Haiti in the New World Order

Alex Dupuy's Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution is one of those studies we should have read several years ago. Probably should have been done around the same time we read Dupuy's book on Aristide, but this one has the benefit of being written in the 1990s and focusing entirely on the first term of Aristide and how his eventual return to Haiti to complete that term was related to US foreign policy and neoliberal structural adjustments in a post-Cold War world. As Dupuy convincingly outlines in the early chapters, the new world order of neoliberal reforms promoted by the US, IMF, World Bank, and USAID would not have favored development for countries like Haiti and would not have alleviated the misery of the population. 

However, even a liberal capitalist state would have represented progress over the prebendary Haitian state and could have won over a share of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, one can see how the very conditions in which Aristide was allowed to return to Haiti after the first coup diminished the left-leaning social democratic agenda of Lavalas while recognizing how it deviated from Cold War-era US interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (which usually involved intervention against leftist or left-leaning governments and support for military dictatorships). Aristide's first term must be contextualized in the new era in US foreign policy as well as the years of pro-democracy activism and struggles in Haiti since the fall of Duvalier in 1986. 

Reading Dupuy's book and thinking about his later analysis of Aristide as a politician who never relinquished the robe of the prophet for the clothes of the prince, one cannot help but feel Haiti may have been better off with Aristide remaining outside of formal politics. His real charisma and footwork for political, economic, and social changes in the 1980s was perhaps squandered or misdirected by his decision to run for president. Perhaps he really think believe it was a messianic or mystical relationship he enjoyed with the Haitian people and God was calling him to run to create a newer, better Haiti with dignified poverty instead of abject poverty most Haitians survive under. 

But his political and tactical errors of resisting a broad left coalition in government, employing threatening rhetoric against the bourgeoisie (which already hated or opposed him), his failure to thoroughly condemn violence or political mobs, and the "deal with the Devil" he agreed with to be returned to office almost ensured an unpleasant end to his political career. Just imagine if he had remained outside of formal politics but supported a broader left-leaning coalition that, while still facing pressure from the military, the haute bourgeoisie, and the US, was able to build a moderately progressive growth with equity economic policy for Haiti? Just imagine if the institutions and practice of democracy had been given the chance to actually develop and Aristide, as an outsider of the formal political process, could have used his charisma and influence to support this trend?

Perhaps it is naïve on our part to think the Duvalierist old guard and neo-Duvalierists would have ever agreed to this, but the last 36 years in Haiti have been a constant struggle for building democratic institutions and stability. The US role in this failed transition seems quite clear, and the old Duvalierists did not disappear since they played a role in 2004 and Martelly's presidency. We just wish Haiti could get a "do-over" for the last few decades, although it would be difficult to see huge progress made in Haiti becoming a "developed" or industrialized country. Perhaps things didn't have to become this bad, with the breakdown of the state, immiseration of the population, proliferation of gangs (and the Aristide years contributed to this), continued drug trafficking, fraudulent elections, and common human rights violations. When will Haiti's next chance for a democratic transition or something else to escape the current cycle present itself?

The Idea of Haiti: Rethinking Crisis and Development

The Idea of Haiti: Rethinking Crisis and Development, edited by Millery Polyné, is uneven but useful for general and academic audiences. The text consists of a collection of essays and one phone conversation on Haitian development and the need for new narratives and approaches after the 2010 earthquake. Some essays were quite informative and challenged common notions of Haitian underdevelopment or responses to the earthquake, particularly Karen Richman's nuanced explanation of Protestant conversions in Leogane after the catastrophe. Instead of arguing, like some Western journalists did, that Haitians turned away from Vodou after the earthquake because the lwa did not stop the natural disaster (clearly, these US journalists know nothing about Vodou, as Richman demonstrates), Richman argues that we must see the religious landscape of Haiti as fluid and inseparable as people adopted new religious identities for various reasons, often temporary. 

