Yarnam, Mandara and Descourtilz

 

Something we have thought about for some time now is the reference to a tyrannical and extreme Sayfawa maina in a 19th century Mandara chronicle. The kirgam, translated in French in Eldridge Mohammadou's Le Royaume du Wandala, ou Mandara, au XIXe siècle, was the subject of another post on the ill-fated 1781 Mandara campaign of Borno. But the chronicle, despite being written several years after the war and from a highly biased perspective, also tells us of a Sayfawa prince named Yarnam who robbed, raped, and killed en route to Mandara. At a place called Karangou, Yarnam was said to have stayed with a man named Ali Ayssami. The prince not only demanded money, he also raped his host's wife and daughter and executed her son. When the host sought justice from the mai of Borno, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, he received nothing. 

While this episode could be a literary invention to portray the Sayfawa ruler in as poorly a light as possible and make his attack on Mandara unjust, it is interesting to note Descourtilz also reported something similar about an African prince who was extremely cruel and monstruous. In the case of Descourtilz, however, it is left ambiguous as to the origin of this prince. But he included the anecdote of this prince in a chapter on Borno, based on interviews with Africans from there living in Saint Domingue (modern Haiti). In Descourtilz's version, this African prince mercilessly killed a child and then killed the daughter of a ruler in a neighboring state. Since the daughter had the same name as the animal meant for sacrifice in some sort of ritual or rite (labani, a forest beast), the despotic prince killed her and offered her as a sacrifice. Needless to say, this triggerered a larger conflict won by the father of the princess. His victory against the prince and his followers supposedly led to some of them ending up on the Rossignol-Desdunes plantation in colonial Haiti.

As previously mentioned, the story reported by Descourtilz does not specify that the young prince was from Borno. But it is inserted in a short chapter on Borno. Is it possible this young prince was the same Yarnam mentioned in the Mandara chronicle? The timing is consistent with a perhaps 1780s Sayfawa maina whose extremely abusive and violent actions led to his demise. Some of his followers may have ended up in Saint Domingue by the end of the 1780s and then were met by Descourtilz. Of course, Descourtilz never clearly identified the place of origin for the prince he was writiing about. 

A Tentative Study of the Reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun (1729-1744)

         Mai Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, who likely reigned in 1729-1744, was one of the last successful Sayfawa monarchs of the 18^th century. During the Late Sayfawa Period, the dynasty that ruled Borno gradually withered with the loss of Bilma. Even more, Wadai’s expansion into eastern Kanem, the autonomy of the Bedde, and Bagirmi’s attacks against the Kotoko states and southern Borno during the reign of mbang Muhammad al-Amin also occurred in this late 18^th century decline. Naturally, tensions between Borno and Mandara continued as well, with disastrous consequences for Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. Nonetheless, until the fall of Gazargamo in 1808, the Sayfawa remained powerful and likely possessed a spiritual stature or authority unequalled in the Central Sudan. Yet before that decline of the second half of the 18^th century, some of the last maiwa endeavored to reassert Borno’s political and economic dominance. Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents such a ruler, and although his reign is poorly documented, glimpses of his attempts to restore Borno’s hegemony can be found. After a brief overview of the extant sources, this article shall review Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun’s policy with regard to Hausaland, the question of relations with Mandara and Bagirmi, and an overview of domestic affairs within Borno. Undoubtedly, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents one of the last assertive Sayfawa rulers, whose reign complicates narratives of 18th-century Bornoan decline and political disengagement.

Discussing the Sources

            In terms of source material, the lack of a surviving chronicle severely limits one’s efforts to reevaluate the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Nonetheless, an assortment of oral sources and written sources provide enough clues for a tentative overview. First, the Diwan. Essentially a list of the various rulers of the Sayfawa maiwa with brief details on their reign, the Diwan aids in establishing an approximate timeline for the Sayfawa rulers.[1] In addition, the Kano Chronicle briefly alludes to an attack on the Kano kingdom by Borno during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Besides identifying the Sarkin Bornu as Ali, the chronicle’s erroneous description of the campaign is contradicted by Bornoan oral sources which establish that it was not Ali who attacked Kano in the 1730s.[2]

A third written source, a rihla copied in the mid-19^th century, presents a number of problems. The manuscript was found in the library of Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Miskin, and supposedly written by his grandfather, Muhammad b. Ali b. Dunama b. Ali b. Umar b. Idris.[3] It is supposedly a description of the hajj of Ali b. Umar. But the year given for this undertaking, 1727-8, and the description of the reign of about 15 years that followed, are more applicable for Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Is it possible that this source is about the hajj of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun but changed to be about Ali b. Umar due to the latter’s renown?[4]

