Nachtigal's Bornu

 

Our poor attempt at sharing Gustav Nachtigal's map of Borno from his Sahara and Sudan (naturally, we used the English translation by Allen B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher). Since we had to take a photo using a cellular phone and the map was creased from the way it was folded, this was the best we could do. Nonetheless, we are glad we did so, as Nachtigal's map provides some indication of the distribution of ethnicities or language groups as well as major sites in Borno surrounding areas (his maps of Kanem, Bagirmi, Wadai, and Darfur are also interesting). Of course, the demography of certain areas had changed quite a lot by the time Nachtigal arrived in the area.

al-Kanemi and the Berawuna

 

Whilst perusing Gustav Nachtigal's Sahara and Sudan again, we came across an intriguing letter by Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi from 1828. Whilst reporting on an expedition in Kanem, what stood out to us was the word al-Kanemi used to refer to people of Borno: Berawuna. According to the footnote of Gustav Nachtigal, this word meant "people of Borno." We find this interesting since this was the word used by people in the Fazzan to refer to people from Borno as well as the Tubu. In other words, the term appears to recognize the common origin of the Kanuri in Borno with the Tubu. On the other hand, Barth, in his massive account of his travels in this part of Africa, reported that the Goranes called the people of Mao in Kanem Beránema, perhaps a reference to the Dalatoa. Likewise the Kel Ewey Tuareg apparently called the Teda Beráuni. Anyway, al-Kanemi's use of the term makes sense given his own Fazzani background.

One wonders if there is any connection here to the Hausa word for the Kanuri, Bareberi. We once thought that it may be a possible remnant of the alleged "Zaghawa" origins of early Kanem, particularly due to the existence of the ethnonym Beri by the Zaghawa. Now we wonder if it may be related to Beráuni or Berawuna/Berâouna. Or was the Fazzani term possibly related to the Beri? Someone with the requisite language skills and understanding of linguistics should explore this to understand the origins of the various ways people referred to the people of Borno and what we know as the Kanuri.

The Strange, Mysterious and Unexpected in the Annals of Kanem and Borno

Map of the northern half of Africa in Palmer's Bornu Sahara and Sudan.

The following list is a compilation of various strange, miraculous, mysterious, or surprising anecdotes, traditions, and supernatural phenomena from the history of Kanem and Borno. The list is meant merely to function as a catalog for our own interests in various aspects of the history of this part of Africa. Undoubtedly, the list is also incomplete and surely is lacking several miracles attributed to various ascetic saints or stories about other supernatural phenomena. Nonetheless, as a beginning list, it can be of use for our later projects. Numerous other episodes, such as the execution of the people who retrieved the corpse of a murdered mai from a river (for seeing the deceased king’s nudity) or the return of a prince, Medicon, from enslavement in North Africa during the reign of Ali b. Umar are also fascinating episodes we should add to the list. Or perhaps the curse of the mother of 4 thieves against the progeny of Abd Allah (r. 1315-1335) or the attempt to kidnap Ali b. Umar ordered by the Pasha of Tripoli.

1.      Ngamaram: An evil creature believed to resemble a ram, with long hair and only 4 feet tall.[1] According to Ali Eisami, it was a water demon.[2]

2.      Sau Giants hunting elephants: According to “A Legend of the Saus,” a Sau giant killed two elephants and slung them on a stick. The Sau then called the elephants “small beef.”[3] Stories about the Sao as giants who preceded the Sayfawa kingdom in Borno can be found elsewhere. The story of the henna and ruse used by the Kanuri against the Sao (led by Dala Gomami) is another example of the Sao “giants” in Borno oral tradition.

3.      Goigoi: a tiny, fairy-like creature which can speak and walk. Although it lives in the bush, it comes to towns in order to seize children. The children taken by him who are brought back become mad.[4]

4.      Meiram Kurugu: a very tall monster or demon heard at night but rarely seen. It walks through towns whilst howling. It may be like the kúrīram demon described by Ali Eisami. According to Eisami, this entity was enormous, had the complexion of a Fulani, lived in the hollow of trees and slaps people. It was active after sunset, before sunrise, and at midnight.[5]

5.      Wet snakeskin to understand the speech of animals: One of the seemingly bizarre anecdotes in the “Mahram of the N’Galma Duku” in H.R. Palmer’s Bornu Sahara Sudan alludes to a gown made of a snake’s skin. When the faki Abd ul Lahi Dili ibn Bikuru correctly recognized the gown of Salma ibn Bikuru was made of the snakeskin, he also reported that the wearer of it gains the ability to understand animals. Later, after the Kanem ruler put it in water, he was able to understand two black birds.[6]

6.      Ali b. Umar stretching his hand toward al-Azhar: from an account of Gazargamo in Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan, the Sayfawa mai stretched his hand toward al-Azhar to retrieve a book. The episode may metaphorically represent the Sayfawa ruler’s numerous pilgrimages and piety.[7]

7.      The Opening of the Mune: According to Ahmad b. Furtu’s chronicle of Idris Alooma’s Kanem campaigns, the Mune flew away when Dunama ibn Dabale (Dunama Dibalemi) opened it.[8] The question of the Mune has been a controversial one as some read it as an example of a pre-Islamic talisman or relic. Others, however, point to the Islamic nature of the Mune or its similarities with the Ark of the Covenant.

8.      Al-Marwazi and the gigantic trees (and people!) in Kanem: Although the wild stories reported by al-Marwazi, related by Hamza b. Hasan al-Isfahani in the 10^th century, cannot be taken literally, the idea of giants in Kanem brings to mind the Sao legends.[9] Surely, the idea of the trees in Kanem being so huge that 30,000 horsemen could sit under them is more in the realm of fantasy. But the reference to the bodies of the people being in proportion to their trees is reminiscent of Kanuri traditions of the Sao giants.

9.      Royal sugarcane agriculture in 13^th century Kanem: “They used to tend the sugar-cane, but it yielded little, and only the sultan concerns himself with it; the same applies to vines and wheat.”[10] The reference to a royal garden 40 miles from Jimi (Njimi), presumably close to the Bahr el-Ghazal, is a surprise. This may be one of the earliest attestations of sugarcane cultivation in this part of Africa. Although it was unsuccessful on a large-scale, one wonders if the royal garden was worked by slave labor.

10 . “Pots of Fire” at Night: according to Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Kanemi, in a story later repeated by al-Umari, walkers in Kanem saw objects that looked like pots of fire at night.[11] As walkers approached the objects, they moved further away. This may be an allusion to some sort of unusual natural phenomenon. In addition, al-Umari reported that giant pumpkins existed in Kanem, so large that boats were made from them.

11. The miraculous Shahada in Spilled Blood: According to Muhammad Bello, unquestionably relying on oral traditions, a miraculous event occurred when Shaykh al-Jarmi was killed. Identified as a Tuareg by Bello, his origins may have been Arab. Nonetheless, when his execution was ordered by Borno’s Umar b. Idris (r. 1619-1639), his blood gushed out and spelled the Kalimah al-Shahada.[12]

12. Abu Gantur’s Rebellion Against Rabeh: According to various sources, Abu Gantur claimed control or power of jinn. However, he lost their support after accepting a bride from Rabeh. Mallam Abu Gantur’s movement won popular support and featured millenarian tendencies. Access to powers or control of the spirits apparently shaped his popularity or standing with supporters.[13]

13. Sacrifices for the River: One of the accusations of Muhammad Bello against Borno was the practice of sacrifices or offerings to the river. In some cases, this was even said to be human sacrifice as virgins were thrown into the river when it inundated Gambaru.[14]

14. Flying Blankets: In Borno tradition, Shaykh Waldede was said to have escaped the pursuing horsemen of Borno’s mai with a flying blanket.[15] Unlike al-Jarmi, Waldede survived the wrath of Umar b. Idris (r. 1619-1639).