Understanding and respecting Vodou is one of the central themes of the text (McAlister's excellently researched essay on Bois Caiman as a pact with Satan in the eyes of evangelical Christians was also informative) tied to the need for inclusion of grassroots organizations, the peasantry, and the urban lower classes in government and decisions made by NGOs. In a similar context, arguing for the philosophical underpinnings of Haitian univeralist freedom and the importance of the Haitian Revolution, as well as the detrimental impact of the Western powers, indicates the importance of understanding Haiti's history, positive meanings and contributions of the nation, and how Haiti cannot be solely reduced to a aberration of international standards or crises. Patrick Sylvain's essay buttresses these points, too, focusing on the silence of Preval in the aftermath of the quake as a lost opportunity for fostering Haitian solidarity and national identity. The President's failure to speak to the people was, as Sylvain suggests, a form of violence that materialized in protest, anger, social distrust, and lamentable conditions as NGOs and the US became the real arbiters of authority and providing services in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. 

The impact of NGOs on taking away resources from the Haitian state and lacking any real accountability to Haitian citizens is also superbly elucidated by Mark Schuller through his analysis of several camps established after the earthquake for internally displaced people. Moreover, the funding of NGOs and the shift after the Cold War in donors' relationship with NGOs was new information to me, and quite useful for explaining how Haiti became the 'Republic of NGOs. The transformation of Port-au-Prince, also included in the text, was a dry read but the essay on Duvalier's relationship with Kennedy via the Alliance for Progress aid program was an enlightening reminder to the geopolitical and strategic purposes of international aid  the difficulties of delivering that aid to the Haitian state. The author of that essay, Arthus, unfortunately, seems to have a more conservative conclusion that is at odds with most of the other writers, but certainly is in the right for placing part of the burden on the Haitian state for not taking enough measures to ensure compliance with some of the conditions of donors for aid. 

Unfortunately, Yveline Alexis's chapter was the weakest part of the text. It was lacking in enough sources and felt redundant, which is odd given how strong her dissertation on the same subject reads. Regardless, her chapter supports the aforementioned role of remembering the caco resistance as part of Haitian historical memory, just like Bois Caiman, as important in Haitian self-identity and key to local ideas of democracy as rooted in the popular classes. Nesbitt's chapter, alas, was too pedantic for my taste and nothing new from his earlier writings, but useful for introducing new concepts and arguing for Haiti's place in history as part of universal liberation, not as the cause of Haiti's 'ruin' or persistent series of crises. Fischer's essay on Gilden's photography was likewise one of the weaker sections of the text, albeit certainly important for understanding how Haiti is framed by the outside world as exceptional, savage, mysterious, irrational, ultimately working against the possibility of supporting a sovereign Haiti.

For scholars and lay audiences, this is certainly a worthwhile read. The editor's useful introduction places everything into context and the essays, for the most part by Haitians or Haitian-Americans, offer different perspectives that reorient questions of development and what Haiti represents to those more meaningful to Haitians. Instead of blindly supporting NGOs, Western governments, and imperialist or racist readings of Haiti's history and present poverty, one must see Haiti as part of modernity (the incarnation of the radical Enlightenment, to paraphrase Nesbitt) that is a highly complex society in need of multiple solutions (some, seemingly so simple, like formal cadastres). Overall, the text seems consistent with leftist ideas on Haitian development, while some individual essays in the text are more aligned with neoliberal development.

The Choices Program: Haitian Revolution

Check out this fascinating program on the Haitian Revolution featuring 3 different scholars. The Choices Program special on the Haitian Revolution features several video interviews with scholars (such as Alex Dupuy) that cover the basics of the turbulent period, as well as some of its legacies. Although it serves more of an introductory purpose, there is still lots to learn from this project, as well as a chance to hear Anthony Brogues and Patrick Sylvain, two scholars I am not familiar with.

