Muhammad Bello, al-Kanemi, and Borno

Although Muhammad Bello did not reproduce in full all the letters he received from al-Kanemi of Borno, his Infāq al-Maysūr contains a plethora of important details on the conflicts between the jihadists of Uthman dan Fodio and Borno. Translated by Salahudeen Yusuf as A History of Islam, Scholarship and Revivalism in Western Sudan, Being an Annotated Translation with Introduction of  Infaqul-Maisur fi Tarikh Bilad al-Tukur of Sultan Muhammad Bello bin Fodio, the first chapter contains an overview of the lands of the western and central Sudan. Borno, receives mention as an area in which Islam was widely spread and deeply practiced before the jihad, even by commoners. Recitation of the Quran, Islamic scholarship and religious devotion were well-rooted in the area. 

However, for two reasons, Muhammad Bello called into question the Islamic legitimacy of the Sayfawa rulers of Borno. First, certain customs and traditions persisted despite the conversion to Islam centuries ago. Women went unveiled, sacrifices were made in the river (Komadugu?), and sacrifices or ceremonies were held at trees or certain rock sites. Al-Kanemi saw the old rituals involving sacrifices at presumably venerated in pre-Islamic times as customs similar to what was done by people in central Islamic lands, like Syria and Egypt. Bello, on the other hand, was very rigid on this, even condemning the nomadic Fulani for a custom or tradition involving fire, dances, and objects tied around the head of children by agreeing with Shaykh Abdullahi al-Thuqa. Nonetheless, this was seen as justification for the jihad, since it was perceived as shirk by Bello. Furthermore, by lending support to the Hausa rulers who fought against the jihad, Bello argued that the Sayfawa mai had become an unbeliever. If a Muslim ruler supports unbelievers against other Muslims, such a ruler becomes an unbeliever himself. Furthermore, as head of the state, the behavior of the mai called into question the Islamic legitimacy of Borno. Thus, the jihadists were in the moral right. Unsurprisingly, al-Kanemi countered this by drawing on the same sources and evidence as Bello: the Quran, Islamic law, hadith, logic.

Later in their correspondence, which appears to have been infrequent due to messengers failing to deliver letters, al-Kanemi seems to have shifted somewhat his argument. While acknowledging some customs in Borno that were improper, he accuses the allies of the jihad of initiating conflict with Borno on incorrect, false grounds. The Fulani and others who attacked Borno seemed to be more interested in gathering booty and captives, which triggered part of the debate between Bello and al-Kanemi on whether enslavement of said captives was legal in Islam. The two never reconciled, based on the letters reproduced by Bello, but one can see how the conflict between Sokoto and Borno was centered on defining a Muslim. Part of this even drew from the longer history of Islam in West Africa, especially Askia Muhammad of Songhay and his questions posed to al-Maghili. Askia Muhammad's seizure of power was seen as a jihad of sorts by Bello, and a model for a proper Islamic ruler to emulate. Intriguingly, Bello did not cite or reference other works of al-Maghili written to or for Hausa rulers of Kano and Katsina, perhaps since that would have called into question the legitimacy of the jihad against Hausa rulers. Nonetheless, the model of Askia Muhammad and expectations of a Muslim ruler as a pious, just figure who corrects the behavior of his subjects and follows Islamic precepts. One wonders to what extent al-Kanemi would have drawn on the history and legacy of the Sayfawa monarchs to counter Bello's claims. Perhaps al-Kanemi would not have used the past of the Sayfawa due to his own political ambitions?

The Sokoto Caliphate

Murray Last's The Sokoto Caliphate is perhaps outdated, but still highly useful for an overview on the history of Sokoto. Beginning with the regional background and the origins of Uthman Dan Fodio early Community of followers, Last covers the jihad, the early expansion and consolidation of the Caliphate, its administration, and the vizierate. Basing his work mainly on local Arabic sources penned in the 19th and 20th centuries, Last's work is supplemented by the journals, letters, and colonial-era documentation when available. Thus, the portrait of the Caliphate is undoubtedly one of its elite. Those eager to find a deeper social history or economic history of the Sokoto Caliphate will be disappointed. Indeed, the study itself is mainly focused on Sokoto and its hinterland, meaning those eager for a complete history of Sokoto that includes the developments in all its emirates during the period from, say, 1804-1903, will not find it here. Nonetheless, Last's history is still significant in its rich use of the aforementioned sources to demonstrate how Uthman Dan Fodio's successors created an Islamic state which managed to survive for a century, transforming the larger Central Sudanic region in the process. 

In fact, through its early days battling with Gobir and establishing a new state after their hijra, to the establishment of a more established administrative structure during the reign of Muhammad Bello as caliph, one must note the accomplishments of the jihad. First, the Hausa kingdoms were transformed in a process that drew from Fulani, Hausa, Tuareg and other ethnic groups supporting it (or, indifferently allowing it). Second, the Shaikh and his successors were able to transcend a strictly Fulani base for power by moving beyond a solely Fulani/Fulani clan alliances and marriages. Third, Bello was able to promote the settlement of "cattle Fulani" in the sparsely settled area of Sokoto's hinterland, thereby encouraging them to become sedentary, more productive and more amenable to thorough Islamization. Fourth, the jihad established a state system in which the moral authority of the caliph was strong enough to never be successfully rebelled against by the major emirates. Fifth, the Sokoto rulers cultivated a unity through their adherence to Islam and the guidance of Islamic Law and religion as recommended in the writings of Uthman dan Fodio and his brother and son. Unlike their "pagan" and other enemies, the forces of the Sokoto caliphate were usually more unified, even when the major emirates to the east only sent "presents" as tribute or did not fully participate in the annual campaigns.

