Mbang Burkomanda I: Bagirmi's 17th Century Rise in Sudanic Context

 

Lancer of the Sultan of Begharmi.

          Investigating the history of Bagirmi before the 19^th century is an arduous task. Due to the lack of detailed sources on the history of this part of the Chad Basin before the 1800s, Bagirmi receives less attention than its more famous neighboring polities, Kanem and Borno. Moreover, the 19^th and 20^th centuries provide far richer source materials, consisting of travel reports, al-Tunisi’s account of Sabun’s invasion of Bagirmi, and a plethora of colonial-era publications and reports. This material, naturally, makes it far easier to research Bagirmi in the 1800s whilst its earlier period remains somewhat shadowy. In an attempt to explore early Bagirmi history, this brief article will analyze the reign of mbang Burkomanda I of Bagirmi, whose reign has been tentatively dated c. 1635-1665 by Gustav Nachtigal. In spite of the paucity of written sources from this time, one can triangulate various traditions from Bagirmi, Wadai and its neighbors to create a fuller narrative of Burkomanda’s reign. Moreover, Burkomanda I’s reign was part of a much larger trend of dynamic political leadership across much of the Chad Basin and the Central Sudan in the 1600s. Indeed, Burkomanda’s reign overlapped with a period of political change and unrest to the east of Lake Chad, one which Bagirmi endeavored to profit from through far-flung raids and political interventions. Symbolically and materially, this was represented by the erection of brick walls around the palace in Massenya, cementing the ascent of the mbang in the wider region.

A Commentary on the Sources

          Whilst a few important works have been written by Anglophone and Francophone scholars on Bagirmi’s royal genealogy, much remains to be done. Even so, studies of the kingdom’s cosmological symbolism, political structure or its model of predatory accumulation have been produced. Still, little has been done to advance the study of pre-1800 Bagirmi. John Lavers, in a brief essay published in Annals of Borno tentatively sketched this lengthy period of Bagirmi history (c. 1500-1800), but largely repeated Nachtigal. Besides Lavers, of course, many colonial-era writers wrote studies on Bagirmi kingship, history, the Barma language, or the specific Melfi district. But few have been able to advance beyond this due to the contradictions in the oral traditions, which all the sources ultimately rely upon. In other words, unless new textual sources come to light, historians will not progress from Nachtigal’s schematic view of Bagirmi history.[1] Indeed, some scholars, such as Viviana Pâques, have even gone as far as to challenge simple assumptions of linear historical narratives in the oral materials. In a move that recalls the ways in which Zuidema interpreted the Spanish cronistas on the history of the Incas, Pâques seems to believe that much of what is reported in the traditions reported to Nachtigal, Barth, and others is ultimately tied to a mythological and cosmological order of thinking.

            However, close examination of the various 19^th century and colonial-era reports and texts can be triangulated for a deeper understanding of Burkomanda I’s reign. For instance, the various lists of Bagirmi kings produced by Nachtigal, Escayrac de Lauture, Barth, Lanier, and Palmer can be subjected to greater scrutiny. This can unveil commonalities and patterns.[2] Using Henri Carbou’s writings on the Bulala and Wadai, as well as al-Tunisi, highlight some of Wadai’s traditions as relevant for reconstructing Bagirmi history. Abadie, Palmer, Tubiana, Barkindo, and Hagenbucher on the history of Bagirmi’s neighbors and rival polities can shed further light. For example, a number of Bagirmi-oriented sources allude to ephemeral reigns of Wadai kings usually omitted from the Wadai kings lists. By using the general dates for Wadai, the Bulala sultans in Fitri, Mandara, as well as Kanem and Borno, one can better contextualize the events associated with Burkomanda’s reign. In addition, utilizing these sources permits a likely more accurate reading of Bagirmi’s attempts to assert itself in a politically dynamic Chad Basin and Central Sudan during the 1600s.

Mbang Burkomanda I’s Rise to Power

          Although little is known of Burkomanda’s early life, he is intriguingly remembered by the name of his mother, Aisa Bele. Furthermore, he was reportedly the son of Omar, who reigned from c. 1608-1625 in Nachtigal’s chronology. Surprisingly, Burkomanda was tchiroma during the reign of his uncle, Dalai (r. 1625-1635).[3] One can surmise from this that Burkomanda’s mother may have hailed from a powerful faction or family in Bagirmi, if Burkomanda’s maternal kin helped him succeed his uncle.

          Burkomanda also benefited from the political reforms and accomplishments of Abdallah (r. 1568-1608). This powerful mbang promoted Islamic reforms in Bagirmi’s state structure and created several powerful posts held by individuals of slave origin. Indeed, Nachtigal seemingly believed that the powerful military officer, the fatsha, was held by a slave since the time of Abdallah. This may have been done to weaken the influence of brothers, uncles and other relations in Bagirmi’s royal disputes and military leadership. Abdallah was also believed by Nachtigal to have completely reversed the tributary relationship with the Bulala sultans, too. By 1608, this seminal Bagirmi ruler was allegedly responsible for imposing a small tribute on Middogo and receiving annual presents from the Bulala, Logon, and Kousseri.[4]

          In short, Bagirmi had already demonstrated signs of greater political centralization and expansion during the reign of Abdallah. Indeed, this may have triggered a campaign from Borno’s Idris b. Ali (r. 1564-1596) which led to his death.[5] Undoubtedly, Burkomanda benefitted from the reforms of his grandfather and may have sought to surpass his predecessor, Dalai, who was less successful in his military raid against the Musgo (Musgun).[6] Burkomanda later succeeded in expanding the scale of military actions, intervened in Fitri, and even struck Borno territory in Kawar.

Raiding Far and Wide for Three Years

          Believed to have begun a long series of campaigns soon after his reign began, Burkomanda led his troops far and wide. Targeting Burlum, Bayo, and Bolongo districts, Burkomanda threatened the Kenga. Crossing to Middogo and Fitri, Burkomanda went even further afield. His troops crossed Batha and the Bahr el-Ghazal to Kanem, then moved to the Karka region. Then, Bagirmi raiders struck Borku and Kawar, before passing to the south and plundering the Shuwa in the Kotoko principalities. This was followed by another attack, this time against Mandara. Fellata to the south of Mandara were also targeted before Burkomanda camped his troops in Musgo territory. Due to the wishes of his soldiers to return, Burkomanda eventually agreed.[7] Given that tradition remembers this taking place over the course of three years, one must ask why the ruler of Bagirmi was eager to launch several punitive raids and actions against Bagirmi’s neighbors. Given the volatile conditions in Kanem around this time and the formation of Wadai, perhaps in c. 1635 (to use Nachtigal’s chronology), one can best interpret Burkomanda’s actions as an attempt to profit from and exert Bagirmi’s status as a regional power.

