic observations often found foreign maternal ancestry among the Kotoko princes of recent times. More intriguing is the claim to Bulala origin of the first Muslim king of Goulfeil. Even if not entirely accurate, it attests to an instance of Bulala interest and possible expansion into this region south of Lake Chad, presumably during the 1300s-1500s.  Likewise, the Babalia ties of Gawi and through them to Yao in the Lake Fitri region is another interesting tradition, although difficult to place chronologically.  One can certainly detect the use of Kanuri titles and influences in some of the Kotoko states, perhaps beginning or expanding after the rise of Muslim dynasties. For instance, the possible Kanuri influence in Makari and Afade was certainly established by the 1500s, although Borno traditions point to contacts by the 1300s (see H.R. Palmer's work for the relevant traditions). This influence even affected Kotoko myth to some extent, with the bull, turtle, and primordial waters story appearing here. But Kotoko traditions remain very ambiguous when it comes to the specific details of relations with their northern neighbors from Kanem and Borno. 

In other respects, there are broadly shared regional commonalities among the Kotoko states, Bagirmi, Wadai, Kanem and Borno. For example, the central role of the nguva, or dendal, is shared between the Kotoko towns and cities of Borno. The centrality of the palace is also important, although in this region the Kotoko masons did not apply brick. Instead, their palace complexes and monumental gudu or guti were made of earth. Nonetheless, the emphasis on monumental architecture that, to Lebeuf at least, symbolized the meeting of the sky and the earth, could match the role of monumental mosques used in Wadai, Borno, and Bagirmi. To what extent moieties and quarter systems seen in Kotoko towns correspond with similar notions in Kanem, Borno, Wadai and Bagirmi is a topic we shall have to explore in the future.

What of the Kotoko states themselves? To Lebeuf, analysis of myths of origin and their symbolism provide the key. The foundation myths often refer to hunters and fishmen, the fusion of distinct populations in one region, and the sacrifice of children by representatives of the two populations. Animal symbolism is also key here, with the varan and serpents or other animals often appearing in tales. The "Sao" are accorded an important place here in these origin stories, often associated with the founders of towns like Makari. Over time, larger towns existed as agglomerations of communities walled their settlements after unifying. The Kotoko princes, to use Lebeuf's vocabulary, were sometimes seen as descendants of outsiders who forged alliances with the local people. This is perhaps why the gumsu was often chosen from among the descendants of the first families of a town or city, to maintain this pact between the dynastic line and the original settlers. Interestingly, however, succession in the Kotoko states usually passed to sons of slave women. Complex age grades were used as well as the moieties or quarter system to organize the people of the towns themselves. 

Over time, some began to increase their power over their neighbors, but the Kotoko states were never unified into a single polity. Instead, 3 broader sub-regions appear, with Makari as the dominant state in Mandague, Mser led by Kousseri, and Lagouane under Logone-Birni domination. This was not always the case, since Houlouf was remembered as once being a powerful state. A close study of references to the Kotoko states in Bagirmi, Bulala, Borno and Mandara traditions and chronicles will undoubtedly shed more light on this.

Overall, Lebeuf's work remains important for attempting to center Kotoko myths, symbolism and ethnographic fieldwork. Undoubtedly, archaeology will remain central for understanding the deep history of this region and the so-called "Sao" often associated with the early period of the Kotoko states. Nonetheless, a thorough examination, comparison and analysis of references to the Kotoko states in the historical traditions of its neighbors can shed more light. Sadly, Lebeuf scarcely attempted this. Except for some more recent history still partly recalled in Kotoko traditions on the expansionist activities of Logone-Birni by the 1760s, little else is remembered specifically. Future research on this region must include attempts at triangulation of disparate traditions as well as a  reexamination of all the relevant written sources from neighboring states. 

