Biu, Kwararafa, and Borno

Although we still have not located a copy of an important study of Kwararafa by Webster, reading a thesis by a student of his, John E. Miller, has been informative. Miller's thesis, The Biu Plateau: Establishing a Chronology and the Linkages Between Bura-Babur and Kwararafa, attempts to interpret oral traditions and the few written sources available to contextualize Biu in the larger context of Kwararafa and Bornoan history. In so doing, the author draws from colonial-era reports and collections of traditions by authors like Meek as well as written sources included in works like Palmer's Bornu Sahara and Sudan. Pushing back against attempts to read the earlier phases of Kwararafa as a heavily Jukun-influenced entity, Miller follows Webster in situating Kwararafa's second phase capital at Tagara (after being driven out of Santolo). It is this earlier context which elucidate things like the royal crocodile totem observed by many groups in the Biu region and along the Gongola, not the supposed Jukun influence reaching this area earlier. 

While pushing back against the Jukun readings of Kwararafa, Miller also tries to tentatively date the arrival of Yamta in Biu. Drawing on somewhat contradictory traditions, which also make Yamta a Bornoan prince from Gazargamo who left after some sort of succession dispute, Miller suggets a date of c. 1519-1546 for reign of Yamta in Biu. Citing Palmer, who reported traditions of Ali b. Dunama defeating Kwararafa, Miller argues that Yamta arrived in the region after Kwararafa abandoned the capital at Tagara to move south to cross the Benue. This meant the region was possibly politically divided or in a state of transition, facilitating the establishment of new chiefdoms in the area. But, critically, the previous ruling lineages who were influenced by or part of Kwararafa may have retained some influence as priestly clans or lineages. The evidence for this is still fragmentary, but observing totems, clan and lineage moieties, as well as commonalities between cultures associated with the later Kwararafa phases and those in regions like Biu, Miller thinks his model is plausible. 

Naturally, Miller's chronology and model here relies heavily upon Webster, whose notion of different phases of Kwararafa we have yet to examine. Miller is also assuming that the Sayfawa mai named in the traditions about Yamta, Idris, is Ali b. Dunama's son, who reigned (in Lange's chronology, 1497-1519). A firmer date is provided by Ahmad b. Furtu, whose account of Idris Alooma's wars refers to Yamta's chiefdom aiding in the attack on Amsaka. Using average regnal lengths and the date of Idris b. Ali, Miller has one of the few confident dates in his chronology. He's also assuming that Kwararafa's later capital at Biepi only began after c. 1485 (and with a Kanuri or more likely, Babur, dynasty by the 1520s) and only after the mid-1700s did the Jukun come to dominate Kwararafa. All of this could be plausible, but we need additional data on the Bura, Kilba, Marghi, Chibbuk, and other peoples to adequate test the proposed chronology of Miller. Hopefully future scholars will consult the more recently published studies on this region and try to incorporate more of the written sources from Vatican archives or European reports of the 1600s and 1700s. These could aid in proving or weakening the chronology adopted here...

The Dagachi of Kano: Elite Exiles, Political Centralization, and Kano-Borno Relations

 

The Gates of Kano City (Studies in the History of Kano). KofarWambai was once associated with the Dagachi.

            Uthman b. Dawud, a Sayfawa ruler of the early fifteenth century, is notable less for his brief reign than for his later career in Kano. Unique among the Sayfawa, Uthman b. Dawud (reigned c. 1421, according to Lange’s chronology) moved to Kano after his deposition, where he became an important official.[1] In addition, his descendants continued his legacy of significant wealth and influence in the Kano kingdom, eventually culminating with their fall from grace and disappearance in historical traditions.[2] Despite the limited sources, the period reveals important developments in state consolidation in the Central Sudan. In the case of Borno, the Sayfawa would eventually consolidate their state as Ali b. Dunama (c. 1465-1497) of the Idrisids defeated the Dawudid branch of the dynasty. Likewise, Muhammad Rumfa initiated several political reforms which strengthened central authority and the role of Islam in the state. The career of Uthman K.l.n.ma, or Uthman b. Dawud, encapsulated this era of contestation as elite lineages competed with the rise of more centralized administrations in both Kano and Borno. Indeed, as an elite political exile forced out of power by a kaigama and yerima in Borno, his own descendants became a threat to the Rumfawa of Kano. Through an alleged revolt which nearly brought Borno and Kano into conflict during the reign of Idris b. Ali (r. 1496-1519), the Dagachi’s descendants became a threat to royal authority. This illustrates how both Kano and Borno navigated the thorny issue of political centralization over the course of the 15^th century. This essay argues that the career and legacy of Uthman b. Dawud (the Dagachi) illustrate how Sayfawa elite exiles shaped political centralization, economic development, and interstate relations in Kano, while also becoming threats to emerging centralized authority. Beginning with an overview on early Hausaland-Borno relations, the essay shall then examine the Dagachi’s arrival in Kano and the growing power of this official. The final section shifts attention to the revolt plotted by the Dagachi and how it relates to Kano-Borno relations as well as political centralization.

Kano and Borno Relations Before Uthman b. Dawud

            Unsurprisingly, the Hausa kingdom of Kano and Kanem-Borno had relations long before Uthman b. Dawud’s arrival in the 1420s. This background is necessary for understanding why Kano emerged as an attractive destination for elite Sayfawa exiles such as Uthman b. Dawud, as well as how they attained significant authority there. Due to the nature of the surviving sources, however, this can only be partially addressed.

The exact timing of Kano’s early relations with Borno is unknown, but scholars such as John Lavers have sought to identify the word afuno or afunu with the Hausa of Kano. Extant medieval Arabic sources first use the Kanuri word for the Hausa during the 1400s, in the writings of al-Maqrizi. However, contacts between Kanem-Borno and parts of Hausaland began by the 1200s or early 1300s. This is not surprising given the extension of Sayfawa rule into Borno by the 1200s during Dunama Dibalemi’s reign. A hint of Borno and Hausa trade may be seen in the travelogue of Ibn Battuta, too. According to this renowned traveler, Takedda and undoubtedly other Sahelian trading centers were linked to both Borno and Gobir.[3] The interests of the Sayfawa in Kawar, the Fazzan and relations with Tuareg groups in Aïr by the 1200s likely involved Gobir and early Hausa states, too. Lamentably, the exact nature of early Hausa state formation and its connections with trans-Saharan trade awaits further archaeological research.[4] But the little data collected so far points to possible links between Marandet (the Maranda of medieval Arabic sources) and the Lake Chad region.[5] In short, relations between Kanem-Borno and the area of Hausaland began in this period.

Lavers, whose admittedly speculative analysis of the topic of early Borno-Kano relations remains the most substantial, even proposed an earlier military engagement between Kano and Borno during the reign of Idris b. Ibrahim (c. 1342-1366).[6] Unfortunately, the narrative reported by P.A. Benton, which must be derived from oral tradition, named the mai in question as Iderisa Arrimi (Idris b. Ali). According to this tradition, Idris b. Ali sent his kaigama, Dalatu, to make war against Kano, eventually subduing and destroying it.[7] The narrative is linked with the folk etymology for the Kanuri term designating Hausa people, afunu. Intriguingly, the tradition also portrayed the people of Kano as Muslims who fasted and prayed (yet still wore arse cloths).[8] This is rather ambiguous but could be an oral tradition of the confrontation between Borno and Kano during the reign of Idris b. Ali (r. 1497-1519) or Idris b. Ibrahim.[9] In fact, an extant mahram dated to the reign of Idris b. Ali refers to a witness named Dallatu Abdullahi. Yet the kaigama who was named as a witness was Mommad ibn Sugu.[10] This may reflect confusion in the tradition regarding Dallatu Abdullahi and the actual kaigama of Idris b. Ali?