Dupuy's The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, The International Community, and Haiti

After finally reading The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community, and Haiti by Wesleyan professor Alex Dupuy, I have a better understanding of what has transpired in recent memory in Haiti. The narrative is quite 'fresh' to me, given my background on Aristide from my mom's pro-Aristide relatives in the 1990s and the US leftist interpretation on the two coups against Aristide (each one supported by Washington) that I received from Democracy Now and other sources. Naturally, things are far more complex than the Bush administration simply forcing Aristide out of power, a process more fully detailed by Dupuy's coverage of the 'hybrid' character of Aristide's presidencies (authoritarian and democratic, condoning violence and corruption, but cloaked in a rhetoric of social democracy, poorly planned verbal attacks on the bourgeoisie and wealthy elite behind the opposition, and Aristide's early messianic stature among the dispossessed masses).

Dupuy, like say, Noam Chomsky or Democracy Now's coverage of recent Haitian history, places the quest for democratization in a broader context of US, French, and Canadian imperialism, but unlike them (and in a fashion, reminding me of a Chilean professor of mine who emphasized domestic factors in the coup that ended Salvador Allende's presidency), emphasizes local Haitian contradictions within Aristide's administrations and the tradition of the Haitian prebendary state (Dupuy's term for what another scholar refers to as the 'predatory' Haitian state, or what Trouillot likened to the Haitian state against the nation) that led to the downfall of Aristide on two occasions, in his first term in the early 1990s and again in 2004.

So, yes, of course US imperialism and Western-controlled flow of economic aid forced Aristide into negotiations with the opposition (which proved itself only interested in forcing Aristide out of office both times), but Aristide's poorly organized Lavalas party (lack of a party structure or coherent political plan  that alienated the bourgeoisie sectors he needed on his side to retain power, and the prevalence of gangs in the urban slums that would claim to act under Lavalas and therefore be used against him by the US, CD (Democratic Convergence), and other observers during his second term) ended his terms prematurely with no substantive progress to bring about what Dupuy refers to as a 'maximalist democracy.'

In short, the symbol of change and progress for the Haitian underclass, the majority of the population who live in abject poverty, Aristide, succumbed to foreign meddling, internal flaws of his 'hybrid' political organization, rhetorical strategies that further alienated the very sectors of the population within the growing opposition movement, and a burgeoning crisis of human rights violations as gangs roamed the slums, journalists were killed (former Aristide supporter Jean Dominique was among those killed by someone working for Aristide's government, or so it is believed), the opposition's former military leaders crossed the border from the Dominican Republic, and Aristide even lost his legitimacy with much of the underclass and middle-class (violence against university students certainly didn't help his case, nor did the general lawlessness, corruption scandals, and inevitable coup, which, unlike the first one, sparked no major protest in Haiti comparable to that of the former), sealing his fate to be forcibly removed from office and choosing to flee with his life intact.

In addition, Dupuy's book offers a more complex view of Aristide's fall than other studies which exaggerate the extent to which Aristide's marriage to a light-skinned Haitian-American led to his loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the urban poor and peasantry. The 'color' question likely influenced a change in the perception of Aristide, but I am sure the poor of Haiti are not so 'color-struck' as to automatically question the legitimacy of a leader for marrying a light-skinned woman. Indeed, reading some of Aristide's speeches, he made it quite clear who he considered the enemies of the poor to be, the bourgeoisie, elite, and the 'cold neighbor to the north' who kept the Haitian masses poor for the last two hundred years. No doubt, he believed that to some extent himself, despite being forced into negotiations that crippled his presidency.

One last thing, I am still not entirely convinced by Dupuy that the fall of Aristide is due just as much to his own internal flaws and the scandals, human rights violations, and chaos that preceded the second coup. It seemed inevitable, something Dupuy recognizes, that the opposition despised Aristide for what he symbolized, and would've removed him from power regardless of how organized he was or if he had an organized political party and did not allow his government to be blamed for human rights violations (something the military juntas and interim government would even more guilty of for the greater number of deaths), or he if cut back on inflammatory speeches against the bourgeoisie, or had he not disbanded the Army (which I don't see how he could have avoided). All these errors and questionable decisions on his part certainly didn't help in the long run, but in the case of Haiti (unlike Allende's Chile), dependence on foreign aid and neoliberal institutions such as the World Bank and IMF with their structural adjustment plans, the longer history of US imperialism in Haiti, and the legacy of the prebendary or predatory state, Aristide would've likely been removed from power regardless of how effective a politician or how many negotiations or deals he made with opposition forces, the Clinton or Bush administration, and the Haitian moneyed classes he did win over.