15. Tuareg Bandits and Hashish: According to Nicholas Said, some of the Tuareg raiders and bandits enjoyed using hashish. One night, after he was kidnapped, the Tuareg were too drunk from hashish eating, so they forgot to confine their captives. About 7 or 8 of them escaped and killed 5 of the Tuareg. Unfortunately for Said, the escapees did not liberate the other slaves.[16]

16. Firing Rockets to Frighten Rebels: During the first British mission to Borno, the Shehu, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi, requested the use of rockets from the British travelers. After they fired 2 rockets, the Manga rebels were awed into submission since such a thing was never seen before.[17]

17. Sandaram Pond or Reservoir in Gazargamo: According to tradition, the creation of this was the result of prayers of Shaykh Umar, whose piety and prayers led to the necessary rain.[18] Umar was one of the sons of the leader of the second Kalumbardo.

18. Several French Slaves and a Cannon Foundry: According to an informant from Afade, the ruler of Borno possessed many French slaves. Said Europeans were used to establish a cannon foundry for making cannons to use against “pagans” to the south.[19] Whether or not this was true is unknown, but the Sayfawa mai did have cannons.

19. The Sayfawa mai and Fire: According to Jukun traditions, one of the rulers of Borno was said to have prayed during battle, causing fire to attack the Jukun forces. However, the Jukun ruler was said to have prayed as well, leading to rainstorms. This neutralized the Sayfawa’s fire. Context suggests this mai was Ali b. Umar (r. 1639-1677).[20]

20. Sultan El Gatous: According to blacks in Tripoli in the 17^th century, Borno’s Ali b. Umar possessed the power to transform into a cat. According to Girard, “Ceux qui ont veu Mahi-Hagi-Hali en racontent une chose, que il j’ay creu ne devoir pas estre teüe, quî est qu’il se transforme souvent en chat.”[21] Since the cat was supposedly one of Muhammad’s favorite animals, this transformation was linked to the Sayfawa king’s piety.

21. Enslavement and Spying for Public Morality: According to his informants from Borno living in Saint Domingue (Haiti), Descourtilz wrote that Borno’s ruler had necklaces, jewelry, and bracelets placed in public places or roads. Then, if a child took one of these objects, the king’s courtiers, who were watching, grabbed the child and sold their family into slavery.[22] If true, this constituted illegal enslavement and punishment of Borno subjects.

22. An Old Woman, a Hyena and the Mai: According to Muhammad Yanbu, the theft of an old woman’s sheep by a hyena prompted Ali b. Umar to send men to seize the hyena. Although the woman’s sheep was lost, the ruler compensated her and had the hyena killed. The story is difficult to take literally, but it is an interesting anecdote.[23]

23. The town of Were-Hyenas: According to Ali Eisami, the capital district of Borno had a town whose residents possessed the ability to transform into hyenas. Koelle wrote of the town, “Kάbūtílõa, in which every individual possesses the faculty of transforming himself into a hyena. Any such person is called ngádza.”[24]

24. An Artificial Fishpond in Fachi: Landeroin reported that Ali b. Dunama (c. 1465-1497) allegedly ordered the construction of a large pond at Fachi. Using 1000 camels to carry the animal skins containing the water and fish, the pond was used to resupply a Bornoan army during a campaign against Aïr.[25]

25. A Bornoan Army Terrified of Ostriches: al-Tunisi, who did not go to Borno, repeated a story of Borno troops fleeing from a flock of ostriches that they believed, from afar, were the Fulani attackers.[26] The story suggests that the Bornoan troops were cowards when sent against the Fulani after Ahmad b. Ali already fled Birni Gazargamo.

26. Ceremony of Giving to the Albinos: According to Ali Eisami, a special ceremony existed in which the mai gave a present to albinos. Called šérifūrám, the giving of a present to such individuals reflected the belief in their supernatural powers.[27]

27. The Charm-Water of Shehu al-Kanemi: When called upon to defeat the Fulani, al-Kanemi employed charm-water against them. In one battle, al-Kanemi threw a calabash with charm-water against the Phula, who fled. The Bornoan troops then pursued them and killed many.[28]

28. A Solar Eclipse in Borno: When Ali Eisami was 11 (or possibly 13), he witnessed a solar eclipse. Everyone in his town gathered in the place for prayer until the Sun was visible again.[29]

29. Royal Orgies in the Last Days of Gazargamo: In his field notes, Louis Brenner recorded a story in which the ruler of Borno ordered the construction of a large hall. At night, men and women gathered there for a big orgy in which a man could not tell if he was sleeping with his sister or mother. Apparently, this orgy “went on until the semen ran out of the door.”[30] This tradition was presumably gathered from descendants of people who may have been far more hostile to the Sayfawa in the 1700s and early 1800s.

30. Umar b. Idris Consulting an Astrologer: An Arabic chronicle, translated into French, claimed the Borno mai was told by an astrologer that Tahir, sultan of the Fazzan, would come to him.[31] Events turned out as predicted, with Tahir fleeing from forces from Tripoli to Borno, where he was drowned in a sac in the river for blinding his nephews.

31. Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama’s Progeny: This mai (r. 1747-1792) was said to have 350 children. But, implausibly, 300 of them were males.[32]

32. Turning Pebbles into Gold: One of the miraculous stories included in a problematic rihla from Borno includes an example of the transmutation of pebbles into gold. A mai, identified as Ali b. Umar but incorrectly dated, was said to have been in need of gold whilst still in the Hijaz. After his ulama counseled him to have pebbles gathered, they spat on them for 3 days until they turned into gold.[33]

---

[1] Johannes Lukas, A Study of the Kanuri Language, 175.

[2] Sigismund Koelle, African Native Literature or Proverbs, tales, fables, & historical fragments in the Kanuri or Bornu language. To which are added a translation of the above and a Kanuri-English vocabulary, 373.

[3] P.A. Benton, Languages and Peoples of Bornu, Vol. II, 9.

[4] See Johannes Lukas, A Study of the Kanuri Language, 176.

[5] Sigismund Koelle, African Native Literature, 342. Eisami’s description of this ghost or demon is very similar to another long-haired forest demon said to live in the trees.

[6] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 19.

[7] Ibid., 35.

[8] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs Vol I, 71.

[9] See al-Marwazi, in Nehemiah Levtzion and Anthony Hopkins (editors), Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History, 92.

[10] See Ibn Sa’id, Ibid., 188.

[11] Al-Umari, in Ibid., 260-261.

[12] “The Sarki slew him (al-Jarmi) and his blood gushed out and made a trace of Kalimah al-Shahada on the ground.” See Muhammad Bello, A History of Islam, Scholarship, and Revivalism in Western Sudan, Being an Annotated Translation with Introduction of Infaqul-Maisur fi Tarikh Bilad al-Tukur of Sultan Muhammad Bello bin Fodio, 70.

[13] Behique Dunama, “Abu Gantur's Rebellion in Borno,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/abu-ganturs-rebellion-in-borno.html.

[14] For more on sacrifices and offerings to rivers and some of the superstitions associated with them, see Behique Dunama, “Bornoan River Ceremony,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/12/bornoan-river-ceremony.html.

[15] Behique Dunama, “Umar b. Idris (r. 1619-1639) and the First Kalumbardo,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/umar-b-idris-r1619-1639-and-first.html.

[16] See Nicholas Said, The Autobiography of Nicholas Said; a Native of Bornou, Eastern Soudan, Central Africa, 42.

[17] Behique Dunama, “The Manga Uprising of 1824,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/the-manga-uprising-of-1824.html.

[18] Behique Dunama, “Birni Gazargamo: A Central Sudanic Metropolis,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/birni-gazargamo-bornoan-metropolis.html.

