Haiti in the New World Order

Alex Dupuy's Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution is one of those studies we should have read several years ago. Probably should have been done around the same time we read Dupuy's book on Aristide, but this one has the benefit of being written in the 1990s and focusing entirely on the first term of Aristide and how his eventual return to Haiti to complete that term was related to US foreign policy and neoliberal structural adjustments in a post-Cold War world. As Dupuy convincingly outlines in the early chapters, the new world order of neoliberal reforms promoted by the US, IMF, World Bank, and USAID would not have favored development for countries like Haiti and would not have alleviated the misery of the population. 

However, even a liberal capitalist state would have represented progress over the prebendary Haitian state and could have won over a share of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, one can see how the very conditions in which Aristide was allowed to return to Haiti after the first coup diminished the left-leaning social democratic agenda of Lavalas while recognizing how it deviated from Cold War-era US interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (which usually involved intervention against leftist or left-leaning governments and support for military dictatorships). Aristide's first term must be contextualized in the new era in US foreign policy as well as the years of pro-democracy activism and struggles in Haiti since the fall of Duvalier in 1986. 

Reading Dupuy's book and thinking about his later analysis of Aristide as a politician who never relinquished the robe of the prophet for the clothes of the prince, one cannot help but feel Haiti may have been better off with Aristide remaining outside of formal politics. His real charisma and footwork for political, economic, and social changes in the 1980s was perhaps squandered or misdirected by his decision to run for president. Perhaps he really think believe it was a messianic or mystical relationship he enjoyed with the Haitian people and God was calling him to run to create a newer, better Haiti with dignified poverty instead of abject poverty most Haitians survive under. 

But his political and tactical errors of resisting a broad left coalition in government, employing threatening rhetoric against the bourgeoisie (which already hated or opposed him), his failure to thoroughly condemn violence or political mobs, and the "deal with the Devil" he agreed with to be returned to office almost ensured an unpleasant end to his political career. Just imagine if he had remained outside of formal politics but supported a broader left-leaning coalition that, while still facing pressure from the military, the haute bourgeoisie, and the US, was able to build a moderately progressive growth with equity economic policy for Haiti? Just imagine if the institutions and practice of democracy had been given the chance to actually develop and Aristide, as an outsider of the formal political process, could have used his charisma and influence to support this trend?

Perhaps it is naïve on our part to think the Duvalierist old guard and neo-Duvalierists would have ever agreed to this, but the last 36 years in Haiti have been a constant struggle for building democratic institutions and stability. The US role in this failed transition seems quite clear, and the old Duvalierists did not disappear since they played a role in 2004 and Martelly's presidency. We just wish Haiti could get a "do-over" for the last few decades, although it would be difficult to see huge progress made in Haiti becoming a "developed" or industrialized country. Perhaps things didn't have to become this bad, with the breakdown of the state, immiseration of the population, proliferation of gangs (and the Aristide years contributed to this), continued drug trafficking, fraudulent elections, and common human rights violations. When will Haiti's next chance for a democratic transition or something else to escape the current cycle present itself?

For Whom the Dogs Spy

Although Raymond Joseph's occasionally oversized ego mars the text, For Whom the Dogs Spy is a breezy read on 50 years of political change and conflict in Haiti. Beginning with his time in Radio Vonvon and the New York-based Haiti Observateur, Joseph chronicles his experience inside and outside of Haitian politics. The underground resistance Radio Vonvon was directed against Duvalier and relied on local informants for radio coverage and criticism of the Duvalier dictatorship. Then, with like-minded Haitians critical of the regime but not Communists, Joseph was part of the group that launched Haiti Observateur, which continued the criticism of the dictatorship that was inherited by Baby Doc. 

Joseph then transitioned to the Wall Street Journal before formally getting involved in Haiti politics as a diplomat. Much of the book is full of anecdotes about his role or contributions to helping Haiti, such as getting HOPE through Congress, making it easier for Préval to meet with Clintons or the appropriate powerful US figures, or his leadership role in defending the image of Haiti after the disastrous 2010 earthquake and securing international aid. Joseph clearly helped to combat Haiti's bad press and tried to combat corruption, inefficiency, and lack of transparency in Haiti's diplomatic staff. There is much to admire here.