Thoughts on Yusuf of Katsina

Part of Landeroin's list of Katsina rulers from Documents scientifiques de la Mission Tilho

Whilst revisiting various sources on relations between Kano and Borno over the last several weeks, our interest in Katsina has been rekindled. However, the inaccessibility of many of the detailed studies of its history has largely limited our readings on its past to Landeroin, Palmer and Yusufu Bala Usman. Dankoussou's Katsina: traditions historiques des Katsinaawaa après la Jihad is also a great resource, drawing upon rich oral traditions. Sadly, his chronology is hard to reconcile with other sources and contains additional problems. This is unfortunate, since Katsina was one of the most important Hausa kingdoms in the centuries before the jihad. 

Part of the problem with even making sense of its history and its connection with Borno is the difficulty of establishing a timeline. Palmer used some Arabic manuscripts listing the kings of Katsina as well as the Kano Chronicle and other sources. Yusufu Bala Usman likewise utilized similar written lists. Others, such as Landeroin and Issaka Dankoussou draw more from oral traditions. Indeed, Dankoussou's list of Katsina kings is similar to that of Landeroin, collected at the beginning of the 1900s. Hunwick has also drawn from some manuscripts to revise our chronology of Katsina kings, but it is less useful for the 1500s. Unfortunately, no manuscripts have come to light from the Fazzan, which could shed light on Katsina's kings since more than once Awlad Muhammad sultan fled to Katsina during troubles with Tripoli. 

But the particular Katsina sarki we are interested in, Yusuf, was given a relatively lengthy reign by Dankoussou and Landeroin. Landeroin reported that Youssoufou reigned 14 years, while Dankoussou also dated his reign 1599-1613. Both concur that Yusuf succeeded Ibrahim Maje and preceded Abdul Kadir (or Abdoul Kerim, in Landeroin's list). Where they disagree most glaringly is in the very long reign Dankoussou assigned to Ibrahim Maje (1531-1599). Landeroin only reported a reign of 18 years. 

When one looks upon Palmer and Yusufu Bala Usman's work, a different picture emerges. Palmer's "History of Katsina" does not even include Yusuf among the list of kings, despite collating different kinglists. Instead, his list jumps from "Maje Ibrahim" (dated 1494-1520) to Abdul Karim and Ashafa. Intriguingly, his list concurs with Landeroin on the exceedingly short reign of Ashafa (8 days to 1 week). Later, Usman's study of Katsina history did include Yusuf, relying on an oral informant for what was supposedly a brief reign. If Usman's dating is correct, Yusuf reigned c. 1562 or 1563 before his deposition or abdication. One cannot help but wonder if Usman's informant was actually mistaking Yusuf for Ashafa. Moreover, Usman also changes the order of succession, having Yusuf succeed Abd al-Karim. 

Ultimately, one may why any of this matters? Well, according to Dankoussou, Borno attacked Katsina during the reign of Yusuf. If this tradition has any merit, one would like to have a better chronology for Yusuf and to determine if it was part of any larger campaigns launched from Borno into Hausaland. One would also be interested in knowing what role, if any, Borno played in the abdication or deposition of Yusuf (assuming that is not a mistaken tradition confusing him with Ashafa). In addition, we also find problematic the dates used by Usman for Muhammad Wari (c. 1575-1587). According to Dankoussou, Kwararafa attacked Katsina during the reign of Muhammad Wari, and his dates (1625-1637) "fit" more evenly with that period of Kwararafa aggression against northern states (mentioned in the Kano Chronicle for the reign of Muhammad Zaki, c. 1582-1618). Until we have a better chronology of Katsina's history that can be corroborated by different texts or oral traditions, much of its history before the jihad will remain elusive.

