Borno's Musketeers

 

Whilst perusing John Hunwick's Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sa'dī's Ta'rīkh Al-Sūdān Down to 1613 and Other Contemporary Documents we came across some intriguing allusions to Borno. In a translated source written by an unnamed Spaniard in 1591, some information pertinent to Borno reached the writer. According to his unclear sources, the ruler of Borno possessed 500 musketeers. The story about the conflict with the Turks is somewhat garbled and if relevant, might have been a reference to past disagreement over a fortress in the Fazzan. Intriguingly, the source does match other sources that speak of a Turkish presence in Borno (Anania, Ahmad b. Furtu) in the last few decades of the 16th century. 

Tripoli and the Two Seas

Jean-Claude Zelter's  Tripoli, carrefour de l'Europe et des pays du Tchad, 1500-1795 is one of those studies of Tripoli that we believed was necessary to understand the North African side of Kanem-Borno's trans-Saharan trade. Due to Zeltner's specialization in the Chadian past and research in Kanem and among the Awlad Sulayman Arabs, we hoped his history of Tripoli would integrate the histories of Tripolitania and the Central Sudan. Unfortunately, a deeper integration of the two remains to be written but this is an interesting start. Indeed, Zeltner fits the history of Tripoli in both a Mediterranean and trans-Saharan context. Indeed, without Europe, the Chad Basin and the bridges of the Mediterranean and Sahara, Tripoli was economically marginal. This indicates how a major North African port relied so heavily on the African interior and Europe and the economic integration of Africa and Europe (and the Levant). 

Outside of corsair activity targeting European ships and enslaving the victims, the trade in slaves and other "goods" acquired the trans-Saharan trade was the main source of revenue for the rulers (beys and pashas) of Tripoli from c.1500-1795. Moreover, as Zeltner takes great pains to indicate, most of the goods traded further south to Borno or sub-Saharan Africa via Tripoli came from Europe, especially Italy and even France. Thus, the trans-Saharan trade of the Central Sudan was directly linked to Mediterranean and European economies. Zeltner seems to have believed that had the Holy Roman Empire under Charles V or another European power had permanently established control of Tripoli and the Barbary coast, European trade with the African interior through the Sahara could have developed fully without the constant attacks of pirates or, in the case of Tripoli, frequent revolutions and unseating of pashas. But that's neither here nor there. Perhaps it is best to see Zeltner's overview of Tripoli's history in an attempt to show how the North African port served a vital role in connecting various regional or really global economies. Future studies could probably, assuming more data is accumulated or discovered, link developments in Tripoli and Fezzan with specific economic and political affairs in the Central Sudan or Borno. 

Unfortunately, there are some problems with Zeltner's approach and the structure of the book. The first 100 pages delve into the larger conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire in the Mediterranean. It is definitely important for understanding how Tripoli fell under the control of Turgut, but it may be excessive to spend so many pages on the period leading up to 1551. Perhaps it would have been good to cover Wadai in the 17th and 18th centuries, too, for an additional kingdom trading with Tripoli and the Libyan coast. Fuller coverage of what was going on in the Central Sudan during the period, in addition to the reign of Idris b. Ali of Borno, could have been juxtaposed with Tripoli's various conflicts with the English, French and other Europeans in the Mediterranean. That could have better emphasized how events or political, social, and religious changes in the Central Sudan had an impact on Tripoli and the Mediterranean, not just Tripoli's political or social changes influencing the Fezzan and "Sudan" to the south. It was also confusing to see Zeltner equate Kwararafa with the Mandara kingdom, despite evidence linking it to the Jukun peoples.

Nevertheless, Zeltner's book is a good introduction to Tripoli that helps us better understand the Tripoli chronicle previously read for this site. Some of the particularities of Barbary piracy, Ottoman interests in the Mediterranean and even the role of the French in shipping African captives in Tripoli to the Levant were especially interesting. The frequent coups and revolutions and the way in which Tripoli, for a time, benefitted from French and English rivalry in the Mediterranean was likewise intriguing and perhaps brings to mind the ways in which banditry in the Sahara and Sahel had its counterpart on sea with the corsairs and rivalry between Sudanic states or kingdoms. Banditry and business go hand in hand, despite the former occasionally hurting the latter. 

An Abridged History of Tripoli

Because Anne-Charles Froment de Champlagarde's loose translation of a Libyan chronicle was in French rather than the German summary of Krause, we were able to read the full text more easily and gleam certain details on the history of Tripoli and Tripoli-Fezzan relations. However, Alain Blondy's introduction is actually more useful for an introduction or overview of the history of Tripolitania and the Fezzan from the period of c.1500-1800. Blondy's lengthy introduction, for instance, helped situate the conflicts over Tripoli in the 1500s between European Christians and, eventually, the Ottomans while providing a Tripoli-based perspective on the Fezzan and trans-Saharan trade. Much of the actual chronicle tracks the often difficult state of relations between Tripoli and Murzuq while the later sections cover the rise of the Qaramanli and the brutal conditions under which Yusuf seized power after slaying his brother. 