Besides the aforementioned written sources, a number of oral sources exist. One of the most important, a Kanuri praise song translated by J.R. Patterson in Kanuri Songs, is particularly conspicuous. Given the genre and its conventions, one cannot expect a song that is necessarily historically accurate. Yet it speaks to a type of court praise singing and ethos that very much emphasized military valor and power. In addition, studies of the history of the Central Sudan based on oral sources supplement the meager textual ones. For instance, H.R. Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs contains a short chapter on Muhammad Hajimi and the Masbarma that alludes to the Kano campaign.[5] Likewise, a girgam translated in Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan refers to Muhammad as the “lord of Lergam the Black Prince with the white mouth-veil.”[6] This supports the identification of the builder of the elite brick building at Lergam with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, a tradition cited by Seidensticker.[7]

Unsurprisingly, a number of 19^th century, colonial-era reports and works by 20^th century scholars drawing on oral sources for the history of Hausaland, Bagirmi and Kanem refer to relations with Borno in the first half of the 18^th century. Furthermore, M.G. Smith, Hogben and Kirk-Greene provide useful clues on Kano and Hausaland during this period while Lavers, Nachtigal, and H. Lanier’s syntheses of Bagirmi history assist in reconstructing Bagirmi’s relationship with Borno. Great caution must be used with such material, particularly as later scholars sometimes regurgitated information from colonial-era scholars who hardly cited their sources. For instance, Lavers has uncritically repeated H.R. Palmer for the theory of a Mandara campaign of Ali b. Umar during the 1650s. When one checks Palmer, however, there is no sourcing to determine where he found this information![8]

Overall, the sources for the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun are hardly adequate, but sufficient for a tentative overview. Doing so allows one insights into the nature of Sayfawa statecraft and relations in a dynamic 18^th century world. The Sayfawa maiwa were hardly the indolent sovereigns only engaged in Islamic study or ritual seclusion in this time.

Borno, Kano, and Hausaland, c. 1729-1744

            Perhaps the best documented action of the mai was his attack on Kano, which may have taken place in 1734 (it coincided with a solar eclipse). Kano had previously been the subject of a campaign during the reign of Idris b. Ali in the 16^th century. At the time, Kano’s actions of fortifying settlements near Borno’s frontier were seen as a threat. For perhaps equivalent reasons, Borno’s Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also attacked the powerful Hausa kingdom. In this campaign, probably in the 1730s, the Kano Chronicle reports that “May Ali” came to make war on Kano during the reign of Sarkin Kano Kumbari (1731-1743). The Bornoan forces allegedly camped at Faggi for 3 nights without fighting due to the intervention of Shehu Tahiru and Shehu Bunduu.[9] Apparently, one of the mallams, Shehu Attahiru, who persuaded the mai to leave was an ancestor of the emir of Kano.[10] Unfortunately, this chronicle does not elucidate why the conflict arose in the first place, but it emphasizes the role of highly respected Islamic leaders in bringing peace.

Despite the chronicle suggesting a rather brief Bornoan siege, other sources suggest a far longer campaign. For example, tradition reported in Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs suggests that the mai was in the Kano state for 7 months.[11] Indeed, the mai attacked but did not prevail “until the appointed time came.” If the campaign lasted at least 7 months and the mai eventually prevailed, then Borno may have been able to successfully restore its position of dominance over Kano, albeit likely only with some form of tribute or vassal status for Kano’s sarki. In terms of why the conflict arose in the first place, Lavers has proposed that Kano was attacked to prevent it from importing guns and upsetting the regional balance of power.[12] While plausible, there is no evidence for this in our surviving sources. Other scholars emphasize internal dynamics within Kano. Thus, the Gaya, whose influence in Kano affairs was great during the reign of Sarkin Kano Sharifa and Kumbari, played a role. Moreover, new towns and walls around several in the eastern domain of Kano, such as Takai, Tsokuwa, and Rano implied the closing of the frontier with ribats. The newer towns constructed in this era often followed a uniform plan, suggestive of state or official planning. They were often built in the open plain while others, at major crossroads for trade, became administrative centers for taxation and cheap labor for Sharifa and Kumbari.[13] Thus, it is possible that Borno’s intervention in Kano was due to the latter’s operations along its eastern frontier and the creation of fortified settlements. This theory is more persuasive than that of the firearms in Kano, although the two are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, Borno’s response was likely motivated by increased attempts at centralization by Kano’s rulers as well as ensuring Kano’s access to firearms did not upset the regional balance of power.

