Kyari Tijani's Dynamics of Administrative Change in pre-colonial Borno: A Comparative Study of the Sayfawa and Kanemi Dynasties is one of those essential studies of Borno history we have been waiting to read for three or four years. Inaccessible and difficult to access, it is a reprint of Tijani's thesis from the 1970s. As such, the publishers chose not to update the text, but they should have at least used an editor to correct the numerous mistakes or typos. That said, nothing is extreme enough to hinder comprehension for the reader. But doing so could have perhaps removed part of the lengthy introduction in which Tijani sought to apply Systems Theory to pre-colonial Borno. Or at the very least, trimmed some of it away. Nonetheless, Tijani's critical study was based on a combination of fieldwork across Borno and into Mandara (in today's Cameroon) as well as the use of local Arabic manuscripts such as the works of Muhammad Yanbu. Although Tijani himself did not read Arabic, he was able to procure translations for some of these rare sources that were products of local Borno writers and scholars in pre-colonial times. His weakness in French and German and the failure of his attempt to visit Mao in Kanem to interview locals were major flaws. This contributed to one of the weaknesses of his study, which often lacked adequate empirical evidence to support his analysis. Without the requisite language skills for deeper source analysis or criticism, some of the examples used by Tijani may not sufficiently substantiate his model.
First, what was the theoretical approach taken by Tijani? Noticing the flaws in the "Great Man" model of Barth, Brenner, Denham and Nachtigal, as well as the weaknesses in Brenner's analysis of the rise of al-Kanemi as shehu of Borno (Tijani was also quite critical of the way Brenner sought to incorporate a conflict theory model of classes), Tijani wanted to understand the nature of Sayfawa longevity and the reasons for dynastic change in the turbulent 19th century. This is a reasonable research question: Why was a single dynasty able to persist for several centuries across time and space? And why was this dynasty, the longest lasting in African history, unable to meet the challenges of the late 1700s and early 1800s? Lastly, what were the conditions of the time and the administrative or political challenges that made a figure like Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi a candidate for leading Borno?
In Tijani's eye, Systems Theory is applicable or relevant for addressing this question. To quote Tijani, "By using its conceptual aparatii, such as the interrelations of interacting, interpenetrating units and the role and significance of legitimation processes and ideology, we have a conceptual model and methodological aparati that can cope with the dynamics of the whole system and would, therefore, enable us understand, describe, and explain Borno political development more adequately" (43). In other words, this theoretical model allows for complex nuances in terms of the interaction of ideology, administrative structure, and the military functions of the state in a heterogeneous, ecologically diverse landscape such as Kanem-Borno. In this case, religio-ideological factors such as the universalist faith of Islam were tied to state legitimation by the Sayfawa (and the subsequent al-Kanemi dynasty). Additionally, the importance of genealogy, clan or lineage affiliations, and the dynastic principle of governance tied to the legend of descent from Sayf b. Dhi Yazan were essential tools in the administrative structures of the Sayfawa. This was so even in the Kanem phase of the Sayfawa state, although Tijani's lack of success in engaging in fieldwork in Mao made his interpretations of the early centuries speculative.
Over time, the Sayfawa adapted their administrative structure to better the standing of the central government and ensure the cultural (ideological) hegemony of the ruling house. Tijani's study traces these changes over time to understand why the Sayfawa state eventually came to an end and a new political order began with al-Kanemi. Indeed, Tijani wrote, "In this case our hypothesis is that change in such a system would be more in the sphere of administration while the political changes would be limited to restatement of pre-existing ideal goals. Change becomes necessary and tolerable when authoritative action neither matches the ideal goals stated nor meets the felt needs of the people or both." Thus, Tijani believed that the type of change that did occur with the rise of al-Kanemi was mostly in the sphere of administration as al-Kanemi restored a more centralized state. Simultaneously, he did not personally take for himself the position of mai, nor did he deviate from the Islamic ideals that were the basis of political legitimacy for the Sayfawa.