[19] Ulrich Seetzen, “Nouveaux renseignemens sur le Royaume ou Empire de Bornou, recueillis au Caire par M. De Seetzen,” Annales des Voyages, XIX (1812), 180.

[20] J.M. Fremantle (editor), Gazetteer of Muri Province, 36.

[21] Rémi Dewière, Du lac Tchad à la Mecque: Le sultanat du Borno et son monde (xvie - xviie siècle), 322. The appellation of Cat King became an insult when used by other blacks not from Borno.

[22] Michel Etienne Descourtilz, Voyages d'un naturaliste et ses observations faites sur les trois règnes de la nature, dans plusieurs ports de mere francais, en Espagne, au continent de l'Amerique Septentrionale, a Saint-Yago de Cuba, et a St.-Domingue, ou l'auteur ... donne les details les plus circonstancies sur l'expedition du general Leclerc, Tome III, 146-147.

[23] Behique Dunama, “A Hyena, an Old Woman and the Mai of Borno,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2026/08/a-hyena-old-woman-and-mai-of-borno.html.

[24] Sigismund Koelle, African Native Literature, 275.

[25] Moise Landeroin, “Notice historique” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 355.

[26] Muhammad ibn Umar al-Tunisi, Voyage au Ouadây par Mohammed ibn-Omar el-Tounsy, 259.

[27] Sigismund Koelle, African Native Literature, 401.

[28] Ibid., 224.

[29] Ibid., 207.

[30] Louis Brenner, “Sources of Constitutional Thought in Borno,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 7, no. 1 (1973): 62.

[31] Anne-Charles Froment de Champlagarde, Alain Blondy (editor), Histoire abrégée de tripoly de barbarie, 1794 et Suite de l'histoire de la Régence de Tripoly de Barbarie. Règne d'Ali Caramanly 1793, 47. The Kanuri word for astrologer is kantágema.

[32] John Ledyard and Simon Lucas, Voyages de MM Ledyard et Lucas en Afrique, 196. Were some wives and concubines claiming other male infants to increase their chances of becoming the mother of a possible future king?

[33] Omer Abdel Raziq El-Nagar, “West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage,” 398.

A Hyena, an Old Woman and the Mai of Borno

The story of a hyena, a goat, and Ibrahim b. Idris in Palmer's Bornu Sahara and Sudan.

One of the best features of Abubakar Mustapha's thesis, "The Contribution of Sayfawa Ulama to the Study of Islam C. 1086-1846 A.D.," is the inclusion of the Arabic text of Muhammad Yanbu's Idarah fi nizam Mulk Kanem-Borno. According to Mustapha, this text was composed in 1771 by the amir of Alarge. Perhaps better known as Muhammad Yanbu, he was the son of the Sayfawa mai, Ali b. al-hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792, according to the chronology of Lange). While extracts from this text were translated and used for analysis by Kyari Tijani in Dynamics of Administrative Change in pre-Colonial Borno: A Comparative Study of the Sayfawa and Kanemi Dynasties (thanks to a copy provided by al-Miskin), Mustapha's thesis contains the complete Arabic text. This work, better known as the Al-Idara fi nizam al-mamlaka wa-l-imara according to Tijani, is essential for understanding the administrative structure of the state. Perhaps a more accurate reflection of the court as it was in the 18th century, it nonetheless includes information from the early history of the Sayfawa. For instance, the tale of a hyena, an old woman, and Ali b. Umar (r. 1639-1677).

According to  Al-Idara fi nizam al-mamlaka wa-l-imara, a hyena seized the sheep of an elderly woman. Subsequently, she attributed the loss to the injustice of the king. When word of this reached Ali b. Umar, the mai and some of his men tracked the hyena, noticed the sheep was dead, and brought the hyena back to the old woman. The mai had the hyena killed, gave the woman sheep in compensation, and apparently ordered the deaths of other hyenas in the region. 

In order to explain the story, here is the Arabic text (from p. 444 of Mustapha's thesis):

وناهيك من ذلك ان ضبعا افترس شاة عجوز في برني من عهد سلطان علي بن عمر فقالت العجوز بأعلى صوتها سبحان الله على ظلم يعني سبحان الله ان السلطان ظالم ولولا ظلمه لما افترس الضبع شاتي فانتهى هذا الكلام إلى الملك فأمر الملك بالركوب إلى نصرتها على الضبع فاتبع اثر الضبع حتى انتهوا إلى جبل مورانسيك فرأوا احد الضبع واتوا بها الى العجوز ولم تأكل الضبع الشاة إلا أنها جرجرتها وقتلتها وأمر الملك لها بشياء واراها عدوتها فقتلها وكذا في سائر بلاد برني

According to our friend, a specialist in hadith literature, the style, scan quality and possible corruption in the text complicates translation. We were also wondering about the place (Bornu or Birni?) and the name of the mountain. Yet he provided two translations for us:

A hyena preyed upon and captured an old woman's sheep in Bornu [??]. This was during the reign of 'Ali b. 'Umar. When this happened, the old woman said: "Praise be to God, what an injustice!" she meant "Praise be to God, the Sultan is unjust and were it not for his injustice, the hyena would not have preyed upon my sheep." The Sultan heard what she said and went out with a group of riders to help the old woman against the hyena. They tracked the hyena following it to mountain named MWRaNSYK. They found that the sheep hadn't been devoured but had merely been dragged around and killed. Then they brought back one of the hyenas to the old woman. They gave her some sheep [as compensation] and they killed the hyena before her eyes. And then they killed all the hyenas in the area.

Moreover, a hyena preyed upon and snatched away a sheep of an old woman in Bornu during the reign of Sultan 'Ali b. 'Umar. The old woman cried out in her loudest voice, "Glory be to God, what an injustice!" meaning, "Glory be to God, the Sultan is unjust, and were it not for his injustice, the hyena would not have devoured my sheep." This reached the king, who ordered his men to ride out [with him] to aid her against the hyena. They followed the hyena's tracks until they reached Mount MWRaNSYK, where they saw one of the hyenas and brought it to the old woman (The hyena did not eat the sheep, but it merely dragged it and killed it). The king ordered that she be given sheep and showed her its enemy, and he killed it. The same thing happened in all the lands of Bornu.

What is most remarkable about this anecdote, which is perhaps not meant to be taken literally, are the similarities to a tradition about Ibrahim b. Idris recorded by H.R. Palmer in Bornu Sahara and Sudan. According to Palmer, Ibrahim b. Idris (r. 1612-1619) was impious until later in life. Moreover, a familiar tale of an old woman whose goat was taken by a hyena led to the elder criticizing the mai. She allegedly said, "You take part in plays and dancing and racing; but you do not pray, neither do you follow religion or righteousness; had you done so, they hyaena would not have taken my goat" (p. 244). 

This leads one to suspect that we are dealing with tropes meant to illustrate ideal and poor leadership of the Sayfawa maiwa. Ibrahim b. Idris was allegedly not religious and pursued a lifestyle of pleasure, signs of poor leadership in the mai. Consequently, the elderly woman berated him. As an elderly woman, she could represent the vulnerable subjects an ideal Muslim ruler must protect. However, Ali b. Umar, the nephew of Ibrahim b. Idris, was so pious and responsive that when an old woman's sheep was stolen and killed by a hyena, the mai tracked the hyena, killed it, and compensated the old woman's property. Muhammad Yanbu, a descendant of Ali b. Umar and able to look back at his reign as one of an ideal Islamic ruler, naturally inserted a story of an old woman and a hyena to show how a mai should respond to the needs of his most vulnerable subjects. 