But what was accomplished by Borno’s intervention in Kano in c. 1734? According to some sources, the conflict with Kano likely reverberated across Hausaland with Bornoan intervention beyond. Although the Kano Chronicle does not report the outcome, other sources highly affirm the notion of Borno’s ruler reestablishing Kano as a vassal state (even if only symbolic).[14] The Gazetteer of Kano Province reports that the mai  had issued an ultimatum to Kano: he would burn the city unless tribute was paid.[15] Others suggest that Borno overran other parts of Hausaland at this time, too. Although corroborating evidence is lacking, Hogben and Kirk-Greene wrote of the many Kanuri links in Zaria. For instance, the office of Limamin Kona was reserved to a family of Borno origin. Other Bornoan emissaries or officials in Zaria could potentially be linked to this episode, such as the Madalla.[16] Another source, the Abuja Chronicle, dates the Beriberi (Kanuri) of Borno attacking Hausaland to 1734, with Zaria paying tribute to Borno.[17] Other evidence for this is lacking, but it is certainly possible that Borno’s actions in Kano in c. 1734 also impacted Zaria and other Hausa states, particularly in the reassertion of a claim by Borno to regional hegemony. To what extent Borno may have also used Gobir to influence events in Hausaland is unclear, but Gobir during the reign of Babari (c. 1741-69?) attacked Bornoan territory at Shirra.[18] Ultimately, a resurgence of Bornoan claims to regional supremacy and tribute may have been won from Kano and Zaria during the c. 1734 campaign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

Mandara, Bagirmi and the East

In addition to the Kano campaign, which appears to have been a success, Borno’s relations with Bagirmi during this time appear favorable for the former. Bagirmi was forced to submit to the authority of Borno during the reign of mbang Lahoual (or Alahouine). In the words of H. Lanier, “En 1741, attaqué par le sultan de Bornou, il fut vaincu et dut se soumettre à la souveraineté de ce pays.” [19] Although Bagirmi was able to throw off the yoke of Borno during the reign of Hadji (dated c. 1741-1784 by Lanier) and end Borno’s claims to sovereignty of the kingdom, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was apparently successful in Bagirmi. Likewise, the rihla mentions Bagirmi as one area where the Sayfawa mai traveled on the pilgrimage. If the problematic source is incorrectly attributing the hajj along the Sudan Road to Ali b. Umar but actually describing a pilgrimage of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, then Bagirmi was allegedly one of the areas where the Sayfawa ruler settled 5000 captives in 1727/8.[20] This act of establishing settlements in Bagirmi could be partly motivated by a desire to facilitate travel for pilgrims using the Sudan Road in the 18^th century. Furthermore, it also served to emphasize the power of the Sayfawa ruler whose act of establishing towns or villages in other kingdoms was an assertion of Borno’s influence and power in the Central Sudan.

Naturally, the highly problematic account of the 1727/8 pilgrimage must be interpreted very carefully. But it is consistent with the actions of the Sayfawa in the first half of the 18^th century who may have successfully imposed tributary relations on Bagirmi. In fact, it may also have been during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun that the “Kurata” or Tunjur Arabs in Kanem sent their leader to Borno for confirmation of his position. This may explain why the praise song to this mai names the Kurata among the captives of the mai.[21] The actions of the Sayfawa mai in Bagirmi are perhaps to be expected with similar developments in Kanem which may have included greater control of the Tunjur in Kanem who usually resisted the alifa at Mao.[22] In short, Borno may have succeeded in establishing firmer control of Kanem (which was to become a major battleground in the 19^th century) as well as imposed tribute on Bagirmi whilst protecting its influence over various polities south of Lake Chad.

Besides Bagirmi and the eastern shores of Lake Chad, Mandara was also another arena of conflict for Borno. The previously mentioned Rihla even claims “Ali b. Umar” (although the dates used in the document align with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun) died in Krowrowa, which appears to be Kerawa, once a capital of Mandara. This problematic source asserts, “He raided Krowrowa and died there in Krowrowa where his grave is visited.”[23] This is contradicted by the Diwan, which indicates that Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in Gazargamo.[24] In spite of these contradictions and inaccuracies, the text does seem to be accurate in referring to conflict with Mandara during the first half of the 18^th century, before Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama’s disastrous campaign in the 1780s. According to Barkindo, the Islamization of Mandara in the early 1700s was supported by Borno. In fact, Dunama b. Ali (c. 1696-1715) was said to have sent Islamic scholars to Mandara. Tradition in Mora of Mandara’s conversion to Islam during the reign of Bukar Aji (who reigned c. 1715-1737) even suggests he grew up in Borno and was sent to Mandara after Borno had the previous ruler killed. Interestingly, Bukar Aji is also said to have taken the title of mai and remodelled his court on that of Borno. Tradition also asserts that Bukar Aji and his successor sent regular gifts of tribute to Borno. Even Hamdun b. Dunama reciprocated, sending a personal Quran to Bukar Aji.[25]