How did Tijani prove his theory in the case of Borno? And were his conclusions on the nature of al-Kanemi's political ascent accurate or more compelling than Brenner's study of the al-Kanemi line? Before addressing that, he reviewed the source material. Some of his citations are of unpublished Arabic manuscripts from Borno. He also cited some of the materials from Nigerian archives in Kaduna and conducted fieldwork to record and engage in conversation with locals in Marte, the area of Gazargamo (Gazargumo in his spelling), Kukawa, Maiduguri, and other places. Tijani clearly saw Muhammad Yanbu's Al-Idara Fi Nizam al-Mamlaka Wa 'l-Imara as an exceptional source. A copy was procured for him by Abubakar al-Miskin, a Sayfawa descendant. Assuming Yanbu's text is an authentic work of the 18th or early 19th century, the text outlines the palace administration of Gazargamo in great detail. Unsurprisingly, Tijani also relied heavily on Palmer, the chronicles of Ahmad b. Furtu, and a famous poem by Shaykh al-Tahir b. Ibrahim. Besides these, occasional references to an unpublished Arabic text on the Fulani of Borno, some of al-Kanemi's writings, and a Mandara chronicle, or kirgam, written about that kingdom's war with Borno in c. 1781 abound. Undoubtedly, Tijani's greatest contribution here is his status as a local, fluent speaker of Kanuri with access to various local notables to discuss the past. By drawing upon oral traditions from across Borno, Tijani can begin to synthesize the two different types of source materials (oral sources and written texts) for Borno. Sadly, not being able to visit Kanem restricted what Tijani could accomplish there. Perhaps a lack of French reading comprehension placed another limitation on what Tijani could have done with Landeroin, Zeltner, and Lange.
In terms of applying or adapting Systems Theory to Kanem-Borno, Tijani is weakest on the Kanem centuries. He emphasized the "dynastic character" of Sayfawa administration in Kanem without being able to strongly support it. Based on the meager data from the external Arabic sources and certain speculations on the nature of lineage groups and the retention of power or control over people or territory based on lineage ties to the Sayfawa ruling group, the Sayfawa state in Kanem emphasized its dynastic character. This shaped the administration since relatives of the maiwa were apparently assigned powerful posts in the central government and provincial administration. Unsurprisingly, this later led to problems of fission as these groups descended from the Sayfawa administered distant territories or principalities within the larger Kanem empire, particularly after Dunama Dibalemi's reign. But much of this is difficult to illustrate with specific examples besides what was recounted in the Diwan. Outside observers who never went to Kanem, like al-Maqrizi, may be referenced for what became a decentralized administrative structure, yet Tijani did not deeply explore the rise of the Bulala as a competing lineage group. Nor was there any attempt to understand this in terms of social relations with medieval Kanem or the possible role of slaves and caste groups in this process. Ultimately, the Kanem phase of the Sayfawa appeared to have been little more than a prelude to the central area of Tijani's analysis: Borno.
Once the Sayfawa had relocated permanently to Borno and experienced a consolidation under Ali Gaji (Ali b. Dunama), Tijani's analysis improves. With Ali Gaji, who Tijani unfortunately thought was the mai who went to war with the Kanta of Kebbi, one notes the development of a full dynastic structure of government including the koguna class. However, Ali Gaji replaced Sayfawa relatives with slave officials in some of the key military posts, ending the period of troubles in the 1200s, 1300s and 1400s when powerful officials related to the dynasty could trigger civil wars or coups. Using the example of Ali Gaji's campaign against Logone, dated to c. 1501/2 (although this was likely earlier, if one uses Lange's chronology), or the establishment of a permanent capital at Gazargamo, Tijani perceived Ali Gaji as establishing the conditions for a stronger state to emerge within Borno and the Central Sudan. Although the kogunawa later took on more administrative responsibility for the subsequent maiwa, Ali Gaji's council of state, enslaved officials, and building of a new capital tied to trade, Islamic education, and stability laid the foundation for the Sayfawa state's longevity in Borno. Even the sending of Yerima Musa against Logone was portrayed by Tijani as an instance in which the mai used dangerous campaigns as an opportunity to rid himself of political threats. Ali Gaji's victory against the Bulala at Lada was similarly important for showing the resurgence of the Sayfawa with a strong center.
