Muhammad Nur Alkali's Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty is a vastly important work in the history of one of Africa's greatest royal dynasties. Existing for probably over 1000 years, the dynasty succeeded to build a strong state in an environmentally challenged zone. Later, they survived disintegrating forces to reemerge from their new, more secure base, Borno, as the dominant power of the Central Sudan. It's rulers were renowned for undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca, sponsoring Islamic scholarship, and for occupying a central role in trans-Saharan and Sudanic trade routes for centuries. Nur Alkali's careful history of the dynasty, which benefits from his local connections and familiarity with Kanuri language and unpublished sources by local Borno scholars, is mainly marred by poor editing. This, sadly, occasionally hinders understanding and is a shame. Nur Alkali's explanation for the Sayfawa dynasty's decline in the 18th century is also unconvincing or incomplete. The spread of Sufism within the state, for instance, is never elucidated, and the reader is still somewhat confused about the author's argument for the growing autonomy of provinces and territorial chiefs within the Empire. Nonetheless, this work, despite its age as a 1970s dissertation, is foundational for its delicate balance of written and oral sources, plus Nur Alkali's judicious analysis of these sources to create a complete narrative of the Sayfawa maiwa.
One of the best features of the book, although also depressing, is the reference to unpublished and important studies by local Borno intellectuals. For instance, Ibrahim Imam was the author of an unpublished work, Peoples of Bornu, that is cited repeatedly by Alkali. It is a pity the work was never published since its author was a Kanuri person with elite connections who interviewed people from different backgrounds/social classes about history, genealogies, etc. While colonial-era administrators like Palmer did similar things, Palmer lacked the deeper familiarity and experience with the local languages and cultures and undoubtedly introduced his own colonialist and racist biases. Alkali also cites some other unpublished works, including ones from an elder shaykh's family library, Sheikh Abubakar El-Miskin. Obviously, we lack the ability to read such texts in Arabic, Kanuri or West African languages, but it is a shame some of these texts were never published or translated into English and French. For instance, an important Kitab by Muhammad Yanbu remains unpublished, while a study and translation of another of his texts remains inaccessible. These sources are of great importance for shedding light on local traditions of historiography and scholarship, which may be at risk of loss due to the ravages of time.
Moving on to Alkali's analysis of Kanem, or the first phase in the Sayfawa's history, our historian favors environmental/ecological understandings for the decline of Sayfawa power in the 1200s and 1300s. He also favored a divine kingship model for the pre-Islamic Sayfawa rulers, although "sacral" rather than divine kingship might be more applicable in this context. And despite the conversion to Islam, there was continuity in the "sacral" nature of kingship that was promoted further by Islamic study, pilgrimage, and devotion after Islamization of the dynasty. Nonetheless, the Sayfawa were able to unite various clans and establish a firm power base in Kanem. Through control of Kawar and trans-Saharan trade, plus ties to Egypt and the East, Kanem emerged as a major power in the Central Sudan during its Kanem phase. However, the apogee of medieval Kanem was quickly followed by decline after the reign of Dunama Dibalemi. Nur Alkali here prefers environmentalist explanations that center on the growing competition for increasingly scare resources. Imperial overexpansion under Dunama plus the decline of conditions in Kanem caused by the increasingly arid conditions led to conflict, civil strife, rebellious princes, and the near-disintegration of the empire. Nur Alkali is probably on firm ground here, as studies by subsequent researchers have pointed to dry periods and the further desiccation of the Sahel that must have contributed to the decline of living conditions in Kanem as sedentary agriculturalists and nomadic groups completed for resources. The reference to Muhammad Yanbu attributing the opening of the Mune by Dunama to the nefarious influence of Egyptians is also fascinating, although possibly a tradition from centuries later that did not accurately reflect what transpired. Nonetheless, that later generations of Borno scholars believed Egyptian intervention may have played a role in the destabilizing of Kanem suggests the Sayfawa maiwa may have been seen as a potential threat by leading powers of the Muslim East.
