Speculating on L'Empire de Ghana: le Wagadou et les traditions de Yéréré

Although we must revisit this work and engage in a deeper reading of the different recorded versions of Soninke oral traditions on Wagadu, Germaine Dieterlen's L'Empire de Ghana: le Wagadou et les traditions de Yéréré raises a number of intriguing questions about the extent we can reconstruct this distant past. Beginning with a translation of Diarra Sylla's rendition of this past as a gessere, Dieterlen then provides additional context and attempts a wider analysis of the ancient empire of Ghana (Wagadu). To some extent, she drew on the ethnographic present as well as cultural practices and rites among the Bambara, Dogon, and other West African peoples. This makes her interpretation of the institutions, social structure, and culture of Wagadu necessarily speculative.

In spite of some of these pitfalls in researching a period in pre-colonial West African history that is only partly covered in external Arabic sources, Dieterlen confirmed some of our own past theories. For instance, a cult of sorts to the vulture and hyena was part of the Soninke ritual calendar. According to Dieterlen, on the second moon of the Soninke's calendar, the wage (noble clans) gathered with their gessere to offer sacrifices to the hyena, an animal tied to their oath to Kaya Maga. Remember, the hyena played a role in assisting Diabe in Soninke tradition. There was also a special regard for the fox, it being a taboo for wage to kill this particular animal. Even the dog was the subject of taboos for the wage. For instance, they were not allowed to marry people who ate or sacrificed dogs, presumably due to the dog that accompanied the legendary ancestor, Dinga. One cannot help but wonder if the dogs with collars of gold and fine jewelry in the palace of the Ghana kings was in memory of this? Unsurprisingly, al-Bakri was likely ignorant of this, but informants told him of the palace dogs with richly decorated collars.

Besides these aforementioned taboos, Dieterlen offered some additional information on Kumbi and the Wagadu kingdom. Presumably based on her informant, she reported that Kumbi, the capital, had fifty-one quarters. Koumbi Saleh was allegedly the quarter for the market associated with caravan trade. The imperial quarter was supposedly called Kalaata, presumably the al-Ghaba of al-Bakri. There was even a quarter or section associated with the gessere. A glimpse of the different social classes or ranks in Wagadu can be seen in the description of four types of royal drums. Essentially, the major groups were the nobles, clan chiefs, slaves, and the people (commoners?). A distinct drum was used to call each of these types of residents in the capital city. Although it is difficult to see where the number of fifty-one quarters or neighborhoods came from, the number is probably meant to be symbolic or merely to suggest a huge concentration of people living within a larger capital district. That is very likely to have been true, as al-Bakri's description of the capital as two cities, one for Muslims and another for the king, with continuous habitations between, fits this.

In terms of the administration of the state, Dieterlen provided additional clues. The Koussa, for instance, participated in collecting gold for the king. Other Koussa were Koussa Tounkara, who assisted in organizing official ceremonies for the rulers of Wagadu. Another role attached to spiritual powers like access to ancestors through trance and the fabrication of ritual objects began with Djourou Tandjigo, an artisan in the times of Diabe. In addition, there were fade and hida, the governors or chiefs of provinces within Wagadu. Dumbe and djuwara were said to have been generals or military leaders. The Cisse clan which allegedly produced the most kings. A number of wage or noble clans were tied to specific provinces or regions, such as a figure remembered as Diamera Sokona, son of a fade named Birama, at Nakhata (interestingly, this figure was also said to have been the first to offer a woman to the Bida snake). Supposedly, control of territories included administration of land, markets, livestock, hunting grounds, and water sources, meaning these administrators had a lot of power over the areas under their remit. As for the military chiefs, Dieterlen suggested that these were the nana, a word possibly distorted in Arabic sources as Ghana.

But what of the known history of Wagadu as a state? Or its dynastic genealogy? Here contradictions abound as different versions of oral traditions disagree on details. Dieterlen presented Wagadu as dominated by the Cisse, beginning with Diabe as the first king based at Koumbi. Inexplicably, there were thirty-three of these Cisse kings before a member of the Toure clan became the 34th king. The Toure, who were associated with the power to control water, seized the kingdom with Moudou Toure at the head. A Muslim, Moudou Toure enjoyed support from some of the local Kakolo clans and Diane and Koma clans. Elsewhere, it is claimed that Madyou Toure was the last to reign, though it is unclear what his relationship was to Moudou Toure. Prior to this, one of the 5 Cisse clans apparently dominated rulership, the Kharesi. But the switch to the Toure may have led to a change in capitals and greater Islamization as the first Muslim kings (in the late 11th century, according to Arabic sources). One may interpret this as the rise to prominence of an Islamic noble clan in Wagadu, evidence of which can be found in external Arabic sources on Wagadu in the 1100s and 1200s. Even Zafun allegedly entered the picture, where the older brother of Diabe left when Diabe succeeded Dinga. This Cisse brother married a woman of the Dyafone clan of Dyafounou, suggesting links between Zafun and Wagadu began early in Ghana's history.

However, a looming question remains. Can one reconcile Dieterlen's reconstruction of the kingdom's past with other sources? Her text includes a few other variants of the Soninke tale of Kumbi and the dispersal from Wagadu after the killing of Bida. Some of these other sources provide a different king list for Wagadu. One named the Wagadu kings as Khaya Makha Sise, Wakane Sakho, Damera Sokhna, Gumane Fade, Sero Khumma (all brothers of Diabe, the first king). Then leadership passed to the family of D'ariso, beginning a new line of kings: Kambine, Suleyman, Bannabubu, Wagadu Makha II, Gane, Musa, Biramu, and then a disastrous civil war. Needless to say, some of the people considered kings here were supposedly noble governors or warrior leaders in Sylla and Dieterlen's version of events. We also wonder about Biramu, a name which sounds close to Birama. But once the D'ariso lineage succeeded, one notes father to son inheritance (6 generations) and the appearance of Islamic names. If the civil war which followed the reign of Biramu, among his own sons no less, involved a warrior from D'ara in Tiraka, then this could have been the moment of an Islamic faction seizing the throne. Tiraka, after all, had been an important center for trade to Ghana, Tadmakka, and other groups, with a Wangara population also there attested by some external Arabic sources. This raises the legitimate question of how to interpret the dynastic and/or religious change in Wagadu's leadership in the 11th century. It is tempting to see traditions of a Toure clan Muslim becoming king with the support of some elements within the kingdom (and possible support from the Almoravids).

Ultimately, Dieterlen's book raises more questions than it can possibly answer. Yet the connections she makes to other West African cultures and the Soninke ethnographic present can give the reader new ways to think about the history of pre-Islamic Wagadu. The clear role of the "traditional" religion as the legitimizing ideology behind kingship and the worldview of the people, as well as the strong role played by lineage in creating and distributing hierarchies, rank, and identities is worth exploring.

On the Great Mosque of Djenne

 

We recently saw this short video from a 2005 BBC program on Djenne, Mali. The video shows parts of the Great Mosque of Djenne that are not often shown, such as the system of ventilation on the roof of the structure. It is truly remarkable as an example of mud architecture.

Early Gao or Kawkaw (AI-Written)

What follows below is an attempt to use AI to write a short essay on a topic based on our notes. The notes in question were written based on several academic publications we read a few years ago. Sadly, the free version of ChatGPT was unable to reproduce proper citations before we used up the free access to the best version. Nonetheless, we thought it would be worthwhile to show what it is capable of doing with information we fed to it. After some time, we will ask it to revise this again using whatever additional sources it can access. A link to our notes that are the basis of this can be found here. Naturally, take everything below with a grain of salt as it is entirely written by AI...