Beginning with Kanem, a political vacuum made raids and possible expansion attractive. The Bulala sultans were defeated by the Tunjur and were no longer relevant here. Borno, whose ruler, Umar b. Idris, likely appointed Dala Afuno to oversee Kanem around this time, relied on the alifas to ensure the tribute from Kanem. However, Dala Afuno was remembered in Kanem for having to wage war on various groups to receive any tribute. Indeed, Dala Afuno had to fight the Tubu, Daganas, El-Lassalas, Shuwas and Koukas to the west of Lake Fitri to pay tribute.[8]

Besides trouble receiving tribute, conflict with the recently arrived Tunjur, migrating after Wadai’s foundation in c. 1635, soon arose. Tunjur tradition, according to Gros, remembers conflict between the Tunjur and Bulala occurring at Mao during the time of Dawud’s grandson, Smain. While the Tunjur eventually seized Mao, Tunjur tradition specifically named their leader, Ramadan, as dying in conflict with the Dala Afuno.[9] In other words, Kanem during the 1630s was politically volatile and unstable as the first alifa sent by the Sayfawa was engaged in conflict with various groups refusing to pay tribute. Sensing this insecurity and instability, Burkomanda may have viewed Kanem as relatively easy to raid. This would explain why he was able to reach beyond to Borku and Kawar.

As for the raids on Borku and Kawar, one sees another aspect of Bagirmi’s long-term regional aspirations. Due to its geographic position, the kingdom lacked direct access to towns in the southern Sahara used for profitable trans-Saharan trade. Bagirmi needed access to these to become less dependent on Borno for North African, European, and other goods. Thus, it is likely Burkomanda envisioned long-term acquisitions to the far north.[10] Lavers was correct to note this possible motive for Burkomanda’s actions, perhaps aiming to maintain Kanem’s openness for commerce or to assert Bagirmi control over routes to the north.[11] The ultimate failure of this strategy may be explained by the distance involved and the eventual restoration of Sayfawa authority in Kanem through the consolidation of the alifas. Nonetheless, memories of this Bagirmi raid in Bilma were vivid enough when Maurice Abadie reported it. In Kawar tradition, however, the Bagirmi attack which resulted in a massacre of the town’s population was the result of a Bulala attack.[12] This may have been a result of Burkomanda’s close relationship with the Bulala sultans in Fitri, particularly as his sister, Zara, was married to the Bulala ruler.

Afterwards, Burkomanda’s forces moved south and west. Attacks against the Shuwa certainly included many cattle and horses among the booty. The assault directed against Mandara, which may have been ruled by Abale at the time, was probably inspired by Mandara expansion into the Musgo (Musgun) territories. Burkomanda’s goal was undoubtedly intended to minimize the expansion of rival polities into Bagirmi’s own raiding zones and tributary regions. Mandara, at the time not yet Islamic, was possibly also attacked by Borno during the reign of Ali b. Umar (c. 1639-1677). This suggests that Mandara’s rulers were expansionist at this time or threatening its peer polities. In fact, according to Barkindo, Bagirmi’s attack “appears to have had the purpose of checking Wandala expansion into what was assumed by Bagirmi, to be her own area of influence.”[13]

Lastly, Burkomanda’s whirlwind campaigns included the Fitri region for an important reason. Heading toward that direction was important for the alliance between the Bulala sultans and Bagirmi at this time. Sealed through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to the Bulala sultan, this seemingly developed after the Bulala already established the dynasty in the Fitri region, after defeating the Kuka. Bulala oral traditions attribute this to a half-Tubu Bulala prince, Djil Esa Tubo, or Djili Esa Toubo. According to traditions not cited by Carbou, this Djil Esa Tubo actually lived in Bagirmi with his mother for some time. If so, it is no wonder that Djil Esa Toubou was likely the Bulala ruler who married Burkomanda’s sister. He was already raised there and probably connected to Bagirmi elites.[14] Carbou, presumably drawing on oral traditions as well as the earlier work of Nachtigal, provides strong evidence for a Bulala-Bagirmi alliance around the time of Burkomanda, confirmed through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to Djil Esa Tubo. This, in turn, explains why Burkomanda may have included the Fitri area in his lengthy military excursions during his reign.

Map of the region in  Bjorkelo's State and Society in Three Central Sudanic Kingdoms: Kanem-Bornu, Bagirmi, and Wadai.

By contextualizing this seemingly random series of attacks within the wider political changes affecting Kanem as well as the foundation of Wadai to the east, one can perceive how Bagirmi’s actions were likely done in response to a politically volatile moment. Burkomanda sought to strengthen his position within the Central Sudan through raids, political expansion, and achieving long-term economic goals through access to Kawar and Borku. Attacking Mandara due to the latter’s expansion into Musgun lands was designed to ensure Bagirmi’s own sphere of influence there and source of captives. Bagirmi interests in Fitri were tied to their relationship with the Bulala and, perhaps, a desire to keep an eye on developments further east in Wadai.

The Later Years of Burkomanda I

Unfortunately, the remainder of Burkomanda I’s reign becomes much harder to contextualize. Besides campaigns against the Sarua and Ndamm about 3 years later, little else is known, except for a war with Wadai. Nonetheless, one can detect Burkomanda’s continued interests in expansion and promoting his own position across the region with brick walls for the palace. A later war with Waday suggests Bagirmi was, at this time, still a stronger power.

 Nachtigal, one of the better sources, wrote of subsequent campaigns led by the mbarma and fatsha. Directed against the Sarua and Ndamm, they were not especially successful.[15] Burkomanda’s later execution of his fatsha and mbarma due to a small offense is not explained by Nachtigal but may be connected to this. Perhaps their failure to achieve success like Burkomanda’s earlier campaigns aroused his anger. Or the two were involved in a plot. Given the vast military authority these figures held, it is difficult to imagine Burkomanda ordering their execution on a simple offense. Lack of success in military ventures or a political conflict may have been part of it.