After Ali b. Dunama, Idris Alauma (Idris b. Ali) was seen as the next great statesman of the dynasty. According to Tijani, the increasing dichotomization between the center and periphery in Borno was not a problem until Idris Alauma's successors. Instead, during his reign, a greater degree of centralization took place with a modicum of political realism. Idris b. Ali took action against residual Sau populations, intervened in the succession and affairs of Mandara, Kanem, the Ngizim, and asserted Sayfawa rights to protect subject populations like the Fulani from Tuareg raids. By actively intervening within Borno and its frontier to defend subjects, promoting Islam among the Ngizim and others, resisting banditry and external enemies, and campaigning against the Bulala in Kanem, Idris b. Ali ensured the periphery was not cut off from Gazargamo. And due to the logistical and ecological difficulties of holding together a vast empire, Tijani saw Idris Alauma as a realist who acknowledged that some regions, like Kanem, would have to remain autonomous or semi-autonomous. His active military campaigns, suppression of insecurity, and ongoing commitment to Islamic standards of legitimacy and a dynastic right to rule as a Sayfawa promoted the administration's religious, political, and cultural hegemony. In fact, Idris Alauma's reign was the apogee of Borno for Tijani. In a segmented administrative structure ruling a heterogeneous population with ecological diversity, Idris Alauma promoted a robust central government whilst being politically realist. The state responded to the peripheries, provided protection, pacified the Sau, yet acknowledged the need to leave Mandara and Kanem as autonomous vassals.
After Idris Alauma, Tijani traced the development of greater dichotomies between center and periphery. Although the aforementioned autonomous provinces like Kanem under the Bulala sultans were understandably not integrated into the central administration of Gazargamo, subsequent maiwa accelerated the problem. As a result, multiple new frontier polities were promoted or created as vassals and buffers for Borno's frontiers, particularly the alifa in Mao (Kanem), the Galtima (galadima) of Nguru, the theocratic state of the Koyam shaykh, or Muniyo. Whilst this strategy created a defensive buffer for Borno to protect the territory from raiding activities of nomadic peoples like the Tuareg or Tubu, later Sayfawa administrations were less successful at maintaining close supervisory control of the vassal states. Over time, local chiefs or kings began to decide succession without consulting Gazargamo (which sometimes confirmed their decisions without interfering in the process). As the Sayfawa were less involved in active administration and less invested in conducting military campaigns themselves, they were also less likely to be able to offer adequate protection or support to some of these autonomous or semi-autonomous provinces. Indeed, Tijani accused these later Sayfawa rulers of changing to emphasize far more heavily the Islamic faith as their basis for legitimacy. Certainly, maiwa who engaged in long periods of ritual seclusion, Islamic studies, or lengthy travel abroad to perform the pilgrimage were less likely to be able to effectively or immediately address political concerns directly. Consequently, the administrative system relied on more intermediaries, thereby lengthening the chains in government as the distance between ruler and ruled increased. With this pattern acceleration over time, it very well could have led to poor governance or more corruption and exploitation of the ruled through chima gana or other officials.