Yet despite Borno’s role in the ascent of Mandara’s first Muslim king, occasional conflict occurred. To Lavers, serious trouble with Mandara occurred during the reigns of al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama and Muhammad b. Hamdun, who both fought Mandara.[26] It would seem that Mandara’s allegiance to Borno depended on the proximity of Borno’s army. So even the spiritual authority or stature of the Sayfawa and the renown some maiwa achieved as pious figures was not sufficient to ensure the loyalty of Mandara. In this case, Mandara’s now Muslim kings were likely eager to benefit from expansion and raiding, when possible, the vulnerable tributary polities of Borno. Though it does not seem likely that Hamdun b. Dunama or Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in a war with Mandara, the existence of conflict between the two states points to a problem which only grew during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. But for now, Borno was able to meet the challenge, at least based on available evidence. Moreover, the period of Aji Bukar and Madi Makiya’s reigns, c. 1715-1751, also coincided with the immigration of Bornoan settlers in Mandara. Their presence also necessitated the assertion of Sayfawa rule or authority that may have caused conflict with Mandara’s kings who saw these settlers as their subjects.[27] But, Mandara’s kings accepted Borno’s right to tax many towns in the northern part of its domains until c. 1751 and Borno continued to raid parts of Mandara despite receiving gifts and tribute from Aji Bukar and Madi Makiyya, the latter possibly the son of a Kanuri woman.[28] This level of Bornoan influence in the affairs of Mandara may have also been motivated by the interests of the Bornoan elite to expand and protect their influence in the south while the north was challenged by population movements due to prolonged drought and climate change.

Internal Dynamics in Borno

In terms of internal affairs and domestic concerns, the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was challenged by ecological shifts, migration, and famine. Indeed, a famine that persisted for 2 years occurred during his reign.[29] The last several years of his reign coincided with a drought that lasted from 1738-1753. Due to this period of long-lasting drought, various groups such as the Jetko, Tubu, Tuareg, Koyam, and Fulani migrated to more fertile lands, thereby increasing the chances for conflict over scarce resources in difficult times.[30] Despite these challenges, Borno was still in control of Bilma. The Bedde, however, were beginning to act autonomously in the 18^th century and disrupt caravan routes.

In the face of these challenges, the Bornoan state was still able to continue past Sayfawa practices such as the sponsoring of elite brick structures. At the site of Lergam, for instance, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun is remembered for sponsoring the construction of a brick building for what was likely a palace enclosure. According to Wilhelm Seidensticker, “The name of the founder of the palace was given as Mohammed Ajimi, who can be considered identical with Muhammad b. al-Haji Hamdun (ca. 1731-1747).”[31] Located 31 kilometers west of Geidam and on the northern banks of the Komadugu Yobe, today the site lacks any visible evidence of bricks except for a few from what was presumably the wall of the palace enclosure. Magnavita also described the site of Lergam, reporting that Lergam was also known as Kirishadam, referring to the largest refuse mound. Although the area was only an estimated 250 by 250 meters, Lergam appears to have been built by the mai as a temporary residence.[32] Like Gambaru built in the 16^th century, Lergam indicates that a Sayfawa ruler was still able to support elite architecture using brick well into the 1700s.

 Likewise, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also supported the creation of new towns or settlements, including Kurnawa or Dalaturi. Kurnawa, according to J.R. Patterson’s Borsari District Assessment Report, was founded by a Mandara slave named Haji Amadu. This Mandara captive of the Borno mai, Momadu Haji, was given his freedom upon his return from Mecca. Subsequently, he left Birni Gazargamo and founded Kurnawa with his followers. His descendants later ruled the town.[33] This act demonstrates the role of the Sayfawa and their captives or dependents in the administration and the creation of new settlements. The praise song to this mai also emphasizes his power to redistribute and relocate people:

You son of Aji, can collect or disperse people at your will

And turn again, and make a town (with those you have dispersed)

You are the scourge of Jillam, Dalla Darge and Dakkinam Dalla Damaram

Some towns are founded during the cold season of the year

But some of yours have been founded as the result of your victories, Aji Gana the Intriguer[34]

 

Many of these places are difficult to identify, but the implication is rather clear: the mai possessed great authority through the control of people, including the relocation of dependents or subjects to create new towns. Additionally, he was able to found towns through his military victories. Since the conventions of the praise song may lead to exaggeration, one must use this type of material very cautiously. Even though the general image of the authority of the maiwa in this period is supported by conflict with Mandara (possibly related to Bornoan settlers in parts of Mandara), the possible settlement of slaves in parts of Bagirmi and Wadai, and the creation of Kurnawa as a prosperous town.

