Historical Materialism and the Kel Ahir

Kathleen O'Mara's A Political Economy of Ahir (Niger): Historical Transformations in a Pastoral Economy, 1760-1860 adopts a historical materialist approach to analyze transformations in the Ahir region's political economy once the Kel Owey federation become the dominant Tuareg group in that region. Focusing on class and a materialist interpretation allows greater clarity on how the Tuareg of this region of the Sahara shifted from a pastoral economy to a more centralized, agro-pastoral tributary economy in the 18th century. Thus, the transformations of the state and economy in the Ahir (or Air) region predate the jihad and establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. According to O'Mara's view, the Ahir sultanate government's "glorious period" in the 1500s was not fully tributary, although the sultanate administration survived with the rise of Kel Owey hegemony and commercial expansion in order to protect the interests of the Tuareg elites, imajeren. Essentially, the seizure of the Kawar salines, especially Bilma, was an impetus for further trade and agro-pastoral expansion. This, in turn, was accompanied by the increasing centralization and development of a regional economy in Hausaland, particularly after the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. In other words, Borno's loss of Kawar in the 1760s favored the Ahir Tuareg, particularly the Kel Owey, who reaped huge profits from the sale of salt to Hausaland, where a burgeoning market and growing manufacturing (textiles, leather, etc.) centers in places like Kano fueled more Tuareg trade. 

Indeed, to O'Mara's view, Ahir became so connected to the larger, regional economy of the Central Sudan that trans-Saharan commerce became less important and Agadez's population moved to lands in the Sudan. The cycle fueled more economic growth as the Kel Owey, as well as other Tuareg groups, increasingly used captives and "free" dependents, often Kanuri, Hausa, or Dagera, to work farmland in Damergu. Agricultural production in the more fertile lands of the Sudan favored Tuareg commerce since the grain from these areas could be used to trade with the Kawar oases (and to ensure adequate grain supplies for the Ahir  region). This, of course, meant that the Ahir Tuareg could be less dependent on the meager agricultural resources of the Ahir region or from grain supplied by the independent Hausa states. With the growth of a Kel Owey commercial class investing in salt, agricultural production, livestock, and trade in textiles, slaves, leather products, and items acquired through trans-Saharan trade via the Fezzan or Ghat, the Ahir Tuareg system became a fully tributary one that maintained the dominance of the "nobles."  In fact, the continuance of the Ahir sultanate structure in Agades as an intermediary of Tuareg groups in Ahir, plus their own source of legitimacy via Islam, provided a balance with Kel Owey elites.

As one might expect in a highly unequal, hierarchical arrangement that was the Ahir political economy from 1760-1860, conflict within the elites (vertical) and between "nobles" and other groups (ineslemen, dependents of various types, etc.) was a constant. Dependents, both "free" and servile, could change masters easily and the Kel Ahir Tuareg had to find ways to maintain a system of exploitation of their labor. Like the free Dagera, Kanuri and Hausa groups conquered by Tuareg groups, the Tuareg "class" system allowed for significant local autonomy to settlements of slaves and others. In addition, manumission was frequent while intermarriage and absorption of captives into the lineage (as fictive children) meant enslavement was, according to Barth at least, less horrific than in other locales. One wonders, however, tow hat extent conditions here were similar with regard to slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno, where a history of slave settlements and even plantations existed. Nonetheless, O'Mara wishes to highlight how enslavement and exploitation of captives for their labor in agriculture, livestock rearing, carrying goods, or salt production was similar to the tribute extracted from "free" dependents in the Kel Ahir class system. Clerical lineages, too, tried to occasionally resist through the ideology of jihad or even becoming warriors themselves, yet they could not build a diverse enough coalition 

Through an ideology of noble dominance and control of camels, the most important animal in the pastoral economy, these nobles justified their position through the protection they could provide to dependents and clerical lineages. Their ownership of camels furthered their position as guides for caravans from North Africans, traders in their own rights, and for the use of camels to carry salt or other products. However, claims to noble status were always dynamic, and were frequently adjusted genealogically after the fact to legitimize the imajeren domination. This is connected to the purpose of the Agades Sultanate itself, instituted to resolve conflict between Tuareg groups in Ahir as well as to secure the overall interests of an elite group. Ongoing conflicts between the Kel Owey and others, naturally meant that the hegemony of any specific federation was always up for grabs, which in turn justified elite positions as "protectors" of their dependents against other Tuareg or non-Tuareg foes. 