Whether or not the events actually transpired is likely not the point. Instead it is meant to illustrate ideal sultans or kings. Similar traditions of Sayfawa maiwa responding to the complaints of women whose communities were attacked by the Tuareg (see Landeroin for an example on Ali b. Dunama's Air campaign after a Magumi woman's village was raided) or had their property stolen may reflect this trope. What is remarkable in the case of Muhammad Yanbu's anecdote about Ali b. Umar is the way it possibly reflects this larger traditional discourse, and may contain an implicit critique of Ali b. Umar's uncle, Ibrahim. Although tradition, which was likely the main source for Palmer on the reign of Ibrahim b. Idris, acknowledged Ibrahim b. Idris's transition to a pious and proper ruler, one cannot help but wonder if Yanbu was also glorying his own ancestor by inserting a similar story of Ali b. Umar.

Thoughts on The Contribution of Sayfawa Ulama to the Study of Islam C. 1086-1846 A.D

 Abubakar Mustapha's "The Contribution of Sayfawa Ulama to the Study of Islam C. 1086-1846 A.D." is an important but highly flawed work. Whilst occasionally proposing novel interpretations to controversial topics or themes in the history of Kanem and Borno, Mustapha's work often fails from a historical perspective. For instance, the questionable attempts to date the Islamization of Kanem to a period before Hummay, the speculative attempt to read Shi'a influences in the Mune, or the acceptance of al-Bakri's report of a rumor of Umayyads in Kanem illustrate real weaknesses in historical analysis. Thus, Mustapha was only partly successful in terms of offering a new approach to the history of Islam and Islamic study in Kanem and Borno. 

The most egregious case is in his attempt to antedate the Islamization of Kanem to a period before late 11th century. Although we have broached the question in our own speculative writings, Mustapha let wishful thinking shape his analysis. Naturally, he is likely correct about some Muslims trading in or reaching Kanem by the 9th century, but it seems quite unlikely that all the maiwa from Bulu to Abd al-Jalil were already Muslims. One also wonders about his interpretation of Uqba b. Nafi's expedition to Kawar in the 7th century. For Mustapha, "All available evidence seems to suggest that Uqba must have converted the people as they had shown not only their willingness and desire to accept Islam but also had demonstrated their support by giving him three hundred and sixty people to reinforce his army" (p. 19. Given the fact that our early sources on Uqba b. Nafi's escapades in the Fezzan and Kawar were written down centuries later, there is nothing that definitely establishes local converts to Islam at such an early date. Certainly by the 9th century, however, there were Muslims in Kawar and likely Kanem. But Mustapha wants this early wave of Muslim traders or itinerant preachers to have somehow achieved the conversion of the masses in Kanem before Hummay or the rulers of Kanem. 

A similar problem connected to dating the Islamization of Kanem can be found in the Umayyads and al-Bakri. Admitting his speculative reasoning here, Mustapha proposes identifying Hummay or Umme with the Umayyads. To be fair, he is no more ridiculous here than H.R. Palmer was on a number of grounds. But the main source for the Umayyad refugees reaching Kanem was al-Bakri, who knew little about Kanem and reported the Umayyad tale as something he heard asserted by "some" (see Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History, p. 64. Consequently, we have far too little in terms of firm evidence for dating the Islamization of Kanem to a period from Bulu onwards. And in spite of Mustapha's useful analysis of the mahram issued to Muhammad b. Mani by Hummay, which outlines multiple generations of maiwa studying the Koran with Mani, there is not enough to truly establish which mai was the first Muslim ruler. Certainly, the account of Ibn Sa'id seems suggest it was in the later half of the 11th century. But the possible Ibadi influence in early Kanem and the appearance of Muslim names like Abd al-Jalil before Hummay demonstrate some degree of Islamic influence. For Mustapha, however, Mani would not have taught non-Muslims to read the Koran due to the precepts of the Islamic faith (to what extent this was true remains unclear, particularly for this period). Yet the largest problem facing Mustapha is a problematic source which is used to claim al-Aswani reported the rulers of Kanem were Muslims. Since al-Aswani was quoted by later authors like al-Maqrizi who mixed different sources or their own prose into their work, the section describing Kanem from al-Maqrizi's work appears to be drawn from more recent sources. Yet Mustapha tried to use this to problematically affirm an early Islamization of Kanem's ruling house by the late 10th century. 

Despite these issues with Mustapha's attempt to backdate the origins of Islam in Kanem, there are useful insights to be found. For instance, he claims Katuri is the Kanuri form of AbdulKadir, while Shu is Shuaib. If true, this is intriguing for increasing the number of early maiwa with Islamic names. Through his fieldwork, he also quotes a Kanuri song referring to the "Waseti" (Berbers) of Zaila, Tripoli, Dirku, and Siggidim as friends of the mai (p. 25). The close ties to Kawar, where Islam had penetrated by the 9th century, was undoubtedly important for the gradual spread of Islam further south in Kanem. Mustapha also finds evidence of the Ibadi influence in Kanem through the Kanuri term Liman Kaumi, similar to the Ibadi way of referring to their imams as Imam al-Qawni. Perhaps even the Kanuri term for North Africans, waseri, was derived from the Wasiliyya name applied to the Ibadis. Lastly, the possible role of the Tura Tazan in the teaching of literacy or philosophy is an intriguing notion, albeit not backed by much.

Similar problems abound the later chapters of Mustapha's study. Claims of the Shi'a influence on the Mune appear to be based on little more than similar verses used in the Mune and a letter written to an early Muslim governor of Egypt in the 7th century. Naturally, one must also wonder about the alleged role of Egyptians in the opening of the Mune during Dunama Dibalemi's reign. Why exactly this led to a shift toward a more Sunni orientation is not entirely clear, yet it's tied to the Ayyubids takeover in Egypt after the Shi'ite Fatimids. For much of his framework here, Mustapha relies heavily on the Idarah and the general narrative on Borno history which appears in that Arabic text, included as an appendix in the thesis. This is used as a larger framework for contextualizing the development of Islamic education and legal studies in Kanem and Borno until 1846. We waited in vain for an explanation of who Muhammad Yanbu was or the background to the Idarah and Kitab al-Borno which clearly were central to how Mustapha divided the history of the Sayfawa. 

Despite the quibbles and issues with contradictory and problematic assertions by Mustapha, he raises a number of legitimate and intriguing questions about the history of Islam in Kanem and Borno. He also challenges attempts to use the Shurb al-Zulal as a reformist text critical of al-Barnawi's time. There is value here in terms of how Mustapha elucidates the steps in an Islamic education in Borno. This is then followed by an overview of advanced Islamic study which led to the influence of kalam in later centuries. This period, in which the questions and answers raised by local scholars in their writings became more abstract and hypothetical, is an interesting notion that needed more explicit examples to properly refute authors like Bivar, Lavers, and Hiskett. Fortunately, more recent scholars have contributed to the study of Ajami in Borno contexts with regard to the Tarjumo used for tafsir. With additional scholarship on the intellectual output of Borno scholars, researchers can hopefully expand upon Mustapha's contributions here. 

Organa, Kuri Gana and Kagha: Speculating on Kanem in the Dulcert Map (1339)

  

Although this is speculative, we have long considered "Organa" in European planispheres, portolan charts, and maps to have been a reference to Kanem and Borno. Some consider "Organa" to have been Ouargla in the Sahara, but the inscriptions in maps from the 1300s and 1400s suggest Kanem and Borno. The strongest evidence of this identification is the Latin inscription from the 1339 portolan chart of Angelino Dulcert. To our knowledge, this is the earliest European source to use the toponym of Organa ("Orgena"). But what makes its identification as Kanem more likely is the Latin inscription's reference to naked black populations attacked by Organa's Saracen king. Moreover, these peoples allegedly lived by a sea. The best candidate for this area is therefore Lake Chad, where we know the rulers of Kanem occasionally engaged in wars or raids with non-Muslim societies near Lake Chad. 