The early history of the Songhay and the rise of Gao (known to medieval Arabic writers as Kawkaw) illustrate the development of one of West Africa’s earliest powerful political centers. Located along the Niger River at the point where Saharan caravan routes met fertile riverine settlements, Gao emerged as a dominant regional hub before and during the early second millennium CE. Arabic geographers, although writing from afar and often relying on merchant testimony, consistently presented Gao as a sovereign kingdom that exercised influence over multiple subject peoples. Archaeological evidence, particularly from Gao-Saney, reinforces this image by revealing craft specialization, foreign imports, and signs of urban stratification. Yet the limited availability of contemporary written sources means historians must critically combine archaeology, oral tradition, and later West African chronicles to reconstruct this period. Through this synthesis, a picture emerges of a culturally dynamic society grounded in indigenous traditions but strengthened by the adoption of Islam and long-distance trade.

Well before the rise of Gao as a trans-Saharan commercial center, the Niger Bend supported communities that relied on the river’s abundant resources. The Sorko, known as expert fishers and boatbuilders, and the Gow, skilled hunters of hippopotamus and other dangerous river animals, formed some of the earliest identifiable groups associated with Songhay. Their craft specialization facilitated trade along the river and created patterns of settlement that anchored early political formation. Matrilineal descent was a defining feature of these river societies. Authority passed not solely from father to son but through the mother’s lineage, which ensured that elite women played essential roles in validating leadership transitions. Religious life centered on spirits connected to water, the riverbed, and animal life. Kingship was sacred, and rulers derived legitimacy from their roles as intermediaries with supernatural forces. Such cultural foundations did not disappear with the arrival of Islam; instead, these Sudanic social structures shaped the ways Islam was received and practiced.

Songhay historical memory, preserved in later chronicles, places the earliest ruling seat at Kukiya, downriver from Gao. The Zuwa (or Za) dynasty, said to descend from a foreign ancestor or hero figure, represents the first political lineage acknowledged by tradition. Oral narratives speak of battles between these early kings and powerful river spirits, sometimes depicted as fish demons, symbolizing struggles over control of ritual authority and sacred space within the community. Archaeological discoveries in the Bentyia–Kukiya region, including early Muslim burials, suggest that the site was not isolated nor purely mythical. Instead, Kukiya appears to have been a substantial multiethnic settlement that was already interacting with Islamic traders by at least the 11th to 12th centuries. Over time, as trade networks intensified and Gao’s geographic advantages became more important, political power shifted northward, indicating a gradual process of state consolidation rather than abrupt replacement.

By the 8th–9th centuries CE, Gao emerged clearly in Arabic writings as a capital city and political force. The geographer al-Yaqubi noted that the king of Kawkaw ruled a number of subject peoples, including desert-dwelling Sanhaja nomads. This claim aligns with archaeological findings showing that Gao was integrated into long-distance economic systems. Gao’s prosperity stemmed strongly from trans-Saharan trade. Caravans from Tadmekka, Kawar, and the Fezzan arrived with salt — a critical commodity that held both economic and political value. In return, Songhay merchants and rulers exported copper, ivory, animal products, and enslaved captives. These exchanges linked Gao to the wider Islamic world stretching from North Africa to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Excavations at Gao-Saney have revealed copper-working furnaces, imported pottery and glass beads, and architectural features suggesting elite compounds. Such evidence confirms that Gao was not merely a waystation but a thriving production and consumption center. The kingdom’s ability to control trade routes and levy taxes or tribute helped consolidate political authority and population growth.

Islam did not arrive in Gao through conquest but through commerce and diplomacy. By the 10th–11th centuries, rulers known by the title Qanda (or Kanda) had converted to Islam, according to al-Bakri. Their subjects, however, largely maintained traditional beliefs and cult practices. Gao thus existed at this time as a dual-religious polity, with two towns: one Islamic and one that upheld indigenous spirituality. This structure demonstrates a transitional phase when kings embraced Islam’s advantages for diplomacy and legitimacy while still depending on traditional bases of ritual power among their people. Notably, Islamization appears to have been elite-driven. Conversion supported alliances with North African Muslims and facilitated smooth trade relations. But kings continued to rely on matrilineal structures to ensure dynastic stability, which reflects the persistence of indigenous frameworks for rule.

A political transformation became visible in the late 11th and early 12th centuries. The names of rulers that appear in Arabic texts vanish, and new rulers known as the Zaghe/Za emerge prominently in the archaeological record. Royal tombstones found at Gao-Saney are inscribed with Arabic prayers and titles such as malik (king) and malika (queen). Some of these funerary stelae were carved from marble imported from Almeria in Islamic Spain, revealing direct commercial and cultural connections with the wider Muslim world. This new leadership reinforced Islam at the highest levels of authority while retaining Songhay’s matrilineal basis of succession. The prominent burial of queens indicates that elite women were not diminished by Islam but remained central to the legitimacy of rulers. These developments mark Gao’s first clearly documented period of Islamic monarchy, accompanied by a flourishing of intellectual and cultural engagement beyond the Sahara.

Gao’s influence extended beyond commerce. Medieval accounts record that its rulers engaged in conflicts with the Ghana Empire to the west and Kanem to the east. These wars were not merely territorial but economic, driven by competition for control of trade corridors, especially those linking goldfields, salt mines, and northern markets. Warfare and diplomacy were tools to secure and manage tribute from both riverine and desert communities. Gao’s growing military power suggests a centralized administrative apparatus capable of organizing cavalry and riverine forces. That capacity would later form the basis of Songhay’s imperial strength under Sunni Ali.

Islam in Gao did not override existing beliefs. Instead, the two systems merged into a culturally hybrid form of statecraft. Rulers valued Islamic law, Arabic literacy, and international alliances, while also maintaining sacred ceremonial roles rooted in Sudanic cosmology. Spirit possession, public ritual, and matrilineal inheritance endured. This dual legitimacy — Islamic and indigenous — made Gao’s political structure both flexible and resilient. Rather than abolishing entrenched social customs, Islam was used to reinforce monarchy and expand bureaucratic functions, especially in commerce, taxation, and diplomatic communication.

Reconstructing early Songhay history requires attention to the nature of the available sources. Arabic geographers provide some of the earliest written references to Gao, but their works contain gaps and uncertainties because they relied heavily on second-hand information. Archaeology offers concrete material evidence of urban development and Islamic influence but remains limited to sites that have been excavated, especially around Gao-Saney. Oral traditions preserve indigenous perspectives and cultural meanings but contain mythic elements and were shaped by later political contexts. The Tarikh al-Sudan and Tarikh al-Fattash, written centuries later, reflect Songhay’s imperial ideology rather than early history. Despite these limitations, the convergence of evidence strongly indicates that Gao was a powerful and Islamizing state by the 11th century, rooted in earlier indigenous cultural institutions. Continual comparison of sources allows historians to create a clearer, though still evolving, understanding of this crucial period.

By the beginning of the 12th century, Gao had emerged as a thriving urban center with solid economic, military, and religious foundations. Its rulers commanded long-distance trade networks, projected force against rival states, and served as guardians of both Islamic and indigenous authority. These achievements ensured that Gao remained influential even when incorporated into the Mali Empire in the 13th and 14th centuries. When the Sunni dynasty restored independence in the 15th century and expanded to create the Songhay Empire, they built upon centuries of state formation and a tradition of political innovation rooted in the early history of Gao. The foundations of one of West Africa’s greatest empires began not with sudden transformation, but through gradual evolution driven by commerce, culture, and hybrid spirituality.

L’empire du Wagadu: état de la question

Boubacar Séga Diallo's L’empire du Wagadu: état de la question was rather underwhelming. We were expecting a condensed version of his thesis that draws more heavily on Soninke oral traditions, linguistics, and archaeology to sketch a fuller picture of the historical state of Ghana (Wagadu) known from external Arabic sources. However, the reader mainly receives a summary on the history of Wagadu with occasional references to oral traditions, archaeological evidence from Kumbi or Mali, and some undefended assertions about topics like the antiquity of caste or the prevalence of slavery in ancient Soninke society. Perhaps, if Diallo's thesis is published, the reader can benefit from a West African scholars deep exploration of Soninke tradition in light of other types of evidence. Without that, we are sadly left with a very brief summary that also repeats the typical line of Almoravid victory over Ghana. It would also have been interesting if the author tried to speculate about the magico-religious powers of the rulers of Wagadu and how that shaped the political structure of the state.