Even more baffling, the question of which polity in what would later become the united kingdom of Kano first formed relations with Borno is unknown. Lavers, borrowing from the tentative theories of Murray Last, has suggested that the Afnu king of al-Maqrizi, Mastur, was perhaps the ruler of Santolo or Santoro.[11] This early Kano polity or chiefdom was the original Afnu from the perspective of Borno. But the evidence for this is lacking in the Kano Chronicle. And if the Sayfawa were allies of the ruler of Santolo before the leaders at Dala who later became dominant in Kasar Kano, there is no mention of this in the chronicle.[12]

Furthermore, evidence derived from the history of titles in Kano support an earlier Sayfawa link with the Dala rulers who consolidated their state against Santolo. C.L. Temple’s research on the history of Kano included mention of the title of Dan Kade. According to Temple, this post was given to sons of the ruler of Kano, but was named after a “dan Sarki” of Borno who fled to Kano in the early days.[13] This figure was certainly Kaday Afnu of the Sayfawa, a son of Idris b. Ibrahim who died in war with the Bulala. Using Lange’s chronology, Kaday Afnu’s brief reign as mai was in c. 1388.[14] Kaday Afnu’s predecessor was possibly a usurper, Sa’id, and before him ruled Umar b. Idris (c. 1382-1387), a brother of Kaday Afnu. It is possible that Kaday Afnu fled to Kano during the reign of Sa’id or that of his brother, Umar. Alternatively, he may have fled to Kano when Dawud b. Ibrahim (c. 1366-1376) or another Dawudid held the throne. He possibly arrived in Kano as early as c. 1366, perhaps predating Sarkin Kano Yaji’s victory against Santolo.[15]

In summation, the story of early relations between Kanem-Borno and Hausaland is a field awaiting much further research. What seems clear is the relationship between Kasar Kano and Borno by the 1300s. This included a possible Sayfawa prince who arrived in Kano sometime after c. 1366. The later legend involving Bayajidda and interpreting Hausa states’ origins regarding Borno may obfuscate the more complicated question of early trade, migration, conquests, and cultural exchange. Nonetheless, even before the Sayfawa relocated to Borno for good by the reign of Umar b. Idris, Kano may have been the part of Hausaland with closest ties to Borno. This history of close ties elucidates why Kaday Afnu was comfortable fleeing there at an indeterminate period. It also indicates why Uthman b. Dawud later moved to Kano after his deposition.

Uthman b. Dawud’s Arrival in Kano

The Kano Chronicle, our main source on Uthman b. Dawud (or Uthman K.l.n.ma), refers to him as a “great prince” who came from South Bornu with many men and mallams. In addition, “He brought with him horse-drums, and trumpets and flags and guns. When he came, he sat down at Bomfai.”[16] Ignoring the anachronistic allusion to firearms, the chronicle sadly omits any reasons for why this elite figure from Borno moved to Kano. However, his use of royal regalia and large retinue, including mallams, suggests he was no ordinary person. Reading between the lines of the chronicle and the Diwan, it is possible to reconstruct some of the context for his coming to Kano during the reign of Dauda b. Kanajeji.

First, Uthman b. Dawud’s Borno context. Ascending to the throne in c. 1421, Uthman K.l.n.ma was a son of Dawud. In the words of the Diwan, “Il fut chassé du pouvoir par le kayghama Nikale, fils d’Ibrahim et le yarima Kaday Ka’aku. Il mourut à Afnu Kunu. La durée de son règne fut de 9 mois.”[17] In other words, he was in power for less than a year before the powerful kaigama and a yarima overthrew him. His descent from Dawud may have been an additional factor in his deposition as his two predecessors and successors were both descendants of Idris. But this was not merely part of the contested succession of the houses of Idris and Dawud. The kaigama was frequently involved in depositions and civil wars during this troubled era in the annals of the Sayfawa. Barth even proposed that the kaigama remained very powerful until the rise of Ali b. Dunama. Moreover, if the kaigama was already based in Borno before the Sayfawa maiwa abandoned Kanem to the Bulala, they may have had tremendous advantages in local ties and alliances. That advantage enabled them to frequently intervene in the internecine wars between the Dawudids and Idrisids.[18] Clearly, the yarima (a position given to princes, too), was also involved in the fall of Uthman in c. 1421-1422.

With the return to descendants of Idris to the throne after Uthman b. Dawud, one may surmise that the loyal followers and court of Uthman were supporters of the Dawudian house. Why Kano appealed to the deposed mai as a place of exile is not clear in the sources. But he certainly knew of the Idrisid Kaday Afnu who spent time there some decades before him. Kano in the 1420s was also increasingly Islamic. For instance, “The Song of Bagauda” referred to Sarkin Kano Umaru as “one learned in Islam, he it was who escaped (Hell-fire); He lit a fire which defied extinction.”[19] Likewise, the Kano Chronicle describes Umaru (r. 1410-1421) as abdicating to pursue a life of Islamic piety. More importantly, his friend, Abubakra, left for Borno during his reign.[20] Perhaps the reputation for piety achieved by Umaru and the time spent in Borno by Muslims affiliated with Kano’s court appealed to Uthman b. Dawud and his retinue.

Upon arrival, Uthman b. Dawud was appointed to the position of dagachi. Conventionally spelled dagaci (dagatai, plural) in Hausa, this is usually translated in English as village head.[21] But the responsibilities and power of the dagaci in this context was much more than a simple village ward head. More recent evidence from the political history of Kano, for example, reveals that the rulers of Gaya, Rano, Karaye and Dutse, powerful chiefs of areas within the kingdom, were given the title of dagaci. M.G. Smith argued that these officials exercised wider territorial authority than the hakimai and appointed their own dagatai.[22] It is very likely that the Dagachi from Borno exercised similar authority. The Kano Chronicle reports that the Dagachi settled with his large following at Dorai. He also acted as regent for the ruler of Kano when he left for 5 months to campaign against Zaria. This period of 5 months coincided with an increase in the wealth of the Dagachi.[23] Later, either during Uthman b. Dawud’s tenure or that of his progeny, the Dagachi was likewise powerful and wealthy during Abdullahi Burja’s reign (1438-1452).

Indeed, by this period, there was an increase in the scale of commerce in Kano that connected it with Gwanja, Asben, Borno, and beyond. The Dagachi’s followers also built homes from his own palatial estate to Salamta, thereby proving growth of this ward. The Chronicle similarly reports the Dagachi’s role in founding the market of Karabka.[24] Though not stated in the chronicle, one can surmise that the Dagachi enjoyed a role in the market taxes and the increased commercial activity across the region. Meanwhile, Kano appears to have gained a substantial captive population settled in various villages during this time. A galadima named Dauda was said to have established 21 towns with 1000 slaves each.[25] Notably, this same galadima had a daughter married to the ruler of Kano. Is it conceivable that the increase in commerce and slaving was another source of wealth for the Dagachi, whose market may have been a center for this trade? Besides the Dagachi, Uthman b. Dawud or his unnamed heir, only the galadima Dauda appears to have shared his power and influence.

Thus, the Dagachi from Borno rose from political exile to a post of great wealth and standing in Kano. This undoubtedly reflected the reputation of the Sayfawa dynasty across much of the region. The Dagachi’s arrival also occurred simultaneously with an increase in trans-Saharan and West African trade in Hausaland. The Wangara influence from the West and the trade in salt, kola, slaves, textiles, and the exchange of information and learning unquestionably shaped this context. Even a deposed Sayfawa mai brought royal rituals, regalia, and practices from a more established Islamic dynasty. It was perhaps no coincidence that Kano began to send “gifts” to Borno during Abdullahi Burja’s reign, too. The Dagachi’s presence in Kano could have been connected to this sending of “gifts” for blessings to the ruler of Borno and the maintenance of cordial relations.[26] As a result of the great privileges extended to the Dagachi for decades, his royal Sayfawa origin is rather probable. It likely contributed to the cultural and political exchanges between Kano and Borno during the 1400s.

Revisiting the Attempted Revolt of the Dagachi

Unfortunately, the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud later lost their power and privilege. During the reign of Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509), the son of Muhammad Rumfa, deposed the Sayfawa-descended Dagachi and gave the title to a slave. This episode, poorly explained in the Kano Chronicle, triggered an invasion from Borno (then ruled by Idris b. Ali, 1497-1519). Various authors have proposed alternative and sometimes illogical interpretations of this episode. Exploring the theories propounded by Yusufu Bala Usman, and M.G. Smith, this section shall endeavor to elucidate the conflict in terms of Kano’s political centralization and consolidation of Queen Hauwa’s descent group.