Indeed, the Latin inscription for Organa reads, "Iste rex Saracenus permanet senper in armis cum Saracenis maritimis, scilicet cum una tera Nigroom qui senper vadunt nudi et sine aliquo vestimento." The French translation of De la Roncière rendered this as "Ce roi des Sarrasins demeure toujours en guerre avec les Sarrazins des bords de la mer, c'est-à-dire avec les  nègres qui vont toujours nus, sans le moindre vêtement." The "tera Nigroom" is likely a reference to a "black land" or "land of the blacks," but also close to a sea or body of water. The best candidate for this is Kanem, although it is possible a Saharan region like Ouargla was confused with Kanem further south. To strengthen the identification of Organa as Kanem, one can also note that its position east of Mali and south from Sicily onward points toward the Lake Chad area.

But in 1339, other sources do speak to the kingdom of Kanem engaging in wars or raids against "black" people who lived near a large body of water. According to Dierk Lange's chronology based on the Diwan of Kanem-Borno, there was a king named Kuri Gana (Kuri the Younger) who reigned in c. 1339. This king was said to have died in war with the "Sao" at Ghaliwa, possibly Ngala. This king's name in Kanuri was produced in Nachtigal's list in Sahara and Sudan of Sayfawa maiwa as Kure ghana Ben Abd Allah, dated to 1350. Since Lange's chronology "works best" for the Sayfawa, a date of c. 1339 seems more likely. This date also happens to be around the same time that Dulcert's portolan chart listed a place called Organa. Consequently, one wonders if the name of Kanem's mai, Kuri Gana, was perhaps deformed into "Organa" across the Mediterranean. Then, Kuri Gana's name became the established name for the toponym representing the Kanem/Borno areas. This would require the name of Kanem's mai to have reached Dulcert quite quickly, however. Even if he rose to the throne a year or two before 1339, his name would have had to have reached Dulcert rapidly in order to appear in a corrupted form on a map in 1339.

Exactly how the initial letter was dropped is unclear, but the idea of a Saracen king fighting "naked" dark-skinned people by a sea might match Kuri Gana and the Sayfawa. After all, the Diwan attributed the death of Kuri Gana and 3 other maiwa to wars with the "Sao" in this period. Moreover, if one follows Palmer in Bornu Sahara and Sudan, Kuri Gana (named Kore al-Saghir here) died at N'geliwa, in the area of Marte. This area in the 1300s would have been closer to the shores of Lake Chad and perhaps explain why reports of a "Saracen" king fighting "black" people without clothes by a sea reached Dulcert. Since it is unlikely that areas near the Mediterranean coast would have been defined as a "black land" (perhaps based on the Arabic term for the land of the blacks), Kanem and the Lake Chad region are the best fit for "Organa" in 1339. 

The next step to confirm this pet theory would be to examine subsequent mentions of Organa in the 1300s and 1400s European cartographic corpus. Understanding how the name Kuri Gana would have been pronounced in 14th century Kanembu or the routes through which it was deformed in Arabic and Latin are additional necessary steps. Resolving the later conflation of Organa and Ouargla (or another Saharan region) is also necessary.  More importantly, if the toponym Organa really was derived from the name of a Kanem king who reigned at the end of the 1330s, it would partially confirm the maiwa of this era engaging in wars with the "Sao" on the other side of Lake Chad, in Borno. Our theory might also have more merit than the often playful and inventive linguistic wordplay and reconstruction of Palmer.

That said, the Kagha (origin of the term kaigama) seems like a reasonable contender, too. The word Kagha seems to have been established in medieval Arabic sources by the end of the 1200s for designating part of Borno (Jaja, Kaka, Kagha). But how that transmogrified into Organa is unclear. The Kuri Gana or Kore Gana etymology we proposed may explain the appearance of the "gana" part of "Organa" but also requires dropping the initial k and a vowel. It also is unlikely that a Kanem king with such a short reign possibly right before the time Dulcert's map was finished could be the source of the toponym Organa (Orgena). The Kagha theory is more likely.

Kanuri Women of Borno (Nigeria): Perspectives from the Little Kingdom of Musune

Editha Platte's Kanuri Women of Borno (Nigeria): Perspectives from the Little Kingdom of Musune is a fascinating but often flawed work on a topic still neglected by those interested in the history of the Kanuri. Unfortunately, this work, which appears to contain parts of her dissertation and subsequent research, was not translated well from the German. It is usually not enough to hinder understanding, but when combined with the repetition of pages in later sections, it is enough to make the last third of the text an arduous enterprise. The second half, focusing on the life cycles experienced by Kanuri women from birth to marriage, child-rearing, and divorce or widowhood, sorely lacked a conclusion to connect it with the earlier part of the book on titles held by Kanuri women. 

One was also expecting a conclusion to connect it to the possible question of looking at the Kanuri mai mbauji for possible insights into how the Sayfawa court was organized and run. After all, if these smaller chiefdoms or princedom courts, which were ruled by local dynasties who once occupied a vassal status as tributaries to Birni Gazargamo, could possibly shed light on that topic, it would have been of interest to see that argument made explicitly or with strong examples. Some of this likely can be found in a few of the older studies or inaccessible German resources or a more thorough reading on our part of the works of Cohen on the question of women and queen mothers. 

Nonetheless, Platte apparently did not wish to engage in a more detailed historical study using the various written sources from the precolonial era which do contain allusions to women titleholders and royal women. Indeed, thanks to Platte, we began to take another look at some of the mahrams in Palmer's Bornu Sahara and Sudan and references to elite women in Muhammad Yanbu's work. Some of the connections were, in fact, quite obvious and we are embarrassed to admit we did not do this earlier. For instance, the sokotoma Aisha  bt. Ali, who was mentioned in one of the mahrams, was likely the eldest daughter of the mai. Platte also makes fascinating references to the donning of male garb in some of the installation rituals for female titleholders among the Pabir, Bolwa, and other groups. One cannot help but wonder if some of these rites, forms of seclusion, and use of male dress were also part of Sayfawa court practice for the maira or moworam. 

Also of use is Platte's reference to some of the then-recent theories about the "Sao" and Kotoko. If Musune was once a "Sao" center that transitioned into a Kotoko polity whose ruling class later claimed Maumi origin (Maami-Ariwa, though commoners were of the Ngaala clan), then Musune's history can be contextualized within the broader context of ethnic and political changes in Borno from the 1200s to the 1500s. This model of Platte assumed the "Sao" were building centers or towns at places like Musune by the 1200s (by c. 1300 for Musune). Possible proof can be found in the giant "Sao" pots in this region, dated from the 1200s-1400s. Then, a Kotoko identity gradually emerged as the Massa expanded northward. This led to the absorption or displacement of the "Sao" already in the area. Subsequent changes began when the expansionist Sayfawa state in the 1500s began to incorporate the former "Sao" and Kotoko polities. Somehow, although it is not clear from the evidence utilized by Platte, Musune transitioned from a possible Sao-Tatala affiliation to Kotoko by the 1500s. Presumably, the new ruling dynasty was installed by the Sayfawa (or they began to claim common origin with the regional hegemon). 

To what extent this aforementioned (and tentative) historical overview is accurate for Musune or the Kotoko is up for debate. One also wonders why Platte was perhaps more persuaded by the idea of the Sayfawa in Borno borrowing some of its titles or court practices from local "Sao" groups. For instance, the central role played by elite women as titleholders in the Sayfawa court in Kanem can be partially glimpsed from the Diwan for the 1100s. And why the Sayfawa would have needed to borrow so heavily from groups who, according to Platte, did not develop more elaborate political formations until the 1200s or 1300s, is not addressed. But as an introduction to one of the Kanuri princedoms of Borno and the life cycle of the Kanuri women, there is an ample amount of fascinating information. 