Developments in architecture or the material expression of royal authority also occurred at this time. Burkomanda appears to have been the first to construct a brick wall for the palace in Massenya. According to Nachtigal, at least.[16] The use of brick for royal or elite structures has a longer history in Kanem and Borno, areas which influenced the development of the Bagirmi state. To see them used here in Burkomanda’s reign must be interpreted as an expression of the state’s political ascent in the Central Sudan. After all, besides Bagirmi, the use of fired-brick had been practiced by the Bulala and Sayfawa, rival dynasties which had once dominated Burkomanda’s polity. By employing them in his own palace, Burkomanda demonstrated Bagirmi’s ascending status as a Sudanic power.[17]

Finally, Bagirmi’s war with Waday during Burkomanda’s reign raises more tantalizing questions. Sparked by Waday’s attacks on the Bulala state in Fitri, which led to the capture of Burkomanda’s sister, they clearly indicate the importance of the Fitri area for Wadai and Bagirmi. Nachtigal wrote that Burkomanda freed his sister after a battle at Rabbana on the west bank of the Fitri.[18] Carbou, on the other hand, saw a possible Kuka role in fostering a Waday attack in Fitri, perhaps to force the Bulala sultans out of the region.[19]

With Lanier, likely drawing from Escayrac de Lauture, one learns more about Wadai’s leader during this war. Apparently, Wadai’s troops were led by a king named Mohamed ez Zaouni, who supposedly attacked twice. In the second attack, at Middogo, Wadai forces captured Burkomanda’s sister. But Burkumanda was able to “refouler les Ouadaiens.”[20] In Escayrac de Lauture’s version of events, Burkomanda’s victory against Wadai took place at a place called Sadao. His version emphasized that after the capture of Wadai’s Mohammed-Zaouni, “qui avait occupé le trône pendant six mois,” Wadai replaced him with a king named Issa. But, tellingly, any war with Bagirmi was finished by an unspecified epidemic.[21] In other words, Bagirmi not only captured the Wadai king, but the conflict continued until an outbreak of disease or pestilence forced an end.[22]

Unfortunately, none of the Wadai king lists mention this Mohammed-Zaouni or Issa, but Lauture’s list of Wadai rulers places them after Abd el-Kerim and a king named Edris (Idris).[23] As it appears quite likely that the standard lists of Wadai kings tend to omit names of rulers who only lasted briefly on the throne, Mohammed-Zaouni and Issa may have been very brief rulers sometime in the 1650s or 1660s. Indeed, Lauture’s list places Issa right before Saleh-Dered, clearly omitting many Wadai kings of the 1700s. Another writer, Carbou, likewise noted at least one king often not included in the Wadai kingslist: El Djezam, who succeeded Kharif.[24] If, as Lauture indicates, Mohamed-Zaouni and Edris ruled for less than a year while Issa reigned for under 2 years, it is possible they briefly occupied the throne after c. 1655, when Abd el-Kerim likely died (according to Nachtigal’s chronology).[25]

Undoubtedly, much of Burkomanda’s relatively long reign of 30 years has not survived in traditions. Nevertheless, the later annals of his reign included the use of brick walls, the victory against Wadai, and Burkomanda’s actions regarding the Surua and Ndamm. Of course, the executions of his fatsha and mbarma raise a number of tantalizing questions, too. The victory against Wadai raises important manners related to the known chronology and list of kings of this state in the 17^th century. Despite the unexplained factors in the rest of his reign, the use of brick attests to a regional aspiration to status and power in the Central Sudan. Likewise, the ruler’s continued interest in Bagirmi’s expansion and influence in neighboring peoples demonstrates an ongoing interest in “predatory accumulation.”

Conclusions on Bagirmi in the Pivotal 17^th Century

Despite the limited written sources for this period in Bagirmi history, deep investigations into the earlier centuries of Bagirmi’s political history are feasible. Endeavors to make sense of the contradictions must keep in mind the importance of looking to traditions from neighboring societies and rival polities, too. Whilst some contradictions and gaps will remain unresolved, one can approach a holistic view of pivotal Bagirmi mbang reigns prior to the 19^th century.

This tentative analysis of Burkomanda I’s reign was an attempt to do so. By contextualizing what is reported about Bagirmi’s neighbors and rival states in the middle decades of the 17^th century, one can make sense of (or at least approach a reasonable interpretation) how Bagirmi, for some time during the dynamic 17^th century, asserted itself as a major state in the Central Sudan. This was accomplished or attempted through military raids and wars, the adoption of brick buildings, interventions in Fitri and Kanem, and Bagirmi success against Wadai. Future scholarship on this period of Bagirmi history must examine more closely the question of religion, particularly in the aftermath of Umar b. Idris of Borno’s termination of the first Kalumbardo. Subsequent research must thoroughly revisit the list of kings for Waday, the Bulala in Fitri, the alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur to better understand how the Bulala sultans losing Kanem led to Bagirmi’s attempt to fill a political void.

---

[1] Of course, Nachtigal’s retelling of Bagirmi history was based on what may have been relatively informal conditions in the 1870s. His claim to have spoken with multiple descendants of elite lineages in Bagirmi who could recount specific details of various campaigns their forebears participated in throughout Bagirmi history is undoubtedly useful. However, like Sarmiento de Gamboa, whose interviews with various panaqa Inca descent groups was methodogically sound, descendants of different branches of the royal family and elite groups can disagree on many relevant historical questions. One wonders if, despite Nachtigal’s travels to Bagirmi predating European colonialism, his elite informants told him contradictory narratives about their past or the larger history of the Bagirmi royal dynasty. If so, Nachtigal’s retelling of it is far too “neat” and free of contradictions.

[2] See Alain Vivien, “Essai de concordance de cinq tables généalogiques du Baguirmi (Tchad)” in Journal de la Société des Africanistes, 1967, tome 37, fascicule 1. pp. 25-40.

[3] See Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 405. In other kings lists of Bagirmi, Burkomanda I is not listed, or he is conflated with Burkomanda Tad Lele, who reigned in the 1700s. See H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Bagirmi” in Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française 35, 1925 for an example of Burkomanda possibly listed as Osman, succeeding Omar (Oumar) and reigning 1612-1631. Escayrac de Lauture also evinced signs of confusion in his list of Bagirmi kings. For instance, his list of Bagirmi kings places Bourkoumanda, or Osman, after Abdala (Abdallah), and only assigns him a reign of 9 years. Yet his informant, presumably the Shaykh Ibrahim he met in Cairo who was believed to be a relative of the Bagirmi royal line, reported to him that Burkomanda defeated Wadai and captured their king. See Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, géographie naturelle et politique, histoire et ethnographie, moeurs et institutions de l'Empire des Fellatas, du Bornou, du Baguermi, du Waday, du Dar-Four, rédigé, d'après des renseignements entièrement nouveaux et accompagné d'une esquisse du Soudan oriental, 74-75.