Beginning with Usman, one can see how torturous and questionable readings of the Kano Chronicle can lead one astray. Usman, wisely wishing to avoid reading the history of relations between Borno and Hausaland solely through the lens of empire or military conquests, tries to shift attention to other factors. For him, the burning question of internecine conflict within the Sayfawa branches claiming descent from Idris and Dawud was a factor. Purely speculating, Usman proposes that the intervention of Idris b. Ali during the planned revolt of the Dagachi was meant to neutralize the threat of a Dawudid Sayfawa descent group ruling Kano.[27] This view is quite unlikely based on a close reading of the English translation of the Kano Chronicle. In the Chronicle, it is clearly stated that Kano’s king waited for Idris b. Ali to leave Guduawa and return to Borno before he “beguiled” the Dagachi into submission. In the words of the Chronicle, “As soon as he was gone, Abdulahi beguiled Dagachi into submission and then turned him out of office and gave his own slave the title.”[28] If the ruler of Borno was opposed to the Dagachi, why would Kano’s king wait until he left before “beguiling” the Dagachi and then replacing him with a slave? Clearly, Idris b. Ali’s attack was coordinated to support the Dagachi who had been “prevented” from revolting due to Hauwa’s intervention.

Another view, explored by M.G. Smith’s Government in Kano, 1350-1950, suggests that the Dagachi probably did not intend to revolt. Instead, the Dagachi may have reported the actions of Kano’s ruler against Zaria and Katsina to Borno. Assuming Kano’s attacks on Zaria and Katsina were viewed as disloyalty by the ruler of Borno, Idris b. Ali consequently led an army against Kano. Smith is agnostic on the matter for he also suggests that the Dagachi may have been attempting to contest the throne of Kano with Abdullahi. Alternatively, they may have sought the throne due to the reforms of Muhammad Rumfa. Since conflict between Hausa states was perennial and it is unclear to what extent if any Borno sought to intervene in Kano’s wars with Zaria and Katsina. Nonetheless, Smith’s theory is plausible but cannot be demonstrated with any evidence from the Bornoan side. Idris b. Ali was certainly an active ruler on the military front, besting the Bulala in Kanem in two campaigns and was potentially more active in the west, too.[29] Since the reign of Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509) witnessed Kano’s victory against Katsina and Zazzau, Kano’s actions could have triggered alarm in Borno. The possibility of Kano upsetting the balance of power among the Hausa states may have been a sincere concern.[30] Of all Smith’s theorizing, the question of Rumfa’s reforms and changes in the state remains the most compelling theory, though a mixture of factors were probably relevant.

What were the changes in Kano’s administrative structure during the lengthy reign of Muhammad Rumfa? Why did they potentially lead to an attempted revolt by the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud? According to the Kano Chronicle, Rumfa (c. 1463-1499) was responsible for a number of reforms. These included the appointment of eunuchs to political office.[31] Besides constructing the palace used by subsequent Kano kings, Rumfa remodelled kingship based on Borno (at least in the eyes of M.G. Smith). This included the creation of a Council of Nine supposedly inspired by Borno’s royal court.[32] The nine principal officials around the sarki in subsequent centuries included the Galadima, Madaiki, Wombai, Makama, Sar. Dawaki, Sar. Bai (a slave), Ciroma, Dan Iya, and the Sar. Dawaki Tsakkar Gidda, also of slave origin.[33] The exact composition during the reign of Rumfa was probably slightly different, but one can note the influence of Borno through titles such as ciroma. At the same time, one also notes the influence of slave officials. By creating a new palace and redesigning the administrative system with more enslaved officials loyal to himself, Rumfa was able to centralize authority more successfully than his successors. Also important was Rumfa’s establishment of the Kurmi Market and initiated the use of ostrich-feather sandals, kakaki instruments, and other signs of royal authority.[34]

Consequently, one no longer reads of overwhelmingly powerful galadimas who effectively ruled Kano during the reign of Bugaya (c. 1385-1390) and the galadima entrusted with the affairs of Kano after Umaru (c. 1410-1421) abdicated.[35] The position retained its significance in future centuries of Kano history, even manifesting in Hauwa and Guli’s attempts to shape Kano politics long after Rumfa’s demise in the 1500s.[36] In short, the reforms of Rumfa increased the presentation and authority of the rulers of Kano through a new Borno-inspired court. With the enhancement of royal authority both visually and politically, the Dagachi may have felt threatened, or perceived a threat to Borno’s influence in this part of Hausaland.

But, the question of Rumfa hardly explains it all. After a lengthy reign terminating in c. 1499, the Dagachi may have represented another faction in Kano politics opposed to Hauwa. The wife of Rumfa, this remarkable woman shaped the next several decades of Kano politics through her influence on her son, Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509), and her grandson. In the context of Abdullahi’s reign, however, Hauwa sought to consolidate power for her descendants by sidelining other contenders supported by the Dagachi’s faction. Additionally, the Dagachi may have initially perceived Abdullahi as a much weaker ruler than his father who instituted several reforms and held the throne for a lengthy period. Hauwa, however, may have come from a powerful chiefly lineage within the Kano kingdom that was seeking to increase their influence in the royal court. Hence, her brother, Guli, was also a key ally in this process. Barkindo, citing a local Kano chronicler, has suggested Hauwa could have been the daughter of the Gaya king.[37] Hauwa’s strong role in the reign of Abdullahi can be seen in her suppression of the alleged revolt of the Dagachi whilst her son was away on campaign. Meanwhile, she promoted the interests of Gaya in court. This may have been a factor in the Dagachi’s plan to revolt, an ill-fated attempt to weaken Hauwa’s influence while also intervening to either supplant or replace Abdullahi.

Regrettably, we are indebted to the Kano Chronicle as the sole source on the Dagachi’s revolt. This imposes severe limitations on any attempt to reconstruct what transpired. Reading between the lines, however, one can generate a rough outline of what occurred. It is known that the Dagachi plot was scheduled for a time when Abdullahi was away, so the Dagachi must have planned and waited for an opportune time to strike. But Hauwa outmaneuvered him, preventing serious trouble from the Dagachi. One is apt to suspect the ruler of Borno was already aware of the Dagachi’s plot. But, by humbling himself with mallams by his side, Abdullahi convinced Idris b. Ali to return to Borno. Then, and only after the mai was no longer an immediate military threat, did Abdullahi trick the Dagachi into submitting to his authority. Afterwards, by replacing him with a slave, Abdullahi removed a powerful noble lineage as a threat to the state.[38] This revolt, which represented the final attempt by the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud to preserve their power and privilege, concluded with their demise in the face of Kano political centralization and a powerful queen-mother.

Elite Political Exiles and Sayfawa Influence Beyond Kanem and Borno

As the above endeavor to analyze the influence and legacy of a deposed Sayfawa mai in Kano illustrates, elite political exiles exerted tremendous authority and power in their new homes. In the case of Uthman b. Dawud and his descendants, they represent a product of the descendants of Dawud who were deposed by overly powerful officials of noble origin. Ironically, the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud were later deposed and replaced by slave officials, just as the Sayfawa accomplished against the kaigama during the reign of Ali b. Dunama and his successors. Much more remains to be said on this episode and the larger question of Kano-Borno relations, but it shows how even a branch of the Sayfawa could shape political culture and economics in areas on the periphery of Borno. Elites, bringing with them the Sayfawa state structure, a retinue, and Islamic scholars, nonetheless profoundly shaped their new locations. The example of the Dagachi serves as one example of this.

Looking beyond, to Darfur, for example, descendants of Dawud and other Bornoans claiming Magumi origin were able to achieve similar levels of influence. This promoted an image of Borno and the Sayfawa as ideal Islamic rulers across a vast expanse of the Sudanic belt, from the Niger to the Nile. Their cultural influence was compounded by an increase in trade, religious ties, pilgrimage routes, commerce, and official relations with Borno. In the case of Dagachi, this overwhelming power was considered a threat by a centralized Kano court with a possibly close tie to a Gaya-backed faction eager to consolidate their influence with Rumfa’s son. And while conflict erupted between Borno and Kano after Abdullahi’s reign, one can conclude that Borno’s cultural influence did not exclude military clashes or raids. Yet the type of regional politico-cultural hegemony achieved by the Sayfawa was undoubtedly aided by Sayfawa elite exiles and envoys. Perhaps more importantly, the Dagachi of Kano also serves as an example of how elite migrants and exiles affected state formation in the Central Sudan.