Anyway, this is a very useful text to examining the current crisis in Haiti and the lingering effects of Duvalierism without Duvalier as Haitian 'democracy' continues to be a sham, corruption remains rampant, the 'elected' president is a pawn of foreign corporate interests and Haitian elites, promotes sweatshop labor, tourism, and a 'minimalist' democracy where right-wing forces, domestic and abroad, continue to profit off the marginalization of the 'poorest country in the western hemisphere.' How Haiti's 'lawlessness' in the aftermath of the 2004 coup led to MINUSTAH and the growth of the NGOs after the 2010 earthquake are all connected with the exile of Aristide, the legacy of Duvalierism, Western imperialism (Wikileaks just revealed how, like previous administrations, Obama pushed against raising the minimum wage in Haiti), and the persistence of extreme social inequality and divisions within Haitian society where only violence seems to be the main key to controlling the state (the recent violent protests against Martelly, for instance, or the frequent police and MINUSTAH targeting of civilians, talk of restoring the Army, and 'selling out' to the capitalist world system through luxury tourism projects, no real protection of the environment, and a non-response to the crisis faced by Dominicans of Haitian descent are all examples of the plethora of internal problems within the Haitian social structure and its peripheral place).

Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race and Underdevelopment Since 1700

I recently read this gem of an overview of Haitian history by Alex Dupuy. Perhaps the reason I enjoyed it so much is that its in agreement with my own preconceived notions of Haitian underdevelopment as a product of a plantation model or dependency theory in economic relations with the North. However, after reading the text, it is hard to take seriously the neoliberal remedies for Haitian development, or, for that matter, development in a broader Caribbean and African context. Dupuy's thesis is best stated by him on the fifth page of the text:

I argue that Haiti’s underdevelopment stems from its incorporation into the capitalist world-system since the end of the seventeenth century as a peripheral economy specializing in the production of primarily agricultural crops for export and late some manufactured goods. In addition, the emergence of specific class, racial/color, and political relations and structures during the colonial period and after independence reinforced the economy’s dependence on foreign capital and it’s extroverted and unintegrated characteristics.

Hard to disagree with that, eh? It explains the structural flaws of the Haitian economy (and likewise, much of Latin America and Africa) as a product of unequal exchange in a capitalist world-system on the peripheries. Similarly, class and racial factors entrenched unequal economic and power relationships with Europe and North America that have perpetuated Haitian poverty. Fortunately, Dupuy does not attribute most of Haitian economic and political turmoil to the color question, since he spends a considerable amount of time in each chapter on Haitian history detailing the common interests of black and mulatto elites against the peasantry. 

For instance, the transformation of the interests of black military leaders during the Haitian Revolution from the same as the ex-slaves to resembling more and more those of their affranchi elites illustrates the flaws of attributing Haitian social inequality solely to color (57). Of course, one should not assume this was always the case, since Toussaint's nephew, Moise, was believed to have had a role in organizing a revolt against his uncle that sought land reform in favor of the ex-slaves (65). Also, I am not certain how dependable Dupuy's estimate is, but the Haitian War of Independence cost Haiti 1, 144, 258, 948 francs, an astronomical figure (74)! 