Rouch's Contribution to the History of Songhay

Jean Rouch's Contribution à l'histoire des Songhay is rather outdated yet still useful for insights on Songhay history and culture. A reputable ethnographer who studied Songhay religion and magic extensively, Rouch's understanding of their history unsurprisingly emphasizes Islam as an alien element that laid the foundations for the collapse of the Askia. Despite this problematic frame for Songhay history, Rouch's work is one of the best earlier attempts to make sense of Songhay history from its shadowy early origins at Kukiya to the late colonial period. 

Unfortunately, Rouch repeated some of the mistakes of Delafosse and early colonial scholars. For instance, the Za dynasty were said to have been Christianized Lemta Berbers who left Tripolitania around 670. In addition, the early state of Ghana (Wagadu) is attributed to Judaeo-Syrian colonists. These mistakes inhibit a deeper understanding of early Songhay, one which clearly indicates an important role for the Sorko, Gow, and farming populations living near and along the Niger as the foundation of the first Songhay polity. This later inhibits Rouch's analysis of the Za, Si, and Askia dynasties since Islam, promoted by Askia Muhammad, is blamed for the fall of Songhay. Sonni Ali, on the other hand, was the champion of a "black" state that brought Songhay to its zenith, something commemorated in Songhay oral traditions, religion, and Rouch's problematic view of Islam's relations with Songhay religion. 

Of course, later scholars have benefitted from new approaches to the Timbuktu chronicles, epigraphic evidence from Bentia & Gao, as well as archaeological excavations at Gao and other sites in Mali to throw into question a number of theories held as gospel in Rouch's day. The picture that emerges now is one far more dynamic and one that calls into question some of the older generation's stereotypes of Kukiya as the fount of "black" Songhay paganism and even the historicity of Ali Kulun. Nonetheless, Rouch's insights are occasionally insightful here, particularly his proposed translations for Za dynasty rulers recorded in the Timbuktu chronicles. His familiarity with Songhay oral tradition and religion also adds a new dimension to the ways in which Sonni Ali and other rulers are remembered for building their empires through military conquests aided by magic or occult knowledge. 

1000 Years of Economic Growth and Regression on the Middle Niger

Le développement et la régression chez les peuples de la boucle du Niger à l'époque précolonial by Michael Tymowski is an ambitious work. An attempt to make sense of around 1000 years of economic progress and regression along a key part of the Western Sudan (centered on the Middle Niger), Tymowski relies heavily on the Timbuktu chronicles, external Arabic sources, and oral traditions. He persuasively makes the case for economic development with the growth of urban centers, limited private land tenure, and accelerated long-distance trade, which later declined in the 1600s and 1700s. This shows that the history of "development" in sub-Saharan African areas has always been dynamic, and not simply one of timeless "backwardness" or irrelevance. 

However, Tymowski's study is quite outdated and relies on French translations of sources in Arabic. It also relies heavily on Jean Rouch and other somewhat outdated scholarship on Songhay ethnography and oral traditions, even repeating the unproven claim that the Dia/Za dynasty of early Songhay rulers were actually Lemta Berbers. In addition, he heavily relied on the problematic Tarikh al-Fattash chronicle for assertions about servile/caste populations. This dependence on French translations of Arabic sources and outmoded scholarship on Songhay ethnography and oral traditions suggest possible limitations of Tymowski's study. While one must acknowledge that the aforementioned Timbuktu chronicles are probably reliable for the 1400s and 1500s (at least more so than for earlier centuries), Tymowski's attempt to derive meaningful conclusions or theories about the economic development of the Mali Empire and Songhay Empire may be misleading or problematic. Nonetheless, there are a number of intriguing ideas about the relationship between the towns (Gao, Djenne, Timbuktu) and the countryside, as well as the role of the state in promoting land tenure arrangements along the lines of property property or through state domains (those of the askias) that controlled and promoted the redistribution of goods.

Arabic Medieval Inscriptions and Songhay History

Arabic Medieval Inscriptions from the Republic of Mali: Epigraphy, Chronicles and Songhay-Tuareg History by P.F. de Moraes Farias has long been on our reading list. One of the essential studies that endeavors to incorporate medieval epigraphic sources into our understanding of the history of the Songhay and the eastern arc of the Niger, this important work, despite its (necessarily) occasional speculative nature, raises a number of questions about the received wisdom on the history of Mali. First, by exploring the problematic way in which Heinrich Barth, Delafosse, and others have problematically assumed the 17th century Timbuktu chronicles can be treated as a reservoir of basic facts and data without any deeper ideological or textual analysis, this study illustrates how and why the funerary and non-funerary epigraphic evidence has been ignored, sidelined, or treated as peripheral. 

However, the funerary sources, as early sources covering dates from the early 11th century until the end of the 15th, are actual textual sources from the period before the rise of Sonni Ali and Askia Muhammad I. They shed (some) light on earlier rulers at Gao and Saney with more than just the kingslists that appear in the 17th century chronicles. Moreover, by ignoring the innovative nature of the tarikh genre in the 17th century Western Sudan, and the specific political and socioeconomic conditions which shaped its development after the fall of the Songhay imperial state and the establishment of the Arma, modern scholars have underappreciated the creativity of the chroniclers and their own motives. Furthermore, the chroniclers themselves lamented the lack of sufficient or detailed records from the early history of the Western Sudan, so epitaphs and other inscriptions from the 11th-15th century become exceptionally important sources to supplement our meager knowledge of that era.

That said, the inscriptions obviously cannot tell us everything. They do, however, provide a vista onto how the deceased and those who erected stelae or inscribed tombstones for the dead conceived of time, the calendar, their connection to the larger world of Islam, and hints of kingship, ethnicity, language, or cultural change. Part of this can be seen in Bentyia, where inscriptions record Songhay, Berber, and what appear to be Mande names. The intense interplay between Songhay and Tuareg cultures also challenges us to rethink casual or simplistic assumptions about "race" and culture, too. For instance, the askia title, which appeared in inscriptions centuries before the rise of Askia Muhammad at the end of the 15th century, may have a connection to a word of Berber derivation referring to a male slave (though this is a complex question that requires deeper familiarity with Songhay linguistics and oral tradition). It's quite clear, too, from reading de Moraes Farias, that the Ali Kulun character of Tuareg oral literature was likely the source for how the Timbuktu chroniclers sought to make sense of the period of Mali imperial domination of Gao and the eastern Niger. This suggests that some of the narratives about that period reported in the chronicles are unhistorical and the chronology of Malian rule and the different dynasties that ruled Gao will remain up for debate. 

Whether or not the epigraphic evidence can be used to postulate how kingship might have operated at Gao before the period of Mali's domination is uncertain, but de Moraes Farias's theory of rotating succession in the 11th-13th centuries is an intriguing one., After all, based on the funerary inscriptions from the early 1100s and 1200s at Gao and Saney (another site near Gao), he speculates that there may have been two lines or royal clans who alternated kingship. The first one was definitely Muslim by the second half of the 1000s, and the second one, the so-called Zuwa 'dynasty' may have either been officeholders who shared power with the earlier 'dynasty'. 

Besides raising questions about the Timbuktu chronicles and how medieval inscriptions in Arabic force us to rethink or reconceptualize space, belief, and culture in the medieval Sahel, one is also left with tantalizing references to what may have been early Sufist influence in the Sahel at Junhan. One is also left wondering why it funerary inscriptions were in vogue at Gao, Saney, Bentyia, and Essuk (Tadmakka) but no evidence for the practice has been found yet in Kanem. One would expect that similar connections with Tripoli, Qayrawan and other parts of the Maghrib (as well as similar Saharan and Sahelian Berber populations) did not lead to the development of funerary inscriptions at sites like Njimi (or perhaps at Manan, the earlier capital of Kanem which remains unknown). If the early prominence of Ibadis in Kanem's trans-Saharan trade is a factor, something similar was also an inhibiting factor at Gao.