[4] Ibid., 328, 403-404. For a different perspective on Bagirmi-Bulala relations, see Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Premier Tome, 298. In Carbou’s mind, it was the Kuka who once imposed tribute on the Fulani in what became Bagirmi during the 1400s. However, given the likely Fitri origins of the Bulala sultans ruling Kanem, they too may have exercised a loose suzerainty or influence on the Kuka state in the 1400s and early 1500s.

[5] John Lavers, “An Introduction to the History of Bagirmi,” Annals of Borno 1, 31.

[6] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 404.

[7] Ibid., 405.

[8] See Landeroin, “Notice historique,” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 380.

[9] See Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries,”  https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html. Tunjur traditions in Kanem suggest conflict with the Dala Afuno and Ramadan occurred in c. 1735, which is likely a century too late. A c. 1635 date is more plausible given the genealogy of the Kanem alifas based in Mao.

[10] See Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries (1890), 86.

[11] John Lavers, “An Introduction to the History of Bagirmi,” 34.

[12] Maurice Abadie, Afrique centrale: la colonie du Niger, 133. This could also be possible evidence of Bagirmi’s forces incorporating additional soldiers from their Bulala allies.

[13] See Bawuro M. Barkindo, The Mandara Sultanate to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 107, 111-112.

[14] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 307-308, 311. While Hagenbucher’s “Notes sur les Bilala” is essential reading, he dates Djil Esa Tubo to c. 1536 based on a problematic Bulala royal genealogy. Hagenbucher’s dates are too problematic and difficult to reconcile with the wider regional history of Fitri, Kanem, and Bagirmi during the 1530s. Instead, Djil Esa Tubo was more likely to arrive in the Fitri area during the 1630s, which matches the general c. 1630 dating for the arrival of the Tunjur in Kanem. After their defeat at the hands of the incoming Tunjur, the Bulala may have spent some time in Massoa, to the east of the Bahr el-Ghazal, before moving to Fitri. Whether or not the Bulala were asked to intervene there against the Kuka is unclear, but it could very well have involved Bagirmi military assistance. As for the question of Bagirmi interests in Kanem possibly being related to their ties to the Bulala sultans, the question remains ambiguous. Bagirmi sources certainly suggest the Bulala were reduced to vassals or tributaries, so it would seem Bagirmi’s actions in Kanem and Kawar were not motivated by a desire to restore the Bulala sultanate in Kanem. For a reference to Bagirmi’s overt conquest of the Bulala, see H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” 460. According to Lanier, who confused Burkomanda I with Burkomanda Tad Lele, “Il fit la guerre au sultans des Boulalas, conquit son pays, le soumit et donna à son nouveau vassal une de ses soeurs en mariage.” Either way, Burkomanda exerted some degree of influence over the Bulala in Fitri.

[15] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Vol. 3, 405.

[16] Ibid., 406. For a speculative attempt at contextualizing the usage of bricks in Massenya, see Behique Dunama, “Speculating on Massenya and Bricks in Bagirmi,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/12/speculating-on-massenya-and-bricks-in.html.

[17] Religion may have provided an additional avenue for Bagirmi to assert its position within the Sudan. Umar b. Idris (c. 1619-1639) of Borno’s destruction of the first Kalumbardo forced Shaykh Waldede to flee for his life, returning to Bagirmi where the town of Bidderi had a long history of ties to Islamic scholarship (and the rulers of Bagirmi). See Behique Dunama, “Umar b. Idris (r.1619-1639) and the First Kalumbardo,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/umar-b-idris-r1619-1639-and-first.html. Though Nachtigal and other sources do not mention this in the context of Burkomanda’s reign, it would be interesting to explore how Umar b. Idris’s assault against the first Kalumbardo may have had political repercussions in Bagirmi. After all, if Waldede came from Bagirmi and had long-established ties to Bagirmi, including one associated with designing the palace, would Bagirmi’s rulers continue to look positively upon the Sayfawa? In terms of their own state’s Islamic legitimacy, they may have began to harbor more animosity against Borno’s ruler. Even more intriguing in this context is Wadai tradition linking the founder of the state, Abd el-Kerim, with Kalumbardo’s other leader as well as Bidderi in Bagirmi.

[18] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol 3., 405.

[19] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 312.

[20] Henri Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” 460.

[21] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 74-75.

[22] The only reference to anything close to a plague early in Wadai history is a cattle pestilence and drought during the reign of Ya’qub Arus (1681-1707, in Nachtigal’s chronology). See Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol. 4, 208.

[23] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 77.

[24] Henri Carbou, La région du Tchad et du Ouadai, Tome Premier, 111.

[25] Comte Escayrac de Lauture, Mémoire sur le Soudan, 77.

Thoughts on Lebeuf's Les principautés Kotoko: essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité

Les principautés Kotoko: essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité by Annie M.D. Lebeuf is rather difficult to "use" for those interested in the relations of the Kotoko states and Kanem-Borno. Despite Lebeuf's (and that of Griaule and her husband) work on both ethnographica and archaeological studies of the Lake Chad Basin, oral traditions are sadly vague on any kind of chronological precision. Consequently, Lebeuf engages in a deep discussion of myths heard in various Kotoko states, seeking to identify the symbolic meanings of these mythic origin tales. Doing so allows some insights into the nature of Kotoko cosmology and socio-political organization in the various principalities or states, like Logone-Birni or Makari. 

Unfortunately, this approach means that one is entering a terrain in which more exact notions of the historical development of the Kotoko states are elusive. The "Sao" period remembered as preceding the states as we know them is recalled through myth. Likewise, the long lists of names of Sao and post-Sao rulers of different Kotoko towns are just that, a list of names. Most, at least as understood by Lebeuf, have little or nothing specifically remembered about them beyond their names. As a result, Kotoko royal genealogies and oral traditions sadly cannot fill in much of the gap in the history of relations between the states of the Sayfawa (Kanem, and then Borno) and the so-called "Sao" or Kotoko principalities. 