As the 17th and 18th centuries progressed, Tijani divided Borno (and its empire) into areas of Sayfawa sovereignty and Sayfawa hegemony. In the former, the Sayfawa state, or central administration, was in direct control. In areas of hegemony, on the other hand, the influence of Borno was often expressed through the cultural and religious stature of the Sayfawa across much of the Central Sudan. This would be areas under the rule of the local dynasties in Marte, Dikwa, Muniyo, Damagaram, Kanem, Gumel, Mandara, Logone, Deya, Gulfe, Ngala, and the galadima. Due to their long history and promotion of Islam, Borno enjoyed a degree of regional hegemony without necessarily possessing administrative structures to integrate autonomous and semi-autonomous principalities. One sees this in Marte, the hometown of Tijani. There the first king, Kadiri Arsomi, was said to have been a brother of Ali Umarmi (Ali b. Umar?) and from the Sayfawa-Maghumi clan. Whilst the genealogy raises more questions, it is significant that the Martema claimed common origin with the Sayfawa dynasty as part of its own local legitimacy. In another case, Dikwa, descent from a maina of Gazargamo is claimed. In the Dikwama case, they also had to contend with non-Muslim Gamergu peoples who offered resistance to Borno. In both cases, these chiefly lineages claimed a common origin with the Sayfawa. But they became more autonomous over time in various matters. Even Logone, which sent "gifts" to Borno, saw these sandi as non-obligatory. They were intended for buying peace and cooperation. Likewise, the other principalities who sent gifts to Gazargamo expected to be reciprocated with even greater gifts.
Once nomadic and semi-nomadic groups and immigrants to Borno in the Late Sayfawa Period are considered, the inability of the central government to adapt to new conditions became clear. As the Shuwa began to migrate to Borno due to pressures from Wadai and Bagirmi, their local leaders were sometimes able to become the fugu of their respective communities. These Shuwa representatives of the central government often represented their local Shuwa group much more than Gazargamo. It did not help that, per Tijani, maiwa after Idris Alauma did not sustain the goodwill of the Shuwa Arabs. Hence, the Shuwa groups who were in Borno in the 1700s were not particularly close to the government. As cattle herders eager to avoid raids and excessive taxation, they needed to court advantageous relationships with governments and local farmers. In the case of Borno, however, the mid-1700s actually witnessed a local war over Kabela. Initially held by the Fulata, the Shuwa seized it for three years, eventually losing it to the Fulata. Unfortunately, Tijani did not provide a clear indication of how the Sayfawa government responded to this conflict between two nomadic groups. Clearly, it shows tensions over resources. The Fulani Wodabe and Bororo'en groups were often under the authority of the galadima based in Nguru while others were under the authority of Deya, one of the vassal polities. They too had a strained relationship with Gazargamo that the burgeoning parasitism of the central bureaucracy could not address. Subject to expropriation or conflicts with other groups in Borno, the Shuwa, Fulani, and others sought to better their situation. Therefore, it is not surprising that these two groups came to play a large role in the events of the 19th century, albeit on opposing sides. One could add the Kanembu migrants to Borno in this category as well.
In order to further buttress his view of the bloated administration of the later Sayfawa maiwa, Tijani heavily relied on Muhammad Yanbu. Again, assuming this text is a reliable and authentic view of Sayfawa bureaucracy in the 1700s or early 1800s, it is quite revealing. For example, Tijani believed one reading of Yanbu supports the notion of the Sayfawa relinquishing more power to the wazirs. Much of the first part of Yanbu's text also shows the many types of palace servants, such as the Servants of the Apartment, or the Masters of the Sandals. Besides these, Yanbu's text listed leatherworkers, Masters of the Saddles, Masters of the Horse Armor, Masters of the Stirrups, Masters of the Cushion, and more. The central government even included a Secret Chancery that provided intelligence services and royal guards. Yet the famous chima system is suspiciously absent in Yanbu's text. If anything, Yanbu shows that, to some extent, the Sayfawa had become accustomed to a life of luxury and tranquility in their capital. They may have returned to past customs in government appointments which were so costly to their forebears. According to Yanbu, "Each of them deploys the army, which follows him, and no one is appointed to this rank other than sons or other relatives of the king" (300). This claim, which Tijani believed served as evidence of the Sayfawa appointing their close relatives as kaigama, was a step backwards. Yanbu is even cited for further Sayfawa disengagement with military matters since there was a "king's substitute" who took the place of the mai in battle.