Undoubtedly, Raymond Joseph accomplished much in his professional, political and personal lives. Unfortunately, we were sometimes wondering if his braggadocio style might obfuscate more nuanced events or meetings that took place. There was also a surprisingly light critique of Aristide that relied on some extreme language. It was clear that Joseph was not a fan of Lavalas, but to dismiss him as a terrorist because of his past rhetoric displayed a lack of the deeper analysis he exhibited in chapters on the Duvaliers, Préval, and Martelly, whose strongman presidency is covered by the final chapters of the text. We also wonder how Joseph feels today now that his cousin Wyclef's charity has been exposed and the Haiti is arguably in far worse conditions today. 

His several chapters on the ways in which Martelly avoided holding elections, intimidated and threatened the press, gave a pass to kidnappers and drug dealers, and engaged in unbridled public corruption and embezzlement with the tacit approval of the "international community" clearly paved the road to the Hell of Haiti after the assassination of Martelly's successor. Perhaps because of his own political orientation and relationships with powerful US politicians, their role in supporting or cosigning the calamitous, undemocratic elections and transitions have led to the miasma of today. Nonetheless, we hope Joseph writes another book on his experiences in Haiti's troubled democratic transition and the legacy of Duvalierism. Too often one finds young Haitians who believe Duvalier was Haiti at its best, or they have never been taught the darker chapters in their history of repression, state terror, and violence under Papa Doc and Baby Doc. 

Charlie Rose and the 2004 Coup

Now that Aristide is in the news again for being placed under house arrest, let's watch this video (and the second part) about the 2004 coup in Haiti that unseated Aristide. It's interesting but of course expected to see how Mark Foley and the US Ambassador to Haiti tote the line for the official US stance on what exactly happened without incriminating the US at all. Needless to say, I am more in agreement with Montas and Sachs, particularly in how the US curtailed the numbers of options and policies Aristide's presidency could implement. 

Aristide and the Endless Revolution

After reading Alex Dupuy and Robert Fatton regarding the rise and fall or Aristide, the documentary Aristide and the Endless Revolution comes off as an attempt to place the blame for the 2004 coup overwhelmingly on foreign intervention and imperialism, mainly from the US. Aristide and his supporters are often interviewed and taken at face value, whereas Dupuy and Fatton have a more nuanced perspective that emphasizes internal dynamics and factors, including some of Aristide's own problematic political actions and unattractive tendencies well aligned with Duvalierist practices. This is not to say that Aristide was entirely responsible for the 2004 coup, he was, as Fatton makes clear in The Roots of Haitian Despotism, quite acquiescent to foreign demands and even willing to concede some power to the opposition in 2004 in a compromise the opposition did not have to agree to because of US backing.

So, this documentary serves the opposite function, I suppose, of placing the 2004 coup in a broader international perspective that places the emphasis on US economic crippling of Aristide and support for the Haitian opposition. Undoubtedly, the role played by the US ensured the demise of Aristide's presidency, since it certainly weakened Haitian institutions by refusing to allow any aid to Aristide's government, as well as providing funds, arms, and support to the disbanded military and Haitian elites hell-bent on imposing a coup. However, unlike Dupuy and Fatton, the documentary overlooks how Aristide lost much legitimacy with the middle-classes and poor of Haiti for escalating violence, or even Aristide turning his back on some of the more populist and left-wing social programs he favored in his first presidency. Fatton states that as soon as Aristide agreed to a US invasion to reinstall his presidency in the 90's, he basically signed on to agree to anything the US expected him to do, which meant changing his stance on sweatshops, and abandoning some of the more populist and class-infused rhetoric of his early forays into organizing and politics.

In addition, the documentary interviews US attorneys and proponents of Aristide who deny all claims that Aristide or his government funded or used urban gangs and crime to retain power, something Fatton and Dupuy argue was likely true. If not, Dupuy and Fatton seem to concur that Aristide lost legitimacy to Haitians for being allegedly involved in the gang violence, or for being unable to control it. The documentary qualifies that observation, however, by revealing how the US economic embargo to the Aristide government included a prohibition on police equipment or supplies, which would have strengthened the National Police as well as provided additional funding for civil servants, infrastructure, government departments, and social programs. Thus, part of the reason Aristide was gradually losing more and more control was due to constraints on his administration from Washington. However, I was surprised to hear some pro-Aristide commentators in the film criticize Aristide for disbanding the army, the very same institution that has weakened democracy and the development of a stronger, inclusive civil society. If by internal security, one means strengthening the police to control gang violence and to have defended the administration from the small rebels who unseated Aristide, then I suppose that makes sense.