Nonetheless, one can gleam some useful nuggets of information from Kotoko traditions. The royal families of Makari and Afade, for instance, were said to be of Kanuri Muslim extraction. Indeed, the first Muslim ruler of Afade, Assana or Meskeri Tchigo, was said to be the brother of Ousseini of Makari. To what extent they actually were of Kanuri origin is unclear, but Lebeuf's ethnographic observations often found foreign maternal ancestry among the Kotoko princes of recent times. More intriguing is the claim to Bulala origin of the first Muslim king of Goulfeil. Even if not entirely accurate, it attests to an instance of Bulala interest and possible expansion into this region south of Lake Chad, presumably during the 1300s-1500s.  Likewise, the Babalia ties of Gawi and through them to Yao in the Lake Fitri region is another interesting tradition, although difficult to place chronologically.  One can certainly detect the use of Kanuri titles and influences in some of the Kotoko states, perhaps beginning or expanding after the rise of Muslim dynasties. For instance, the possible Kanuri influence in Makari and Afade was certainly established by the 1500s, although Borno traditions point to contacts by the 1300s (see H.R. Palmer's work for the relevant traditions). This influence even affected Kotoko myth to some extent, with the bull, turtle, and primordial waters story appearing here. But Kotoko traditions remain very ambiguous when it comes to the specific details of relations with their northern neighbors from Kanem and Borno. 

In other respects, there are broadly shared regional commonalities among the Kotoko states, Bagirmi, Wadai, Kanem and Borno. For example, the central role of the nguva, or dendal, is shared between the Kotoko towns and cities of Borno. The centrality of the palace is also important, although in this region the Kotoko masons did not apply brick. Instead, their palace complexes and monumental gudu or guti were made of earth. Nonetheless, the emphasis on monumental architecture that, to Lebeuf at least, symbolized the meeting of the sky and the earth, could match the role of monumental mosques used in Wadai, Borno, and Bagirmi. To what extent moieties and quarter systems seen in Kotoko towns correspond with similar notions in Kanem, Borno, Wadai and Bagirmi is a topic we shall have to explore in the future.

What of the Kotoko states themselves? To Lebeuf, analysis of myths of origin and their symbolism provide the key. The foundation myths often refer to hunters and fishmen, the fusion of distinct populations in one region, and the sacrifice of children by representatives of the two populations. Animal symbolism is also key here, with the varan and serpents or other animals often appearing in tales. The "Sao" are accorded an important place here in these origin stories, often associated with the founders of towns like Makari. Over time, larger towns existed as agglomerations of communities walled their settlements after unifying. The Kotoko princes, to use Lebeuf's vocabulary, were sometimes seen as descendants of outsiders who forged alliances with the local people. This is perhaps why the gumsu was often chosen from among the descendants of the first families of a town or city, to maintain this pact between the dynastic line and the original settlers. Interestingly, however, succession in the Kotoko states usually passed to sons of slave women. Complex age grades were used as well as the moieties or quarter system to organize the people of the towns themselves. 

Over time, some began to increase their power over their neighbors, but the Kotoko states were never unified into a single polity. Instead, 3 broader sub-regions appear, with Makari as the dominant state in Mandague, Mser led by Kousseri, and Lagouane under Logone-Birni domination. This was not always the case, since Houlouf was remembered as once being a powerful state. A close study of references to the Kotoko states in Bagirmi, Bulala, Borno and Mandara traditions and chronicles will undoubtedly shed more light on this.

Overall, Lebeuf's work remains important for attempting to center Kotoko myths, symbolism and ethnographic fieldwork. Undoubtedly, archaeology will remain central for understanding the deep history of this region and the so-called "Sao" often associated with the early period of the Kotoko states. Nonetheless, a thorough examination, comparison and analysis of references to the Kotoko states in the historical traditions of its neighbors can shed more light. Sadly, Lebeuf scarcely attempted this. Except for some more recent history still partly recalled in Kotoko traditions on the expansionist activities of Logone-Birni by the 1760s, little else is remembered specifically. Future research on this region must include attempts at triangulation of disparate traditions as well as a  reexamination of all the relevant written sources from neighboring states. 

A Tentative Study of the Reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun (1729-1744)

         Mai Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, who likely reigned in 1729-1744, was one of the last successful Sayfawa monarchs of the 18^th century. During the Late Sayfawa Period, the dynasty that ruled Borno gradually withered with the loss of Bilma. Even more, Wadai’s expansion into eastern Kanem, the autonomy of the Bedde, and Bagirmi’s attacks against the Kotoko states and southern Borno during the reign of mbang Muhammad al-Amin also occurred in this late 18^th century decline. Naturally, tensions between Borno and Mandara continued as well, with disastrous consequences for Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. Nonetheless, until the fall of Gazargamo in 1808, the Sayfawa remained powerful and likely possessed a spiritual stature or authority unequalled in the Central Sudan. Yet before that decline of the second half of the 18^th century, some of the last maiwa endeavored to reassert Borno’s political and economic dominance. Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents such a ruler, and although his reign is poorly documented, glimpses of his attempts to restore Borno’s hegemony can be found. After a brief overview of the extant sources, this article shall review Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun’s policy with regard to Hausaland, the question of relations with Mandara and Bagirmi, and an overview of domestic affairs within Borno. Undoubtedly, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents one of the last assertive Sayfawa rulers, whose reign complicates narratives of 18th-century Bornoan decline and political disengagement.

Discussing the Sources

            In terms of source material, the lack of a surviving chronicle severely limits one’s efforts to reevaluate the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Nonetheless, an assortment of oral sources and written sources provide enough clues for a tentative overview. First, the Diwan. Essentially a list of the various rulers of the Sayfawa maiwa with brief details on their reign, the Diwan aids in establishing an approximate timeline for the Sayfawa rulers.[1] In addition, the Kano Chronicle briefly alludes to an attack on the Kano kingdom by Borno during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Besides identifying the Sarkin Bornu as Ali, the chronicle’s erroneous description of the campaign is contradicted by Bornoan oral sources which establish that it was not Ali who attacked Kano in the 1730s.[2]

A third written source, a rihla copied in the mid-19^th century, presents a number of problems. The manuscript was found in the library of Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Miskin, and supposedly written by his grandfather, Muhammad b. Ali b. Dunama b. Ali b. Umar b. Idris.[3] It is supposedly a description of the hajj of Ali b. Umar. But the year given for this undertaking, 1727-8, and the description of the reign of about 15 years that followed, are more applicable for Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Is it possible that this source is about the hajj of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun but changed to be about Ali b. Umar due to the latter’s renown?[4]

