Tuesday, March 14, 2023

Tilho Mission and Borno

An example of the type of musicians expected to announce and accompany the Shehu of Borno.

The historical chapter of the Documents scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909 remains an indispensable source for reconstructing the history of the vast region from Lake Chad to the Niger. Landeroin and the Tilho Mission collected numerous local traditions, reports, and descriptions which, despite some severe limitations, supplement Barth and Clapperton excellently. Since they mostly base their themselves on local informants who were not always named, and they did not find much in the way of local written records (though extracts from one local source mentioning the various campaigns of what appears to have been Ali b. Umar suggest military expansionism, the centrality of slavery and the use of slave officials and relations of the mai in administration were significant) or lost chronicles, their historical chapter is most detailed and useful for the last 100 or 150 years before the European colonial conquest and partition of the region. For events and processes prior to the late 18th century, they usually rely on the speculations and analysis of Nachtigal, Barth, and guesswork based on the current traditions of the heterogeneous populations inhabiting the Chad Basin. Despite these limitations, and some of their questionable assertions regarding the chronology and origins of the Sayfawa dynasty in Kanem and Borno, we know of no other source with similarly rich oral traditions.

Undoubtedly, the major question of Sayfawa (or Toubba) origins occupies much of our attention. Repeating the tales of Yemen origins and the Toubba kings who migrated into Kanem with related and servile groups, the traditions cited here contract Barth, Nachtigal, the Diwan, and the chronicles of Ahmad b. Furtu. Despite acknowledging the monumental contributions of Barth and the written sources he was able to procure, the Tilho Mission wants one to believe that when the Sayfawa (or Seibouas) first came to Kanem, it was under Bulala rule. Then, after seizing control of Kanem, they chose to migrate to Borno by the 15th century. Other sources, however, suggest Bulala pressure was one of the primary factors that pushed the Sayfawa out of Kanem by the late 1300s. Moreover, local sources suggest the Sayfawa dynasty were the earliest major dynasty in Kanem, not relative newcomers who seized it from the Bulala. What appears to have happened here is a Kanem informant, of Magumi origins, told the version of the ruling clan's history as understood in early 20th century Kanem to the French visitors. Somewhere along the line, the chronology was distorted so that the Sayfawa reconquest of Kanem in the 1500s was pushed further back in time to match the earlier history of Birni Njimi and the dynasty's Kanem phase. However, the Tilho Mission is in agreement with Barth and others about the generally highly important reign of Ali Ghaji and his role in restoring the dynasty's fortunes in late 15th century Borno. This suggests that they may have not been careful enough when interviewing informants and collecting data, so their chronology is suspect. Perhaps the timeline for the genealogies of the khalifas of Kanem (descendants of Dala Afuno, who was either a Magumi raised in Hausaland or a slave of the Sayfawa dynasty appointed by the latter) is also suspect. If, indeed, the Tunjur were selected to oversee Kanem for the Sayfawa rulers based in Birni Gazargamo after defeating the Bulala, we cannot easily determine exactly when they were replaced by Dala Afuno. We also know that Idris Alooma had placed a Bulala vassal sultan in power in Kanem, so we still need to uncover when the Bulala sultans were finally disposed of by Borno. Much of what transpired in Kanem under the Bulala and Tunjur.