This is all rather fascinating and engaging. However, some of what O'Mara proposes is either implausible or debatable. For instance, many of the political offices in the Ahir sultanate are of Hausa origin. Perhaps this suggests that the transformation of the Kel Ahir from a pastoral economy to a fully tributary one required the adoption of administrative features found in the Sudanic states to their south, especially Borno and the Hausa. Moreover, the increasing sedentarization of some Tuareg and the growth of agricultural ventures owned by Kel Ahir in Damergu, Zinder, or the Caliphate could be seen as similarly following patterns from Songhay, Borno, and Hausa history. Indeed, even the justifying ideology of elite rule via protection offered to dependents could be seen in the case of Borno, which failed to provide the necessary protection for its subjects in Kawar, western Borno, and northern Borno. Unlike Borno, however, the Ahir Tuareg federations structure and "looseness" and the ecological conditions of the southern Sahara could make it rather fragile. But, the exploitation of producers, a free and slave peasantry, seems to be a common for the Central Sudan, where chronic insecurity was also present despite the existence of large Hausa states or Borno (when it was a regional hegemon). 

On Precolonial Adar

Djibo Hamani's L'Adar précolonial (République du Niger): contribution à l'étude de l'histoire des états Hausa is  an interesting account of a region of the Hausa world sometimes forgotten or ignored. It's about what was really a peripheral area of the Hausa world, and one for which written sources only truly appear in the 1600s (although references to its powerful neighbors could be found a few centuries earlier). According to him, it was peopled by Azna (a Hausa population) that was once based in Air to the north, but migrated in small groups under different chiefly lineages by c. 1000 to 900 years ago, in various waves. they were probably migrating south due to pressure from Tuareg pastoralists and the declining environment of Air for agriculturalists. However, unlike the Gobir or Gobirawa Hausa, the Azna who migrated south into Adar never consolidated into a single state that ruled the area. It was then conquered by Kabi (sometimes spelled Kebbi, a Hausa state that was once part of the Songhay Empire under Askia Muhammad but then went its own way in the 1500s and became, for a time, a powerful Hausa kingdom dominating Adar and other Hausa areas. Then, after 1674, when prince Agabba of Agades defeated the ruler of Kebbi, the Agades Sultanate decided to annex Adar. Agabba, later deposed by his brother from the throne of Agades, moved south and established himself as the Sultan of Adar. Thus, Adar was unified under the Istambulawa sultanate of Air, which was, despite sometimes threatening other Hausa states or even Borno, was politically unstable (the Air sultan was seen by the Tuareg as a mediator and sometimes had little direct rule over the Kel Air Tuareg clans and tribes, which sometimes fought amongst themselves or defied directives from the Agades Sultan). So, long story short, the Adar Sultanate, a tributary of Agades, ruled a unified Adar but then later lost control of most of it in the 19th century.

The jihad of Uthman dan Fodio began in nearby Gobir, which caused changes in Adar since it too became, at least in theory, subject to the caliphs of Sokoto. The Adar ruling dynasty was initially split, like the Tuareg in Air, about supporting Uthman dan Fodio but once the sultan in Agades threw his support behind the jihad, Adar's ruling dynasty also accepted Sokoto. The caliph Muhammad Bello, son of Uthman dan Fodio, even gave the rights to the tribute of part of Adar to Tuareg allies. The 19th century then later saw the partition of Adar as the Kel Geres Tuareg took the Eastern part (they were more assimilated to the local area) while another Tuareg confederation seized the north of Adar. The Sarkin Adar, or local dynasty, was reduced to a small section of the province and lacked access to enough troops or revenue to seriously threaten or defeat the Tuareg who now dominated most of Adar. However, the 1800s saw the greater integration of Adar into the world of Hausa trade and international commerce and Islam spread more deeply. Adar's case is somewhat interesting as a peripheral Hausa region which never developed its own unified ruling dynasty until the Istambulawa of Air conquered it, but they themselves were reduced to little power in only a little more than a century. However, the 19th century witnessed more conversions to Islam, the growth of the mallam population, and, likely, an increase in the enslaved population as Adarawa and Tuareg traders traveled to Sokoto, Kano, and other markets.