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[1] As always, we prefer Dierk Lange’s chronology for the annals of the Sayfawa. It has not yet been superseded, despite its occasional contradictions. See Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808).

[2] Although he has not presented sufficient evidence to support his interpretation, Murray Last has suggested the Dagachi was actually a prince from Mandara. This seems highly unlikely, however. Last’s reasoning is based on the name of the mother of Kano king Dauda, Mandara. Apparently, this was implausibly linked to the kingdom of Mandara on the basis of the name of Dauda’s mother. On the other hand, Abubakar Dokaji’s chronicle of Kano’s history presents the Dagachi as a warrior. See discussion in Bawuro M. Barkindo, “Kano Relations with Borno, Early Times to C. 1800” in Bawuro M. Barkindo (editor), Kano and Some of Her Neighbours, 151. Of course, when one consults the translation of a kings list for Kano by John Hunwick, the name of Dawud’s (Dauda’s) mother is Manduna. See John Hunwick, “Not Yet the Kano Chronicle,” 106. As for Dokaji’s theory, one must wonder why a warrior had a large number of mallams in his party. The large number of dependents, mallams, and possibly slaves who accompanied the Dagachi to Kano suggest someone of great wealth and status, not a mere warrior.

[3] Ibn Battuta in J. F. P. Hopkins and N. Levtzion (editors). Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History, 281, 302. Ibn Battuta’s reference to Gobir, whose ruler was not Muslim (if the sons of the ruler were killed and buried with their father, this would imply the people of Kubar (Gobir?) were still non-Muslim. Overall, Ibn Battuta’s brief report, recorded from a Masufa interlocutor, is indicative of an early Hausa state engaged in trans-Saharan trade.

[4] For one speculative look at Sayfawa intervention in the affairs of Aïr in the late 1100s or early 1200s, see Behique Dunama, “Kanem, Kawar and the Tuareg in the 12th Century,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/kanem-kawar-and-tuareg-in-12th-century.html. For another speculative interpretation of early Gobir, see Behique Dunama, “Gobir and the Copts,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2024/06/gobir-and-copts.html. Also worth considering is the possible connection between the Kanawa and the people of the Sosebaki states. According to Landeroin, the subjects of the Sosebaki rulers were Kanawas of Kutumbawas like the people of Kano. Oral traditions from the early 1900s indicated that about 800-900 years ago, a prince named  Mohammed Nafarko arrived in the region from Borno (Landeroin, “Notice historique” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 425-427). Additional oral traditions on the foundation of Birni Gazargamo also link the Sao leader, Dala N’Gumami, with Kano. See Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs Vol 2, 67. Interpretation of these disparate traditions require much closer analysis but imply connections between peoples in Kano and Borno specifically long before the 1400s. Also worth noting is the name Dala, used by Ahmad b. Furtu during Idris Alooma’s reign to refer to Kano (the city). See Lange, A Sudanic chronicle: the Borno Expeditions of Idrīs Alauma (1564–1576 according to the account of Ahmad b. Furtū. Arabic text, English translation, commentary and geographical gazetteer. Also, note the genealogy of the alifas of Kanem as reported by Landeroin in “Notice historique.” The founder of their dynasty, Dalatoa Afuno, was allegedly of Magumi descent and from a village in the Kano kingdom. The name Dalatu may be a reference to Kano.

[5] See Sonja Magnavita and Juan-Marco Puerta Schardt, “Tracing connections: Exploring links between Marandet (Central Niger) and the Chad Basin through pottery provenance analysis using pXRF,” Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports 67 (2025).

[6] John Lavers, “A Note on the Terms “Hausa” and “Afuno,”’ Kano Studies 2 (1) 1980, 116.

[7] Intriguingly, there may have been a kaigama named Dalatu in the 1300s. According to the Diwan, Bir b. Idris, whose reign stretched from c. 1389-1421, engaged in war with a kaigama named Muhammad b. D.l.t. See Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 77. The title of kaigama was perhaps not inherited through direct succession but Muhammad’s father may have held the title sometime during the reign of Idris b. Ibrahim. For evidence of the title of kaigama once being the domain of elites whose children were considered princes, see Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries Vol. II, and Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A Study of the Origin, Growth, and Collapse of a Dynasty (891-1846), 93. For an opposing view, see Lange, “Preliminaires pour une histoire des Sao,” Journal of African History 30, no. 2 (1989), 209. Lange’s perspective, however, is contradicted by Palmer, Barth and Nur Alkali.

[8] P.A. Benton, The Languages and Peoples of Bornu, Vol 1., 25. Benton’s report also indicates that the chima of Kano was the mulima of the kaigama. This connection with the kaigama may stem from the earlier territorial domains of the kaigama, which, according to Nachtigal, encompassed the lands stretching from what was the Sokoto Caliphate to Logon, including Daia, Gujeba, Mabani and Bulgoa (Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. II, 249). The title may also have some connection with Kagha, possibly an earlier capital of Borno under the administration of the kaigama. See Djibo Hamani, Quatorze siecles d'histoire du Soudan Central: Niger du VIIè au XXè siècle, 110.

[9] Oral tradition conflating the reigns of different maiwa with the same name is likely.

[10] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 29. One is also tempted to consider later maiwa such as Idris Alooma as a possible candidate for the ruler of Borno recounted in Benton’s tale. However, based on the chronicle of Ahmad b. Furtu, we know that the kaigama was named Muhammad Kaday (at least for the Sau-Gafata campaign). See Lange, A Sudanic Chronicle, 49.

[11] John Lavers, “A Note on the Terms “Hausa” and “Afuno,”’ 115.

[12] Although it is possible the Wangarawa traders whose arrival in Kano during the late 1300s is probable supported one local group whilst Borno lent its aid to the other?

[13] Paul E. Lovejoy, Abdullahi Mahadi, and Mansur Ibrahim Mukhtar, “C.L. Temple’s Notes on the History of Kano: A Lost Chronicle of Political Office (1909),” Sudanic Africa 4 (1993), 76.

[14] Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 77. Lamentably, the Diwan does not provide many details on the political turbulence within the Sayfawa state during the 1300s and 1400s. Besides allusions to conflict with the Bulala and Sao or civil wars with kaigama officials, it is difficult to reconstruct in greater detail the possible alliances of elite officials or competing branches of the Sayfawa which made this an unstable era, politically.

[15] See H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 38 (1908), 72.

[16] Ibid., 74.

[17] Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 77.

[18] To properly understand the period stretching from c. 1389-1459, recall that there were 12 Sayfawa rulers, 6 each from among the descendants of Dawud and Idris. Frequent contestations of succession or civil wars may have given the kaigama officials tremendous power to shape events to their favor. See Jean-Claude Zeltner, Pages d'histoire du Kanem, pays tchadien, 82.

[19] Mervyn Hiskett, “The ‘Song of Bagauda’: A Hausa King List and Homily in Verse—II,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 28, no. 1 (1965), 116.

[20] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 74.

[21] Roxana Ma Newman, An English-Hausa Dictionary, 296.

[22] M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350–1950, 73.

[23] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 75. This suggests that despite his humble title, the Dagachi was actually one of the most powerful or important titleholders in Kano. Before the Dagachi’s regency, only the galadima appears similarly influential and powerful, including acting as regent or deposing kings.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., 76.

[26] Kofar Dagachi, for instance, was an important gate that opened on the road to Kazaure, Hadejia and beyond. Is there any chance this was linked to trade with Borno from Kano? More investigation is needed into the possible role of branches of the Sayfawa from the Dawudid branch in other lands despite ongoing hostilities between Dawud’s descendants and those of Idris. For more on the gate of the Dagachi, see Bawuro M. Barkindo, “Gates of Kano” in Bawuro M. Barkindo (editor), Studies in the History of Kano, 18.

