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The Gates of Kano City (Studies in the History of Kano). KofarWambai was once associated with the Dagachi.
Uthman b. Dawud, a Sayfawa ruler of the early fifteenth century, is notable less for his brief reign than for his later career in Kano. Unique among the Sayfawa, Uthman b. Dawud (reigned c. 1421, according to Lange’s chronology) moved to Kano after his deposition, where he became an important official. In addition, his descendants continued his legacy of significant wealth and influence in the Kano kingdom, eventually culminating with their fall from grace and disappearance in historical traditions. Despite the limited sources, the period reveals important developments in state consolidation in the Central Sudan. In the case of Borno, the Sayfawa would eventually consolidate their state as Ali b. Dunama (c. 1465-1497) of the Idrisids defeated the Dawudid branch of the dynasty. Likewise, Muhammad Rumfa initiated several political reforms which strengthened central authority and the role of Islam in the state. The career of Uthman K.l.n.ma, or Uthman b. Dawud, encapsulated this era of contestation as elite lineages competed with the rise of more centralized administrations in both Kano and Borno. Indeed, as an elite political exile forced out of power by a kaigama and yerima in Borno, his own descendants became a threat to the Rumfawa of Kano. Through an alleged revolt which nearly brought Borno and Kano into conflict during the reign of Idris b. Ali (r. 1496-1519), the Dagachi’s descendants became a threat to royal authority. This illustrates how both Kano and Borno navigated the thorny issue of political centralization over the course of the 15th century. This essay argues that the career and legacy of Uthman b. Dawud (the Dagachi) illustrate how Sayfawa elite exiles shaped political centralization, economic development, and interstate relations in Kano, while also becoming threats to emerging centralized authority. Beginning with an overview on early Hausaland-Borno relations, the essay shall then examine the Dagachi’s arrival in Kano and the growing power of this official. The final section shifts attention to the revolt plotted by the Dagachi and how it relates to Kano-Borno relations as well as political centralization.
Kano and Borno Relations Before Uthman b. Dawud
Unsurprisingly, the Hausa kingdom of Kano and Kanem-Borno had relations long before Uthman b. Dawud’s arrival in the 1420s. This background is necessary for understanding why Kano emerged as an attractive destination for elite Sayfawa exiles such as Uthman b. Dawud, as well as how they attained significant authority there. Due to the nature of the surviving sources, however, this can only be partially addressed.
The exact timing of Kano’s early relations with Borno is unknown, but scholars such as John Lavers have sought to identify the word afuno or afunu with the Hausa of Kano. Extant medieval Arabic sources first use the Kanuri word for the Hausa during the 1400s, in the writings of al-Maqrizi. However, contacts between Kanem-Borno and parts of Hausaland began by the 1200s or early 1300s. This is not surprising given the extension of Sayfawa rule into Borno by the 1200s during Dunama Dibalemi’s reign. A hint of Borno and Hausa trade may be seen in the travelogue of Ibn Battuta, too. According to this renowned traveler, Takedda and undoubtedly other Sahelian trading centers were linked to both Borno and Gobir. The interests of the Sayfawa in Kawar, the Fazzan and relations with Tuareg groups in Aïr by the 1200s likely involved Gobir and early Hausa states, too. Lamentably, the exact nature of early Hausa state formation and its connections with trans-Saharan trade awaits further archaeological research. But the little data collected so far points to possible links between Marandet (the Maranda of medieval Arabic sources) and the Lake Chad region. In short, relations between Kanem-Borno and the area of Hausaland began in this period.
Lavers, whose admittedly speculative analysis of the topic of early Borno-Kano relations remains the most substantial, even proposed an earlier military engagement between Kano and Borno during the reign of Idris b. Ibrahim (c. 1342-1366). Unfortunately, the narrative reported by P.A. Benton, which must be derived from oral tradition, named the mai in question as Iderisa Arrimi (Idris b. Ali). According to this tradition, Idris b. Ali sent his kaigama, Dalatu, to make war against Kano, eventually subduing and destroying it. The narrative is linked with the folk etymology for the Kanuri term designating Hausa people, afunu. Intriguingly, the tradition also portrayed the people of Kano as Muslims who fasted and prayed (yet still wore arse cloths). This is rather ambiguous but could be an oral tradition of the confrontation between Borno and Kano during the reign of Idris b. Ali (r. 1497-1519) or Idris b. Ibrahim. In fact, an extant mahram dated to the reign of Idris b. Ali refers to a witness named Dallatu Abdullahi. Yet the kaigama who was named as a witness was Mommad ibn Sugu. This may reflect confusion in the tradition regarding Dallatu Abdullahi and the actual kaigama of Idris b. Ali?