There are some moments where I question Dupuy's assessment of Haitian leaders, though. For example, he claims that the main goal of Dessalines was to establish the black elite as the uncontested leaders of Haiti (81). I don't buy that. Dessalines was willing to marry his daughter to one of the mulatto leaders of Haiti and, assuming we take Charles Mackenzie as a credible source, Dessalines was very trusting of Alexandre Pétion. This alleged pro-nouveaux libres policy of Dessalines was continued under Christophe, even though we know anciens libres were represented in his court and enjoyed positions of prestige and influence (86). Apparently workers fled Christophe's state for the republic to pursue their own subsistence and small landholding production, which suggests the sharecropping and peasant autonomy were stronger than in the north, which is not too surprising given Christophe's maintenance of large estates (88). I just wish Dupuy had some additional sources or figures for the numbers of people who fled Christophe's state for  Pétion's.

Anyway, moving back to the broader structural and economic underpinnings of the Haitian state, race and the particular path taken to Haitian independence hindered development due to diplomatic isolation. As Dupuy rightfully so argues, lack of full diplomatic relations prevented the Haitian bourgeoisie from engaging in complete financial and commercial transactions, limiting the amount of technology, access to markets, and sources of credit from the metropoles (93). Thus, the quest by Boyer to procure French recognition of Haitian independence, and thereby assuring other European powers would follow suit, was closely tied to attempts to restore export-oriented, latifundia-styled agricultural production (92). Now, we know things did not quite turn out well for him, with Boyer's Code Rural being a disaster and his several attempts to prevent the the proliferation of small farms and the sale of national lands, Boyer in 1821, 1832, 1837, 1835, and 1838 by suspending sales (94). 

This aforementioned struggle between peasants and small landholders to control their own productivity and have some degree of autonomy did not stop the merchant bourgeoisie from adopting a predatory position as speculators and merchants who underpaid producers of coffee, cacao and other exports while overcharging them for imported goods (103). Since Haitian rural communities were usually not entirely self-sufficient, they had to work through the merchant bourgeoisie which controlled access to foreign goods and the exchange of items in the port towns, creating a dependency that over time impoverished the peasantry (102). Although the divisions within the peasantry left room for class mobility, over time the conjunction of the merchant bourgeoisie setting prices for Haitian exports and cheating peasant producers, as well as the state's excessive taxation, resulted in greater poverty over the course of the 19th century (103). Added to the fluctuating prices for raw exports such as coffee, Haiti's economy could weaken tremendously if global prices fell, as was the case during the Great Depression (144). 

Haitian piquets, or rebel peasants, such as the movement led by Acaau in the 1840s, tried to resist some of these entrenched patterns in Haitian society by asking for higher prices on their products, but ultimately failed or were incorporated within the state (97). Perhaps the fact that it was the wealthier peasants, usually of the peasant elite and 'middle class,' played a role in weakening the path for radical change in rural Haiti, since the landless or rural proletariat that survived on selling its labor, as well as the poorer tenant farmers, did not arrive at leadership positions within these uprisings (110-111). This lack of a single goal or shared interest among peasantry likely contributed to the lack of a centralized or united revolutionary movement during the various uprisings of cacos and piquets.

Regardless, Dupuy is correct in challenging Lundahl's pro-capitalist stance on Haitian poverty, which suggests that the root causes of poverty are not to be found in the market system when the market and state interact in a vicious way that perpetuates poverty, hunger, and unequal social relations (105). To quote Dupuy, "Lundahl rightly stresses the political marginalization of the peasantry and their exploitation by the state but overlooks how ‘the market’ itself is a product of class relations and the conditions of existence that structured the population into dominant and subordinate groups, expressed through market exchanges" (106). Basically, the market and the state are not separable factors, and the critical role of foreign capital and the merchant bourgeoisie in dictating the rules of the state, comprising the state, and furthering dependency reveal the insidious bias of Lundahl and other European and North American economists who wish to attribute the underdevelopment of the Global South to internal causes not pertinent to capitalism. For this reason alone, Dupuy's text is of immense import for challenging dominant narratives of poverty in the so-called "Third World." 