Besides the aforementioned written sources, a number of oral sources exist. One of the most important, a Kanuri praise song translated by J.R. Patterson in Kanuri Songs, is particularly conspicuous. Given the genre and its conventions, one cannot expect a song that is necessarily historically accurate. Yet it speaks to a type of court praise singing and ethos that very much emphasized military valor and power. In addition, studies of the history of the Central Sudan based on oral sources supplement the meager textual ones. For instance, H.R. Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs contains a short chapter on Muhammad Hajimi and the Masbarma that alludes to the Kano campaign.[5] Likewise, a girgam translated in Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan refers to Muhammad as the “lord of Lergam the Black Prince with the white mouth-veil.”[6] This supports the identification of the builder of the elite brick building at Lergam with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, a tradition cited by Seidensticker.[7]

Unsurprisingly, a number of 19^th century, colonial-era reports and works by 20^th century scholars drawing on oral sources for the history of Hausaland, Bagirmi and Kanem refer to relations with Borno in the first half of the 18^th century. Furthermore, M.G. Smith, Hogben and Kirk-Greene provide useful clues on Kano and Hausaland during this period while Lavers, Nachtigal, and H. Lanier’s syntheses of Bagirmi history assist in reconstructing Bagirmi’s relationship with Borno. Great caution must be used with such material, particularly as later scholars sometimes regurgitated information from colonial-era scholars who hardly cited their sources. For instance, Lavers has uncritically repeated H.R. Palmer for the theory of a Mandara campaign of Ali b. Umar during the 1650s. When one checks Palmer, however, there is no sourcing to determine where he found this information![8]

Overall, the sources for the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun are hardly adequate, but sufficient for a tentative overview. Doing so allows one insights into the nature of Sayfawa statecraft and relations in a dynamic 18^th century world. The Sayfawa maiwa were hardly the indolent sovereigns only engaged in Islamic study or ritual seclusion in this time.

Borno, Kano, and Hausaland, c. 1729-1744

            Perhaps the best documented action of the mai was his attack on Kano, which may have taken place in 1734 (it coincided with a solar eclipse). Kano had previously been the subject of a campaign during the reign of Idris b. Ali in the 16^th century. At the time, Kano’s actions of fortifying settlements near Borno’s frontier were seen as a threat. For perhaps equivalent reasons, Borno’s Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also attacked the powerful Hausa kingdom. In this campaign, probably in the 1730s, the Kano Chronicle reports that “May Ali” came to make war on Kano during the reign of Sarkin Kano Kumbari (1731-1743). The Bornoan forces allegedly camped at Faggi for 3 nights without fighting due to the intervention of Shehu Tahiru and Shehu Bunduu.[9] Apparently, one of the mallams, Shehu Attahiru, who persuaded the mai to leave was an ancestor of the emir of Kano.[10] Unfortunately, this chronicle does not elucidate why the conflict arose in the first place, but it emphasizes the role of highly respected Islamic leaders in bringing peace.

Despite the chronicle suggesting a rather brief Bornoan siege, other sources suggest a far longer campaign. For example, tradition reported in Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs suggests that the mai was in the Kano state for 7 months.[11] Indeed, the mai attacked but did not prevail “until the appointed time came.” If the campaign lasted at least 7 months and the mai eventually prevailed, then Borno may have been able to successfully restore its position of dominance over Kano, albeit likely only with some form of tribute or vassal status for Kano’s sarki. In terms of why the conflict arose in the first place, Lavers has proposed that Kano was attacked to prevent it from importing guns and upsetting the regional balance of power.[12] While plausible, there is no evidence for this in our surviving sources. Other scholars emphasize internal dynamics within Kano. Thus, the Gaya, whose influence in Kano affairs was great during the reign of Sarkin Kano Sharifa and Kumbari, played a role. Moreover, new towns and walls around several in the eastern domain of Kano, such as Takai, Tsokuwa, and Rano implied the closing of the frontier with ribats. The newer towns constructed in this era often followed a uniform plan, suggestive of state or official planning. They were often built in the open plain while others, at major crossroads for trade, became administrative centers for taxation and cheap labor for Sharifa and Kumbari.[13] Thus, it is possible that Borno’s intervention in Kano was due to the latter’s operations along its eastern frontier and the creation of fortified settlements. This theory is more persuasive than that of the firearms in Kano, although the two are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, Borno’s response was likely motivated by increased attempts at centralization by Kano’s rulers as well as ensuring Kano’s access to firearms did not upset the regional balance of power.

But what was accomplished by Borno’s intervention in Kano in c. 1734? According to some sources, the conflict with Kano likely reverberated across Hausaland with Bornoan intervention beyond. Although the Kano Chronicle does not report the outcome, other sources highly affirm the notion of Borno’s ruler reestablishing Kano as a vassal state (even if only symbolic).[14] The Gazetteer of Kano Province reports that the mai  had issued an ultimatum to Kano: he would burn the city unless tribute was paid.[15] Others suggest that Borno overran other parts of Hausaland at this time, too. Although corroborating evidence is lacking, Hogben and Kirk-Greene wrote of the many Kanuri links in Zaria. For instance, the office of Limamin Kona was reserved to a family of Borno origin. Other Bornoan emissaries or officials in Zaria could potentially be linked to this episode, such as the Madalla.[16] Another source, the Abuja Chronicle, dates the Beriberi (Kanuri) of Borno attacking Hausaland to 1734, with Zaria paying tribute to Borno.[17] Other evidence for this is lacking, but it is certainly possible that Borno’s actions in Kano in c. 1734 also impacted Zaria and other Hausa states, particularly in the reassertion of a claim by Borno to regional hegemony. To what extent Borno may have also used Gobir to influence events in Hausaland is unclear, but Gobir during the reign of Babari (c. 1741-69?) attacked Bornoan territory at Shirra.[18] Ultimately, a resurgence of Bornoan claims to regional supremacy and tribute may have been won from Kano and Zaria during the c. 1734 campaign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

Mandara, Bagirmi and the East

In addition to the Kano campaign, which appears to have been a success, Borno’s relations with Bagirmi during this time appear favorable for the former. Bagirmi was forced to submit to the authority of Borno during the reign of mbang Lahoual (or Alahouine). In the words of H. Lanier, “En 1741, attaqué par le sultan de Bornou, il fut vaincu et dut se soumettre à la souveraineté de ce pays.” [19] Although Bagirmi was able to throw off the yoke of Borno during the reign of Hadji (dated c. 1741-1784 by Lanier) and end Borno’s claims to sovereignty of the kingdom, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was apparently successful in Bagirmi. Likewise, the rihla mentions Bagirmi as one area where the Sayfawa mai traveled on the pilgrimage. If the problematic source is incorrectly attributing the hajj along the Sudan Road to Ali b. Umar but actually describing a pilgrimage of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, then Bagirmi was allegedly one of the areas where the Sayfawa ruler settled 5000 captives in 1727/8.[20] This act of establishing settlements in Bagirmi could be partly motivated by a desire to facilitate travel for pilgrims using the Sudan Road in the 18^th century. Furthermore, it also served to emphasize the power of the Sayfawa ruler whose act of establishing towns or villages in other kingdoms was an assertion of Borno’s influence and power in the Central Sudan.