The oral traditions of the Buduma, Kanembu, Kanuri, and other groups claiming descent from the Sao also complicate any simple-minded assumptions of ethnic identity or ethnogenesis. The oral traditions of the Buduma or Yedina, by the early 20th century, linked them to a Bulu and common ancestry with the Kanembu. Since Bulu was one of the early kings remembered in the Diwan, these oral traditions suggest deep relations with the Kanembu east and within Lake Chad. Despite the ancestors of the Buduma appearing in Ibn Said' work as the Kuri infidels raided by the rulers of Kanem in the 13th century, they were and are closely related to the Kanembu and intermarriage between the two even led to the formation of new populations of Buduma, Kanembu, and Tubu origins. In addition, oral traditions of Ali Ghaji also refer to his conflicts with the Tuareg before he established Gazargamo as the capital. Traditions of this conflict appear to have been remembered and later recorded in the Agadez Chronicles, which suggest the Sayfawa rulers did conquer or at least raid the Tuareg in the area north of Borno in the 1400s. While one should doubt that the new capital was pointed out to Ali by the Tuareg, it points to the role of both northern and southern conquests and trade in the expansion of Sayfawa rule in Borno. Indeed, some of the traditions suggest merchandise and trade was one way in which the Toubbas won the favor of the autochthonous Sao, later seizing the territory through ruse and war.

Besides close ties with groups such as the Buduma, various descendants of the Sao, and even the Tuareg, the Sayfawa and related Kanembu, Kanuri, Koyam and Kanuriphone populations suggest a complex process of ethnogenesis. The Koyam, supposedly Kanembu pastoralists associated with Islamic education and piety, were also related to the Sayfawa. Various clan names that appear among the Tubu, Kanembu, Kanuri, and Koyam also point to a deep antiquity of relations and likely migratory waves that traversed Kanem, Lake Chad, and Borno. Some of these traditions claiming deeper antiquity could also be of relatively recent origin, perhaps invented traditions that spread with the growth of Sayfawa power across the region. In that regard, it is interesting that the Buduma, who were mostly independent due to their mobility and piracy on Lake Chad, would claim common ancestry with the Kanembu. Perhaps that was due to largely peaceful relations with them and the absorption of Kanembu populations? With Borno, on the other hand, the Buduma were usually independent and carried out frequent raids for booty and captives. Yet in the early 20th century, the Buduma were culturally similar to the Kanembu but less thoroughly Muslim. As for the Tomageras, Kayi, Magumi, Sugurtis, Koyam, and other widely dispersed groups claiming common origins or clan names, they might be a testament to the strategic matrimonial alliances of the millennial Sayfawa, whose marriages with women from these aforementioned groups helped secure allies across a vast area of the Central Sudan.

Despite the problematic chronology and uneven collection of oral traditions, the Tilho Mission bequeathed to posterity an amazing source. Some of the traditions may be "false" or misleading or perhaps misinterpreted, but they add rich narrative and cultural nuance. For instance, the story of Mai Ali telling the Koyam shaykh that his own followers would not die for him helps explain why he was defeated by Mandara in the 1780s. Perhaps, by then, the Sayfawa mais were no longer able to command loyalty from the military and were already losing legitimacy. Certainly, the inability of the Sayfawa mais to protect and defend the western and northwestern frontiers of the empire would have compromised the willingness of soldiers and vassals to obey. The traditions likewise report personal details that may have played a role in the final demise of the Sayfawa. For example, the attempt in 1846 to remove Shehu Umar with the help of Wadai allegedly failed, in part, because the puppet mai's daughter revealed the details of the plot to her lover, a relative of Umar. The historical narrative here also sheds a more cynical light on Shehu al-Kanemi and his son, portraying the former as ambitious and usurping and the latter as corrupt and too close to his vizier. These details need corroboration, naturally, but unveil more of the personal dynamics of the key personages. 

America

"Pedro Navaja" got us hooked on this number from West Side Story. Although never fans of this musical or musical theater in general, this is a clever (and problematic) song on Puerto Rican migration in the US. The gendered difference in perceptions of their experience in New York is interesting in itself. 