Muhammad Kisoki and Borno

            The altercation between Borno and Kano during the reign of the latter’s Muhammad Kisoki is an intriguing example of conflict between the two states. Although there are some chronological ambiguities that require attention, Yusufu Bala Usman has connected Kisoki’s raid on Nguru with the Kano campaign of Borno during the time of Idris Alooma. According to Ahmad b. Furtu, a highly biased but contemporary source, Kano had “betrayed” Borno through fortifying towns or sites on their border with Borno and launching attacks. In response, Borno raised an army which destroyed the fortifications or walls and then failed to take Kano itself.[1] Importantly, the opposing side’s perspective can be glimpsed through the Kano Chronicle. Thus, one does not have to rely solely or mainly on Ahmad b. Furtu’s panegyrical text for his patron, unlike the case of most of the other peoples Borno went to war against during the lengthy reign of Idris Alooma. Therefore, this brief article shall examine Borno-Kano relations during the reign of Muhammad Kisoki, focusing on the raids launched from Kano against Borno and the response. This post argues that Muhammad Kisoki’s eastern raids likely correspond to the campaigns described by Ahmad b. Furtu and were autonomous Kano initiatives rather than part of a Kebbi-led regional conflict.

By examining this episode more closely, however, one sees yet again the influence of Maidaki Hauwa (and her brother, Guli) in a confrontation with Borno. Maidaki Hauwa had previously been involved with suppressing a revolt by the Dagachi in Kano, someone descended from the Sayfawa line and very influential. After preventing his rebellion, her son, Abdullahi, returned from a campaign and then faced an invasion from Borno. Undoubtedly linked to the Dagachi’s actions, Kano’s king, accompanied by mallams, had to submit to the mai. Then, once the mai returned to Borno, Abdullahi tricked or deceived the Dagachi and gave his office to a slave.[2] Although taking place several years before the Borno-Kano conflict during Idris Alooma’s reign (1564-1596, according to Lange’s chronology), it is very likely that Kisoki’s influential grandmother and her brother, whose influence at court was extremely powerful, shaped Kano state policy with regard to the frontier with Borno. By taking another look at this critical juncture, one can see just how realpolitik shaped relations between a regional power like Borno and the smaller Hausa states which, depending on one’s view, paid tribute or sent regular “gifts” to the mai.

But can we confidently date Muhammad Kisoki’s attacks on Borno with the reign of Idris Alooma? The two only overlapped, using Lange’s chronology and the dates in the Kano Chronicle, c. 1564-1565. Dierk Lange has suggested that the conflict with Kano occurred early in Idris b. Ali’s reign, perhaps in c. 1564, but other sources suggest the mai went on a pilgrimage to Mecca at this time.[3] Since our dates for Kisoki and Idris Alooma are approximations and other king lists of Kano give Kisoki’s predecessor a slightly longer list, one could possibly make the case for a longer period of overlapping reigns.[4] The other problem with Kisoki’s Borno conflict occurring during the reign of Idris Alooma is the praise song mentioning his grandmother, Hauwa. She could have been alive in the 1560s as a very aged woman, but some may prefer to date this period of conflict to an earlier decade in Kisoki’s lengthy reign.

The other issue with establishing a clearer chronology is the, quite frankly, mess made by previous generations of scholars interested in this part of the world. For instance, M.G. Smith, without a single source to back his speculative reasoning, suggested that Kisoki’s raiding of Borno territory may have been done in conjunction with the Kanta of Kebbi. Without any firm evidence and relying upon later sources and traditions of the power and stature of the Kanta in this part of West Africa, Smith has argued that Kisoki may have been the Kanta’s representative in central Hausaland. Consequently, Kisoki’s raid may be associated with Kebbi’s larger conflict with Borno. Building this possible theory on flimsy foundations, Smith then tentatively dates Kisoki’s attack on Nguru to 1544.[5]