Bambara in Haiti

Marriage in Jacmel of Louis Rene, of the Bambara country, to Sophie, also of the Bambara nation. When free people still use the "nation" Bambara to identify themselves, it may be a more meaningful claim of self-identity or self-expression tied to the Bamana or Bambara peoples.

Unlike, say, Louisiana, where the "Bambara" presence and legacy has been a subject of study or inquiry for some time, the "Bambara" legacy in Haiti is understudied. While scholars continue to debate the meaning of the term and to what degree its use in the Americas reflected a single or singular "people" in our modern sense, "Bambara" was a "nation" in Saint-Domingue with a consistent presence throughout the 18th century. The "Bambara" were always a sizable proportion of the Senegambian/Upper Guinea captives in the colony, and have likely shaped Haitian Creole, Vodou, and other aspects of Haitian culture in ways we do not always appreciate. For instance, is the Haitian Creole baka related to the Bamana baga or are veve also partly inspired by graphic signs of Bamana? Is the concept of nyama perhaps relevant here for understanding aspects of Haitian religion?

Arrival of a slave ship bringing "Bambara"captives to Saint-Domingue.

We suspect that "Bambara" did acquire some specificity in Saint-Domingue as an ethnolinguistic term, perhaps as a hodgepodge category combining non-Muslim Mandingues, Bamana, and others who spoke Mande languages. For instance, one runaway ad describing a Soso (Susu) as a type of "Bambara" suggests that the French recognized that some of the captives from areas of Upper Guinea spoke related languages or were conversant in other tongues. That "Bambara" was an ambiguous "nation and that its use within West Africa itself was also somewhat ambiguous is clear, however. The appellation of "Bambara" for pagans in Senegambia region and today's Mali is clear, and the Bamana states of the 17th and 18th century were also heterogeneous in that people of diverse origins could be incorporated into the state. 

More examples with 2 slave ships bringing "Bambara" captives to Haiti. One carried a mixed cargo with Wolof, Poulard and Bambara.

What is clear is that the "Bambara" were distinct from Wolof and Poulards. They also shared enough commonalities within their own group to be recognizable in the colony for factors besides language. Behavior, facial scarification, and, in some cases, self-assertions of a "Bambara" identity in the colonial era or post-independence era may point to an actual idea of a "Bambara" ethnicity or "nation" in some limited form. To what extent these were victims of the slave trade of Kaarta and Segu is unclear, although one would expect some Bamana to have fallen victims to the slave trade when their armies lost to others. 

Amazingly, assertions of a Bambara national identity persisted in 19th century Haiti. The above case, of Charles, born in c.1770 but registering in 1810, is declared to be of the Bambara nation. This is possibly meaningful, since it suggests that an identity linked to Bambara-ness lingered after Haitian independence.

Its interesting to see that even after Haitian independence, some were still identified as Bambara, as the case of Charles in 1810 indicates. "Bambara" did mean or connote something beyond a "nation" entirely fabricated or shaped by the slave trade and colonial society. Indeed, the retention of a "Bambara" nation in Haitian Vodou and aspects of Mandingue and Bamana culture surviving among Haitians in Morne Rouge may be telling. A deeper study of the Bamana language may also reveal more influence from Bamana and related Mande languages in Haitian Creole. 

Intriguingly, Bambara also survived as a surname in Haiti. Like other African "nations" taken as surnames, Bambara appeared as late as the end of the 19th century in places like Bainet. There, in Bainet, a Dessources Auguste, who died in 1905, was said to be the son of a Simone Bombara (Bambara). 

The "Bambara" legacy can also be seen in the Haitian Revolution itself with leaders like Gilles Bambara, who was sadly imprisoned by the orders of Dessalines for raising questions of caste (according to Ardouin and Madiou). One wonders if the martial prowess and development of Segu and Kaarta may have been an influence on the rebel slaves of "Bambara" origin in Saint-Domingue. Certainly "Bambara" and other West African beliefs influenced the use of charms and gris-gris or amulets during the Haitian Revolution. 

A "Bambara" captive listed in a notarized document from 1719, Jacmel.

We hope to revisit this topic with a deeper level of sources on the "Banbara" nation in Vodou and possible influences from the Bamana in Haitian Creole. Even if outnumbered by other groups, the "Bambara" were a consistent presence throughout the 18th century for African "nations" in Saint-Domingue. It is very likely that, like in Louisiana, they had a strong influence on the early slave culture in the colony and probably shaped other aspects of Haiti we do not know about. That some free people of color and even Haitians in the 19th century still used the "nation" of Bambara to mean something, we suspect that the self-identification may have actually corresponded more than we realize with the Bamana in Mali. 

"Bambara" Timeline

Adanson's augmented/revised map includes the "Bambara Empire" of which he knew little except for its role in providing slaves.

-1063: Tunka Manin of Ghana (Wagadu) ascended to the throne

-c.1137: al-Zuhri writes of Ghana attacking "Barabara" people for slaves, as well as Tadmakka raids against the "Barbara" pagans. The description of al-Zuhri is quite ambiguous, but the "Barbara" appear to have been pagan peoples related to the peoples of Ghana and to have practiced facial scarification and believed in their own nobility.

-1464-65: Sonni Ali of Songhay defeats Mossi ruler, Komdao, pursuing him to limits of "Bambara' land (Tarikh al-Fattash)

-c.1506: Earliest written attestation of "Bambara" in the Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, a work referencing Banbarranaa, Beetu and Bahaa as towns whose inhabitants travel to Toom to buy gold for slaves. Mandingua merchants buy gold in the fairs there. 

-c.1558: Askia Dawud of Songhay, in addressing the ruler of Jenne, alludes to Bambara incursions.

-after 1591: Pagan "Bambara" referenced as attacking Jenne after the fall of Songhay (Tarikh al-Sudan). 

-c.1593-1608-1615: Ahmad Baba of Timbuktu, in his response to the questions of al-Isi on who was permissible to enslave, mentions the Bambara and Bobo as pagans beyond Jenne. A Bambara presence in Kala is also mentioned. The Bambara may also have been referenced as the pagan population living closest to the lands of Islam.

-1597-98: Pagan Bambara referenced in the Tarikh al-Sudan as allies of Hammad Amina, ruler of Masina

-1599: Mansa Mahmud IV of Mali fails to take Jenne

-1644: Revolt of Bambara of Segu area (Abitbol), possibly the revolt against the Sanakoi and Farkakoi 

-c.1650: Traditions indicate Bamana presence in Segu by 1650

-1674: Arma expedition against Bambara in Bara

-Late 1600s: Kaladian Koulibaly active as leader.

-c.1712-1755: Reign of Biton Koulibaly at Segu

-c.1715: Ruler of Cheibi fled to Douko, Bambara town, to escape an attack from the Pasha of Timbuktu

-1716: "Bambara" soldiers in Timbuktu

-1716-1719: Military expeditions against Bara Bambara from Arma of Timbuktu

-by 1719: "Bambara" slaves in Jacmel Quartier of Saint-Domingue (if not present earlier)

-1728: Labat describes people of Bambara as slaves of their king

-1731: Conflict between Haoussa and Gourma and Bambara pagans; Samba Rebellion in Louisiana, led by a "Bambara" slave 

-1733: Askia el-Hadj aids son of Maro to defeat Silti-Ouerendagh, pagan Bambara

-1739: Calm for all Bambara from Dirma to Bara and Bara to the west; reports of Fa Maghan the Wangara attacking Jenne and Bambara tradition of Fa Maghan attacking Segu and his defeat (Chronicles of Gonja)

-1740s: Long drought that severely impacted the Sahel region of West Africa

-c.1742: Pasha Said attacks 11 Bambara towns or settlements near the town of Askia El-Hadj

-1747: Ighor, a "Bambari," attacked caravan of Alid Oualata, taking prisoners.

-1753-1754: Segu blocked town of Sansa, Masina, and killed its chief, Folokoro

-1754-55: Segu attempts to take Jenne

-1755: Death of Biton Kulibali

-1756-57: Murder of Doukoure, son of Biton Kulibali, by slaves of Biton; Segu ruler who attempted to impose Islam deposed (faama Ali)

-1757: Adanson's Histoire naturelle du Sénégal: coquillages refers to the "Bambara Empire" that provided captives sold at Galam and the Gambia. 