            Finally, the domestic religious policies and political choices made by Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun were also significant. He was the first mai to invite Shaykh Tahir b. Ibrahim to Gazargamo. This shaykh later played a prominent role in Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). His father, Hamdun, was also remembered as a scholar in Borno tradition who had studied at al-Azhar in Cairo.[35] Hamdun was also said to have written 12 copies of the Quran and placed himself in ritual seclusion.[36] His son, whose pilgrimage to Mecca is still up for debate, may have been similarly pious but was also more likely to have engaged in military campaigns. Yet he also included respected Muslim leaders such as a Masbarma in his retinue during the c. 1734 campaign against Kano. He also listened to Kano mallams to end that conflict, again suggestive of how essential Islam was to state ideology and administrative practices of the Sayfawa court. He likely benefitted from the caliphal status of the Sayfawa whose pious sanctity was acknowledged widely, while also simultaneously endeavoring to recover or restore Borno’s economic and political hegemony.

Conclusion

Despite the paucity of written sources that directly speak to the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, enough material exists to reconsider this reign. Whilst the Late Sayfawa Period unquestionably included decline, it is very misleading or inaccurate to portray the last century of effective Sayfawa rule as merely one of indolent or secluded maiwa who passively responded to the changing political, economic, intellectual and ecological landscapes. Through the Kano campaign in the 1730s, interventions in Mandara and Bagirmi, the possible support for the Sudan Road for pilgrims, Borno remained a significant contender in the region. Similarly, the sponsoring of new towns and brick architecture as an expression of elite authority reveal the strength of Borno’s ruling dynasty. In other words, all was not immediately lost for the Sayfawa maiwa until the second half of the 18^th century. Undeniably, the prolonged drought and population movements from 1738-1753 and the burgeoning power of the Kel Ewey in Kawar, as well as favorable shifts in power relations that benefitted Mandara, Bagirmi, and Wadai eventually did weaken Borno’s claims to regional hegemony. Yet assertive and dynamic leaders did exist in the 18^th century. The reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, poorly documented as it is, illustrates this dynamic leadership of the Late Sayfawa Period.

---

[1] Dierk Lange, whose masterful study of this source remains unsurpassed, has illustrated how it can be corroborated by a number of external and internal sources on the history of Kanem and Borno. Whether or not the form that survives is an abbreviated version of a much longer chronicle is unknown, but it at least helps in constructing a mostly accurate timeline for the political history of the Sayfawa maiwa.

[2] The Kano Chronicle is hardly free of anachronisms, inaccuracies, omissions, or additional textual problems. There is a great danger in relying too heavily on it to reconstruct the history of Kano and Hausaland, but it can also be corroborated by various external sources that are suggestive of an at least generally accurate chronology.

[3] See Behique Dunama, “A Sayfawa Hajj in c. 1728” for an early attempt at reconciling this source with the mainstream of historical sources on the Sayfawa, https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/a-sayfawa-hajj-in-c1728.html.

[4] This source requires much deeper textual analysis and a new translation. It may also refer to an attack on Kerawa, a capital of Mandara, that could have taken place during the reign of Ali b. Umar, Dunama b. Ali, or al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama. It problematically refers to the Sudan in a seemingly modern way, too.

[5] It is not always clear from where and by whom H.R. Palmer derived his information. Nonetheless, the tradition strongly supports the identification of the Sayfawa mai who attacked Kano in the 1730s or so with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

[6] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 253.

[7] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks” in Nilo-Saharan. Proceedings of the First Nilo-Saharan Linguistics Colloquium, Leiden September 8–10, 242.

[8] This specific example refers to a problematic passage in H.R. Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan. In describing Ali b. Umar’s campaign against the Tuareg of Air, Palmer adds narrative elaboration in which a Kel Etti woman sought Ali b. Umar’s aid at the same time he was in the midst of a Mandara campaign. See Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 247.

[9] H.R. Palmer, “Kano Chronicle,” 90.

[10] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 10. Without elucidating his evidence, Louis Brenner has argued that Shehu Tahir was Muhammad b. al-Tahir b. Ibrahim al-Fallati, a known Fulbe scholar in Borno. See “Three Fulbe Scholars in Borno,” 107.

[11] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 111.

[12] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, 203.

[13] Murray Last, “From Sultanate to Caliphate: Kano c. 1450-1800” in Studies in the History of Kano, 83-84.

[14] See M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350-1950.

[15] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 9.

[16] Kirk-Greene & Hogben, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions, 219.

[17] Alhaji Hassan and Shuaibu Na’ibi, Abuja Chronicle, 14.