Sunday, March 12, 2023

Spiks

For some strange reason, we never finished Pedro Juan Soto's Spiks during a past obsession with Puerto Rico and the Diaspora a few years ago. This time around, we devoured the slim collection of short stories and vignettes of Puerto Rican life in New York City. As the title suggests, these stories focus on ghetto life and the crushing poverty, dilapidated housing, and lack of opportunities for Puerto Rican migrants established in Harlem. Stories deal with themes of becoming an adult, frustrated romance, migration, the breakup of families, lack of work, English classrooms in school and failed dreams. Of all these tales, the most effective story is probably "Scribbles." The brief work perfectly encapsulates what happens when ambition and marital love are brutally confronted by the realities of life in New York. The father of the family will never become an artist and his one attempt to express his feelings for his wife through his talent are abruptly terminated by Graciela. Sadly the canvas of his planned artwork becomes a "wide and clear gravestone of his dreams." This is an apt description of the New York experience for more than a few of those earlier generations of migrants from Puerto Rico.

Rambling on Modern Ethiopia

Although our major interest is in the Solomonic Dynasty's medieval and early modern history, one cannot avoid the fascinating history of modern Ethiopia in the 19th and 20th centuries. Like Liberia and Haiti, Ethiopia was rather unique for being one of the few independent black countries in the imperial world order after the Scramble for Africa. Like Haiti, it also offers an example of a country of heterogeneous origins with a recognized yet compromised sovereignty. In the case of Ethiopia, it was the tripartite alliance of Britain, France, and Italy which ensured post-Adwa Ethiopia could not have developed too independently. In Haiti, the Western powers were also present and helped to ensure Haitian economic development would be limited. Thus, Haiti and Ethiopia share a common history of heroic political sovereignty won through the sword but failed economic development through internal dynamics and foreign imperialism. The Ethiopian case also adds another dimension of imperialism since modern Ethiopia's borders were based on the expansion of the Shawan ruler Menelik II and he had to defeat the legacy of the Zamana Masafent's regionalism.

Bahru Zewde's A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991 seems to be one of the better general introductions to understand this dynamic in Ethiopian history: political independence accompanied by economic dependency. Beginning with the late Zamana Masafent and the striking rise and fall of Tewodros II, Zewde suggests Tewodros possessed a modern vision without practical steps or a process for achieving it. Later emperors, like Yohannes IV, were able to muster enough power to defeat expansionist Egypt but did not fully centralize the empire. That great task was left to Menelik II, an astute leader who managed to secure the throne and expand the more to a greater extent than any of the medieval great Solomonic dynasts. Zewde's study demystifies the Battle of Adwa and shows the failure of Menelik II to follow through after Adwa. Thus, Italy retained significant influence in Italian Somaliland and Eritrea while the French exerted influence through the Djibouti railway extension to Ethiopia. The British, the major imperial power in northeast Africa, sought to protect their interests in Sudan and were willing to, with the French, allow Italy the ability to exert itself in the Horn. 

Unfortunately, Menelik's modernizing attempts were restricted and succession posed another threat to the fragile state. Lej Iyyasu, who eventually became emperor, was removed from power for his alleged immoral conduct and interest in integrating minority populations such as the large Muslim population. Eventually, the future Haile Selassie, an ambitious man and an absolutist, secured the throne over the course of several years. According to Zewde, Haile Selassie's ascent to absolute power was based on favoring men of humble or lower rank as appointees to political office instead of the hereditary nobility. This tactic, however, did not mean the Emperor was interested in any meaningful social, economic or democratic reforms. Land, especially in the southern provinces, was increasingly privatized and the lot of the Ethiopian peasantry declined. Industrialization remained weak and foreign economic penetration of the economy was strong. Much like Haiti, actually, Ethiopia was dependent on exports of coffee. This generally dismal condition continued after the restoration of imperial power with the Liberation of Ethiopia from the fascist Italian occupation. Despite a few attempted coups and assassinations, and a bourgeoning student movement, Haile Selassie clung to power until 1974, when the Solomonic lineage came to an ignominious end. 