Dynamics of Administrative Change in pre-colonial Borno: A Comparative Study of the Sayfawa and Kanemi Dynasties

Kyari Tijani's Dynamics of Administrative Change in pre-colonial Borno: A Comparative Study of the Sayfawa and Kanemi Dynasties is one of those essential studies of Borno history we have been waiting to read for three or four years. Inaccessible and difficult to access, it is a reprint of Tijani's thesis from the 1970s. As such, the publishers chose not to update the text, but they should have at least used an editor to correct the numerous mistakes or typos. That said, nothing is extreme enough to hinder comprehension for the reader. But doing so could have perhaps removed part of the lengthy introduction in which Tijani sought to apply Systems Theory to pre-colonial Borno. Or at the very least, trimmed some of it away. Nonetheless, Tijani's critical study was based on a combination of fieldwork across Borno and into Mandara (in today's Cameroon) as well as the use of local Arabic manuscripts such as the works of Muhammad Yanbu. Although Tijani himself did not read Arabic, he was able to procure translations for some of these rare sources that were products of local Borno writers and scholars in pre-colonial times. His weakness in French and German and the failure of his attempt to visit Mao in Kanem to interview locals were major flaws. This contributed to one of the weaknesses of his study, which often lacked adequate empirical evidence to support his analysis. Without the requisite language skills for deeper source analysis or criticism, some of the examples used by Tijani may not sufficiently substantiate his model. 

First, what was the theoretical approach taken by Tijani? Noticing the flaws in the "Great Man" model of Barth, Brenner, Denham and Nachtigal, as well as the weaknesses in Brenner's analysis of the rise of al-Kanemi as shehu of Borno (Tijani was also quite critical of the way Brenner sought to incorporate a conflict theory model of classes), Tijani wanted to understand the nature of Sayfawa longevity and the reasons for dynastic change in the turbulent 19th century. This is a reasonable research question: Why was a single dynasty able to persist for several centuries across time and space? And why was this dynasty, the longest lasting in African history, unable to meet the challenges of the late 1700s and early 1800s? Lastly, what were the conditions of the time and the administrative or political challenges that made a figure like Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi a candidate for leading Borno?

In Tijani's eye, Systems Theory is applicable or relevant for addressing this question. To quote Tijani, "By using its conceptual aparatii, such as the interrelations of interacting, interpenetrating units and the role and significance of legitimation processes and ideology, we have a conceptual model and methodological aparati that can cope with the dynamics of the whole system and would, therefore, enable us understand, describe, and explain Borno political development more adequately" (43). In other words, this theoretical model allows for complex nuances in terms of the interaction of ideology, administrative structure, and the military functions of the state in a heterogeneous, ecologically diverse landscape such as Kanem-Borno. In this case, religio-ideological factors such as the universalist faith of Islam were tied to state legitimation by the Sayfawa (and the subsequent al-Kanemi dynasty). Additionally, the importance of genealogy, clan or lineage affiliations, and the dynastic principle of governance tied to the legend of descent from Sayf b. Dhi Yazan were essential tools in the administrative structures of the Sayfawa. This was so even in the Kanem phase of the Sayfawa state, although Tijani's lack of success in engaging in fieldwork in Mao made his interpretations of the early centuries speculative. 

Over time, the Sayfawa adapted their administrative structure to better the standing of the central government and ensure the cultural (ideological) hegemony of the ruling house. Tijani's study traces these changes over time to understand why the Sayfawa state eventually came to an end and a new political order began with al-Kanemi. Indeed, Tijani wrote, "In this case our hypothesis is that change in such a system would be more in the sphere of administration while the political changes would be limited to restatement of pre-existing ideal goals. Change becomes necessary and tolerable when authoritative action neither matches the ideal goals stated nor meets the felt needs of the people or both." Thus, Tijani believed that the type of change that did occur with the rise of al-Kanemi was mostly in the sphere of administration as al-Kanemi restored a more centralized state. Simultaneously, he did not personally take for himself the position of mai, nor did he deviate from the Islamic ideals that were the basis of political legitimacy for the Sayfawa. 

How did Tijani prove his theory in the case of Borno? And were his conclusions on the nature of al-Kanemi's political ascent accurate or more compelling than Brenner's study of the al-Kanemi line? Before addressing that, he reviewed the source material. Some of his citations are of unpublished Arabic manuscripts from Borno. He also cited some of the materials from Nigerian archives in Kaduna and conducted fieldwork to record and engage in conversation with locals in Marte, the area of Gazargamo (Gazargumo in his spelling), Kukawa, Maiduguri, and other places. Tijani clearly saw Muhammad Yanbu's Al-Idara Fi Nizam al-Mamlaka Wa 'l-Imara as an exceptional source. A copy was procured for him by Abubakar al-Miskin, a Sayfawa descendant. Assuming Yanbu's text is an authentic work of the 18th or early 19th century, the text outlines the palace administration of Gazargamo in great detail. Unsurprisingly, Tijani also relied heavily on Palmer, the chronicles of Ahmad b. Furtu, and a famous poem by Shaykh al-Tahir b. Ibrahim. Besides these, occasional references to an unpublished Arabic text on the Fulani of Borno, some of al-Kanemi's writings, and a Mandara chronicle, or kirgam, written about that kingdom's war with Borno in c. 1781 abound. Undoubtedly, Tijani's greatest contribution here is his status as a local, fluent speaker of Kanuri with access to various local notables to discuss the past. By drawing upon oral traditions from across Borno, Tijani can begin to synthesize the two different types of source materials (oral sources and written texts) for Borno. Sadly, not being able to visit Kanem restricted what Tijani could accomplish there. Perhaps a lack of French reading comprehension placed another limitation on what Tijani could have done with Landeroin, Zeltner, and Lange.

In terms of applying or adapting Systems Theory to Kanem-Borno, Tijani is weakest on the Kanem centuries. He emphasized the "dynastic character" of Sayfawa administration in Kanem without being able to strongly support it. Based on the meager data from the external Arabic sources and certain speculations on the nature of lineage groups and the retention of power or control over people or territory based on lineage ties to the Sayfawa ruling group, the Sayfawa state in Kanem emphasized its dynastic character. This shaped the administration since relatives of the maiwa were apparently assigned powerful posts in the central government and provincial administration. Unsurprisingly, this later led to problems of fission as these groups descended from the Sayfawa administered distant territories or principalities within the larger Kanem empire, particularly after Dunama Dibalemi's reign. But much of this is difficult to illustrate with specific examples besides what was recounted in the Diwan. Outside observers who never went to Kanem, like al-Maqrizi, may be referenced for what became a decentralized administrative structure, yet Tijani did not deeply explore the rise of the Bulala as a competing lineage group. Nor was there any attempt to understand this in terms of social relations with medieval Kanem or the possible role of slaves and caste groups in this process. Ultimately, the Kanem phase of the Sayfawa appeared to have been little more than a prelude to the central area of Tijani's analysis: Borno. 

Once the Sayfawa had relocated permanently to Borno and experienced a consolidation under Ali Gaji (Ali b. Dunama), Tijani's analysis improves. With Ali Gaji, who Tijani unfortunately thought was the mai who went to war with the Kanta of Kebbi, one notes the development of a full dynastic structure of government including the koguna class. However, Ali Gaji replaced Sayfawa relatives with slave officials in some of the key military posts, ending the period of troubles in the 1200s, 1300s and 1400s when powerful officials related to the dynasty could trigger civil wars or coups. Using the example of Ali Gaji's campaign against Logone, dated to c. 1501/2 (although this was likely earlier, if one uses Lange's chronology), or the establishment of a permanent capital at Gazargamo, Tijani perceived Ali Gaji as establishing the conditions for a stronger state to emerge within Borno and the Central Sudan. Although the kogunawa later took on more administrative responsibility for the subsequent maiwa, Ali Gaji's council of state, enslaved officials, and building of a new capital tied to trade, Islamic education, and stability laid the foundation for the Sayfawa state's longevity in Borno. Even the sending of Yerima Musa against Logone was portrayed by Tijani as an instance in which the mai used dangerous campaigns as an opportunity to rid himself of political threats. Ali Gaji's victory against the Bulala at Lada was similarly important for showing the resurgence of the Sayfawa with a strong center. 