Yet Adar's case makes one think that perhaps its Azna (local Hausa population of diverse origins) and their village-based level of political organization may have been what most of Hausaland was like before the development of the major states like Kano, Katsina, Gobir, etc. The close association between religious authority in the "animist" belief system and political authority in Adar may provide hints as to the origin of the earliest sarakauna in Hausaland. Furthermore, the case of Adar illustrates how loose the authority of Hausa or Central Sudanic states over other regions could be. Indeed, the Sultan of Agades, who could demand tribute from Adar, was clearly unable to assert his control over the region in any meaningful way in the 19th century to restore order. And despite Adar's importance for caravan routes to more important markets in Katsina and Kano, or even for the provision of horses to Kebbi (or Kabi) from Air, Adar remained rather peripheral in the grand scheme of Hausa states. Nonetheless, the region's larger significance in Hausa history can be found in a few episodes detailed by Djibo Hamani. For example, Jibril b. Umar, the mallam and scholar who had traveled to Egypt and Mecca and taught Uthman dan Fodio, was a native of Adar. Although his later jihadist movement differed from Jibril b. Umar on the question of Muslims who do not practice Islam lacking faith, Uthman dan Fodio clearly saw his teacher as the spiritual forerunner of his own attempts to restore and reform Islam in Hausaland. Later on, Adar also witnessed the rise of another reformer who imposed his own jihad in Adar, against the "animist" Azna and Tuareg who did not follow Islamic precepts. This figure, Muhammadu Jelani, was such a radical that he even preached social equality and racial equality in an Adar where the Tuareg nobility saw themselves as superior to the maraboutique clans as well as the Adar commoners. 

Perhaps more recent scholarship can shed more light on the particularities of this region. Although based on both textual sources and oral traditions, Hamani's book was published in the 1970s. Today, with more advances in recent scholarship and perhaps new interpretations of the written sources, the history of Adar, and by extension, Kebbi, Air, and Gobir may challenge some of Hamani's conclusions. For instance, what exactly transpired between 1674, when Agabba of Agades defeated the ruler of Kebbi, and 1721 or so, when Agabba finally establishes himself permanently in Adar as the sultan. And perhaps the nature of Adar's role in trade between Air and Kebbi or Air and other Hausa states was more important than we realize, especially if the salines the Kel Air possessed access to before they gained control of Bilma's salt were already highly prized or valued. One also wonders about the relationship between the "pagan" cults of the Azna villages and the relationship with Islam after the Istambulawa conquest. If, for instance, the Kel Geres were already established in the eastern part of Adar and more sedentary, and even their nobles were more racially mixed than other Tuareg nobles, perhaps there was also a deeper penetration of Islam in the eastern part of Adar? 

Revisiting Sufi Mystics of the Niger Desert

Due to a rekindled interest in the history of Sufism in Kanem and Borno, we decided to revisit H.T. Norris's Sufi Mystics of the Niger Desert. Largely consisting of a translation of the Qudwa (at least part of it likely written in the late 17th century or certainly before the 1800s) with commentary and additional contextual information on Sidi Mahmud al-Baghdadi and the question of Sufism in the region of Air, the study is of great potential importance for understanding how Sufism functioned in the Sahel and Central Sudan. While Sufism in, say, Kanem-Borno, was undoubtedly of greater antiquity than the appearance of Sidi Mahmud in the Air region in the first half of the 16th century, various sources connect the Mahmudiyya with later Islamic scholars, holymen, and mystics in the Central Sudan. For instance, Shehu Uthman dan Fodio, was initiated into Sufism with a silsila that linked to Sidi Mahmud. In addition, Uthman dan Fodio lived for some time in Agadez and was undeniably exposed to those who followed in or were influenced by the "Way" of Sidi Mahmud. Furthermore, Muhammad Bello, whose writings on Air and Mahmud al-Baghdadi bear an uncanny resemblance to the Qudwa, also revered the memory of this Sufi mystic. Moreover, North African sources similarly attest to the far-ranging contacts and influences of the Mahmudiyya and Air Sufism. Shaykh Ahmad al-Yamani, a native of the modern Sudan, visited Air after spending time in Kalumbardo, a Sufi settlement in Borno. According to al-Yamani, who reported on Kalumbardo and the Mahmudiyya in Morocco, reputation of Sufis like Shaykh Ahmad al-Sadiq b. al-Shaykh Uwayis al-Lamtuni was of the highest standing. 