Miraculously, however, the Sayfawa dynasty survived the century or so of political instability and strife after Dunama Dibalemi's reign. The houses of Idris and Dawud battling for the throne, scheming kaigamas and wars or battles with the Bulala, Sao (spelled Sau by Nur Alkali) and Judham Arabs did not lead to the complete collapse of the dynasty. Yet, realizing how unsustainable Kanem was and the ongoing conflict with the Bulala, the Sayfawa wisely made the decision to relocate to Borno as the center of the Empire. According to Nur Alkali, Borno was an excellent choice for rebuilding the Sayfawa state. Here, in a rich agricultural plain favorably situated for trade with both North Africa and across the Sudanic belt, the Sayfawa were able to reestablish their power through a period of consolidation, expansion and, in the 18th century, decline. Borno, whose "Sao" and other non-Kanuri groups were not completely subjugated until the reign of Idris b. Ali in the late 1500s, was nonetheless a favorable environment for agriculture, leather, textiles, salt trade, the slave trade, and the growth of towns and cities, like Birni Gazargamo. Borno, in short, provided a firmer foundation for the next apogee of the Sayfawa dynasty, one built on a more stable base that did not quickly collapse as the case of Kanem.
As one would expect, much of the book is spent on the important reigns of mais like Ali Gaji, Idris b. Ali, Umar b. Idris, and Ali b. Umar as major figures in the development of Sayfawa's power. These rulers also exemplified certain trends of state-building and political philosophy that reflected Islamic influences as well as local factors deeply rooted in the dynasty. Unlike Nur Alkali, we would suggest the Sayfawa retained many aspects of their pre-Islamic roots, particularly those which enhanced the status of the mai. Yet, under the periods of expansion and consolidation in the 1500s and 1600s, Borno embraced new ideas, military tactics and weaponry (firearms, for instance), and administrative reforms to integrate non-Kanuri peoples into the state. This remarkable achievement led to a period of longer-lasting hegemony and regional preeminence for Borno, which saw its influence spread deeply across the Central Sudan and the effective reconquest of Kanem, it's ancient heartland. Rulers like Umar b. Idris appear to have strengthened or consolidated the gains of the 16th century by incorporating, as in the case of Muniyo, a Mandara prince as a loyal agent of the state. Additional provincial officials were appointed and incorporated into a complex administrative system that improved defenses while preserving a predominant role of the central state for ensuring additional military support in the provinces.That said, one is surprised by some of Nur Alkali's conclusions. For instance, he expressed skepticism about the presence of Turkish mercenary gunners in the army of Idris b. Ali during the 1570s. That struck us as an unfair conclusion, particularly as Ahmad b. Furtu would have been well-informed and certainly able to distinguish Turks, Arabs, and others. In addition, some of Idris b. Ali's campaigns in and near Borno itself were not mentioned, since the author focused on the campaigns against the Sao and Ngizim. That seems to have been a mistake, since understanding Borno's relations with the Tuareg in the 1600s and 1700s would have benefitted from an analysis of Tuareg groups raiding Borno's frontier in the 1500s. This was clearly a longstanding problem in the region, and almost certainly one in which the sultans at Agades likely had little or no control over.
As previously mentioned, we are not sure his explanation for the decline of the Sayfawa in the 1700s is convincing or complete. The period of decline, which he states began as early as the late 17th century but really developed over the course of the 18th, was attributed to a gradual loss of Sayfawa or Central control of territorial chiefs and rulers, like the Galtima (galadima?). This process is not exactly clear, although this may reflect our limited sources on this era. It is clear that some provincial officials began to ignore the Mai in Gazargamo while other peoples, like the Bade, resumed their semi-autonomous state. Meanwhile, the conflicts with the Tuareg did not end, as Borno lost, in c.1759, the lucrative Saharan site of Bilma. In addition, a drought in the 1740s triggered more southward migration of nomadic groups like the Tubu, Koyam and Jotko, who were not easily controlled by the Sayfawa. Unfortunately, we are still in the dark about why exactly the central government began to lose control of provincial chiefs and officials. And why this process led to a decline in military effectiveness that would be necessary to reassert Sayfawa control. Was it due to an abandonment of an expansionist foreign policy? In a disappointing way, Nur Alkali's final chapters seem to echo the problematic views of Urvoy, who see in the Late Sayfawa Period a series of weak rulers more focused on Islamic piety and study than the ordeals of effective state management or policy. Of course, this portrayal could be accurate, but it seems quite incomplete and does not adequately explain why the administrative system of fiefs, territorial divisions and military defenses severely declined across the 18th century. Undoubtedly, the famine years were likely an important factor. Tuareg raids and the loss of Bilma certainly contributed, too. But something else must have been occurring during the "Late Sayfawa Period" to hasten this decline. This decline, perhaps best epitomized by Mai Ali's disastrous 1781 campaign against Mandara, revealed just how much decay or rot infested the state. References to written sources seem to affirm this idea of corruption and decay, too, if the poems of al-Tahir (died c.1776) and other intellectuals are any indication. But surely there remains much room in future scholarship to entangle what caused the decline of the Sayfawa political system in the 18th century.