Although Smith is merely suggesting possible regional scenarios to contextualize the wars and raiding between the major states in the Central Sudan, this is hardly supported by the source materials. While Muhammad Bello in the 1800s wrote of Kebbi conquering other Hausa states like Kano in the 1500s, it is very difficult to detect any of this in the Kano Chronicle or the Bornoan records. The Chronicle actually portrays Kisoki as the ruler of all of Hausaland. Indeed, according to this same source, “He waged war on Birnin Unguru because of Agaidam.”[6] This last word brings to mind Geidam in modern Nigeria, to the east of Nguru. This area may have been a source of contention as Borno was facing an extended famine during Abd Allah b. Dunama’s reign (c. 1557-1564).[7] This could have been influenced by the wars between Borno and Kebbi, as well as the distractions Borno faced from the Bulala to the east in Kanem and local revolts by the Sao in Borno and other groups. Seeing an advantageous position to strike, Kisoki (or perhaps his grandmother’s brother, who was extremely influential in the royal court) may have envisioned Kano extending further east. Certainly, booty in horses and textiles were desirable since Kisoki ordered no captives taken from Nguru.

Furthermore, utilizing all the various sources on the Kanta of Kebbi and his negative relations with Borno suggests a large-scale confrontation in which Borno attempted to besiege Surame took place in c. 1561. Traditions referring to this do not reference Kano at all. In fact, it was on Katsina territory the Bornoan forces engaged in combat with the Kanta.[8] This is highly suggestive of Kano’s actions against Borno likely being autonomous responses of the state to Borno and perceived weaknesses on its western borderlands with Kano.

For these aforementioned reasons, one is inclined to agree with Yusufu Bala Usman. Usman, in a largely insightful article on the history of relations between Borno and the Hausa states, correctly identified Kisoki’s raids with the ones described by Ahmad b. Furtu. Moreover, as Furtu writes, these raids were a “betrayal” by the people of Kano. As for the Kano Chronicle, Kano attacked Nguru because “it is the will of God.”[9] Usman’s reasoning here is not entirely clear, but the raids from Kano and the reference to the building of walls or fortifications around various towns in the Kano kingdom  are consistent with the actions of Kisoki. After all, by improving defenses on his eastern frontier, forces from Kano could more safely engage in raids or attacks on western Borno or its vassal provinces, then retreat to secure sites if pursued or followed. Over time, this could have led to a gradual increase in Kano’s influence and possible territorial gains to the east. One suspects the “will of God” as a justification of war was designed to show Kisoki as waging just war against various subject peoples of Borno who were not necessarily Muslims.

Agreeing with Usman also allows one to gain some insight into how both sides viewed their actions. One already knows the Borno perspective, even if Ahmad b. Furtu was not an eyewitness to the Kano campaign. He nonetheless wrote an explanation for the campaign based on Kano and its fortified towns like Kirza, Kalmasan, Majiya, Ukluya, Dulu, Awazaki, Ajiyajiya, Sa’iyya, Galaki and Kay. To Furtu, they not only fortified many settlements, but “resorted to abominable cunning and vile deeds.”[10] The conflict ended with the “many” expeditions launched against Kano, including Majagani. These expeditions led to the destruction of fortifications while the residents fled. Unfortunately, most of these expeditions are not described in detail and after the destruction of Majiya’s fortifications, the Bornoan forces were allegedly able to dismantle the walls and fortresses placed around other towns with little or no resistance. It is very unlikely that the ruler of Kano would have sat idly by, even if the musketry of Borno proved very effective against Majiya’s defenders. Overall, Furtu’s account seems to suggest Kano began this process of fortifying towns and launching raids before the reign of Idris Alooma, especially since the labor and resources necessary to build walls around several towns or cities could hardly have been accomplished in a short amount of time.