[27] Yusufu Bala Usman, “A Reconsideration of the History of Relations Between Borno and Hausaland Before 1804” in Yusufu Bala Usman & Muhammad Nur Alkali (editors), Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno, 182.

[28] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78.

[29] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs Vol 1, 17.

[30] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78.

[31] Ibid.

[32] M.G. Smith, “Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 6, no. 2 (1964), 168.

[33] Paul E. Lovejoy, Abdullahi Mahadi, and Mansur Ibrahim Mukhtar, “C.L. Temple’s Notes on the History of Kano: A Lost Chronicle of Political Office (1909),” 50.

[34] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78. The state-sponsored establishment of a market, perhaps several years after the Dagachi had sponsored one, is a sign of state support for commerce and likely a greater role for the government in taxation and long-distance trade.

[35] Ibid., 73-74.

[36] Ibid., 80.

[37] Bawuro Barkindo, “Kano Relations with Borno, Early Times to c. 1800” in Kano and Some of Her Neighbours, 156. The unlikely theory of Murray Last on a royal Songhay origin for Hauwa is derived from Leo Africanus, a questionable source on the details of Kano during this era. As for Hauwa’s Gaya origins, the ruling lineage there were noted in the Kano Chronicle to have come to the capital during the reign of Yakubu (1452-1463). Was Hauwa a daughter of Agalfati? If so, she was a descendant of the ruling line of Machina, whose local dynasty were close with the Sayfawa. See H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 76.

[38] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 78. 

Idris b. Ibrahim and Afnu (c. 1342-1366)

  

Whilst revisiting various sources on Dagachi and the question of Sayfawa relations with Kano and Hausaland in the 1300s and 1400s, we were naturally drawn to a speculative essay by John Lavers. Entitled "A Note on the Terms "Hausa" and "Afuno"" and published in Kano Studies, Lavers endeavored to trace the period of Kanem-Borno involvement in Kano to the 1300s. Our evidence for this is, understandably, limited and problematic. But, Lavers raised a legitimate question of an earlier Sayfawa interest in Kano based on how Ibn Battuta and al-Maqrizi refer to Kanem-Borno as well as the sending of tsare from Kano during the 1400s. If the rulers of Kano were sending gifts to Borno's ruler in the 1400s, particularly in an era before Ali b. Dunama successfully stabilized the Sayfawa state in that region, this could possibly be based on earlier moments when the Sayfawa were active in Kano or the west. This could very well explain why Ibn Battuta, for instance, referred to Idris b. Ibrahim (c. 1342-1366) as ruler of Borno, even before the Sayfawa permanently relocated to Borno from Kanem. It would also explain why there was a Sayfawa ruler called Kaday Afnu in c. 1388. Perhaps he had been raised there or possibly had a mother from the western lands. Of course, it would further elucidate why Uthman b. Dawud (c. 1421-1422) later moved to Kano after his deposition. 

If close relations between Kanem-Borno and the area of Kasar Kano were apparent by the 1300s, it also explains the tradition heard by Benton for the origin of the word afuno. Although oral tradition by the time of P.A. Benton associated the ruler who initiated the use of this word for the Hausa with Idris b. Ali, it is likely that another Sayfawa mai named Idris is intended. For example, from the chronicle of Ahmad b. Furtu translated by Lange, we know that Idris b. Ali, who ruled from c. 1564-1596, had a kaigama named Muhammad Kaday during the campaign against the Sau-Gafata. During the reign of an earlier Idris b. Ali, 1497-1519, Palmer included a mahram in Bornu Sahara and Sudan naming the kaigama as Muhmmad ibn Sugu while another witness was named Dallatu Abd ul Lahi. This Idris could be the one recalled in tradition for attacking Kano, an event recorded in the Kano Chronicle in the context of Muhammad Rumfa's successor's reign. 

Yet Lavers could be correct about Idris b. Ibrahim (c. 1342-1366) as the Sayfawa ruler recalled in the tradition for another reason. When one consults the Diwan, one can see that Bir b. Idris, whose rule extended from c. 1389-1421, engaged in a civil war with kaigama named Muhammad b. D.l.t. Since Muhammad b. D.l.t. was certainly the son of a man named Dalatu, and the position of kaigama was held by princes or those of royal blood, it is actually conceivable for there to have been a kaigama named Dalatu during the reign of Idris b. Ibrahim (c. 1342-1366). Based on the Diwan, however, the position of kaigama was not clearly inherited in a hereditary fashion. Nonetheless, Barth's history of the reign of Ali b. Dunama (c. 1465-1497) indicates that the title of kaigama was held by powerful elites whose children were seen as princes or princesses. They may not have inherited the position of kaigama directly from their fathers, but may have been able to claim the title after other relatives from other branches occupied the post (perhaps collaterally?). This suggests that there likely was a kaigama named Dalatu sometime in the mid-14th century. This official may have been the one recalled in tradition as attacking Afnu, or the arse-clothed people, to the west of Borno. 

Ultimately, Lavers was writing based more on speculation than anything, but his reasoning is not without merit. The notion of Sayfawa campaigning in the area of Kasar Kano in the mid-1300s is certainly plausible. It also has some support for the existence of a kaigama named Dalatu in the Diwan. Of course, the tradition reported by Benton could also be alluding to Idris b. Ali (1497-1519), although the reference to a kaigama named Dalatu seems to be a figure who lived in the 1300s.

Looking for Borno in Aïr Traditions

Whilst perusing  Documents Nigériens: Tome I, l'Aïr edited in French by Boubou Hama in the late 1960s, we came across references to Borno multiple times. Unfortunately, the corpus of oral traditions collected here are often of a very vague nature. Indeed, when recounting the history of the sultans of Agadez, informants appeared to be making composite figures of various sultans without any clear chronological precision. With these limitations, it is sadly difficult to use these traditions to better contextualize the relations between the Tuareg of Asben and Borno.

Nonetheless, some of the traditions do affirm a period of Bornoan hegemony of Aïr. For instance, one elder reputed to be over 100 years old, reported that that the people of the region had to pay tribute to the people of Borno annually. Part of this tribute consisted of animals (cattle?), slaves, and sometimes nobles. Since the tribute was too onerous, the Abzinawa decided not to pay it any longer. When Borno's representative came to collect it, the people of Aïr refused. The sultan of Borno, not named, prepared to go to war and came to Aïr with his army. But, the Tuareg had fled to the mountainous caves of Bagzam and withstood the besieging forces of Borno. Through a ruse conceived by a man named Hamed Yahya, the eldest, the Tuareg sent out an old camel stuffed with grains, dates, and water. When the Bornoan forces killed and opened the entrails of the camel, they found it full of provisions. This led the Bornoans to assume the Tuareg had sufficient food and water in their mountainous caves to continue to avoid engaging the king of Borno. Deciding to leave Asben, the Bornoan troops lifted their siege and returned to Koukaoua (Kukawa). Obviously, the reference to Kukawa is an anachronism here since this event is said to have taken place when Agadez was a small village or recently founded. This campaign is probably the ill-fated Bornoan expedition to Asben mentioned in the Kano Chronicle, taking place in the 1400s. 

Another informant cited in the study also referred to the same conflict with Borno. According to an elder named Ousmane ben Elhadj Kemel, the Bornoans collected an annual tribute from the Tuareg of Aïr consisting of a beautiful young girl. The Bornoan envoy was called Aganga (a Kanuri or Bornoan form of this word is not known to us) and was refused the tribute one year. According to tradition, the girl who was supposed to be given in tribute had a brother who refused to accept it. What is distinct about this version of events is that the girl's brother actually killed the Aganga, triggering an invasion from Borno. In addition, this tradition of the conflict mentions 3 camels whose stomachs were filled with ample food, giving the impression to the Bornoan troops waiting out the Tuareg hiding in the caves of Bagzan that their enemies had ample resources. Meanwhile, the Bornoan troops were running out of water and supplies, forced to abandon Aïr soon after. Another distinguishing trait of this tradition is that the Istanbul legend starts here, with the Tuareg sending their dignitaries to find a sultan in Istanbul during the time Borno's sultan was in the region. 