-1758-59: Death of Kedebo Kanimou, ruler of Segu, after Tames. Succeeded by Kafa Dyogui, 3rd slave to govern Segu after death of Biton Kulibali.

-1766: Ngolo Dyara seizes power in Segu (reigns 16-18 years)

-1775-76: One of slave leaders of Biton Kulibali pillaged town of Hammat

-1788: Jacques Jacquet, dit Bambara, free black near Mirebalais (Saint-Domingue) appears as owner of runaway slave

-1790: Death of Ngolo Dyara, Reign of Da Manzon begins

-before 1791: a "Bambara camp" or neighborhood of Port-Louis in Mauritius established

-1796: Segu attacks Kaarta; Mungo Park visits Segu

-c.1806: Death of Gilles Bambara, a leader in the Haitian Revolution imprisoned by Dessalines for bring up "caste" (the color question). 

-1812: Muhammad Bello of Sokoto writes of the Bambara land as one rich in gold and inhabited by pagans

Sources

Abitbol, Michel. Tombouctou Et Les Arma: De La Conquête Marocaine Du Soudan Nigérien En 1591 à L'hégémonie De L'empire Peulh Du Macina En 1833. Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1979.

Amselle, Jean-Loup, and Elikia M'Bokolo. Au Cœur De L'ethnie: Ethnies, Tribalisme Et État En Afrique. Paris: Découverte, 1985.

Caron, Peter. 1997. “‘Of a Nation Which the Others Do Not Understand’: Bambara Slaves and African Ethnicity in Colonial Louisiana, 1718–60.” Slavery & Abolition 18 (1): 98–121. doi:10.1080/01440399708575205.

Clozel, F.-J. (François-Joseph), and Maurice Delafosse. Haut--Sénégal--Niger (Soudan Franc̜ais): Séries D'etudes Pub. Sous La Direction De M. Le Gouverneur Clozel .. Paris: E. Larose, 1912.

Courlander, Harold, and Ousmane Sako. The Heart of the Ngoni: Heroes of the African Kingdom of Segu. 1st pbk. ed. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994.

Geggus, David. "The French Slave Trade: An Overview." The William and Mary Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2001): 119-38. Accessed October 3, 2020. doi:10.2307/2674421.

Gomez, Michael A. African Dominion: A New History of Empire in Early and Medieval West Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Green, Toby. A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019.

Hall, Gwendolyn Midlo. Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992.

Hopkins, J. F. P., and Nehemia Levtzion. Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History. 1st Markus Weiner Publishers ed. Princeton [N.J.]: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2000.

Houdas, Octave Victor. 1901. Tedzkiret En-Nisian Fi Akhbar Molouk Es-Soudan. Paris: E. Loroux.

Levtzion, Nehemia. Ancient Ghana and Mali. New York, N.Y.: Africana Pub. Company, 1980.

Maghīlī, Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Karīm, and John O. Hunwick. Sharīʻa in Songhay: The Replies of Al-Maghīlī to the Questions of Askia Al-Ḥājj Muḥammad. London ; New York: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1985.

Marty, Paul (trans.). 1927. Les Chroniques de Oualata et de Nema (Soudan Francais). Paris: Paul Geuthner.

Monteil, Charles. Les Bambara Du Ségou Et Du Kaarta: (Étude Historique, Ethnographique Et Littéraire D'une Peuplade Du Soudan Française). Paris: É. Larose, 1923.

Moreau de Saint-Méry, Méderic Louis Élie. Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie françoise de l'isle Saint-Domingue. 3 vols. Philadelphia:  1797.

Richard, François G., and Kevin C. MacDonald (editors). Ethnic Ambiguity and the African Past: Materiality, History, and the Shaping of Cultural Identities. Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press, Inc., 2015.

Roberts, Richard L. Warriors, Merchants, and Slaves: The State and the Economy in the Middle Niger Valley, 1700-1914. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987.

Saʻdī, ʻAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʻAbd Allāh, and John O. Hunwick. Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Saʻdi's Taʼrikh Al-Sudan Down to 1613 and Other Contemporary Documents. Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 1999. 

Timbuktī, Maḥmūd Kutī ibn Mutawakkil Kutī, Christopher Wise, and Hala Abu Taleb. Taʼrīkh Al Fattāsh =: The Timbuktu Chronicles, 1493-1599: English Translation of the Original Works in Arabic By Al Hajj Mahmud Kati. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 2011.

Bambara Runaways in Saint-Domingue

 

Samba, runaway "Bambara" in 1767. Samba as first name may be more indicative of a Fula or perhaps other Senegalese origin. Actual "Bambara" origins may be more likely when paired with a description of runaway slaves bearing evidence of facial scarification.

Part of the problem with gathering precise information on "Bambara" captives in Saint-Domingue is that the French themselves didn't seem to know much about them. They appear to have learned that there was indeed a "Bambara" language but runaway ads like the one above express confusion. We suspect "Mandingue" was meant instead of Bambara, particularly since Mandingues and Bambaras spoke related tongues.

Yet another example of the ambiguity of "Bambara" and other nations in Saint-Domingue. If the Tacoua were Nupe, then it seems unlikely for a Nupe person to speak "Bambara." If "Bambara" here is interpreted broadly as a Mande-related language, then it is possible for a Nupe woman to have also spoken or learned a language related to "Bambara." But it raises questions about the accuracy of labels like "Tacoua" and "Bambara" in the colony.

Another example of the ambiguity or perhaps broad meaning of "Bambara" can be seen in the case of a runaway named Fevrier. His nation, Saufo, probably Soso (Susu), a group present in the colony in larger numbers than we think, is described as a "type of Bambara." This suggests any group of peoples speaking languages similar to Bamana and probably non-Muslim could become a "Bambara."

Another ad for a runaway includes someone who spoke both Bambara and Thiamba. If Thiamba referred to the broader cluster of Gur peoples, then it is possible this man spoke Mandingue or Bambara. 

Even free blacks in Saint-Domingue called themselves Bambara. The case of Jacques dit Bambara is an interesting one, since he owned slaves and property near Mirebalais. 

Other "Bambara" runaways appear with Islamic names. Moussa, or Musa, could have been from another of different ethnic groups. We have encountered Bambara runaways with names like Boucary (Bakari) and Mamadoux.

Another ambiguous case involved a Bambara runaway who supposedly spoke Nago (Yoruba). If accurate, this is rather remarkable unless the "Bambara" maybe learned Nago in Saint-Domingue? The runaway ads also include one for a Bambara who spoke Mine, which is a bit more plausible.

Mali and the "Western Sudan"

Another interesting thing about the Ancestry Update is seeing the 4 reference populations used for their "Mali" region. This area is based on the Bambara, Dogon, Fula and Mende, although they also state that populations with similar genetic background can be found in Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal (as well as Mali and Sierra Leone). Our Haitian parent, the origin of our "Mali" ancestry, has also matched with people from this region as distant cousins (1 from Mali, another from Sierra Leone of a Mandinka background). Since "Mandingues" and "Bambaras" were present in Saint-Domingue, it seems very likely that some of our ancestors came from this region of West Africa. Indeed, Ancestry assigned us 6% in the 2024 update, and the "hacked" results put it at 6.89% for "Mali." Perhaps some of our distant forebears were from Segu or Kaarta, but were captured and sold to the French slave traders on the coast of Senegal?

Ancestry's "Senegal" category also overlaps with this, which we inherited from both sides for a total of 4% (3.80% according to the "hacked" results). Alas, the specific ethnic groups used as reference for this category are not listed, although we know Poulards, "Senegalois" and Wolofs were in Saint-Domingue. We suspect the "Senegal" inherited from our Spanish Caribbean ancestry might reflect some of the ethnic groups known to be in the West Indies in the 1500s and 1600s, such as the Wolof, Berbersi, and others. Unfortunately, without knowing the ethnic breakdown of the reference populations for "Senegal" and other West African regions, like Ivory Coast and Ghana, it is difficult to say.