One thing that threw me off was the mention of Aristide asking France to repay the indemnity Haiti was coerced to accept for diplomatic recognition from France in 1825 and 1838. I was not sure how relevant it was unless one takes for face value the somewhat 'conspiratorial' claims by Ira Kurzban, that France's consul stole legal documents from Aristide's government which were going to be used in a very strong case against France for repayment of the indemnity. I suppose it was huge for the time, and even I recall hearing about it in the news back in 2003, but France's role in the 2004 seems negligible, even though I am sure Chirac's government was not fond of Aristide. Anyway, bringing up the long history of debt in Haiti probably provided another opportunity to place the blame for Haitain poverty on additional foreign powers besides the US, which clearly played the largest role in the downfall of Aristide. Indeed, Roger Noriega is interviewed accusing Aristide of ruling through lawlessness, criminality, and murder, despite presenting any evidence whatsoever, just as some Haitian elites are interviewed saying Aristide was undemocratic because in the 2000 parliamentary election, some seats were given to Lavalas without proper run-off elections (despite Aristide sending a letter to the election monitoring team from OAS that he would agree to a run-off race for those contested seats).

Clearly, this documentary features extensive interviews with a wide variety of people (including Aristide, who goes so far as to label the 2004 coup and its aftermath as 'genocide' for the targeting of Lavalas supporters by the disbanded military and interim government, a claim verified by the human rights lawyers' investigations, as well as Dupuy and Fatton) who offer differing interpretations of the 2004 coup. As a documentary, the message of the film is severely limited by its medium, unlike Fatton and Dupuy, whose texts on the prebendary Haitian state or the fall of Aristide are far more detailed, likely took advantage of sources that were not available in 2005 (the year the documentary was released), as well as offer a more nuanced interpretation that certainly raises some troubling questions about Aristide's adherence to a long tradition of Haitian authoritarianism, messianic leadership, use of parastatal forces, and corruption. This is not to say the documentary does not have value, because it reveals some new facts, gives useful interviews with key players in the background to the coup, including Aristide, his lawyer, Roger Noriega, and US officials and representatives, but it lacks the requisite complexity of academic analyses and ignores local factors. In conjunction with academic literature, however, the documentary is quite useful and eye-opening. Besides, anything that sheds light on the 2004 coup goes a long way into explaining the events that led to the catastrophic earthquake of 2010 and persistent trends in US relations with the Caribbean and Latin America.

Dupuy's The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, The International Community, and Haiti

After finally reading The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community, and Haiti by Wesleyan professor Alex Dupuy, I have a better understanding of what has transpired in recent memory in Haiti. The narrative is quite 'fresh' to me, given my background on Aristide from my mom's pro-Aristide relatives in the 1990s and the US leftist interpretation on the two coups against Aristide (each one supported by Washington) that I received from Democracy Now and other sources. Naturally, things are far more complex than the Bush administration simply forcing Aristide out of power, a process more fully detailed by Dupuy's coverage of the 'hybrid' character of Aristide's presidencies (authoritarian and democratic, condoning violence and corruption, but cloaked in a rhetoric of social democracy, poorly planned verbal attacks on the bourgeoisie and wealthy elite behind the opposition, and Aristide's early messianic stature among the dispossessed masses).

Dupuy, like say, Noam Chomsky or Democracy Now's coverage of recent Haitian history, places the quest for democratization in a broader context of US, French, and Canadian imperialism, but unlike them (and in a fashion, reminding me of a Chilean professor of mine who emphasized domestic factors in the coup that ended Salvador Allende's presidency), emphasizes local Haitian contradictions within Aristide's administrations and the tradition of the Haitian prebendary state (Dupuy's term for what another scholar refers to as the 'predatory' Haitian state, or what Trouillot likened to the Haitian state against the nation) that led to the downfall of Aristide on two occasions, in his first term in the early 1990s and again in 2004.