Of course, Yanbu's text may not be reliable on all these matters as the kaigama mentioned in Borno traditions during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama did not appear to be a Sayfawa descendant. Nor could one say Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama did not risk his life in military ventures. After all, Landeroin's report on Koyam traditions recorded him receiving an arrow wound in the battle with Mandara (not to mention the Mandara kirgam mentioning the mai fleeing for his life on horseback as Wandala soldiers pursued him). For similar reasons, readers may take issue with Tijani's views on the reign of Ali b. Umar (c. 1639-1677). To Tijani, Ali b. Umar's numerous trips to the East led to Kashim Biri's revolt and the development of overly powerful officials. This included Tuareg attacks that reached Gazargamo. But not mentioned here was the context in which a faction in Borno invited Agadez to send troops. And even as Ali b. Umar took five pilgrimages, his reign is often portrayed in the academic literature as Borno at its zenith.
Mandara's war with Borno in the 18th century is another problem for analysis. Tijani heavily relied on the biased Mandara kirgam written several years after the event. Since a copy of the chronicle was found for him by a notable in Borno, Tijani assumed that the text was taken seriously as an accurate chronicle by Borno ulama. That leap in reasoning may be valid, but without taking into account local Borno texts mentioning Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama's war with Mandara, Tijani made the mistake of relying too much on a single source. The incredibly biased kirgam written decades after the event it described must be treated with greater caution. Consulting local Arabic texts from Borno that were written during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama would have provided the necessary balance to evaluate what triggered the war.
Finally, readers may question Tijani's stark views. Even Heinrich Barth saw in Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama a mai who was active on multiple fronts. It is too hasty to dismiss the later Sayfawa mais of the 1600s and 1700s as being dedicated to Islamic piety or scholarship and removing themselves from practical considerations of governance. Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama is an illustrative case. Not only was he active against Mandara, but he also sought to defend the frontier from Tuareg raiders and support those buffer states. Other 18th century mai may have been active on the frontier with Kano during the 1730s or with groups like the Kurata in Kanem to the east. Without providing empirical examples from the various rulers of the 1600s and 1700s, Tijani ran the risk of sounding like Yves Urvoy, Barth, and past scholars who dismissed these maiwa.
The remainder of Tijani's study focuses on the effects of the Jihad, the ascent of al-Kanemi, and the return to what he saw as a more centralized administrative structure. The unresolved tensions and political climate for the Fulata led to hostilities in 1799. Bi Abdur, Ardo Lerlima and Ibrahim Zaki led Fulata communities against the galadima, Dunoma of Nguru. Tensions continued, culminating in the 1808 attack on Gazargamo led by Goni Mukhtar. Meanwhile, al-Kanemi, the son of a Kanembu and a Fezzani Arab, had settled in Ngala. Gaining renown as a scholar and due to his own Kanembu background, al-Kanemi was able to cultivate a support base from the Kanembu and Shuwa. Like him, some were migrants to Borno (although Tijani stressed that most in Borno would not have perceived al-Kanemi as a foreigner). Since respected mallams often became a source of leadership and community guidance in times of trouble, it was no surprise that al-Kanemi generated genuine legitimacy among various groups in Borno. His standing led to the defeated Sayfawa requesting his aid in driving the Fulata out of Gazargamo. Despite his success against the Fulata groups, Gazargamo was abandoned and the Sayfawa themselves were internally divided.