The depressing and horrifying annals of the Derg years and the role of the TPLF and Eritrean independence forces in toppling it conclude Zewde's history. The Derg administration, which arose out of the military, was not initially Marxist, but adopted its rhetoric. Land reform was implemented, albeit not in a way that actually gave inalienable land rights to the peasant or included them in the political process. The depressing condition of the economy, widespread practice of executions and political persecution and the catastrophic famine of the 1980s shed additional light on the failures of the Derg regime. This tragic recent history highlights how the struggle for political centralization had to, in some fashion, restructure itself along federal lines, come to accept the loss of Eritrea and confront the question of ethnic and religious diversity. However, throughout the 1900s, some of the reforms which had interested some Ethiopian intellectuals since the beginning of the century finally saw the light of day, albeit after several decades of collaborating with various members of the traditional elite or through influence on the military and students. Unfortunately, throughout the period Ethiopia remained economically weak and internally divided. Replacing Britain with the US and, later on, the USSR, as major sources of financial and technical support, did little to improve the lot of the impoverished masses. Limited import substitute industrialization under Selassie remained embryonic. Thus, without real economic development, political autonomy meant little. 

Friday, March 10, 2023

La Cura

Frankie Ruiz really was one of the greats. This live performance of "La Cura" shows him at his best with an amazing band that knew how to "cook" like few others.

Wednesday, March 8, 2023

Ghana and Wagadu

 "A discussion of the traditions of Wagadu with some reference to ancient Ghāna, including of review of oral accounts, Arabic sources and archaeological evidence" by Abdoulaye Bathily effectively combines linguistic, textual, and oral sources. A speaker of the Soninke language who brings an internal perspective on the deeply ancient Soninke, Bathily dispels some of the worst (and racist) theories while pushing for a more balanced interpretation of the oral traditions, external Arabic sources, Timbuktu chronicles, and cultural evidence. Delafosse, Frobenius and their ilk are proven incorrect and fanciful, particularly the notion of ancient Judeo-Syriens colonizing West Africa in Antiquity before founding Ghana. Moreover, Bathily's knowledge of Soninke language and culture allows him to craft more plausible theories and interpretations of medieval Arabic sources such as al-Bakri while suggesting a more likely interpretation from the limited archaeological sources on Dhar Tichitt and Kumbi. Bathily's essay is truly exemplary and it is a shame scholarship on Wagadu has not advanced significantly since it was published. 

Bathily also applies common sense to parse the meaning of the the genealogies and oral traditions from the Soninke or the Timbuktu chroniclers who sought to link Soninke origins to the Middle East. Clearly, the Soninke were later influenced by Islamic conceptions and some "remixed" their genealogies, oral histories and legends to reflect this. If Islamization was already a process impacting the Soninke of Wagadu, or Ghana before the Almoravid movement (and Bathily is agnostic on the Almoravid conquest or its alleged role in hastening Islamization), then anyone attempting to interpret the references to the Middle East or Islam should know not to interpret it literally. Indeed, even al-Idrisi in the 12th century reported Alid ancestry for the kings of Wagadu, suggesting these should probably not be taken at face-value. In addition, Bathily's study suggests one should not interpret the legends of Wagadu's fall as necessarily meaning climate change, servile chiefs or lineages in revolt or a dramatic conflict between "traditional" religion and Islam. For instance, some of the traditions collected by Monteil suggest Sumanguru was a slave official of Wagadu who broke away. Yet other traditions do not mention that. His appendix, consisting of the Soninke original and translation of 2 oral traditions on Wagadu origin, demonstrates that any historical reconstruction of deep Wagadu history clearly require careful ethnographic and linguistic expertise. However, the current academic research may have stronger evidence today about the role climate change in influencing Ghana's decline. Nonetheless, it would not necessarily elucidate the decline of Ghana if indeed Ghana's capital city shifted. In fact, Bathily suggests that Kumbi may have only been one of the possibly many capitals of Ghana, if indeed different ruling clans or factions of the ruling clan switched political capitals. Such a theory would be consistent with post-Wagadu Soninke kingdoms and chiefdoms. It also suggests climate change might not have been so significant of a factor if indeed Ghana had a multiplicity of capitals, including some further south.