Even more baffling, the question of which polity in what would later become the united kingdom of Kano first formed relations with Borno is unknown. Lavers, borrowing from the tentative theories of Murray Last, has suggested that the Afnu king of al-Maqrizi, Mastur, was perhaps the ruler of Santolo or Santoro. This early Kano polity or chiefdom was the original Afnu from the perspective of Borno. But the evidence for this is lacking in the Kano Chronicle. And if the Sayfawa were allies of the ruler of Santolo before the leaders at Dala who later became dominant in Kasar Kano, there is no mention of this in the chronicle.
Furthermore, evidence derived from the history of titles in Kano support an earlier Sayfawa link with the Dala rulers who consolidated their state against Santolo. C.L. Temple’s research on the history of Kano included mention of the title of Dan Kade. According to Temple, this post was given to sons of the ruler of Kano, but was named after a “dan Sarki” of Borno who fled to Kano in the early days. This figure was certainly Kaday Afnu of the Sayfawa, a son of Idris b. Ibrahim who died in war with the Bulala. Using Lange’s chronology, Kaday Afnu’s brief reign as mai was in c. 1388. Kaday Afnu’s predecessor was possibly a usurper, Sa’id, and before him ruled Umar b. Idris (c. 1382-1387), a brother of Kaday Afnu. It is possible that Kaday Afnu fled to Kano during the reign of Sa’id or that of his brother, Umar. Alternatively, he may have fled to Kano when Dawud b. Ibrahim (c. 1366-1376) or another Dawudid held the throne. He possibly arrived in Kano as early as c. 1366, perhaps predating Sarkin Kano Yaji’s victory against Santolo.
In summation, the story of early relations between Kanem-Borno and Hausaland is a field awaiting much further research. What seems clear is the relationship between Kasar Kano and Borno by the 1300s. This included a possible Sayfawa prince who arrived in Kano sometime after c. 1366. The later legend involving Bayajidda and interpreting Hausa states’ origins regarding Borno may obfuscate the more complicated question of early trade, migration, conquests, and cultural exchange. Nonetheless, even before the Sayfawa relocated to Borno for good by the reign of Umar b. Idris, Kano may have been the part of Hausaland with closest ties to Borno. This history of close ties elucidates why Kaday Afnu was comfortable fleeing there at an indeterminate period. It also indicates why Uthman b. Dawud later moved to Kano after his deposition.
Uthman b. Dawud’s Arrival in Kano
The Kano Chronicle, our main source on Uthman b. Dawud (or Uthman K.l.n.ma), refers to him as a “great prince” who came from South Bornu with many men and mallams. In addition, “He brought with him horse-drums, and trumpets and flags and guns. When he came, he sat down at Bomfai.” Ignoring the anachronistic allusion to firearms, the chronicle sadly omits any reasons for why this elite figure from Borno moved to Kano. However, his use of royal regalia and large retinue, including mallams, suggests he was no ordinary person. Reading between the lines of the chronicle and the Diwan, it is possible to reconstruct some of the context for his coming to Kano during the reign of Dauda b. Kanajeji.
First, Uthman b. Dawud’s Borno context. Ascending to the throne in c. 1421, Uthman K.l.n.ma was a son of Dawud. In the words of the Diwan, “Il fut chassé du pouvoir par le kayghama Nikale, fils d’Ibrahim et le yarima Kaday Ka’aku. Il mourut à Afnu Kunu. La durée de son règne fut de 9 mois.” In other words, he was in power for less than a year before the powerful kaigama and a yarima overthrew him. His descent from Dawud may have been an additional factor in his deposition as his two predecessors and successors were both descendants of Idris. But this was not merely part of the contested succession of the houses of Idris and Dawud. The kaigama was frequently involved in depositions and civil wars during this troubled era in the annals of the Sayfawa. Barth even proposed that the kaigama remained very powerful until the rise of Ali b. Dunama. Moreover, if the kaigama was already based in Borno before the Sayfawa maiwa abandoned Kanem to the Bulala, they may have had tremendous advantages in local ties and alliances. That advantage enabled them to frequently intervene in the internecine wars between the Dawudids and Idrisids. Clearly, the yarima (a position given to princes, too), was also involved in the fall of Uthman in c. 1421-1422.