In this period of clear failure on the part of the Sayfawa to respond to the military threat of the jihadists, al-Kanemi began to expand his power base. With a court moved to Ngorno, al-Kanemi received courtiers from the Sayfawa (they later followed him to Kukawa). A part of al-Kanemi's reforms was to weaken or remove autonomous local rulers. This entailed actions against the galadima, which decreased the area under his administration. Then Marte, Mintar, Ngala and others were subjects of al-Kanemi's attention. Part of al-Kanemi's vision here was a desire to more fully integrate the southern parts of Borno into the state. These areas were exposed to threats from Bagirmi, Mandara and Wadai yet contained rich, fertile soils. Through his slave military official, Barka Gana, who was assigned the Kotoko states, Borno's central administration was actively attempting to integrate this region. The shaykh depended on enslaved military officials, his kachellawa, to make this happen. He waged similar campaigns against groups reluctant to recognize his authority, like the "Black Shuwa" in Damaturu or the Manga who revolted in the 1820s. Whilst engaged in these military campaigns to subdue autonomous or rebellious local leadership, al-Kanemi relied on a small Council of State which included prominent individuals tied to the Shuwa and Kanembu.
Undoubtedly, one must ask the following: why did al-Kanemi never remove the Sayfawa or officially usurp the throne? Tijani suggested an answer when he wrote, "The reality perhaps was that the religio-ideological power and authority of the Sayfawa, if not necessarily their political and military power, had developed to cover extensive areas in the Central Sudan" (412). In response to this longstanding ideological power, al-Kanemi, whose source of authority was also partly based in religion, may have chosen to merely act in defense of Sayfawa. Unlike them, he was able to combine military leadership with this religio-ideological authority. After rejecting the rationale for the jihad in his correspondence with Sokoto leaders and defending the Islamic legitimacy of Borno's government (though still imperfect), it is not surprising al-Kanemi was never interested in eradicating or replacing them with a new dynasty.
Nonetheless, more skeptical or pessimistic readers may take issue with this period of transition. While Louis Brenner may have overemphasized the personal ambition and court politics as a factor, it is probable that al-Kanemi intervened in Sayfawa succession disputes to his own advantage. To what extent he played a role in the deposition of Muhammad Ngileruma should be explored. It is possible al-Kanemi merely sought to become the delegated authority of the Sayfawa in administration while the ancient dynasty retained its Islamic and historical symbolic power. In other words, al-Kanemi may have wanted to occupy a position similar to the shogunates of Japan who wielded effective power on behalf of the imperial family. Due to their political longevity and renown across much of the Central Sudan, it was better to keep them, even as figureheads, than to remove them outright. When viewed through this lens, al-Kanemi likely was driven by personal ambition. Yet it was ultimately based on restoring and defending Borno as a centralized state and in a position of prominence within the Central Sudan and Islamic worlds. Indeed, completely replacing the Sayfawa would have been tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of the jihadist critiques of Borno.
Despite our issues with Tijani's work, it remains a significant work. Attempting to use a grand theory with enough nuance to elucidate the longevity of the Sayfawa, Tijani faced a number of problems. First, the lack of field research in Kanem weakened his analysis. Although there probably would have been insurmountable obstacles to researching medieval Kanem in the 1970s based on oral tradition, the lack of that perspective leaves the early chapter without the same level of evidentiary basis. The later chapters, on the Borno phase, are much richer. Closer in time to the present and with the benefit of oral traditions as well as more written sources, Tijani can trace the waxing and waning of the Sayfawa from the 1400s to 1808. The main problem is the falling back on generalizations or certain assumptions about the structure without close scrutiny of the maiwa of the 1600s and 1700s. The lack of nuance on certain reigns, like that of Ali b. Umar or Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, hinders the author's point about the Sayfawa emphasizing their religious or Islamic claims to legitimacy and hegemony. Lastly, the reliance on what were translations of Arabic manuscripts and French sources created another problem for the author's use of this material. Without being able to read Arabic, he faced limitations in terms of close textual analysis, source criticism, and the question of authenticity. Unable to use French placed additional obstacles for accessing more source materials on Kanem, Kawar, the Manga, Bagirmi, Wadai, and Agadez. Fortunately, Tijani's local connections, Kanuri fluency, and travels across Borno did allow for some balance of written and oral sources. This did allow for more of the required nuance in elucidating the areas of Sayfawa sovereignty versus Sayfawa hegemony and the Mai Mbauji.