After Ali b. Dunama, Idris Alauma (Idris b. Ali) was seen as the next great statesman of the dynasty. According to Tijani, the increasing dichotomization between the center and periphery in Borno was not a problem until Idris Alauma's successors. Instead, during his reign, a greater degree of centralization took place with a modicum of political realism. Idris b. Ali took action against residual Sau populations, intervened in the succession and affairs of Mandara, Kanem, the Ngizim, and asserted Sayfawa rights to protect subject populations like the Fulani from Tuareg raids. By actively intervening within Borno and its frontier to defend subjects, promoting Islam among the Ngizim and others, resisting banditry and external enemies, and campaigning against the Bulala in Kanem, Idris b. Ali ensured the periphery was not cut off from Gazargamo. And due to the logistical and ecological difficulties of holding together a vast empire, Tijani saw Idris Alauma as a realist who acknowledged that some regions, like Kanem, would have to remain autonomous or semi-autonomous. His active military campaigns, suppression of insecurity, and ongoing commitment to Islamic standards of legitimacy and a dynastic right to rule as a Sayfawa promoted the administration's religious, political, and cultural hegemony. In fact, Idris Alauma's reign was the apogee of Borno for Tijani. In a segmented administrative structure ruling a heterogeneous population with ecological diversity, Idris Alauma promoted a robust central government whilst being politically realist. The state responded to the peripheries, provided protection, pacified the Sau, yet acknowledged the need to leave Mandara and Kanem as autonomous vassals.

After Idris Alauma, Tijani traced the development of greater dichotomies between center and periphery. Although the aforementioned autonomous provinces like Kanem under the Bulala sultans were understandably not integrated into the central administration of Gazargamo, subsequent maiwa accelerated the problem. As a result, multiple new frontier polities were promoted or created as vassals and buffers for Borno's frontiers, particularly the alifa in Mao (Kanem), the Galtima (galadima) of Nguru, the theocratic state of the Koyam shaykh, or Muniyo. Whilst this strategy created a defensive buffer for Borno to protect the territory from raiding activities of nomadic peoples like the Tuareg or Tubu, later Sayfawa administrations were less successful at maintaining close supervisory control of the vassal states. Over time, local chiefs or kings began to decide succession without consulting Gazargamo (which sometimes confirmed their decisions without interfering in the process). As the Sayfawa were less involved in active administration and less invested in conducting military campaigns themselves, they were also less likely to be able to offer adequate protection or support to some of these autonomous or semi-autonomous provinces. Indeed, Tijani accused these later Sayfawa rulers of changing to emphasize far more heavily the Islamic faith as their basis for legitimacy. Certainly, maiwa who engaged in long periods of ritual seclusion, Islamic studies, or lengthy travel abroad to perform the pilgrimage were less likely to be able to effectively or immediately address political concerns directly. Consequently, the administrative system relied on more intermediaries, thereby lengthening the chains in government as the distance between ruler and ruled increased. With this pattern acceleration over time, it very well could have led to poor governance or more corruption and exploitation of the ruled through chima gana or other officials.

As the 17th and 18th centuries progressed, Tijani divided Borno (and its empire) into areas of Sayfawa sovereignty and Sayfawa hegemony. In the former, the Sayfawa state, or central administration, was in direct control. In areas of hegemony, on the other hand, the influence of Borno was often expressed through the cultural and religious stature of the Sayfawa across much of the Central Sudan. This would be areas under the rule of the local dynasties in Marte, Dikwa, Muniyo, Damagaram, Kanem, Gumel, Mandara, Logone, Deya, Gulfe, Ngala, and the galadima. Due to their long history and promotion of Islam, Borno enjoyed a degree of regional hegemony without necessarily possessing administrative structures to integrate autonomous and semi-autonomous principalities. One sees this in Marte, the hometown of Tijani. There the first king, Kadiri Arsomi, was said to have been a brother of Ali Umarmi (Ali b. Umar?) and from the Sayfawa-Maghumi clan. Whilst the genealogy raises more questions, it is significant that the Martema claimed common origin with the Sayfawa dynasty as part of its own local legitimacy. In another case, Dikwa, descent from a maina of Gazargamo is claimed. In the Dikwama case, they also had to contend with non-Muslim Gamergu peoples who offered resistance to Borno. In both cases, these chiefly lineages claimed a common origin with the Sayfawa. But they became more autonomous over time in various matters. Even Logone, which sent "gifts" to Borno, saw these sandi as non-obligatory. They were intended for buying peace and cooperation. Likewise, the other principalities who sent gifts to Gazargamo expected to be reciprocated with even greater gifts. 

Once nomadic and semi-nomadic groups and immigrants to Borno in the Late Sayfawa Period are considered, the inability of the central government to adapt to new conditions became clear. As the Shuwa began to migrate to Borno due to pressures from Wadai and Bagirmi, their local leaders were sometimes able to become the fugu of their respective communities. These Shuwa representatives of the central government often represented their local Shuwa group much more than Gazargamo. It did not help that, per Tijani, maiwa after Idris Alauma did not sustain the goodwill of the Shuwa Arabs. Hence, the Shuwa groups who were in Borno in the 1700s were not particularly close to the government. As cattle herders eager to avoid raids and excessive taxation, they needed to court advantageous relationships with governments and local farmers. In the case of Borno, however, the mid-1700s actually witnessed a local war over Kabela. Initially held by the Fulata, the Shuwa seized it for three years, eventually losing it to the Fulata. Unfortunately, Tijani did not provide a clear indication of how the Sayfawa government responded to this conflict between two nomadic groups. Clearly, it shows tensions over resources. The Fulani Wodabe and Bororo'en groups were often under the authority of the galadima based in Nguru while others were under the authority of Deya, one of the vassal polities. They too had a strained relationship with Gazargamo that the burgeoning parasitism of the central bureaucracy could not address. Subject to expropriation or conflicts with other groups in Borno, the Shuwa, Fulani, and others sought to better their situation. Therefore, it is not surprising that these two groups came to play a large role in the events of the 19th century, albeit on opposing sides. One could add the Kanembu migrants to Borno in this category as well.

In order to further buttress his view of the bloated administration of the later Sayfawa maiwa, Tijani heavily relied on Muhammad Yanbu. Again, assuming this text is a reliable and authentic view of Sayfawa bureaucracy in the 1700s or early 1800s, it is quite revealing. For example, Tijani believed one reading of Yanbu supports the notion of the Sayfawa relinquishing more power to the wazirs. Much of the first part of Yanbu's text also shows the many types of palace servants, such as the Servants of the Apartment, or the Masters of the Sandals. Besides these, Yanbu's text listed leatherworkers, Masters of the Saddles, Masters of the Horse Armor, Masters of the Stirrups, Masters of the Cushion, and more. The central government even included a Secret Chancery that provided intelligence services and royal guards. Yet the famous chima system is suspiciously absent in Yanbu's text. If anything, Yanbu shows that, to some extent, the Sayfawa had become accustomed to a life of luxury and tranquility in their capital. They may have returned to past customs in government appointments which were so costly to their forebears. According to Yanbu, "Each of them deploys the army, which follows him, and no one is appointed to this rank other than sons or other relatives of the king" (300). This claim, which Tijani believed served as evidence of the Sayfawa appointing their close relatives as kaigama, was a step backwards. Yanbu is even cited for further Sayfawa disengagement with military matters since there was a "king's substitute" who took the place of the mai in battle. 