With the return to descendants of Idris to the throne after Uthman b. Dawud, one may surmise that the loyal followers and court of Uthman were supporters of the Dawudian house. Why Kano appealed to the deposed mai as a place of exile is not clear in the sources. But he certainly knew of the Idrisid Kaday Afnu who spent time there some decades before him. Kano in the 1420s was also increasingly Islamic. For instance, “The Song of Bagauda” referred to Sarkin Kano Umaru as “one learned in Islam, he it was who escaped (Hell-fire); He lit a fire which defied extinction.” Likewise, the Kano Chronicle describes Umaru (r. 1410-1421) as abdicating to pursue a life of Islamic piety. More importantly, his friend, Abubakra, left for Borno during his reign. Perhaps the reputation for piety achieved by Umaru and the time spent in Borno by Muslims affiliated with Kano’s court appealed to Uthman b. Dawud and his retinue.
Upon arrival, Uthman b. Dawud was appointed to the position of dagachi. Conventionally spelled dagaci (dagatai, plural) in Hausa, this is usually translated in English as village head. But the responsibilities and power of the dagaci in this context was much more than a simple village ward head. More recent evidence from the political history of Kano, for example, reveals that the rulers of Gaya, Rano, Karaye and Dutse, powerful chiefs of areas within the kingdom, were given the title of dagaci. M.G. Smith argued that these officials exercised wider territorial authority than the hakimai and appointed their own dagatai. It is very likely that the Dagachi from Borno exercised similar authority. The Kano Chronicle reports that the Dagachi settled with his large following at Dorai. He also acted as regent for the ruler of Kano when he left for 5 months to campaign against Zaria. This period of 5 months coincided with an increase in the wealth of the Dagachi. Later, either during Uthman b. Dawud’s tenure or that of his progeny, the Dagachi was likewise powerful and wealthy during Abdullahi Burja’s reign (1438-1452).
Indeed, by this period, there was an increase in the scale of commerce in Kano that connected it with Gwanja, Asben, Borno, and beyond. The Dagachi’s followers also built homes from his own palatial estate to Salamta, thereby proving growth of this ward. The Chronicle similarly reports the Dagachi’s role in founding the market of Karabka. Though not stated in the chronicle, one can surmise that the Dagachi enjoyed a role in the market taxes and the increased commercial activity across the region. Meanwhile, Kano appears to have gained a substantial captive population settled in various villages during this time. A galadima named Dauda was said to have established 21 towns with 1000 slaves each. Notably, this same galadima had a daughter married to the ruler of Kano. Is it conceivable that the increase in commerce and slaving was another source of wealth for the Dagachi, whose market may have been a center for this trade? Besides the Dagachi, Uthman b. Dawud or his unnamed heir, only the galadima Dauda appears to have shared his power and influence.
Thus, the Dagachi from Borno rose from political exile to a post of great wealth and standing in Kano. This undoubtedly reflected the reputation of the Sayfawa dynasty across much of the region. The Dagachi’s arrival also occurred simultaneously with an increase in trans-Saharan and West African trade in Hausaland. The Wangara influence from the West and the trade in salt, kola, slaves, textiles, and the exchange of information and learning unquestionably shaped this context. Even a deposed Sayfawa mai brought royal rituals, regalia, and practices from a more established Islamic dynasty. It was perhaps no coincidence that Kano began to send “gifts” to Borno during Abdullahi Burja’s reign, too. The Dagachi’s presence in Kano could have been connected to this sending of “gifts” for blessings to the ruler of Borno and the maintenance of cordial relations. As a result of the great privileges extended to the Dagachi for decades, his royal Sayfawa origin is rather probable. It likely contributed to the cultural and political exchanges between Kano and Borno during the 1400s.
Revisiting the Attempted Revolt of the Dagachi
Unfortunately, the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud later lost their power and privilege. During the reign of Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509), the son of Muhammad Rumfa, deposed the Sayfawa-descended Dagachi and gave the title to a slave. This episode, poorly explained in the Kano Chronicle, triggered an invasion from Borno (then ruled by Idris b. Ali, 1497-1519). Various authors have proposed alternative and sometimes illogical interpretations of this episode. Exploring the theories propounded by Yusufu Bala Usman, and M.G. Smith, this section shall endeavor to elucidate the conflict in terms of Kano’s political centralization and consolidation of Queen Hauwa’s descent group.