Dupuy also dismantles the myth of overpopulation as a cause of Haitian underdevelopment when high birthrates are actually a product of that poverty. In cases of hunger, too, high population density does not explain hunger in societies with high income inequality (110). So instead of attributing Haitian underdevelopment to the high birthrates or looking at population density per cultivated acre, one should aim to diminish or eliminate the underlying causes, which, in the case of Haiti, would be income inequality, the market system, etc. Such a view aligns well with my critiques of the plethora of annoying North Americans and Europeans who believe that if only (insert poor country or poor continent) had fewer children, then everything would be okay or they could 'develop.'

Like the peasantry, even the merchant bourgeoisie and speculators were not impervious to foreign penetration and dependency. Described by countless scholars, such as Plummer, who analyzes the rise of "Syrians" as well as Europeans (particularly Germans) in controlling internal trade in Haiti and replacing the merchant bourgeoisie by the end of the 19th century (116). Clearly, by the end of the first century of Haitian independence, dependency, debt, foreign meddling, internal divisions, and a vested state interest in what some describe as a plantation model of economic growth, Haiti was firmly on the path of underdevelopment and ripe for US occupation. Though there were attempts to foster industry, education, modern technological innovations and transportation, it did not alter the pattern of Haitian turmoil, poverty, and dependency.

On the question of 20th century (and with some relevance to 21st century Haitian development plans), Dupuy, in my opinion, correctly reveals the inadequacy of light-manufacturing in urban Haiti as a possible solution to unemployment. These initiatives fueled rural to urban migration, thereby worsening overcrowding and the urban infrastructure of Port-au-Prince while only employing a marginal percentage of the workforce (178). Similarly, it reinforced Haitian dependency on foreign capital to establish the factories (175). Indeed, for every dollar of profit earned in Haiti from the manufacturing industries, 85 cents went to the US and a yearly average of 50 million USD of private capital was transferred to the US between 1977 and 1984, which illustrates the insanity of putting faith in what are really sweatshops as a pathway to Haitian development (179). The industrial park project, Caracol, for instance, has proven itself to be a disappointment and waste of time and money in a region of Haiti barely affected by the recent earthquake.

The following articles from Al-Jazeera and The New York Times are worthwhile reads for illuminating the lack of change in the US approach to Haitian underdevelopment. Essentially the same as the sweatshop industries supported in the 1970s and 1980s, which, as one can see from above, failed spectacularly. If the plan for 'reconstruction' is to expand textile factories due to low wages and the lack of unions, then Haiti could resemble the Dominican Republic in some ways, where egregious violations of workers' rights and low wages is the pattern at industrial parks there. Indeed, one can already see the development strategies favored by Martelly's government as a replica of some of the Dominican Republic's, such as tourism.

Agricultural policies of the US have also devastated the Haitian economy through cheap rice imports that weaken Haitian producers who cannot compete, the elimination of black pigs in the 1980s over an alleged swine flu outbreak that destroyed pig production, and other cheap food imports which has led to Haiti importing twice of what it exports (181, 183) In other words, a very poor country is getting worse and worse while other parts of Latin America are booming or at remaining static. 

The remainder of the text looks at Duvalier regimes, 20th century Haitian politics and the question or class and color, and contains some insignful commentary on 'black nationalism' and the dynamics of race and class that could easily pertain to the rest of the Caribbean or the US. At one point Dupuy seemingly becomes a class reductionist who sees race as a product of class dynamics, which seemingly contradicts his earlier position on race and class as mutually influencing each other (155). I find it odd that Dupuy never tackles the broader question of a less naive and fully informed by class form of black nationalism. Perhaps something along the lines of black nationalist strands of leftist economics and social movements in Trinidad or even among some segments of the US Black Power Movement. But I digress, this book is essential for mainstream readers. It can dispel so many of the myths we receive in the media, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the US government on root causes of poverty. Keep in mind that Dupuy never obfuscates the role of Haitians themselves in perpetuating these problems, but the critical role of the European powers and the US certainly have not made any improvements.