Other references to Borno or areas once affiliated with Borno are more arduous to connect with other sources. For example, one tradition based on information from Mohamed ben Agueb refers to Younoussou and Mohamed Ben Younoussou. The latter is mentioned for having attacking Gobir and forcing its ruler to flee their capital. In 578, a year equivalent to our 1182-3. But the context of this attack on Gobir and the conflict in Bilma are more suggestive of the 1700s. The reference to Fachi and Mohamed Younoussou appointing Ibrahim ben Ahmed as chief of Bilma seem to refer to the period of conflict over Kawar in the mid-1700s. 

Later on, Mohamed ben Younoussou defeated Gobir and went to war with Borno, occupying a Bornoan fortress built on a high hill. This campaign was advised by the Agadez sultan's vizir, Abdallahi ben Youssouf, who actually wantedt o weaken the Tuareg. Thus, the troops sent by Agadez to attack Borno found themselves completedly encercled by Bornoan warriors, who trapped the Tuareg on the hill. Eventually, Mohamed ben Younoussou was able to escape and reached Haedja, where he fought with a Bornoan leader named Ibrahim. It is possible this Ibrahim was a galadima of Borno sometime in the mid-1700s. By the end of the conflict, the Tuareg were defeated in 608 and force dto flee to Agadez where the Bornoans followed the Tuareg to Talmari, where they were defeated by the Acharifane. Upon his return to Agadez, Mohamed Elbaki was appointed as heir. 

The best we could do for trying to situate the above tale with the known history of Agadez-Borno wars is to suggest the campaign in which the Agadez sultan penetrated deep into Borno and was forced to flee happened during an attack on Gaskerou or Kawar in the middle decades of the 1700s. According to Landeroin, Bornoan forces did attack and pursue the Tuareg in that raid, before ultimaetly fleeing back to Borno.  In Koyam tradition, the place where the pursuing Bornoan army was defeated was not Talmari, although it is possible the Tuareg and Koyam traditions remember the place differently. 

The same source also included Borno or the Beriberi as enemies of Agadez during the reign of Sultan Mohamed "El Fadel," who reigned after the aforementioned Mohamed ben Younoussou. Apparently, the Beriberi and "Baghoussow" had crossed the Niger to provoke the Tuareg of Aïr on their own territory and committed massacres at Tiguida and Ingall before being vanquished by Mohamed El-Fadel. We could not be sure to what extent any Bornoan sources recall this, or if there is confusion on the part of the traditionists.

A Tentative Study of the Reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun (1729-1744)

         Mai Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, who likely reigned in 1729-1744, was one of the last successful Sayfawa monarchs of the 18^th century. During the Late Sayfawa Period, the dynasty that ruled Borno gradually withered with the loss of Bilma. Even more, Wadai’s expansion into eastern Kanem, the autonomy of the Bedde, and Bagirmi’s attacks against the Kotoko states and southern Borno during the reign of mbang Muhammad al-Amin also occurred in this late 18^th century decline. Naturally, tensions between Borno and Mandara continued as well, with disastrous consequences for Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. Nonetheless, until the fall of Gazargamo in 1808, the Sayfawa remained powerful and likely possessed a spiritual stature or authority unequalled in the Central Sudan. Yet before that decline of the second half of the 18^th century, some of the last maiwa endeavored to reassert Borno’s political and economic dominance. Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents such a ruler, and although his reign is poorly documented, glimpses of his attempts to restore Borno’s hegemony can be found. After a brief overview of the extant sources, this article shall review Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun’s policy with regard to Hausaland, the question of relations with Mandara and Bagirmi, and an overview of domestic affairs within Borno. Undoubtedly, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents one of the last assertive Sayfawa rulers, whose reign complicates narratives of 18th-century Bornoan decline and political disengagement.

Discussing the Sources

            In terms of source material, the lack of a surviving chronicle severely limits one’s efforts to reevaluate the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Nonetheless, an assortment of oral sources and written sources provide enough clues for a tentative overview. First, the Diwan. Essentially a list of the various rulers of the Sayfawa maiwa with brief details on their reign, the Diwan aids in establishing an approximate timeline for the Sayfawa rulers.[1] In addition, the Kano Chronicle briefly alludes to an attack on the Kano kingdom by Borno during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Besides identifying the Sarkin Bornu as Ali, the chronicle’s erroneous description of the campaign is contradicted by Bornoan oral sources which establish that it was not Ali who attacked Kano in the 1730s.[2]

A third written source, a rihla copied in the mid-19^th century, presents a number of problems. The manuscript was found in the library of Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Miskin, and supposedly written by his grandfather, Muhammad b. Ali b. Dunama b. Ali b. Umar b. Idris.[3] It is supposedly a description of the hajj of Ali b. Umar. But the year given for this undertaking, 1727-8, and the description of the reign of about 15 years that followed, are more applicable for Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Is it possible that this source is about the hajj of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun but changed to be about Ali b. Umar due to the latter’s renown?[4]

Besides the aforementioned written sources, a number of oral sources exist. One of the most important, a Kanuri praise song translated by J.R. Patterson in Kanuri Songs, is particularly conspicuous. Given the genre and its conventions, one cannot expect a song that is necessarily historically accurate. Yet it speaks to a type of court praise singing and ethos that very much emphasized military valor and power. In addition, studies of the history of the Central Sudan based on oral sources supplement the meager textual ones. For instance, H.R. Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs contains a short chapter on Muhammad Hajimi and the Masbarma that alludes to the Kano campaign.[5] Likewise, a girgam translated in Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan refers to Muhammad as the “lord of Lergam the Black Prince with the white mouth-veil.”[6] This supports the identification of the builder of the elite brick building at Lergam with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, a tradition cited by Seidensticker.[7]

Unsurprisingly, a number of 19^th century, colonial-era reports and works by 20^th century scholars drawing on oral sources for the history of Hausaland, Bagirmi and Kanem refer to relations with Borno in the first half of the 18^th century. Furthermore, M.G. Smith, Hogben and Kirk-Greene provide useful clues on Kano and Hausaland during this period while Lavers, Nachtigal, and H. Lanier’s syntheses of Bagirmi history assist in reconstructing Bagirmi’s relationship with Borno. Great caution must be used with such material, particularly as later scholars sometimes regurgitated information from colonial-era scholars who hardly cited their sources. For instance, Lavers has uncritically repeated H.R. Palmer for the theory of a Mandara campaign of Ali b. Umar during the 1650s. When one checks Palmer, however, there is no sourcing to determine where he found this information![8]

Overall, the sources for the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun are hardly adequate, but sufficient for a tentative overview. Doing so allows one insights into the nature of Sayfawa statecraft and relations in a dynamic 18^th century world. The Sayfawa maiwa were hardly the indolent sovereigns only engaged in Islamic study or ritual seclusion in this time.

Borno, Kano, and Hausaland, c. 1729-1744

            Perhaps the best documented action of the mai was his attack on Kano, which may have taken place in 1734 (it coincided with a solar eclipse). Kano had previously been the subject of a campaign during the reign of Idris b. Ali in the 16^th century. At the time, Kano’s actions of fortifying settlements near Borno’s frontier were seen as a threat. For perhaps equivalent reasons, Borno’s Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also attacked the powerful Hausa kingdom. In this campaign, probably in the 1730s, the Kano Chronicle reports that “May Ali” came to make war on Kano during the reign of Sarkin Kano Kumbari (1731-1743). The Bornoan forces allegedly camped at Faggi for 3 nights without fighting due to the intervention of Shehu Tahiru and Shehu Bunduu.[9] Apparently, one of the mallams, Shehu Attahiru, who persuaded the mai to leave was an ancestor of the emir of Kano.[10] Unfortunately, this chronicle does not elucidate why the conflict arose in the first place, but it emphasizes the role of highly respected Islamic leaders in bringing peace.