[18] Shaykh Dan Tafa, Rawdat’l-Afkaar.

[19] H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française No. 10 (1925), 460-461.

[20] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage, 397.

[21] “The Kurata Arabs in the Kanem towns are your slaves.” H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[22] For an admittedly speculative look at this period, see Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html.

[23] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage: An historical study with special reference to the nineteenth century, 399.

[24] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan des sultans du Kanem-Bornu : chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 82.

[25] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 132-134, 145.

[26] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808,” 203.

[27] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902, 145.

[28] On the possible Kanuri parentage of Madi Makiya, see H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 98.

[29] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan, 82.

[30] For an overview of this period and the impact of the prolonged drought, see Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty.

[31] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks,” 242.

[32] Carlos Magnavita, “Short report of a visit to the archaeological sites of Lergam and Garu Kime, Geidam L.G.A., Yobe State of Nigeria,” Borno Museum Society Newsletter 76.

[33] J.R. Patterson, “Assessment Report on Borsari District, Bornu Emirate, Bornu Province” (1918).

[34] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[35] Hamidu Bobboyi, The 'Ulama of Borno: A Study of the Relations between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808, 22, 29.

[36] Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty, 299. 

Borno's Failed Mandara Campaign (1781): Ungwa-a-Mufaka

 

A map of Mandara in the early 18th century by Barkindo (The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902).

One particularly interesting textual source on the history of Borno in the 18th century was written in 19th century Mandara. A kirgam written in Arabic decades after a war in which Borno forces were defeated by Mandara, the text is both fascinating and problematic. It nonetheless offers one of the few descriptions of the physical appearance of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). It's also one of the few written sources on Borno's disastrous defeat outside Doulo that is dated to the period before the colonial era. Indeed, the defeat in many ways encapsulates Borno's declining fortunes in what we like to call the Late Sayfawa Period (1715-1808, or 1715-1846). This period saw Borno's loss of the lucrative salt trade from Bilma, growing independence of Bedde communities, Gobir's refusal to render tribute, a long drought, Wadai's incursions into Kanem from the east, and the truly calamitous fall of Birni Gazargamo to forces aligned with the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio. Consequently, Borno's defeat by the hands of Mandara, despite mustering what the sources suggest was an enormous army (including cavalry and firearms), is worthy of historical inquiry for understanding the Sayfawa's gradual loss of paramount status in the Central Sudan. In order to address this conflict, the Ungwa-a-Mufaka is an essential source.

Written during the reign of May Iliayassa (1845-1858) of Mandara, the  Ungwa-a-Mufaka was translated into French in Eldridge Mohammadou's Le royaume de Wandala ou Mandara au XIXè siècle. Though written many years after the conflict, dated to 1196 AH, the kirgam cites a number of eye-witness testimonies. For instance, the future prince, Boukar Adjama, was one witness  (60). Another, Oumata Nadji, was cited for a description of the physical appearance of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama on page 62: 

C'était un homme d'une taille impressionante. Son teint était clair et lui donnait l'apparence d'un Arabe Chouwa. Il avait une grosse tête, des yeux aux globes très blancs mais qui devinrent toutes rouges lorsqu'il monta en selle. S'élancent dans les rangs de son armée, il se mit à exhorter ses hommes d'une voix si puissante que les veines de son cou enflèrent et qu'on put les distinguer nettement à distance. 

Besides the eyewitness reports, the kirgam also quotes letters exchanged between Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama and the king of Mandara, May Bladi. Since it is far more likely that the conflict between the two states happened during the reign of Bladi's successor, Bukar-a-Jama, the kirgam must be interpreted carefully. Nonetheless, the access of the chronicle's author to Mandara elites who were present during the war and possibly correspondence between the Sayfawa mai and Mandara's king, the source presents a plausible account for Mandara's victory. 

A map of Mandara at its territorial zenith (Barkindo).