Beginning with Usman, one can see how torturous and questionable readings of the Kano Chronicle can lead one astray. Usman, wisely wishing to avoid reading the history of relations between Borno and Hausaland solely through the lens of empire or military conquests, tries to shift attention to other factors. For him, the burning question of internecine conflict within the Sayfawa branches claiming descent from Idris and Dawud was a factor. Purely speculating, Usman proposes that the intervention of Idris b. Ali during the planned revolt of the Dagachi was meant to neutralize the threat of a Dawudid Sayfawa descent group ruling Kano. This view is quite unlikely based on a close reading of the English translation of the Kano Chronicle. In the Chronicle, it is clearly stated that Kano’s king waited for Idris b. Ali to leave Guduawa and return to Borno before he “beguiled” the Dagachi into submission. In the words of the Chronicle, “As soon as he was gone, Abdulahi beguiled Dagachi into submission and then turned him out of office and gave his own slave the title.” If the ruler of Borno was opposed to the Dagachi, why would Kano’s king wait until he left before “beguiling” the Dagachi and then replacing him with a slave? Clearly, Idris b. Ali’s attack was coordinated to support the Dagachi who had been “prevented” from revolting due to Hauwa’s intervention.
Another view, explored by M.G. Smith’s Government in Kano, 1350-1950, suggests that the Dagachi probably did not intend to revolt. Instead, the Dagachi may have reported the actions of Kano’s ruler against Zaria and Katsina to Borno. Assuming Kano’s attacks on Zaria and Katsina were viewed as disloyalty by the ruler of Borno, Idris b. Ali consequently led an army against Kano. Smith is agnostic on the matter for he also suggests that the Dagachi may have been attempting to contest the throne of Kano with Abdullahi. Alternatively, they may have sought the throne due to the reforms of Muhammad Rumfa. Since conflict between Hausa states was perennial and it is unclear to what extent if any Borno sought to intervene in Kano’s wars with Zaria and Katsina. Nonetheless, Smith’s theory is plausible but cannot be demonstrated with any evidence from the Bornoan side. Idris b. Ali was certainly an active ruler on the military front, besting the Bulala in Kanem in two campaigns and was potentially more active in the west, too. Since the reign of Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509) witnessed Kano’s victory against Katsina and Zazzau, Kano’s actions could have triggered alarm in Borno. The possibility of Kano upsetting the balance of power among the Hausa states may have been a sincere concern. Of all Smith’s theorizing, the question of Rumfa’s reforms and changes in the state remains the most compelling theory, though a mixture of factors were probably relevant.
What were the changes in Kano’s administrative structure during the lengthy reign of Muhammad Rumfa? Why did they potentially lead to an attempted revolt by the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud? According to the Kano Chronicle, Rumfa (c. 1463-1499) was responsible for a number of reforms. These included the appointment of eunuchs to political office. Besides constructing the palace used by subsequent Kano kings, Rumfa remodelled kingship based on Borno (at least in the eyes of M.G. Smith). This included the creation of a Council of Nine supposedly inspired by Borno’s royal court. The nine principal officials around the sarki in subsequent centuries included the Galadima, Madaiki, Wombai, Makama, Sar. Dawaki, Sar. Bai (a slave), Ciroma, Dan Iya, and the Sar. Dawaki Tsakkar Gidda, also of slave origin. The exact composition during the reign of Rumfa was probably slightly different, but one can note the influence of Borno through titles such as ciroma. At the same time, one also notes the influence of slave officials. By creating a new palace and redesigning the administrative system with more enslaved officials loyal to himself, Rumfa was able to centralize authority more successfully than his successors. Also important was Rumfa’s establishment of the Kurmi Market and initiated the use of ostrich-feather sandals, kakaki instruments, and other signs of royal authority.
Consequently, one no longer reads of overwhelmingly powerful galadimas who effectively ruled Kano during the reign of Bugaya (c. 1385-1390) and the galadima entrusted with the affairs of Kano after Umaru (c. 1410-1421) abdicated. The position retained its significance in future centuries of Kano history, even manifesting in Hauwa and Guli’s attempts to shape Kano politics long after Rumfa’s demise in the 1500s. In short, the reforms of Rumfa increased the presentation and authority of the rulers of Kano through a new Borno-inspired court. With the enhancement of royal authority both visually and politically, the Dagachi may have felt threatened, or perceived a threat to Borno’s influence in this part of Hausaland.