The Kano Chronicle, likely written in the late 1800s, lacks this level of detail but understandably highlights the moment of Kisoki’s victory as Borno failed to take Kano city. As previously mentioned, Muhammad Kisoki ordered the raiding of Nguru, a town which was the capital of the powerful galadimas of Borno by the 1600s. Murray Last has read the account of this as symbolic warfare, playing with the idea of the Kanuri word for the Hausa, afuno, and arse-clothes or nudity. After all, Kisoki did not take captives but focused on horses and clothes.[11] However, this symbolic meaning may not be relevant if Kisoki was endeavoring to present himself as a legitimate Muslim ruler not willing to take Muslim captives. Indeed, even Ahmad b. Furtu portrayed his patron similarly. Next, the Chronicle explains how the ruler of Borno then sought to attack Birnin Kano the following year, but failed to take the town. This led to an extended praise song which even included Maidaki Hauwa as the “old lady with swaggering gait, old lady of royal blood, guarded by men-at-arms.”[12] By praising Kisoki as the “physic of Bornu and the Chiratawa,” one can also surmise that Kano’s war with Borno involved Shira. Despite this victory of sorts, or at least the failure of the attempted assault on Kano, Kisoki invited prominent shaykhs from Borno anyway.[13] One may surmise here that Borno was still perceived as a source of reputable Islamic scholars and religious figures, Kano’s rulers were entrenching their own state legitimacy through war and Islam.

Ultimately, both sides could claim some degree of victory. Kano was able to withstand a military attack on its capital from its powerful neighbor. Borno, on the other hand, secured its western frontier by destroying fortifications and weakening Kano’s ability to launch deeper raids into Borno. Doing so inevitably aided the economy through the increased security for traders and travelers. It likewise made it easier for Borno to focus on internal rebellious groups and the Bulala to the east for a number of Kanem expeditions. Kano, meanwhile, was able to protect its capital and, unlike Abdullahi, Kisoki did not have humble himself before the mai. This expresses a growth in the political stature of the sarki who could meet the Sayfawa as a peer. Lastly, an attempt at revisiting the various sources on this encounter does support Kisoki’s raiding activities to the east as likely to be the same as those mentioned by Ahmad b. Furtu. Furtu’s account is too brief and not backed by eyewitness testimony. But based on the scale of operations and the necessary shovels, hoes, and implements to destroy town walls at various sites and then to attack Kano’s capital, the Kano expeditions must have been large and time-consuming.

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[1] See Dierk Lange, A Sudanic chronicle: the Borno Expeditions of Idrīs Alauma (1564–1576 according to the account of Ahmad b. Furtū. Arabic text, English translation, commentary and geographical gazetteer for a detailed translation of Ahmad b. Furtu’s text.

[2] For an attempt at making sense of the Dagachi and his descendants in Kano and their impact on Kano-Borno relations, see Behique Dunama, “The Dagachi of Kano: Elite Exiles, Political Centralization, and Kano-Borno Relations,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2026/03/the-dagachi-of-kano-elite-exiles.html.

[3] See Dierk Lange, A Sudanic Chronicle, 69.

[4] See Paul E. Lovejoy and John Hunwick, “Not Yet the Kano Chronicle,” Sudanic Africa 4 (1993) for different regnal years for Kano’s rulers. One manuscript assigns Abdullahi, Kisoki’s father, a reign of 12 years instead of the 10 in the Kano Chronicle.

[5] M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350-1950, 140-141.

[6] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 38 (1908), 79.

[7] See Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 80.

[8] For a discussion of the various sources on Kebbi and Borno in the 1500s, see Behique Dunama, “The Kanta of Kebbi and Borno.” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/12/the-kanta-of-kebbi-and-borno.html.

[9] Yusuf Bala Usman, “A Reconsideration of the History of Relations Between Borno and Hausaland Before 1804” in Yusufu Bala Usman & Muhammad Nur Alkali (editors), Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno, 183-184.

[10] Dierk Lange, A Sudanic Chronicle, 66-67.

[11] Murray Last, “From Sultanate to Caliphate: Kano, 1450–1800 A.D.”  in Bawuro M. Barkindo (ed.), Studies in Kano History, 72.

[12] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 79.

[13] This may have predated the Kano campaign of Borno.