Unfortunately, we still don't learn much about the local "negro sovereigns" of the Fezzan except for their various revolts and refusals to pay tribute to Tripoli. But some interesting details emerge in Blondy's introduction and the original text on the Fezzan's relations with Katsina and Borno. For instance, the idea of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty as vassals or quasi-vassals of the Sayfawa dynasty as demonstrated by mai Umar b. Idris executing al-Tahir. Or the importance of "black" merchants in Murzuq, the capital of the Awlad Muhammad rulers. Given that Kanuri was once widely spoken in the region, it might be safe to assume most of these "black" merchants were from Borno, although Hausa traders from Katsina were likely present. Thus, the Fezzan was intimately linked to the larger economy of the Borno and Hausaland, and may have derived much of its textiles, leather goods, and grain from the "Central Sudan" neighbors to the south. 

Indeed, according to Claude Lemaire, about 500-600 slaves passed through the Fezzan from Borno annually, suggestive of the scale of the slave trade in the late 17th century between Tripoli and Borno. That number, though seemingly small, doesn't take into account high mortality rates or the role of Tripoli as a distribution center for African captives to other locations in the Mediterranean. As argued by other historians, Tripoli seems to have relied more heavily on this African slave trade through their tributary Fezzani neighbor than Borno, which raises questions on the role of the slave trade in Borno's economy. Yet influence or control of the Fezzan obviously mattered to the Sayfawa dynasty, since it allowed them to secure the trade routes to the Mediterranean and perhaps protect their own merchants active in the central Sahara or beyond. We would like to learn more about Idris Alooma's interests in the Fezzan during the 1570s and 1580s, as well as the mystery of an anonymous Spanish source from the 16th century mentioning direct military conflict between Borno and the Ottoman Empire in the Fezzan region.

Haiti and Greece: President Boyer's Letter to Greek Revolutionaries

An article from The Journal of Haitian Studies includes a letter from Jean-Pierre Boyer to 4 Greeks from 1822 in France seeking Haitian aid for the Greek nationalist revolt against the Ottoman Empire, which broke out in 1821. According to the introduction, written by E.G. Sideris and A.A. Konsta, Greek expatriates living in France would have definitely heard of the Haitian Revolution and abolitionism from certain circles in revolutionary and postrevolutionary France. Also, the prominent French abolitionist, Abbe Gregoire, who, though not mentioned specifically in the introduction, was a firm supporter of the Haitian republic and remained in contact with some Haitian leaders, may have played a role in disseminating knowledge of the Haitian Revolution to Greek nationalists, though I am still unsure on this point since I cannot recall my source (though it may have been this. Anyway, the letter from Boyer lets the Greek nationalists know that he is sympathetic to their cause and sees both Haiti and Greece as similar in their long history of oppression from others, from imperialism, both European (French) and Ottoman. Indeed, according to Boyer, "Such a beautiful and just case and, most importantly, the first successes which have accompanied it, cannot leave Haitians indifferent, for we, like the Hellenes, were for a long time subjected to a dishonorable slavery and finally, with our own chains, broke the head of tyranny." In addition, Boyer's letter addresses the theme of slavery in relation to imperial or colonial rule as well as several allusions to classical Greek history and culture, such as referring to the Greek nationalists as "descendants of Leonidas."

Though expressing sympathy and moral support for the Greek cause against the Ottomans, Boyer's letter explained that financial restraints prevented significant Haitian troops or cash to be sent. Interestingly, Boyer also attributes the recent integration of Haiti and the Spanish-speaking former Spanish colony to the east as another drain on the Haitian budget because "the revolution which triumphs on the eastern portion of our island is creating a new obstacle in carrying out our aim; in fact, this portion, which was incorporated into the Republic I preside over, is in extreme poverty and thus justifies immense expenditures of our budget." Nevertheless, to many Greek historians, at least according to the translators of this letter, believed this letter to be the first official recognition of Greek independence and citizenship in the 1820s, which is part of the reason the knowledge of this letter survives, particularly in the resonance of Boyer's references to democracy, Greek triumphs against the Persians, and revolutionary idealism. Of course, Boyer's rule in Haiti itself was far from actual democracy or a republican form of government, but the ideals of democratic governance and classical history (no doubt a subject familiar to Boyer) clearly carried some significance, even when the reality on the ground was far from anything democratic (check this out for some info on Boyer's long presidency, 1818-1843).

A quick Google search on this topic also suggests some import to the exchange between Haiti and the Greek revolutionaries combating the Turks. Some even say that Haiti sent several tons of coffee, the main export at the time, to be sold to buy supplies and ammunition for the Greeks. According to this piece, Britain would follow Haiti by one year in recognizing the Greek nationalists in 1823, but Haiti was the first to recognize the Greek right to self-determination. This blog links to a Greek translation of Boyer's letter for all of you who can read it! So, even if Haitian aid did not exceed the alleged 25 tons of coffee to be sold on behalf of the Greek revolutionary cause, we have direct evidence of the Haitian state's involvement in liberation of other former colonies and oppressed peoples, just as Petion did earlier for Bolivar and the liberators of Venezuela and Colombia. This, in a sense, is a case of an international export of the Haitian Revolution, within the broader "Age of Revolutions" in Europe and the Americas.