Despite the chronicle suggesting a rather brief Bornoan siege, other sources suggest a far longer campaign. For example, tradition reported in Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs suggests that the mai was in the Kano state for 7 months.[11] Indeed, the mai attacked but did not prevail “until the appointed time came.” If the campaign lasted at least 7 months and the mai eventually prevailed, then Borno may have been able to successfully restore its position of dominance over Kano, albeit likely only with some form of tribute or vassal status for Kano’s sarki. In terms of why the conflict arose in the first place, Lavers has proposed that Kano was attacked to prevent it from importing guns and upsetting the regional balance of power.[12] While plausible, there is no evidence for this in our surviving sources. Other scholars emphasize internal dynamics within Kano. Thus, the Gaya, whose influence in Kano affairs was great during the reign of Sarkin Kano Sharifa and Kumbari, played a role. Moreover, new towns and walls around several in the eastern domain of Kano, such as Takai, Tsokuwa, and Rano implied the closing of the frontier with ribats. The newer towns constructed in this era often followed a uniform plan, suggestive of state or official planning. They were often built in the open plain while others, at major crossroads for trade, became administrative centers for taxation and cheap labor for Sharifa and Kumbari.[13] Thus, it is possible that Borno’s intervention in Kano was due to the latter’s operations along its eastern frontier and the creation of fortified settlements. This theory is more persuasive than that of the firearms in Kano, although the two are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, Borno’s response was likely motivated by increased attempts at centralization by Kano’s rulers as well as ensuring Kano’s access to firearms did not upset the regional balance of power.

But what was accomplished by Borno’s intervention in Kano in c. 1734? According to some sources, the conflict with Kano likely reverberated across Hausaland with Bornoan intervention beyond. Although the Kano Chronicle does not report the outcome, other sources highly affirm the notion of Borno’s ruler reestablishing Kano as a vassal state (even if only symbolic).[14] The Gazetteer of Kano Province reports that the mai  had issued an ultimatum to Kano: he would burn the city unless tribute was paid.[15] Others suggest that Borno overran other parts of Hausaland at this time, too. Although corroborating evidence is lacking, Hogben and Kirk-Greene wrote of the many Kanuri links in Zaria. For instance, the office of Limamin Kona was reserved to a family of Borno origin. Other Bornoan emissaries or officials in Zaria could potentially be linked to this episode, such as the Madalla.[16] Another source, the Abuja Chronicle, dates the Beriberi (Kanuri) of Borno attacking Hausaland to 1734, with Zaria paying tribute to Borno.[17] Other evidence for this is lacking, but it is certainly possible that Borno’s actions in Kano in c. 1734 also impacted Zaria and other Hausa states, particularly in the reassertion of a claim by Borno to regional hegemony. To what extent Borno may have also used Gobir to influence events in Hausaland is unclear, but Gobir during the reign of Babari (c. 1741-69?) attacked Bornoan territory at Shirra.[18] Ultimately, a resurgence of Bornoan claims to regional supremacy and tribute may have been won from Kano and Zaria during the c. 1734 campaign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

Mandara, Bagirmi and the East

In addition to the Kano campaign, which appears to have been a success, Borno’s relations with Bagirmi during this time appear favorable for the former. Bagirmi was forced to submit to the authority of Borno during the reign of mbang Lahoual (or Alahouine). In the words of H. Lanier, “En 1741, attaqué par le sultan de Bornou, il fut vaincu et dut se soumettre à la souveraineté de ce pays.” [19] Although Bagirmi was able to throw off the yoke of Borno during the reign of Hadji (dated c. 1741-1784 by Lanier) and end Borno’s claims to sovereignty of the kingdom, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was apparently successful in Bagirmi. Likewise, the rihla mentions Bagirmi as one area where the Sayfawa mai traveled on the pilgrimage. If the problematic source is incorrectly attributing the hajj along the Sudan Road to Ali b. Umar but actually describing a pilgrimage of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, then Bagirmi was allegedly one of the areas where the Sayfawa ruler settled 5000 captives in 1727/8.[20] This act of establishing settlements in Bagirmi could be partly motivated by a desire to facilitate travel for pilgrims using the Sudan Road in the 18^th century. Furthermore, it also served to emphasize the power of the Sayfawa ruler whose act of establishing towns or villages in other kingdoms was an assertion of Borno’s influence and power in the Central Sudan.

Naturally, the highly problematic account of the 1727/8 pilgrimage must be interpreted very carefully. But it is consistent with the actions of the Sayfawa in the first half of the 18^th century who may have successfully imposed tributary relations on Bagirmi. In fact, it may also have been during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun that the “Kurata” or Tunjur Arabs in Kanem sent their leader to Borno for confirmation of his position. This may explain why the praise song to this mai names the Kurata among the captives of the mai.[21] The actions of the Sayfawa mai in Bagirmi are perhaps to be expected with similar developments in Kanem which may have included greater control of the Tunjur in Kanem who usually resisted the alifa at Mao.[22] In short, Borno may have succeeded in establishing firmer control of Kanem (which was to become a major battleground in the 19^th century) as well as imposed tribute on Bagirmi whilst protecting its influence over various polities south of Lake Chad.

Besides Bagirmi and the eastern shores of Lake Chad, Mandara was also another arena of conflict for Borno. The previously mentioned Rihla even claims “Ali b. Umar” (although the dates used in the document align with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun) died in Krowrowa, which appears to be Kerawa, once a capital of Mandara. This problematic source asserts, “He raided Krowrowa and died there in Krowrowa where his grave is visited.”[23] This is contradicted by the Diwan, which indicates that Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in Gazargamo.[24] In spite of these contradictions and inaccuracies, the text does seem to be accurate in referring to conflict with Mandara during the first half of the 18^th century, before Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama’s disastrous campaign in the 1780s. According to Barkindo, the Islamization of Mandara in the early 1700s was supported by Borno. In fact, Dunama b. Ali (c. 1696-1715) was said to have sent Islamic scholars to Mandara. Tradition in Mora of Mandara’s conversion to Islam during the reign of Bukar Aji (who reigned c. 1715-1737) even suggests he grew up in Borno and was sent to Mandara after Borno had the previous ruler killed. Interestingly, Bukar Aji is also said to have taken the title of mai and remodelled his court on that of Borno. Tradition also asserts that Bukar Aji and his successor sent regular gifts of tribute to Borno. Even Hamdun b. Dunama reciprocated, sending a personal Quran to Bukar Aji.[25]

Yet despite Borno’s role in the ascent of Mandara’s first Muslim king, occasional conflict occurred. To Lavers, serious trouble with Mandara occurred during the reigns of al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama and Muhammad b. Hamdun, who both fought Mandara.[26] It would seem that Mandara’s allegiance to Borno depended on the proximity of Borno’s army. So even the spiritual authority or stature of the Sayfawa and the renown some maiwa achieved as pious figures was not sufficient to ensure the loyalty of Mandara. In this case, Mandara’s now Muslim kings were likely eager to benefit from expansion and raiding, when possible, the vulnerable tributary polities of Borno. Though it does not seem likely that Hamdun b. Dunama or Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in a war with Mandara, the existence of conflict between the two states points to a problem which only grew during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. But for now, Borno was able to meet the challenge, at least based on available evidence. Moreover, the period of Aji Bukar and Madi Makiya’s reigns, c. 1715-1751, also coincided with the immigration of Bornoan settlers in Mandara. Their presence also necessitated the assertion of Sayfawa rule or authority that may have caused conflict with Mandara’s kings who saw these settlers as their subjects.[27] But, Mandara’s kings accepted Borno’s right to tax many towns in the northern part of its domains until c. 1751 and Borno continued to raid parts of Mandara despite receiving gifts and tribute from Aji Bukar and Madi Makiyya, the latter possibly the son of a Kanuri woman.[28] This level of Bornoan influence in the affairs of Mandara may have also been motivated by the interests of the Bornoan elite to expand and protect their influence in the south while the north was challenged by population movements due to prolonged drought and climate change.

Internal Dynamics in Borno

In terms of internal affairs and domestic concerns, the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was challenged by ecological shifts, migration, and famine. Indeed, a famine that persisted for 2 years occurred during his reign.[29] The last several years of his reign coincided with a drought that lasted from 1738-1753. Due to this period of long-lasting drought, various groups such as the Jetko, Tubu, Tuareg, Koyam, and Fulani migrated to more fertile lands, thereby increasing the chances for conflict over scarce resources in difficult times.[30] Despite these challenges, Borno was still in control of Bilma. The Bedde, however, were beginning to act autonomously in the 18^th century and disrupt caravan routes.