Mali, Masks and Mosques

François-Xavier Fauvelle's highly readable Les masques et la mosquee: L'empire du Mali (XIII-XIVe siecle) is based on a series of lectures given by the author, benefitting from its written form to incorporate new insights and depth. Due to the limitation of the available sources, Fauvelle endeavors to put the pieces of the puzzle together in a manner that is likely or at least to propose hypotheses that match or can correspond with what is known, often without adopting literalist interpretations of external Arabic sources or the large corpus of oral traditions. Thus, a possible area is proposed for the site of Mali's capital during the 1300s, when Mali was at its apogee. In addition, a reinterpretation of Ibn Khaldun's chronology of Mali kings in the 1200s and 1300s is offered that attempts to make sense of the two distinct "houses" of the imperial dynasty, one claiming descent from Sunjata and the other from his brother, Abu Bakr. The legendary Mansa Musa, a descendant of the house of Abu Bakr, may not be remembered by traditionists because of his lack of direct descent from Sunjata. While some of the ideas of Fauvelle are still just hypotheses, we found his analysis of Mansa Musa's pilgrimage and the story of his rise to the throne interesting. Mansa Musa as Moses and his predecessor, who allegedly perished in the Atlantic, as a Pharaoh, is a "fresh take" on the anecdote and how Mansa Musa possibly positioned himself in relation to Quranic or Islamic notions of Moses and proper leadership. The intriguing take on Malian court ritual under Mansa Sulayman is also fascinating, indicating how the rulers of the Mali Empire were mansas and sultans who interfaced between two distinct conceptions of power and legitimacy.

The Sultanate of Mali

Hadrien Collet's Le sultanat du Mali - Histoire régressive d'un empire médiéval XXIe-XIVe siècle is a challenging read. Very academic and interested in avoiding literalist readings of oral traditions or Arabic sources, the focus of this regressive history is an emphasis on the historiography of Mali. This historiography reveals discursive practices of various generations of historians who wrote about the past of Mali, from Mamluk-era scholars like al-Umari to the post-medieval historians and chroniclers of the Timbuktu tarikh tradition or colonial and post colonial academics and scholars. By highlighting the historiographical turn, Collet's study endeavors to understand the ideological, literary, and other contexts of the key texts utilized as sources to construct a narrative of the "imperial" era in the Western Sudan. Likewise, a rereading of Arabic sources and a desire to place them in their context reveals how al-Umari, Ibn Battuta, and others from the Muslim world conceived of Mali in terms of Islamic geography, science, literature, and geopolitics. By attempting to understand the larger context for our external sources on Mali, instead of relying on extracts that divorce these sources from their larger context, one can gain new insights into the origin and meaning of the relevant writings. Collet's text particularly does this with regard to al-Umari's encyclopedic chapter on Mali and the Rihla of Ibn Battta. Surprisingly, Ibn Khaldun, who provides some of the richest information on Mali in the external sources, does not receive a chapter.

The choice of beginning with the colonial-era scholarship of the likes of a Delafosse and orientalists like Cooley to the nationalist scholarship of Mamby Sidibe or the post colonial age of scholarship from the likes of D.T. Niane and Cheikh Anta Diop, makes it easier to see for the reader how the narrative of the "Mali Empire" developed and became an established historical "fact" in academic, Afrocentric and online discourse. However, a deeper analysis of the ways in which this narrative was established by scholars and academics in the 19th and 20th centuries reveals a number of problems and concerns. Since we have not examined some of the scholarship analyzed here, particularly the works of Monteil or the Malian and Guinean publications of the post colonial era, we nonetheless find a problem with the colonialist, nationalist, Afrocentric, and interpretative lens used by these scholars. The colonial-era ones, for instance, like Delafosse, did not always cite their oral sources clearly and later scholars adopted a sometimes uncritical use of oral traditions, treating the griots as "neutral" reservoirs of "raw facts" or data that can be used to supplement the meager external Arabic sources for the medieval sultanate of Mali. In reality, however, these oral traditions as preserved by griots are not frozen in time but adaptable to new conditions and meanings to retain their relevance. In other words, scholars may have rushed to historicize figures like Sundiata while also promoting the narrative of a precociously modern "constitution" for the state established by this figure. 

In short, scholars must use oral traditions as carefully as written sources, and in so doing will similarly recognize the agency and creativity of griots as historians. This type of analysis will potentially elucidate or bring us closer to answering the questions of past generations of specialists and scholars. For instance, using oral traditions and archaeological data critically to rethink the location of the capital of the Mali sultanate. Instead of looking to Niani, the discredited imperial capital promoted by colonial scholars and Niane, the capital of the sultanate may have been further north and not in the Manden heartland as we know it today. Likewise, the collection of oral traditions in different parts of Manden and trying to analyze how they reflect post-"imperial" Mali conditions after the loss of their northern territories (Djenne, Walata, Timbuktu, etc.) highlights the "living" nature or conditions of oral traditions.

The next section analyzes post-medieval West African historians in an intriguing manner. Building on the model of historian Paulo Fernando de Moreas Farias and Mauro Nobili, the famous tarikhs of Timbuktu are seen in a new light. In addition, 19th century Islamic scholars such as Muhammad Bello of Sokoto and the chronicles and writings of Muslim scholars from Walata and the Hamdullahi caliphate. By treating the authors of texts as historian colleagues, one can begin to see how their construction of Mali and the pilgrimage of Mansa Musa functioned to express an Islamic West African conception of the region's past. Takrur, for example, is redefined by these authors in ways that clearly deviate from the historical kingdom of Takrur or the use of the term by Mamluk scholars in the East. Mansa Musa and his wondrous pilgrimage, the sponsorship of mosques, and the honor he accorded to the ulama represent a model of leadership. Like the future Askia Muhammad's function in the chronicles, Mansa Musa therefore served as an exemplary Islamic ruler who also helped establish Takrur as a Muslim geographic space. Although our 17th century chroniclers al-Sa'adi and Ibn Muhtar appear to have largely relied on oral traditions for Mali and a few external Arabic sources, their anecdotes, stories, and traditions on the Middle Niger's past under Malian suzerainty indicate the enduring memory and legacy of the kingdom. Even when in conflict with Songhay, the Islamic sultanate Collet suggests may be conceived as "modern" or "early modern" rather than medieval, Mali and the memory of Mansa Musa suggest it retained its power and legacy as an Islamic state. 

The final chapters analyzing the major external Arabic sources (al-Umari, Ibn Battuta) and the Mamluk-era writings on the pilgrimage of Mansa Musa, present, perhaps, the denouement of the historiographical and hermeneutical turn embodied in this work. These sources, written in the time of the Mali sultanate's zenith or soon after, reflect the power and reputation attained by the West African state after Mansa Musa's pilgrimage impressed Mamluk Cairo in 1325. Collet's reading of al-Umari and Ibn Battuta exemplifies this well, as both authors receive detailed treatment in terms of their backgrounds, their writings beyond the well-known extracts on Mali, and the literary and intellectual concerns and styles of their respective genres. Seeing Ibn Battuta and Ibn Guzzay's co-produced narrative as literary does not mean the voyage to the Sudan never happened (although it is possible Ibn Battuta never went beyond Walata). Indeed, following literary conventions and seeing the topology of the genre of travel writings that situated the Sudan (Black Africa) and the Far East as distinct zones bordering the unknown lands. The notion of "marvels" used here, particularly in the chapter on Ibn Battuta, was fascinating and points to, in our opinion, the overall veracity of Ibn Battuta's account of Mali. While undoubtedly drawing on a larger corpus of literature on the "Land of the Blacks" in Arabic literature, the local customs and "exoticisms" described in the text are sometimes unique and, if not directly witnessed by Ibn Battuta himself, were based on first-hand accounts. Like al-Umari, who also occasionally drew from the larger context of Arabic literary conventions and geography on sub-Saharan Africa, Ibn Battuta's story of cannibals to the south of Mali and other "marvels" demonstrates the literary nature of the source. That insight, however, does not mean the journey to Mali never occurred. It actually offers a new perspective that can raise new questions and conclusions about the nature of Mali during the 14th century. 