Of course, Sokoto's growth and economic importance also transformed the Central Sudan. Borno, which lost some of its territory to the forces of the jihad, mainly coexisted peacefully with Sokoto after al-Kanemi's heroic saving of the kingdom. Relations with Baghirmi were to be peaceful in order to secure an eastern route to the Nile, when the Mahdi was supposedly to appear (Islamic millennialism in the Sokoto Caliphate is a topic worthy of additional study). The Tuareg and Agades were of course already linked to Hausaland via the salt trade and other forms of commerce, but the Sokoto Caliphate's expansion likely helped to secure it as the economic center of the vast region. Studying its economic history and the role of slavery, textile production, the salt and kola nut trades, and trans-Saharan commerce will be our next areas of research. 

Borno in the 1820s

Mai Ibrahim (?), who was allowed to maintain a Sefuwa court at New Birni while all effective power was in the hands of Sheikh al-Kanemi, the "George Washington of Borno"

Although dismissed by some scholars for not being the best or most useful source on Borno's past,  Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa: In the Years 1822, 1823, and 1824 by Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney remains a key text. As the first representatives of Britain to reach Borno, the trio described the trans-Saharan route used to reach it (Tripoli-Fezzan-Borno) and the climate, geography, political context, social conditions and economic factors at play in Borno and nearby regions, particularly around Lake Chad and the Sokoto Caliphate to the west. Astonishingly, some of the social features described by Denham were still relevant in 20th century Borno, if the ethnographic work of Cohen is to be relied on for Kanuri village society. Indeed, Clapperton's account actually includes extensive information on Muhammad Bello, while Denham met with Borno's Sheikh al-Kanemi several times and described his skills as a political leader. Moreover, they were accompanied by a Caribbean native, Adolphus Sympkins of St. Vincent, who may have been the first Afro-Caribbean person to reach Borno. Particularly useful were the materials in the appendix, including a court document from Kuka, extracts from a work by Muhammad Bello on the land of "Takrur" (extending from Darfur in the east to the Atlantic coast of West Africa), and various letters by Sheikh al-Kanemi and the pasha of Tripoli. 

What was perhaps most useful for our purposes, however, is the testimony of Denham, Clapperton, and Oudney on the political consolidation of Borno under the new Shehu dynasty in the 19th century. Unable to rise to the occasion of defending Borno from Fulani incursions and pillagings of the old capital and western Borno, the Sefuwa mai called for Sheikh al-Kanemi, who liberated the land from the "Felatah" jihadists and brought Kanembu and Shuwa Arab followers from Kanem. While Borno had lost some of its western territories to the Sokoto Caliphate, and faced invasions from Bagirmi and Wadai's incursions into the territory of Kanem, al-Kanemi's successful military leadership established a secure basis for a reassertion of Borno's political hegemony and influence over much of the Lake Chad Region. While former vassal states like Bagirmi and Wadai's intervention in Kanem were a threat, and Tuareg and "Biddoomah" islander raids continued, al-Kanemi established more secure conditions for Borno's subjects and traveling merchants. One cannot help but admire the man, even though his wars of conquest and raids were often generating hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of captives for the slave trade. Indeed, one must question the sincerity of al-Kanemi when he complained of the fact that Arabs would only trade for slaves. Perhaps al-Kanemi knew what Denham and Clapperton wanted to hear, and in order to promote the idea of direct exchange with Britain for manufactured goods, pretended to be personally opposed to the slave trade, which had for so long been central to Borno's trans-Saharan trade network.

But the main interest for us at the blog with regards to this text is contextualizing Borno in the 1820s within a larger "Sudanic" and African context. By this we mean Borno's relations with other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the "Sudanic" pilgrim route, trade and migration across the continent. For instance, a man Denham wished to meet, a native of Loggun who had lived in Sennar and was in Borno, would have been an interesting interview subject on the movement of people between Lake Chad and the Middle Nile. Or the fascinating Fulani "fighi" from Timbuktu, Abdel Gassam ben Maleky, en route to Mecca, who met Denham  in Kuka. The Timbuktu pilgrim's father was a "Felatah" chief of Jenne and was living on charity to make it to Mecca with caravans. Unfortunately, the young man was said to have drowned in Lake Chad after heading for Wadai. Alternatively, people from the Muslim central lands were also in the "Central Sudan," such as El Raschid, a native of Mecca who lived in Wadai and Sennar before meeting Denham in Loggun. Perhaps even more intriguing, Denham met a "Moor" fighi named Khalifa who had been to Sierra Leone ("Seralo") and knew English! Thus, despite the difficulties with Wadai and Bagirmi that made the "Sudanic" pilgrim route dangerous in the 1820s, Borno continued to host a variety of transients and migrants from different parts of Africa and the world. People who had traveled or lived in Timbuktu, Sierra Leone, Hausaland, Tripoli, Morocco, Mecca, Fezzan, Kanem, Bagirmi, Tuareg territories, Loggun, Sennar, and beyond intersected in Borno.