To conclude his study, Nur Alkali briefly elucidates the rise of conflicts with the Fulani in western and southern Borno as well as the rise of al-Kanemi (though quite briefly). We are in complete agreement with Nur Alkali on the primarily political nature of the conflict with the Fulani, rather than religious factors being important for understanding Borno's conflicts with Sokoto. We also find it unlikely that Muhammad Bello's account is very reliable, although he should still be seriously considered in light of local Borno sources referring to corruption and internal problems in Borno during the 18th century. But one was hoping for a history of the Sayfawa that chronicled their later years of decline, as al-Kanemi increasingly sidelined them and became the effective head of government. What was the Sayfawa court like in those days, as it was reduced to figurehead status and dependence on al-Kanemi for its very survival of the Fulani attacks? One suspects that those depressing twilight years from c.1808-1846 involved factors that might have been unsavory to elites of Borno in the 20th century. Yet understanding those crucial decades might elucidate our struggle to make sense of the pre-Shehu years of Borno and why, according to Barth and others, records of the Sayfawa dynasty may have been destroyed or obfuscated. That complex, ambivalent legacy seems very relevant for an understanding of the historiography of Borno and how one dynasty supplanted and later erased the one whose very existence had been central in the history of Kanem and Borno. Although it does appear that many notables from the Sayfawa period were incorporated into the al-Kanemi dynasty's system, which inherited and maintained many aspects of the previous system, there likely were a series of conflicts over power and legacy which shaped how the history of the Sayfawa is remembered in the 20th and 21st centuries.
In summation, Nur Alkali's study is a major one that highlights a number of local sources, traditions, and perspectives on one of the world's great royal dynasties. While the explanatory power of the later chapters on Borno's decline leave something to be desired, this is an excellent overview of the complex history of a major dynasty. The familiar problems of sources is a huge barrier for the early period in the dynasty's history, before Islamization in the late 11th century. Nonetheless, Nur Alkali adroitly draws from oral traditions and written sources to develop a plausible model for the Sayfawa dynasty's rise and fall in Kanem. While we take issue with the portrayal of the pre-Hume Mais as divine kings, his analysis of Kanem's decline after its zenith under Dunama Dibalemi is persuasive. Today, with the benefits of more archaeological excavations and new interpretations of the old sources, one can undeniably improve upon this. But, one should pursue the theory proposed by Muhammad Yanbu on Egyptian interference influencing Dunama Dibalemi's behavior with regard to the Mune. Likewise, scholars today must reexamine the 18th century in Borno, trying to find and publish any texts from that era and studying family papers, manuscripts, and texts that have survived. Lastly, a serious analysis of the role of slavery and the slave trade in the history of Kanem-Borno is a must. Nur Alkali largely ignores slavery, though sources suggest captives were the most valued commodity of the Sayfawa state in trans-Saharan commerce. Local agriculture, textiles, leather products, and salt were probably of greater importance for sources of revenue and in terms of the state's trade with other Sudanic peoples (Hausaland, Kwararafa, Kanem, Bagirmi, etc.), but slave labor contributed to this to some degree. While probably on a smaller scale than the prevalent system of slavery in the 19th century Sokoto Caliphate, any attempt at developing a deeper understanding of the social and economic history of Kanem-Borno must treat the issue of slavery more deeply.
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