What is particularly useful for our interests, with regard to the Mahmudiyya, is their possible influence on or shared characteristics with Kalumbardo. While Norris suggests Sidi Mahmud had links to Anatolia and the Muslim East in his approach to Sufism, the Qudwa mentions, with some detail, the practices of dhikr, wird, khalwa, discipline, fasting, ritual ablutions, meditation and group prayer and states of ecstasty achieved by members via prayer. Mahmud did not reject fiqh, either, since he saw the need for both fiqh and gnostic, mystical knowledge. However, his pursuit of ma'rifa and importance of his status as a sharif may have been more unique traits of his particular moment, perhaps including the prohibition on taking the lives of animals during retreats, too. According to the Qudwa, the sultan of Agades had Sidi Mahmud executed after jealous jurists convinced him that the Sufi leader posed a threat to his throne. Only after the fact did the Agades Sultan, Ahmad b. Tilzay, discover that Mahmud truly was an ascetic Sufi and sharif. The tale of his martyrdom has not been corroborated by other sources, although writing by Ahmad Baba from the early 1600s suggests that the Mahmudiyya were heretical mytics who believed that the only "Way" was through their own, rejecting some of the main tenets of the Islamic faith.

The Koyam Sufis and ascetics, descendants of the Kalumbardo community dispersed after a Tuareg attack eradicated Shaykh Abdallah al-Burnawi's community, represent an interesting tradition of Islamic mysticism in the Central Sudan. According to Norris, their prayer rituals resemble those of the Mahmudiyya. Moreover, evidence from the Nashr al-Mathani points to contacts between Kalumbardo and the Air mystics. Further, some of the early followers of Sidi Mahmud were Hausa and Fulani, and Tuareg were also known at Kalumbardo. To what extent the Kalumbardo community of Abdallah al-Burnawi was directly linked to the first settlement associated with a Tuareg, al-Jarmiyu, and a Fulani, Waldede, is muddled in Muhammad Bello's account. However, the earlier Kalumbardo community was destroyed by Umar b. Idris of Borno, who had al-Jarmiyu executed while Waldede fled to Bagirmi. If the community led by Shaykh Abdallah al-Burnawi was following similar Sufi practices yet met favor with Ali b. Umar of Borno, then the asceticism and mysticism of the second Kalumbardo community was perhaps similar to that practiced in Air by the Mahmudiyya. 

What is truly amazing then is the vast network of Sufism and its political impact in the Central Sudan. For example, the founder of the Wadai sultanate, said to have studied in Borno and Baghirmi, may have been influenced by Kalumbardo through the Bagirmi center of Bidderi, which included Fulani with ties to the early Kalumbardo settlement suppressed by Umar b. Idris. Shehu al-Kanemi was also said to have had ties to the Koyam, the descendants of the Kalumbardo community led by Abdallah al-Burnawi. Likewise, subsequent Koyam shaykhs, descendants of Abdallah al-Burnawi, were also connected with the Sayfawa dynasty and protecting the frontier of Borno. Of course, ongoing links to Air and Hausaland were also ongoing, providing a possible additional influence on the spread of Sufism in the Hausa kingdoms. While the origins of Sufism in Kanem-Borno surely predate the 16th and 17th centuries, the Mahmudiyya provide a window into how one community may have functioned for centuries in the area. Remarkably, the descendants of Abdallah al-Burnawi persisted into the 20th century, proving themselves to be long-lasting and effective at forging a long-lasting relationship with the Sayfawa.