But, the question of Rumfa hardly explains it all. After a lengthy reign terminating in c. 1499, the Dagachi may have represented another faction in Kano politics opposed to Hauwa. The wife of Rumfa, this remarkable woman shaped the next several decades of Kano politics through her influence on her son, Abdullahi (c. 1499-1509), and her grandson. In the context of Abdullahi’s reign, however, Hauwa sought to consolidate power for her descendants by sidelining other contenders supported by the Dagachi’s faction. Additionally, the Dagachi may have initially perceived Abdullahi as a much weaker ruler than his father who instituted several reforms and held the throne for a lengthy period. Hauwa, however, may have come from a powerful chiefly lineage within the Kano kingdom that was seeking to increase their influence in the royal court. Hence, her brother, Guli, was also a key ally in this process. Barkindo, citing a local Kano chronicler, has suggested Hauwa could have been the daughter of the Gaya king. Hauwa’s strong role in the reign of Abdullahi can be seen in her suppression of the alleged revolt of the Dagachi whilst her son was away on campaign. Meanwhile, she promoted the interests of Gaya in court. This may have been a factor in the Dagachi’s plan to revolt, an ill-fated attempt to weaken Hauwa’s influence while also intervening to either supplant or replace Abdullahi.
Regrettably, we are indebted to the Kano Chronicle as the sole source on the Dagachi’s revolt. This imposes severe limitations on any attempt to reconstruct what transpired. Reading between the lines, however, one can generate a rough outline of what occurred. It is known that the Dagachi plot was scheduled for a time when Abdullahi was away, so the Dagachi must have planned and waited for an opportune time to strike. But Hauwa outmaneuvered him, preventing serious trouble from the Dagachi. One is apt to suspect the ruler of Borno was already aware of the Dagachi’s plot. But, by humbling himself with mallams by his side, Abdullahi convinced Idris b. Ali to return to Borno. Then, and only after the mai was no longer an immediate military threat, did Abdullahi trick the Dagachi into submitting to his authority. Afterwards, by replacing him with a slave, Abdullahi removed a powerful noble lineage as a threat to the state. This revolt, which represented the final attempt by the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud to preserve their power and privilege, concluded with their demise in the face of Kano political centralization and a powerful queen-mother.
Elite Political Exiles and Sayfawa Influence Beyond Kanem and Borno
As the above endeavor to analyze the influence and legacy of a deposed Sayfawa mai in Kano illustrates, elite political exiles exerted tremendous authority and power in their new homes. In the case of Uthman b. Dawud and his descendants, they represent a product of the descendants of Dawud who were deposed by overly powerful officials of noble origin. Ironically, the descendants of Uthman b. Dawud were later deposed and replaced by slave officials, just as the Sayfawa accomplished against the kaigama during the reign of Ali b. Dunama and his successors. Much more remains to be said on this episode and the larger question of Kano-Borno relations, but it shows how even a branch of the Sayfawa could shape political culture and economics in areas on the periphery of Borno. Elites, bringing with them the Sayfawa state structure, a retinue, and Islamic scholars, nonetheless profoundly shaped their new locations. The example of the Dagachi serves as one example of this.
Looking beyond, to Darfur, for example, descendants of Dawud and other Bornoans claiming Magumi origin were able to achieve similar levels of influence. This promoted an image of Borno and the Sayfawa as ideal Islamic rulers across a vast expanse of the Sudanic belt, from the Niger to the Nile. Their cultural influence was compounded by an increase in trade, religious ties, pilgrimage routes, commerce, and official relations with Borno. In the case of Dagachi, this overwhelming power was considered a threat by a centralized Kano court with a possibly close tie to a Gaya-backed faction eager to consolidate their influence with Rumfa’s son. And while conflict erupted between Borno and Kano after Abdullahi’s reign, one can conclude that Borno’s cultural influence did not exclude military clashes or raids. Yet the type of regional politico-cultural hegemony achieved by the Sayfawa was undoubtedly aided by Sayfawa elite exiles and envoys. Perhaps more importantly, the Dagachi of Kano also serves as an example of how elite migrants and exiles affected state formation in the Central Sudan.
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