So, what does the chronicle actually tell us of the conflict? According to this source, the war began after a Shuwa Arab went to Gazargamo and reported to the Sayfawa mai the resources of Mandara. This Arab had lived in Mandara before moving to Borno, thereby making him an informed observer of Mandara's political, economic and geographical conditions. The ruler of Borno, hearing abou this, developed an interest in seizing Mandara, eliminating Mandara's king and dignitaries, and reducing its people to slavery (44). Subsequently, Borno sent its emissary, Katouri b. Boukar, to Mandara with a letter from the mai. This first correspondence compared the mai to a lion or cat while belittling Mandara's king as a chicken or hare. The implied threat clearly stated his hostile intentions: "Ceci je te le dis pour que tu sois informé et que tu puisse méditer sur la conduite, et les conseils les plus opportuns à prodiguer à  ton peuple" (45). Thus, the conflict was presented as one of Borno initiating conflict and declaring hostile intent through letters. The use of the written word to exchange messages between kings in the Central Sudan was also evident in the letters sent by the Bulala and Sayfawa during the conflict in Idris b. Ali's reign (1564-1596). To what extent the conflict was fully instigated by Borno is unclear, but it is difficult to imagine Borno launching a major expedition against a kingdom merely out of a desire for booty and conquest, particularly due to the problems on many other fronts that must have occupied the court's attention. In that light, it is better to understand the conflict as caused by Mandara's assertion of dominance over some of Borno's southern tributaries during the 1770s and early 1780s, as suggested by Barkindo. 

In order to prevent the war, Mandara's king allegedly sent many letters, gifts, money and slaves. The first response included 3000 thalers, 1000 slaves, 100 horses and a promise of tribute (48). Borno's Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, however, refused to accept this. Indeed, he went as far as imprisoning and later ordering the punishment of a member of his court who urged peace (49). Unsurprisingly, Borno's second letter pledged to invade Mandara. A numerous army consisting of cavalry, archers, spearmen, shield carriers, and men armed with firearms began the march toward Mandara (50). Despite this invasion, Mandara's king continued to attempt a peaceful resolution by sending gifts and money with his letters. Indeed, the kirgam gives an exceedingly high number of 32 letters sent by Mandara to stop the Borno invasion (41). Nonetheless, these repeated peaceful overtures fail despite the Mandara king's message, "Nous mettons entièrement à ta disposition et attendons tes ordres pour les exécuter. Tous tes désirs seront les nôtres" (52). The dream of a Mandara marabout is even mentioned, probably to symbolize the imminent attack from Borno against the capital.

Since the chronicle emphasizes the numerous attempts by Mandara to avoid military conflict, it also highlights the immoral or unjust nature of Borno. For example, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama's imprisonment of a member of his court for speaking against the war serves to highlight his injustice. Another episode, even more alarming, emphasizes the immoral actions of a Sayfawa prince. Named Yarnam, the prince stayed at Karangou with a man named Ali Ayssami. In addition to being fed by his host, Yarnam demanded payment and later raped his host's wife and daughter. When Ayssami sought redress from the mai, he did nothing (57). This episode is yet another instance in which the cause of the Sayfawa was unjust and immoral. That Borno would go to war against another Muslim kingdom who sought peace was also an argument in favor of Borno's immoral war.

Returning to the chronicle suggests Borno's forces took about 18 days to reach Doulo, the Mandara capital. Along the way, thousands of soldiers joined the campaign and various villages of Mandara were sacked or pillaged (56). Once outside Doulo, a kaigama, named Ali Madjounoun, leading Borno's forces, was instructed by Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama to attack, seize the palace and prevent the enemy from fleeing into the mountains (55-56). This suggests that the Bornoan army was very familiar with the mountainous terrain favoring Mandara. While this was happening, Mandara, which apparently had scouts or spies informing their court of the Borno army's movements, had carefully prepared for their defense. The king planned specific areas for his troops to strike (60). Their careful planning paid off despite being outnumbered by the invading forces. Indeed, they were successful enough since the kaigama was taken captive. When he refused to serve Mandara, he was executed (61). As the battle continued, ultimately lasting from noon until sunset, the mai led the Bornoan forces, exhorting them to fight while mounted on his horse. But, the Bornoan forces began to retreat, losing all semblance of order as Mandara soldiers pursued them (63-64). During this chaotic retreat, many Borno troops were seized and their weapons, valuables, horses, and persons were taken. 

Meanwhile, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama continued to retreat on horseback as Mandara soldiers chased after him. They apparently let him escape as the night progressed, but they managed to seize the person carrying his scepter (64). The chronicle suggests that the Mandara troops, being simple soldiers, were hesitant to directly attack the king of Borno due to the "sacred person" of a king, even an enemy (64). That characterization, however, is contradicted by Borno traditions, which mention Ali b. al-Hajj receiving a wound in this war (Landeroin 399). Perhaps this attempt by the Mandara chronicle was meant to minimize the idea of soldiers attacking kings to maintain status distinctions and power relations? Regardless, the Mandara campaign was an utter disaster for Borno. Many troops were lost, horses, weapons, and soldiers were seized, and Mandara likely continued to intrude upon Borno's southern tributaries. While the kirgam states only 180 Mandara elites were killed and 35 disappeared, the casualties of the rank and file are not known (but probably very large) to the chronicler (65).