Of course, Yanbu's text may not be reliable on all these matters as the kaigama mentioned in Borno traditions during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama did not appear to be a Sayfawa descendant. Nor could one say Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama did not risk his life in military ventures. After all, Landeroin's report on Koyam traditions recorded him receiving an arrow wound in the battle with Mandara (not to mention the Mandara kirgam mentioning the mai fleeing for his life on horseback as Wandala soldiers pursued him). For similar reasons, readers may take issue with Tijani's views on the reign of Ali b. Umar (c. 1639-1677). To Tijani, Ali b. Umar's numerous trips to the East led to Kashim Biri's revolt and the development of overly powerful officials. This included Tuareg attacks that reached Gazargamo. But not mentioned here was the context in which a faction in Borno invited Agadez to send troops. And even as Ali b. Umar took five pilgrimages, his reign is often portrayed in the academic literature as Borno at its zenith.

Mandara's war with Borno in the 18th century is another problem for analysis. Tijani heavily relied on the biased Mandara kirgam written several years after the event. Since a copy of the chronicle was found for him by a notable in Borno, Tijani assumed that the text was taken seriously as an accurate chronicle by Borno ulama. That leap in reasoning may be valid, but without taking into account local Borno texts mentioning Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama's war with Mandara, Tijani made the mistake of relying too much on a single source. The incredibly biased kirgam written decades after the event it described must be treated with greater caution. Consulting local Arabic texts from Borno that were written during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama would have provided the necessary balance to evaluate what triggered the war. 

Finally, readers may question Tijani's stark views. Even Heinrich Barth saw in Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama a mai who was active on multiple fronts. It is too hasty to dismiss the later Sayfawa mais of the 1600s and 1700s as being dedicated to Islamic piety or scholarship and removing themselves from practical considerations of governance. Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama is an illustrative case. Not only was he active against Mandara, but he also sought to defend the frontier from Tuareg raiders and support those buffer states. Other 18th century mai may have been active on the frontier with Kano during the 1730s or with groups like the Kurata in Kanem to the east. Without providing empirical examples from the various rulers of the 1600s and 1700s, Tijani ran the risk of sounding like Yves Urvoy, Barth, and past scholars who dismissed these maiwa. 

The remainder of Tijani's study focuses on the effects of the Jihad, the ascent of al-Kanemi, and the return to what he saw as a more centralized administrative structure. The unresolved tensions and political climate for the Fulata led to hostilities in 1799. Bi Abdur, Ardo Lerlima and Ibrahim Zaki led Fulata communities against the galadima, Dunoma of Nguru. Tensions continued, culminating in the 1808 attack on Gazargamo led by Goni Mukhtar. Meanwhile, al-Kanemi, the son of a Kanembu and a Fezzani Arab, had settled in Ngala. Gaining renown as a scholar and due to his own Kanembu background, al-Kanemi was able to cultivate a support base from the Kanembu and Shuwa. Like him, some were migrants to Borno (although Tijani stressed that most in Borno would not have perceived al-Kanemi as a foreigner). Since respected mallams often became a source of leadership and community guidance in times of trouble, it was no surprise that al-Kanemi generated genuine legitimacy among various groups in Borno. His standing led to the defeated Sayfawa requesting his aid in driving the Fulata out of Gazargamo. Despite his success against the Fulata groups, Gazargamo was abandoned and the Sayfawa themselves were internally divided. 

In this period of clear failure on the part of the Sayfawa to respond to the military threat of the jihadists, al-Kanemi began to expand his power base. With a court moved to Ngorno, al-Kanemi received courtiers from the Sayfawa (they later followed him to Kukawa). A part of al-Kanemi's  reforms was to weaken or remove autonomous local rulers. This entailed actions against the galadima, which decreased the area under his administration. Then Marte, Mintar, Ngala and others were subjects of al-Kanemi's attention. Part of al-Kanemi's vision here was a desire to more fully integrate the southern parts of Borno into the state. These areas were exposed to threats from Bagirmi, Mandara and Wadai yet contained rich, fertile soils. Through his slave military official, Barka Gana, who was assigned the Kotoko states, Borno's central administration was actively attempting to integrate this region. The shaykh depended on enslaved military officials, his kachellawa, to make this happen. He waged similar campaigns against groups reluctant to recognize his authority, like the "Black Shuwa" in Damaturu or the Manga who revolted in the 1820s. Whilst engaged in these military campaigns to subdue autonomous or rebellious local leadership, al-Kanemi relied on a small Council of State which included prominent individuals tied to the Shuwa and Kanembu.

Undoubtedly, one must ask the following: why did al-Kanemi never remove the Sayfawa or officially usurp the throne? Tijani suggested an answer when he wrote, "The reality perhaps was that the religio-ideological power and authority of the Sayfawa, if not necessarily their political and military power, had developed to cover extensive areas in the Central Sudan" (412). In response to this longstanding ideological power, al-Kanemi, whose source of authority was also partly based in religion, may have chosen to merely act in defense of Sayfawa. Unlike them, he was able to combine military leadership with this religio-ideological authority. After rejecting the rationale for the jihad in his correspondence with Sokoto leaders and defending the Islamic legitimacy of Borno's government (though still imperfect), it is not surprising al-Kanemi was never interested in eradicating or replacing them with a new dynasty. 

Nonetheless, more skeptical or pessimistic readers may take issue with this period of transition. While Louis Brenner may have overemphasized the personal ambition and court politics as a factor, it is probable that al-Kanemi intervened in Sayfawa succession disputes to his own advantage. To what extent he played a role in the deposition of Muhammad Ngileruma should be explored. It is possible al-Kanemi merely sought to become the delegated authority of the Sayfawa in administration while the ancient dynasty retained its Islamic and historical symbolic power. In other words, al-Kanemi may have wanted to occupy a position similar to the shogunates of Japan who wielded effective power on behalf of the imperial family. Due to their political longevity and renown across much of the Central Sudan, it was better to keep them, even as figureheads, than to remove them outright. When viewed through this lens, al-Kanemi likely was driven by personal ambition. Yet it was ultimately based on restoring and defending Borno as a centralized state and in a position of prominence within the Central Sudan and Islamic worlds. Indeed, completely replacing the Sayfawa would have been tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of the jihadist critiques of Borno. 

Despite our issues with Tijani's work, it remains a significant work. Attempting to use a grand theory with enough nuance to elucidate the longevity of the Sayfawa, Tijani faced a number of problems. First, the lack of field research in Kanem weakened his analysis. Although there probably would have been insurmountable obstacles to researching medieval Kanem in the 1970s based on oral tradition, the lack of that perspective leaves the early chapter without the same level of evidentiary basis. The later chapters, on the Borno phase, are much richer. Closer in time to the present and with the benefit of oral traditions as well as more written sources, Tijani can trace the waxing and waning of the Sayfawa from the 1400s to 1808. The main problem is the falling back on generalizations or certain assumptions about the structure without close scrutiny of the maiwa of the 1600s and 1700s. The lack of nuance on certain reigns, like that of Ali b. Umar or Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, hinders the author's point about the Sayfawa emphasizing their religious or Islamic claims to legitimacy and hegemony. Lastly, the reliance on what were translations of Arabic manuscripts and French sources created another problem for the author's use of this material. Without being able to read Arabic, he faced limitations in terms of close textual analysis, source criticism, and the question of authenticity. Unable to use French placed additional obstacles for accessing more source materials on Kanem, Kawar, the Manga, Bagirmi, Wadai, and Agadez. Fortunately, Tijani's local connections, Kanuri fluency, and travels across Borno did allow for some balance of written and oral sources. This did allow for more of the required nuance in elucidating the areas of Sayfawa sovereignty versus Sayfawa hegemony and the Mai Mbauji.