Naturally, the highly problematic account of the 1727/8 pilgrimage must be interpreted very carefully. But it is consistent with the actions of the Sayfawa in the first half of the 18^th century who may have successfully imposed tributary relations on Bagirmi. In fact, it may also have been during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun that the “Kurata” or Tunjur Arabs in Kanem sent their leader to Borno for confirmation of his position. This may explain why the praise song to this mai names the Kurata among the captives of the mai.[21] The actions of the Sayfawa mai in Bagirmi are perhaps to be expected with similar developments in Kanem which may have included greater control of the Tunjur in Kanem who usually resisted the alifa at Mao.[22] In short, Borno may have succeeded in establishing firmer control of Kanem (which was to become a major battleground in the 19^th century) as well as imposed tribute on Bagirmi whilst protecting its influence over various polities south of Lake Chad.

Besides Bagirmi and the eastern shores of Lake Chad, Mandara was also another arena of conflict for Borno. The previously mentioned Rihla even claims “Ali b. Umar” (although the dates used in the document align with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun) died in Krowrowa, which appears to be Kerawa, once a capital of Mandara. This problematic source asserts, “He raided Krowrowa and died there in Krowrowa where his grave is visited.”[23] This is contradicted by the Diwan, which indicates that Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in Gazargamo.[24] In spite of these contradictions and inaccuracies, the text does seem to be accurate in referring to conflict with Mandara during the first half of the 18^th century, before Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama’s disastrous campaign in the 1780s. According to Barkindo, the Islamization of Mandara in the early 1700s was supported by Borno. In fact, Dunama b. Ali (c. 1696-1715) was said to have sent Islamic scholars to Mandara. Tradition in Mora of Mandara’s conversion to Islam during the reign of Bukar Aji (who reigned c. 1715-1737) even suggests he grew up in Borno and was sent to Mandara after Borno had the previous ruler killed. Interestingly, Bukar Aji is also said to have taken the title of mai and remodelled his court on that of Borno. Tradition also asserts that Bukar Aji and his successor sent regular gifts of tribute to Borno. Even Hamdun b. Dunama reciprocated, sending a personal Quran to Bukar Aji.[25]

Yet despite Borno’s role in the ascent of Mandara’s first Muslim king, occasional conflict occurred. To Lavers, serious trouble with Mandara occurred during the reigns of al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama and Muhammad b. Hamdun, who both fought Mandara.[26] It would seem that Mandara’s allegiance to Borno depended on the proximity of Borno’s army. So even the spiritual authority or stature of the Sayfawa and the renown some maiwa achieved as pious figures was not sufficient to ensure the loyalty of Mandara. In this case, Mandara’s now Muslim kings were likely eager to benefit from expansion and raiding, when possible, the vulnerable tributary polities of Borno. Though it does not seem likely that Hamdun b. Dunama or Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in a war with Mandara, the existence of conflict between the two states points to a problem which only grew during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. But for now, Borno was able to meet the challenge, at least based on available evidence. Moreover, the period of Aji Bukar and Madi Makiya’s reigns, c. 1715-1751, also coincided with the immigration of Bornoan settlers in Mandara. Their presence also necessitated the assertion of Sayfawa rule or authority that may have caused conflict with Mandara’s kings who saw these settlers as their subjects.[27] But, Mandara’s kings accepted Borno’s right to tax many towns in the northern part of its domains until c. 1751 and Borno continued to raid parts of Mandara despite receiving gifts and tribute from Aji Bukar and Madi Makiyya, the latter possibly the son of a Kanuri woman.[28] This level of Bornoan influence in the affairs of Mandara may have also been motivated by the interests of the Bornoan elite to expand and protect their influence in the south while the north was challenged by population movements due to prolonged drought and climate change.

Internal Dynamics in Borno

In terms of internal affairs and domestic concerns, the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was challenged by ecological shifts, migration, and famine. Indeed, a famine that persisted for 2 years occurred during his reign.[29] The last several years of his reign coincided with a drought that lasted from 1738-1753. Due to this period of long-lasting drought, various groups such as the Jetko, Tubu, Tuareg, Koyam, and Fulani migrated to more fertile lands, thereby increasing the chances for conflict over scarce resources in difficult times.[30] Despite these challenges, Borno was still in control of Bilma. The Bedde, however, were beginning to act autonomously in the 18^th century and disrupt caravan routes.

In the face of these challenges, the Bornoan state was still able to continue past Sayfawa practices such as the sponsoring of elite brick structures. At the site of Lergam, for instance, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun is remembered for sponsoring the construction of a brick building for what was likely a palace enclosure. According to Wilhelm Seidensticker, “The name of the founder of the palace was given as Mohammed Ajimi, who can be considered identical with Muhammad b. al-Haji Hamdun (ca. 1731-1747).”[31] Located 31 kilometers west of Geidam and on the northern banks of the Komadugu Yobe, today the site lacks any visible evidence of bricks except for a few from what was presumably the wall of the palace enclosure. Magnavita also described the site of Lergam, reporting that Lergam was also known as Kirishadam, referring to the largest refuse mound. Although the area was only an estimated 250 by 250 meters, Lergam appears to have been built by the mai as a temporary residence.[32] Like Gambaru built in the 16^th century, Lergam indicates that a Sayfawa ruler was still able to support elite architecture using brick well into the 1700s.