Where Bathily's essay especially shines is the analysis of the Arabic sources. Knowing that Kaya Magha as a title does not exist in Soninke, but could have been Kuya Manga (a nickname of a royal title for Wagadu), Bathily additionally explains that Ghana or Gana does not exist as a title among the Soninke. Perhaps, as suggested by Bathily, Ghana derived from the Berber word for bush, agan, since al-Bakri also identified the capital as al-ghaba. It is speculation on his part, but perhaps that Berber term was misapplied or misunderstood by al-Bakri and others to refer to the entire kingdom. Yet the identification of Wagadu as the Ghana of the medieval Arabic sources can be established from other words of Soninke origin appearing in al-Bakri. For instance, the name of a Ghana king, Tunkamenin, is actually derived from the title Tunka. Indeed, it is possible that that Tunkamenin's successor was his Tunka Lemmine, or younger relative chosen to help an elder king rule the kingdom. If indeed the kings of Wagadu were often elders or seniors of the ruling clan(s), then like later Soninke rulers, they might have chosen a younger relative to assist in administration. Perhaps this younger relative was often a nephew of the king, which confused al-Bakri into thinking the kingdom of Ghana practiced matrilineal succession. After all, according to Bathily, the Soninke were not matrilineal but practiced endogamy and stressed relations between maternal uncles and nephews. We also learn from Bathilily that a group who were probably Soninke but not identified as Ghana (the Zafun) were probably adherents of some type of snake cult or religious pratice. Even today, the Soninke possess a taboo against killing the biida snake, which suggests that the "traditional" religion of Wagadu was similar to that of the Ziafun and the Soninke today. All of this suggests the Ghana of the medieval Arabic sources was indeed a Soninke kingdom, probably Wagadu (derived from wago or wage, for the ruling clans who may have alternated in their control). Evidence from the ethnographic present, the history of later Soninke kingdoms, linguistics, and archaeology points to a Soninke identification for Ghana and it almost certainly being the Wagadu remembered in Soninke traditions.

Where things become even more speculative or questionable is the ultimate origin of the Soninke. Were they from the Sahel but eventually dispersed after Wagadu's fall? Bathily is sure they did not come from the Middle Niger. Soninke place names like Biru (Walata) and the archaeological evidence based on Munson's work does seem to point to a northern origin. But is Bathily correct about the possible role of slavery's growing importance during the increase in agricultural activity manifested during the Dhar Tichitt phase? What was the relationship with early trans-Saharan trade and Libyco-Berbers? To what extent was the Wagadu polity administered through slave officials? And what was the origin of occupational castes among the Soninke and related Mande groups? Many questions remain unanswered but Bathily's article points us in some fruitful directions with a robust use of the available sources. 

Tuesday, March 7, 2023

Everything You Need to Know About Puerto Rico

Although we are mainly interested in the history of Puerto Rico before US colonialism, Jorge Duany's Puerto Rico: What Everyone Needs to Know is a good overview of 5 centuries of historical development and cultural transformation. The two are, obviously, closely linked and the format of this introductory book is conducive to finding information quickly and easily. Duany also contextualizes it within the context of the current debt crisis of Puerto Rico and what we consider the checkered or perhaps failed legacy of the Commonwealth status. Clearly, Puerto Rico today and for much of its recent history has demonstrated that the "postcolonial colony" is a failed model for Caribbean "development." The persistence of colonial features in the current status of the island and the heavy reliance on federal transfers of funds is perhaps to be expected from the the outset of the PDP's model for cultural nationalism with limited sovereignty. In its defense, all of the Caribbean is defined by dependency and heavily shaped by migration, but Puerto Rico's case is a disturbing example of recurring colonial exploitation. Haiti tried to look to Puerto Rico's model, like several other countries, but without the benefits of US citizenship for its population or massive federal funds. In retrospect, it is somewhat shocking so many looked to Puerto Rico as an exemplary case of development when the entire project came to rely on outmigration to the continental US and what should have struck many as an unsustainable model.