So, yes, of course US imperialism and Western-controlled flow of economic aid forced Aristide into negotiations with the opposition (which proved itself only interested in forcing Aristide out of office both times), but Aristide's poorly organized Lavalas party (lack of a party structure or coherent political plan  that alienated the bourgeoisie sectors he needed on his side to retain power, and the prevalence of gangs in the urban slums that would claim to act under Lavalas and therefore be used against him by the US, CD (Democratic Convergence), and other observers during his second term) ended his terms prematurely with no substantive progress to bring about what Dupuy refers to as a 'maximalist democracy.'

In short, the symbol of change and progress for the Haitian underclass, the majority of the population who live in abject poverty, Aristide, succumbed to foreign meddling, internal flaws of his 'hybrid' political organization, rhetorical strategies that further alienated the very sectors of the population within the growing opposition movement, and a burgeoning crisis of human rights violations as gangs roamed the slums, journalists were killed (former Aristide supporter Jean Dominique was among those killed by someone working for Aristide's government, or so it is believed), the opposition's former military leaders crossed the border from the Dominican Republic, and Aristide even lost his legitimacy with much of the underclass and middle-class (violence against university students certainly didn't help his case, nor did the general lawlessness, corruption scandals, and inevitable coup, which, unlike the first one, sparked no major protest in Haiti comparable to that of the former), sealing his fate to be forcibly removed from office and choosing to flee with his life intact.

In addition, Dupuy's book offers a more complex view of Aristide's fall than other studies which exaggerate the extent to which Aristide's marriage to a light-skinned Haitian-American led to his loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the urban poor and peasantry. The 'color' question likely influenced a change in the perception of Aristide, but I am sure the poor of Haiti are not so 'color-struck' as to automatically question the legitimacy of a leader for marrying a light-skinned woman. Indeed, reading some of Aristide's speeches, he made it quite clear who he considered the enemies of the poor to be, the bourgeoisie, elite, and the 'cold neighbor to the north' who kept the Haitian masses poor for the last two hundred years. No doubt, he believed that to some extent himself, despite being forced into negotiations that crippled his presidency.

One last thing, I am still not entirely convinced by Dupuy that the fall of Aristide is due just as much to his own internal flaws and the scandals, human rights violations, and chaos that preceded the second coup. It seemed inevitable, something Dupuy recognizes, that the opposition despised Aristide for what he symbolized, and would've removed him from power regardless of how organized he was or if he had an organized political party and did not allow his government to be blamed for human rights violations (something the military juntas and interim government would even more guilty of for the greater number of deaths), or he if cut back on inflammatory speeches against the bourgeoisie, or had he not disbanded the Army (which I don't see how he could have avoided). All these errors and questionable decisions on his part certainly didn't help in the long run, but in the case of Haiti (unlike Allende's Chile), dependence on foreign aid and neoliberal institutions such as the World Bank and IMF with their structural adjustment plans, the longer history of US imperialism in Haiti, and the legacy of the prebendary or predatory state, Aristide would've likely been removed from power regardless of how effective a politician or how many negotiations or deals he made with opposition forces, the Clinton or Bush administration, and the Haitian moneyed classes he did win over.

Anyway, this is a very useful text to examining the current crisis in Haiti and the lingering effects of Duvalierism without Duvalier as Haitian 'democracy' continues to be a sham, corruption remains rampant, the 'elected' president is a pawn of foreign corporate interests and Haitian elites, promotes sweatshop labor, tourism, and a 'minimalist' democracy where right-wing forces, domestic and abroad, continue to profit off the marginalization of the 'poorest country in the western hemisphere.' How Haiti's 'lawlessness' in the aftermath of the 2004 coup led to MINUSTAH and the growth of the NGOs after the 2010 earthquake are all connected with the exile of Aristide, the legacy of Duvalierism, Western imperialism (Wikileaks just revealed how, like previous administrations, Obama pushed against raising the minimum wage in Haiti), and the persistence of extreme social inequality and divisions within Haitian society where only violence seems to be the main key to controlling the state (the recent violent protests against Martelly, for instance, or the frequent police and MINUSTAH targeting of civilians, talk of restoring the Army, and 'selling out' to the capitalist world system through luxury tourism projects, no real protection of the environment, and a non-response to the crisis faced by Dominicans of Haitian descent are all examples of the plethora of internal problems within the Haitian social structure and its peripheral place).