Ultimately, the Ungwa-a-Mufaka is a precious source for contextualizing one of the military defeats in the Late Sayfawa Period. Although obviously biased and perhaps too eager to portray the ruler of Mandara as entirely blameless, the kirgam provides some much-needed context on the affair. It provides a physical description of the mai and some insights into the nature of Late Sayfawa Period military and political thinking of this era. Without the Bornoan perspective as can be reconstructed in the works of al-Tahir al-Fellati, one must use the Mandara kirgam and oral traditions. The benefit of the chronicle is in quoting the testimony of those actually present when the war took place in 1781. Hopefully the other textual sources on this episode will be published or studied for further insights into its causes. Lastly, one should consider the 19th century date for the kirgam and the possible impact of the jihad on delegitimizing the Sayfawa in some quarters. This could be a relevant factor for understanding the kirgam's portrayal of the mai as an oppressive king.

Bibliography

Barkindo, Bawura M. The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development, and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom. Stuttgart : F. Steiner, 1989.

Mohammadou, Eldrige. Le Royaume du Wandala ou Mandara au XIXe siècle. Tokyo: Institute for the study of languages and cultures of Asia and Africa, 1982.

Tilho, Jean (editor). Documents scientifiques de la Mission Tilho. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1910.

The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902

We strongly believe that studying the history of the lesser known polities in the Lake Chad Region is very useful for understanding Kanem-Borno, our main area of interest. By studying smaller polities and societies who, in some cases, were vassals of the state or "empire" of the Sayfawa, one begins to see how Kanembu and Kanuri influences spread throughout various regions in the Lake Chad Basin and beyond. Barkindo's short but powerful study of the Mandara Sultanate from its shadowy 15th century origins to the colonial conquest is a great example of this. Barkindo, with good reason, dismisses accounts of foreign origins or echoes of the Hamitic Hypothesis to explain the formation of a Mandara kingdom. 

Assembling linguistics, oral traditions, archaeological studies, textual sources, and the similarities in political structure of pre-Islamic Mandara and its neighboring societies, it becomes quite clear that the origins of the state cannot be attributed to Tubu, Arab, Berber, or even Borno roots. However, the relocation of the Sayfawa dynasty to Borno in the late 14th century appears to have pushed the ancestors of the Wandala further south into the hills and plains of what became the Mandara state in the 1400s and 1500s. Over time, a combination of Gamergu and Wandala peoples combining agriculture, hunting, iron production, and trade, established a kingdom that was important enough to appear on the world map of Fra Mauro in the 1400s and appear in the works of Leo Africanus and d'Anania. 

But over time, the Mandara/Wandala people adopted and adapted aspects of Bornoan civilization as well as Islam (in c. 1715) and, provide a possibly useful case study of the complexity of Borno relations with neighboring societies. Instead of solely seeing Borno's relationship with Mandara and others in the larger region as one of conquest or empire, the economic, cultural, and, eventually, religious factors appear to explain more fully how the Lake Chad area became a "Bornoan" Sea of sorts. This perspective can be seen in the way Yusuf Bala Usman sought to redefine or contextualize the nature of Hausaland-Borno relations and the question of tribute and gift exchanges. Instead of assuming military conquest was the dominant or only route to which the Sayfawa dynasty established itself as the regional hegemon, cultural, economic, and social factors appear to have been just as important. 

As the dominant power of the Central Sudan until the 18th century, Borno's dominance of salt production/trade, trans-Saharan exchange, textile industry, livestock, horse breeding, and function as a center for Islamic scholarship and culture placed it at a favorable position and could have played a role in Mandara submission or sending of tribute to Borno. Until the second half of the 18th century, when Bagirmi and Wadai offered alternative routes to luxury goods from North Africa and beyond, Borno would have been the major supplier of North African goods to Mandara. Kanuri or Bornoan settlers, Shuwa Arabs, and Islamic scholars also flocked to Mandara, bringing their expertise in weaving, dyeing, animal husbandry, and religious skills to a state that, unsurprisingly, would be more deeply drawn into this orbit. Mandara's expansion and economic growth was stimulated by this development. 

If Barkindo's analysis is correct, Islam also provided a path to push for greater political centralization of the kingdom by challenging the traditional title-holders and their control of the kingship. It would be interesting to compare this with other groups who adopted Islam via Kanem-Borno influence, as well as pushing back against the notion that the Sayfawa were opposed to the expansion of Islam because it would have hurt the slave trade by decreasing the number of legally enslaveable captives. Understanding how and why some peoples resisted Islamization would be shed light on Islamic proselytism and state support for it but we have much to learn about the Bedde, Kotoko, Musgun, Margi, and other ethnic groups and their own distinct histories of relations with Borno.