In the face of these challenges, the Bornoan state was still able to continue past Sayfawa practices such as the sponsoring of elite brick structures. At the site of Lergam, for instance, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun is remembered for sponsoring the construction of a brick building for what was likely a palace enclosure. According to Wilhelm Seidensticker, “The name of the founder of the palace was given as Mohammed Ajimi, who can be considered identical with Muhammad b. al-Haji Hamdun (ca. 1731-1747).”[31] Located 31 kilometers west of Geidam and on the northern banks of the Komadugu Yobe, today the site lacks any visible evidence of bricks except for a few from what was presumably the wall of the palace enclosure. Magnavita also described the site of Lergam, reporting that Lergam was also known as Kirishadam, referring to the largest refuse mound. Although the area was only an estimated 250 by 250 meters, Lergam appears to have been built by the mai as a temporary residence.[32] Like Gambaru built in the 16^th century, Lergam indicates that a Sayfawa ruler was still able to support elite architecture using brick well into the 1700s.

 Likewise, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also supported the creation of new towns or settlements, including Kurnawa or Dalaturi. Kurnawa, according to J.R. Patterson’s Borsari District Assessment Report, was founded by a Mandara slave named Haji Amadu. This Mandara captive of the Borno mai, Momadu Haji, was given his freedom upon his return from Mecca. Subsequently, he left Birni Gazargamo and founded Kurnawa with his followers. His descendants later ruled the town.[33] This act demonstrates the role of the Sayfawa and their captives or dependents in the administration and the creation of new settlements. The praise song to this mai also emphasizes his power to redistribute and relocate people:

You son of Aji, can collect or disperse people at your will

And turn again, and make a town (with those you have dispersed)

You are the scourge of Jillam, Dalla Darge and Dakkinam Dalla Damaram

Some towns are founded during the cold season of the year

But some of yours have been founded as the result of your victories, Aji Gana the Intriguer[34]

 

Many of these places are difficult to identify, but the implication is rather clear: the mai possessed great authority through the control of people, including the relocation of dependents or subjects to create new towns. Additionally, he was able to found towns through his military victories. Since the conventions of the praise song may lead to exaggeration, one must use this type of material very cautiously. Even though the general image of the authority of the maiwa in this period is supported by conflict with Mandara (possibly related to Bornoan settlers in parts of Mandara), the possible settlement of slaves in parts of Bagirmi and Wadai, and the creation of Kurnawa as a prosperous town.

            Finally, the domestic religious policies and political choices made by Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun were also significant. He was the first mai to invite Shaykh Tahir b. Ibrahim to Gazargamo. This shaykh later played a prominent role in Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). His father, Hamdun, was also remembered as a scholar in Borno tradition who had studied at al-Azhar in Cairo.[35] Hamdun was also said to have written 12 copies of the Quran and placed himself in ritual seclusion.[36] His son, whose pilgrimage to Mecca is still up for debate, may have been similarly pious but was also more likely to have engaged in military campaigns. Yet he also included respected Muslim leaders such as a Masbarma in his retinue during the c. 1734 campaign against Kano. He also listened to Kano mallams to end that conflict, again suggestive of how essential Islam was to state ideology and administrative practices of the Sayfawa court. He likely benefitted from the caliphal status of the Sayfawa whose pious sanctity was acknowledged widely, while also simultaneously endeavoring to recover or restore Borno’s economic and political hegemony.

Conclusion

Despite the paucity of written sources that directly speak to the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, enough material exists to reconsider this reign. Whilst the Late Sayfawa Period unquestionably included decline, it is very misleading or inaccurate to portray the last century of effective Sayfawa rule as merely one of indolent or secluded maiwa who passively responded to the changing political, economic, intellectual and ecological landscapes. Through the Kano campaign in the 1730s, interventions in Mandara and Bagirmi, the possible support for the Sudan Road for pilgrims, Borno remained a significant contender in the region. Similarly, the sponsoring of new towns and brick architecture as an expression of elite authority reveal the strength of Borno’s ruling dynasty. In other words, all was not immediately lost for the Sayfawa maiwa until the second half of the 18^th century. Undeniably, the prolonged drought and population movements from 1738-1753 and the burgeoning power of the Kel Ewey in Kawar, as well as favorable shifts in power relations that benefitted Mandara, Bagirmi, and Wadai eventually did weaken Borno’s claims to regional hegemony. Yet assertive and dynamic leaders did exist in the 18^th century. The reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, poorly documented as it is, illustrates this dynamic leadership of the Late Sayfawa Period.

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[1] Dierk Lange, whose masterful study of this source remains unsurpassed, has illustrated how it can be corroborated by a number of external and internal sources on the history of Kanem and Borno. Whether or not the form that survives is an abbreviated version of a much longer chronicle is unknown, but it at least helps in constructing a mostly accurate timeline for the political history of the Sayfawa maiwa.

[2] The Kano Chronicle is hardly free of anachronisms, inaccuracies, omissions, or additional textual problems. There is a great danger in relying too heavily on it to reconstruct the history of Kano and Hausaland, but it can also be corroborated by various external sources that are suggestive of an at least generally accurate chronology.

[3] See Behique Dunama, “A Sayfawa Hajj in c. 1728” for an early attempt at reconciling this source with the mainstream of historical sources on the Sayfawa, https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/a-sayfawa-hajj-in-c1728.html.

[4] This source requires much deeper textual analysis and a new translation. It may also refer to an attack on Kerawa, a capital of Mandara, that could have taken place during the reign of Ali b. Umar, Dunama b. Ali, or al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama. It problematically refers to the Sudan in a seemingly modern way, too.

[5] It is not always clear from where and by whom H.R. Palmer derived his information. Nonetheless, the tradition strongly supports the identification of the Sayfawa mai who attacked Kano in the 1730s or so with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

[6] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 253.

[7] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks” in Nilo-Saharan. Proceedings of the First Nilo-Saharan Linguistics Colloquium, Leiden September 8–10, 242.

[8] This specific example refers to a problematic passage in H.R. Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan. In describing Ali b. Umar’s campaign against the Tuareg of Air, Palmer adds narrative elaboration in which a Kel Etti woman sought Ali b. Umar’s aid at the same time he was in the midst of a Mandara campaign. See Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 247.

[9] H.R. Palmer, “Kano Chronicle,” 90.

[10] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 10. Without elucidating his evidence, Louis Brenner has argued that Shehu Tahir was Muhammad b. al-Tahir b. Ibrahim al-Fallati, a known Fulbe scholar in Borno. See “Three Fulbe Scholars in Borno,” 107.

[11] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 111.

[12] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, 203.

[13] Murray Last, “From Sultanate to Caliphate: Kano c. 1450-1800” in Studies in the History of Kano, 83-84.

[14] See M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350-1950.

[15] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 9.

[16] Kirk-Greene & Hogben, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions, 219.

[17] Alhaji Hassan and Shuaibu Na’ibi, Abuja Chronicle, 14.

[18] Shaykh Dan Tafa, Rawdat’l-Afkaar.

[19] H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française No. 10 (1925), 460-461.

[20] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage, 397.

[21] “The Kurata Arabs in the Kanem towns are your slaves.” H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[22] For an admittedly speculative look at this period, see Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html.

[23] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage: An historical study with special reference to the nineteenth century, 399.

[24] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan des sultans du Kanem-Bornu : chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 82.

[25] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 132-134, 145.

[26] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808,” 203.

[27] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902, 145.

[28] On the possible Kanuri parentage of Madi Makiya, see H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 98.

[29] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan, 82.

[30] For an overview of this period and the impact of the prolonged drought, see Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty.

[31] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks,” 242.

[32] Carlos Magnavita, “Short report of a visit to the archaeological sites of Lergam and Garu Kime, Geidam L.G.A., Yobe State of Nigeria,” Borno Museum Society Newsletter 76.

[33] J.R. Patterson, “Assessment Report on Borsari District, Bornu Emirate, Bornu Province” (1918).

[34] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[35] Hamidu Bobboyi, The 'Ulama of Borno: A Study of the Relations between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808, 22, 29.

[36] Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty, 299.