Sadly, Ibn Khaldun's detailed analysis of Mali does not have a separate chapter in Collet's detailed book. It is a shame, since Ibn Khaldun's use of a "Takruri" informant from Ghana indicates the presence of an account drawing on a different regime of truth. Indeed, the Takruri faqih in Cairo may represent a late 14th century West African perspective on Mali, drawing on "fresh" traditions and possibly written sources for his reconstruction of the chronology of mansas. Uthman, this Ghana faqih interpreted via Ibn Khaldun, represents, besides Mansa Musa himself in the reports on the pilgrimage, the closest thing to a contemporary "internal" voice on the sultanate. It would have been interesting to read Collet's breakdown of Ibn Khaldun and his larger sociopolitical theory of history in this context, as well as an early local/West African history of Mali. Otherwise, al-Umari largely relied on al-Dukkali, who is said to have lived in Mali's capital for several years, or the filtered accounts of what Mansa Musa was reported to have said to Mamluk officials during his Egyptian sojourn. Even if Ibn Khaldun's account is not particularly reliable, the use of Takruri informants who were contemporaries of 14th century Mali merits further investigation. 

Contribution to the History of the Mali Empire

Madina Ly Tall's Contribution à l'histoire de l'Empire du Mali, (XIIIe-XVIe siècles): limites, principales provinces, institutions politiques is by now a dated yet provocative interpretation of the Mali Empire. Pushing back against earlier authors like Delafosse who believed Mali disintegrated into irrelevance by the early decades of the 15th century, Ly Tall uses Portuguese sources and oral traditions to demonstrate the power and economic importance of Mali in 15th and 16th century gold trade, especially through its control of the Gambia for access to coastal trade. The Malian historian also utilized the usual Arabic sources (medieval external Arabic ones like that of al-Umari or Ibn Khaldun and the later chronicles like the Tarikh al-Fattash) and oral traditions recorded in earlier sources or from her own fieldwork. Thus, through an impressive use of nearly all types of sources (including the limited archaeological work in Mali and the site of Niani), the author presents a plausible Mali Empire through its provincial organization and administrative structure.

More than half of the text consists of short chapters on the various provinces of Mali that can be identified with a combination of textual and oral sources. These major provinces are then elucidated in terms of their possible importance in the Mali Empire and how they were lost to the center. Here is where the author is willing to push back against previous scholarship with regards to the eastern extent of Mali. During its apogee in the 14th century, Ly Tall believes the emperor did indeed include Tadmekka and Takedda, despite other historians disputing the problematic Arabic sources on the matter. Of course, due to the paucity of sources, it is possible that these eastern possessions were lost after a short period of time. Ly Tall also makes a problematic case for Kukia possibly remaining under Mali control well into the 15th century. This is based, in part, on the problematic references to a "Quioquia" in Portuguese sources. This, however, seems unlikely to have been the Kukiya associated with the Songhay and Gao. We find it unlikely that the Sonni or Si dynasty would have not controlled Kukiya by the 1430s if not far earlier. After all, Ly Tall herself implies that Mali lost control of much of its northern and eastern domains around the time it lost control of Timbuktu in the 1430s. Consequently, it seems unlikely to have held Kukiya, too. Of course, Ly Tall tdoes raise interesting pints due to the possible depopulation of Gao in c.1375 and its decline in the late 1300s and early 1400s but we believe it unlikely that Malian influence would have still been strong in that area. 

Outside of a few quibbles with questionable claims or debatable conclusions about Mali's imperial reach to the east and over Gao-Kukiya, the author endeavors to use oral traditions in conjunction with Ibn Khaldun, al-Umari, and Ibn Battuta to sketch the outline of imperial Mali's administration. According to her research, the empire appears to have not depended on enslaved officials, although she identifies a griot who was willing to explain the rise of one former slave official who usurped power (perhaps the Sakoura of Ibn Khaldun's account). The issue of succession, which we saw led to frequent conflicts, appears to have followed two patterns. After Sundiata, it was mainly collateral, moving from eldest brother to younger siblings. After Mansa Musa, however, the succession seems to have emphasized father-son inheritance. Perhaps this was due to the greater Islamization of the Mandingue aristocracy or the specific desires of rulers to ensure their sons would reign. Sadly, the lack of sources for later Mali history in the 15th and 16th century does not allow us to clearly identify which pattern of succession predominated. Perhaps, after losing its northern territories, the Mandingue returned to an emphasis on collateral succession, a principle deeply grounded in Mandingue polities and clan structure. In addition, the administrative structure was one that, of course, featured a prominent role for griots, repositories of tradition and history who were closely linked to the mansas. The Mali Empire's administrative structure also included a role for local dynasties in annexed or conquered territories, though sometimes replacing them with representatives of the central government. 

Overall, Ly Tall's study is a careful one that attempts to integrate all the known sources. While she appears to have lacked the ability to read Portuguese, the French and English translations provide enough data to demonstrate that Mali's influence continued in Gambia. Her argument that control of this stretch of the coast played a major role in the survival of a Mali empire until the end of the 16th century is an interesting one that could be strengthened with further data or figures on the scale of the gold trade with the Portuguese. Nonetheless, the fertility of the land along the Gambia River and the trade with Europeans on the coast likely did contribute to Mali's survival after the loss of its northern territories. That said, Malian control of some of the gold sources which provided gold to Djenne and Timbuktu must have been an important source of revenue for the mansas. Even if Songhay and, then the Pashalik in Timbuktu controlled the north, Mali remained relevant in the gold trade to the north. Indeed, as late as 1599, the mansa of Mali attempted to seize Djenne, proof that the state was still a power in the region and willing to try to retake former provinces. 

Voix du Mali

This is only good because of Oumou Sangare. Get rid of the rap lyrics and add some more variation to the music, then Oumou Sangare could have really done something. 

Nobili and Bousbina on Ahmad al-Mansur's Conquest of Songhay

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Although mainly based on one source produced as part of a royal proclamation after the defeat of the Songhay, Mauro Nobili and Saïd Bousbina demonstrate the reduction of Songhay into the trope of the enslaveable black. This attitude, by the way, reminds us of al-Fishtali's similarly condescending references to the envoy of Borno who was received in Morocco during the the reign of Idris b. Ali. Race, and the blackness of the Songhay trumped their Islamic and ethnic identities. 

Timeline of Western Sudan to 1400s

The following is a timeline for the early Western Sudan, basically everything before imperial Mali. While there remains so much to discover and uncover about the Western Sudanic region before the major kingdoms converted to Islam and even deeper in antiquity, the paucity of written sources means we will probably remain in the dark for the foreseeable future on many aspects of its early history. That said, the early Arabic sources do contain a wealth of information on the area, from Takrur to Kawkaw. We decided to attempt a tentative timeline for the region (including the Sahara and sometimes North Africa or the Mediterranean) to illustrate some of the important personages, developments, locales, and events that transpired in our region from the 6th century until the end of the 13th. Since we mainly relied on written sources, the excellent  Corpus of early Arabic sources for West African History edited by Levtzion and Hopkins. Our other sources include Delafosse, Trimingham on Takrur, the French and English translations of the Timbuktu tarikhs, and Arabic Medieval Inscriptions from the Republic of Mali: Epigraphy, Chronicles, and Songhay-Tuareg History by Paulo Fernando de Moraes Farias.