 Likewise, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also supported the creation of new towns or settlements, including Kurnawa or Dalaturi. Kurnawa, according to J.R. Patterson’s Borsari District Assessment Report, was founded by a Mandara slave named Haji Amadu. This Mandara captive of the Borno mai, Momadu Haji, was given his freedom upon his return from Mecca. Subsequently, he left Birni Gazargamo and founded Kurnawa with his followers. His descendants later ruled the town.[33] This act demonstrates the role of the Sayfawa and their captives or dependents in the administration and the creation of new settlements. The praise song to this mai also emphasizes his power to redistribute and relocate people:

You son of Aji, can collect or disperse people at your will

And turn again, and make a town (with those you have dispersed)

You are the scourge of Jillam, Dalla Darge and Dakkinam Dalla Damaram

Some towns are founded during the cold season of the year

But some of yours have been founded as the result of your victories, Aji Gana the Intriguer[34]

 

Many of these places are difficult to identify, but the implication is rather clear: the mai possessed great authority through the control of people, including the relocation of dependents or subjects to create new towns. Additionally, he was able to found towns through his military victories. Since the conventions of the praise song may lead to exaggeration, one must use this type of material very cautiously. Even though the general image of the authority of the maiwa in this period is supported by conflict with Mandara (possibly related to Bornoan settlers in parts of Mandara), the possible settlement of slaves in parts of Bagirmi and Wadai, and the creation of Kurnawa as a prosperous town.

            Finally, the domestic religious policies and political choices made by Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun were also significant. He was the first mai to invite Shaykh Tahir b. Ibrahim to Gazargamo. This shaykh later played a prominent role in Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). His father, Hamdun, was also remembered as a scholar in Borno tradition who had studied at al-Azhar in Cairo.[35] Hamdun was also said to have written 12 copies of the Quran and placed himself in ritual seclusion.[36] His son, whose pilgrimage to Mecca is still up for debate, may have been similarly pious but was also more likely to have engaged in military campaigns. Yet he also included respected Muslim leaders such as a Masbarma in his retinue during the c. 1734 campaign against Kano. He also listened to Kano mallams to end that conflict, again suggestive of how essential Islam was to state ideology and administrative practices of the Sayfawa court. He likely benefitted from the caliphal status of the Sayfawa whose pious sanctity was acknowledged widely, while also simultaneously endeavoring to recover or restore Borno’s economic and political hegemony.

Conclusion

Despite the paucity of written sources that directly speak to the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, enough material exists to reconsider this reign. Whilst the Late Sayfawa Period unquestionably included decline, it is very misleading or inaccurate to portray the last century of effective Sayfawa rule as merely one of indolent or secluded maiwa who passively responded to the changing political, economic, intellectual and ecological landscapes. Through the Kano campaign in the 1730s, interventions in Mandara and Bagirmi, the possible support for the Sudan Road for pilgrims, Borno remained a significant contender in the region. Similarly, the sponsoring of new towns and brick architecture as an expression of elite authority reveal the strength of Borno’s ruling dynasty. In other words, all was not immediately lost for the Sayfawa maiwa until the second half of the 18^th century. Undeniably, the prolonged drought and population movements from 1738-1753 and the burgeoning power of the Kel Ewey in Kawar, as well as favorable shifts in power relations that benefitted Mandara, Bagirmi, and Wadai eventually did weaken Borno’s claims to regional hegemony. Yet assertive and dynamic leaders did exist in the 18^th century. The reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, poorly documented as it is, illustrates this dynamic leadership of the Late Sayfawa Period.

---

[1] Dierk Lange, whose masterful study of this source remains unsurpassed, has illustrated how it can be corroborated by a number of external and internal sources on the history of Kanem and Borno. Whether or not the form that survives is an abbreviated version of a much longer chronicle is unknown, but it at least helps in constructing a mostly accurate timeline for the political history of the Sayfawa maiwa.

[2] The Kano Chronicle is hardly free of anachronisms, inaccuracies, omissions, or additional textual problems. There is a great danger in relying too heavily on it to reconstruct the history of Kano and Hausaland, but it can also be corroborated by various external sources that are suggestive of an at least generally accurate chronology.

[3] See Behique Dunama, “A Sayfawa Hajj in c. 1728” for an early attempt at reconciling this source with the mainstream of historical sources on the Sayfawa, https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/a-sayfawa-hajj-in-c1728.html.

[4] This source requires much deeper textual analysis and a new translation. It may also refer to an attack on Kerawa, a capital of Mandara, that could have taken place during the reign of Ali b. Umar, Dunama b. Ali, or al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama. It problematically refers to the Sudan in a seemingly modern way, too.

[5] It is not always clear from where and by whom H.R. Palmer derived his information. Nonetheless, the tradition strongly supports the identification of the Sayfawa mai who attacked Kano in the 1730s or so with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

[6] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 253.

[7] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks” in Nilo-Saharan. Proceedings of the First Nilo-Saharan Linguistics Colloquium, Leiden September 8–10, 242.

[8] This specific example refers to a problematic passage in H.R. Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan. In describing Ali b. Umar’s campaign against the Tuareg of Air, Palmer adds narrative elaboration in which a Kel Etti woman sought Ali b. Umar’s aid at the same time he was in the midst of a Mandara campaign. See Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 247.

[9] H.R. Palmer, “Kano Chronicle,” 90.

[10] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 10. Without elucidating his evidence, Louis Brenner has argued that Shehu Tahir was Muhammad b. al-Tahir b. Ibrahim al-Fallati, a known Fulbe scholar in Borno. See “Three Fulbe Scholars in Borno,” 107.

[11] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 111.

[12] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, 203.

[13] Murray Last, “From Sultanate to Caliphate: Kano c. 1450-1800” in Studies in the History of Kano, 83-84.

[14] See M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350-1950.

[15] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 9.

[16] Kirk-Greene & Hogben, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions, 219.

[17] Alhaji Hassan and Shuaibu Na’ibi, Abuja Chronicle, 14.

[18] Shaykh Dan Tafa, Rawdat’l-Afkaar.

[19] H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française No. 10 (1925), 460-461.

[20] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage, 397.

[21] “The Kurata Arabs in the Kanem towns are your slaves.” H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[22] For an admittedly speculative look at this period, see Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html.

[23] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage: An historical study with special reference to the nineteenth century, 399.

[24] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan des sultans du Kanem-Bornu : chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 82.

[25] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 132-134, 145.

[26] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808,” 203.

[27] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902, 145.

[28] On the possible Kanuri parentage of Madi Makiya, see H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 98.

[29] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan, 82.

[30] For an overview of this period and the impact of the prolonged drought, see Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty.

[31] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks,” 242.

[32] Carlos Magnavita, “Short report of a visit to the archaeological sites of Lergam and Garu Kime, Geidam L.G.A., Yobe State of Nigeria,” Borno Museum Society Newsletter 76.

[33] J.R. Patterson, “Assessment Report on Borsari District, Bornu Emirate, Bornu Province” (1918).

[34] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[35] Hamidu Bobboyi, The 'Ulama of Borno: A Study of the Relations between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808, 22, 29.

[36] Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty, 299.