294: Mint in Carthage (gold from West Africa a source?)

c.500: Imported cloth found at Kissi, evidence of pre-Islamic trans-Saharan trade

568: Garamantian ruler sent envoys to Byzantium

666/667: Uqba b. Nafi conquers Fazzan and Kawar, imposing tribute payments in slaves

before 732/33: Wahb b. Munabbih mentioned Nuba, Zanj, Qazan (Fazzan?), Zaghawa, Habasha, Qibt and Barbar as the race of Sudan 

734-741: During this period, Muslim raids of Habib b. Abi Ubayda 

740: Revolt of the Berbers during governorship of Abd Allah b. al-Habhab

744/45: Abd al-Rahman became governor of Ifriqiya; said to have begun digging wells on the Saharan trade route

757/58: Foundation of Sijilmassa

761/62: Tahard founded

804/820 or 823-872: Imam of Tahart sent Muhammad b. 'Arafa in a deputation to a Sudan king with a gift

814-15: Walls of Sijilmasa constructed

837: Death of king Sahaja king Tilutan

c.850: Foundation of earliest dynasty of Takrur, the Dya'ogo (Trimingham)

872/73: al-Yaqubi described Kawkaw as the most powerful kingdom of the blacks, obeyed by al-MRW, MuRDBH, al-HRBR, the kingdom of the Sanhaja, TDhKRYR, Zayanir, 'RWR and BQARWT; Ghana also powerful and described as having gold mines and vassal kings ('AM, Sama)

by 889/90: Anbiya people of Sanhaja mentioned by al-Yaqubi, camel nomads with royal capital at Ghust (Awdaghust) whose king lacks religion and raids the Sudan; Lamta Berbers who produce lamtiyya shields live between Zawila and Kawar, and adjoining Zawila to the route to Awjila and Ajdabiya

900: Death of Sanhaja king, Yalattan

c.903: Anbiya described as land of Lamta who produce the lamtiyya shields; people of Ghana grow sorghum and cowpeaes and wear clothes of skins

between 908-938: royal palace at Gao Ancien built

909: Tahart destroyed

918: End of reign of Tamim, Sanhaja king (Sanhaja divided politically again)

918/19: Foundation of Zawila in the Fazzan by Abd Alla b. Khattab al-Hawwari

944-45: Growth of power of Abu Yazid in Ifriqiya; Abu Yazid was born in Kawkaw to a Zanata father 

950/51: Ibn Hawqal went to Sijilmasa, saw many shaykhs and much wealth; Ibn Hawal heard from Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Abd Allah that the Sanhaja king of Awdaghust, Tinbarutan b. Usfayshar, king of all Sanhaja, had been ruling for 20 years and had 300,000 tents (plus shelters and huts) in his domain. Ibn Hawqal also reported story of Tinbarutan defeating a Berber tribe with the vast camel herd of his sister, the wealthiest person in the tribe

952: Check for 42,000 dinars in Awdaghust

961/2-972: Tin Yarutan b. Wisanu b. Nizar Sanhaja king, received tribute from more than 20 Sudan kings; also, this king aided the ruler of Masin against Awgham, east of Ghana, with 50,000 camelry

973: Death of Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Warraq, whose geographical work was a major source for al-Bakri

c.977: final version of Ibn Hawqal's work written, including mention of a check concerning a debt of Muhammad b. Abi Sa'dun in Awdaghust for 42,000 dinars and the kings of Tadmakka, Fusahr b. Alfara and Inaw b. Sabanzak

c.980: Dya'ogo dynasty of Takrur overthrown by the Manna who came from the Nyakhate clan of Dyara (Soninke)

by 990: al-Muhallabi describes Kawkaw (Kuku) as ruled by a king who pretends to be Muslim, names the town Sarnah and its markets

1009-10: Conversion to Islam by King Zuwa Kusay of Kawkaw; said by Trimingham to have moved capital from Kukiya to Kawkaw

1013/14: Earliest known epitaph from Essouk (Tadmakka)

1037-1065: Reign of Ferdinand I, "Galician" king who received a stone substance from the Dar'a valley that takes on the consistency of flax; Fernando I later sent a kerchief made of this to the Emperor in Constantinople,  who in return, sent him a crown

1040/41: Death of Warjabi, Takrur king who converted to Islam

1042: Earliest Islamic epitaph at Kawkaw

1043/44: Wazjay b. Yasin imposed Islam in Takrur 

1048: Early rise of Almoravids

1054/55: Sijilmasa residents massacre Almoravid garrison left in the town after Almoravids conquer it; Awdaghust invaded by Almoravids, and city described as divided due to conflict between Zanata and Arabs (Almoravids persecuted the residents for recognizing the suzerainty of Ghana)

1056-57: Yahya b. Umar fought Banu Gudala with the aid of Labbi b. Warjabi, the king of Takrur

1063: Start of reign of Tunka Menin of Ghana (Wagadu), nephew of previous ruler, Basi

1067-68: Commander of the Almoravids is Abu Bakr b. Umar

1076-77: Conversion of Ghana to Islam

1076-1180: Soso ruled by pagan Soninke dynasty with clan name Dyari-so (Trimingham)

1079-1082: Islam adopted by people of Gao (Mahmud Kati)

c.1083/84: Ghana attacked Tadmakka

1100s: Ghana said to raid Amima and Barbara peoples for slaves; Timbuktu growing in importance for trade

c.1100-1120: Reign of Banna-Bubu of Soso, when Fulbe appear in region and members of the royal family married wives from the So or Ferboe clan, becoming the Sose and Soso

1108: Death of queen S.wa at Gao Saney

1110: Death of Abu Abdullah Muhammad b. Abdu Llah b. Zaghi at Gao Saney, with a stela in Almerian style; death of king Abu Bakr ibn Abu Quhafa at Gao Saney

1116/17: Ghana's royal palace constructed (al-Idrisi)

1117: Death of Aisha, daughter of King Kuri, probably the same Korey or K.r.y in the Zuwa dynasty lists

1119: Death of Queen M.s.r (Gao Saney)

1120: Death of King Yama b. K.ma b. Zaghi, or Umar b. al-Khatta, a king who waged holy war

c.1125-1150: Zafun king received with honor in Marrakesh by Almoravids

1126: Death of Fatima, daughter of King Mama (or Yama or Nama) (Gao Saney)

1127: Death of Za (Zu'a) b. Queen Hakkiya (Saney inscriptions)

1140: Death of Bariqa, daughter of Kuri (Gao Saney inscriptions)

after 1154: Kawkaw mentioned as wealthy town reached by caravans from Egypt, Waraqlan, and Sijilmasa; inhabitants grow sesame, sugarcane, rice

1154: Completion of al-Idrisi's geographical work, which describes Ghana and Kawkaw as Muslim states 

1180: Soso dynasty overthrown by a soldier named Dyara Kante (Trimingham)

c.1199: letter to the king of Ghana refers to him as a pagan (perhaps a reference to the Soso?)

c.1203: Sosso conquest of Ghana

1203: Death of King Fanda, son of 'Aru Bani (Aru-Baani/Arbaani/Aru Bine/Arbine), son of Zaghi (or Zaghay)

1210: Funerary stelae of a Songhay woman, Buwy or Waybiya, at Gorongobo

before 1222: al-Sharishi described Ghana as Muslim kingdom with schools and many Maghribi merchants who stay, buy slaves for concubinage and are well-received by the king

1224: Wealthy Soninke families plus Arabs ad Berbers move to Walata (Biru), according to Delafosse

c.1235: Sundiata Keita defeated Soso king at the Battle of Kirina

1251: Death of Zuwa of Kawkaw

1253: Death of Ai'isha, daughter of king Zuwa Kayna (Gao Saney)

1264-65: Death of Yama Kuri (Yama Korey), son of king R.w.a (Zuwa)

1260-1277: Mansa Wali reigned in Mali, who made the hajj to Mecca during the reign of the Mamluk sultan Baybars

1299-1308: Reign of Mansa Sakura, freed slave usurper who also made the pilgrimage to Mecca and died on his way back. By c.1300, was in control of the Niger Bend

c.1300: Manna dynasty of Takrur replaced by Tondyon

c.1312: Mansa Muhammad launched expedition into the Atlantic 

1324: Pilgrimage of Mansa Musa 

1352-53: Ibn Battuta in Mali

1360: Mansa Mari Jata II sent an ambassador to Morocco who brought a giraffe

1373/74: Death of Mansa Mari Jata II

1390: Mansa Maga III takes power

1433: Tuaregs seize control of Timbuktu