Southern Ethiopia and the Christian Kingdom, 1508-1708

Southern Ethiopia and the Christian Kingdom, 1508–1708: With Special Reference to the Galla Migrations and Their Consequences  is Merid Wolde Aregay's seminal thesis on the Solomonic kingdom. Seeking to elucidate the fall of the centralized state and the decline of imperial control of a regimented military which had made the Solomonic state's expansion to the south possible, Aregay's state contextualizes this development with the history of Ahmad Gran's invasion, Oromo expansion, the Jesuits, and religious controversies between unctionists and tewahedo groups of the Ethiopian Church. Drawing on the voluminous royal chronicles, Jesuit sources, land charters, and travelogues, Aregay presents a convincing case for the various crises being so devastating to the Solomonic state due to the rise of the provincial nobility in power against the emperor. 

Over time, imperial control was effectively lost in some provinces while the chewa regiments and professional soldiers either formed mutinous bands or became part of the provincial elite's retainers. Emperors like Lebna Dengel exacerbated these above problems through tyrannical rule and slave raiding that aroused opposition and even support for Ahmad Gran's conquest. The past ability of the Solomonic state to check the expansion of pastoralist lowland groups into the highlands was lost through the united Muslim front of Adal and the weakening of the military defenses and centralized imperial government. This only facilitated Oromo expansion as, in their early migration waves, Oromo clans were often more effective as there was enough land and booty for various clans to collaborate in their raids. The military, through its ineffectiveness or imperial abandonment of provinces, led to some peasants and tributaries bearing arms to defend themselves or becoming dependents or clients of Oromo groups. 

Subsequent emperors, particularly after Galadewos, continued the trend of weakening central authority and the military by relying on slave raiding, not resisting the growing autonomy of regional governors and nobility, and failing to check rapid Oromo expansion. Minas, who was a pawn of his mother and her influence, and Sarsa Dengel who succeeded him, were often ineffective or unable to check provincial officials like the bahr negash Yeshaq. Later neguses, such as Susenyos, a former bandit, tried to administer the empire by allowing the provinces to be mostly ruled by his brothers and sons-in-law. Susenyos, according to Aregay, weakened the position of emperor by rejecting the pomp and ritual associated with his office. His reliance on slave raids targeted non-rebellious pagan Agaw and other groups to raise revenue instead of reforming the administrative structure of the empire to increase revenue derived from the provinces. The attempt to impose Catholicism on the population drove the Church into revolt, further weakening the central government as it illustrated for posterity that the Church could act independently of the emperor. 

This contributed to the later conflicts within Ethiopian Christianity between the unctionists and orthodox positions on Christological controversies. Unfortunately, these religious controversies became even more problematic in the 17th and 18th centuries as emperors from Fasiladas to Iyasu I struggled to contain the conflicts between clerical and monastic groups that involved nobles, warlords, and Oromo groups in their struggles with each other and the imperial court. Thus, even a "traditionalist" emperor like Fasiladas appeared to rule a state with flimsy foundations as the Solomonic state faced internal Christian religious division, Oromo raiding, nobility vs. imperial court intrigues or civil wars, and pretenders to the throne. In other words, the system which had been established by the early Solomonic rulers that had led to the formation of an empire was not maintained.

For the interests of this blog, it is interesting how the Solomonic Dynasty appears to have followed a similar trajectory to the Sayfawa during this same period. The Sayfawa appear to have reasserted themselves in the Central Sudan as a major power from c.1500 until the early 18th century. While Sayfawa rule seems to have declined after Ali b. Umar in the 17th century, Sayfawa rule may have suffered from overtaxation of the peasantry, slave raiding on certain tributary or predatory areas that could have been more effectively integrated into the core, and the increase of mallamtis and Sufi centers that might have challenged the imperial court's authority or religiously-based legitimacy. Some of the seeds of their decline may have already been evident in the uprisings, political discord and factions over succession, and inability to protect the western frontier from Tuareg bandits, lacustrine settlements from Yedina attacks and Kanem and Kawar from Tubu and Tuareg incursions. However, like their Solomonic counterparts, the Sayfawa occasionally produced great or competent mai who attempted to challenge the decay or complacency of the court. But circumstances eventually reached the point where the mais were unable to stamp resistance from former tributaries like Mandara.

Bahrey on the Oromo

Although the writings of Bahrey are sadly too brief for a deeper history of the Oromo peoples of the 16th century, his History of the Galla is a fascinating document. As an early ethnographic document of sorts, the Ethiopian monk sought to elucidate the social structure of the Oromo and its role in their often victorious raids and battles with Solomonic Ethiopia. Furthermore, in spite of his own Christian biases and panegyrical allusions to Sarsa Dengel's military prowess and zeal for Christian expansion, Bahrey strikes the modern reader as a relatively balanced source on the Oromo. He blames the small size of the Ethiopian warrior class and the egalitarian (or relatively so) Oromo social system in which all men are reared for war. 

If true, this meant the Oromo age-grade system and their lubas were able to expand and raid several parts of the Solomonic kingdom due to their large source of warriors. Their social system also, according to the end of Bahrey's brief account, included a division of labor on the behalf of the village or community. Their system, though lacking the kind of permanent centralized authority of the Abyssinians or the later Oromo kingdoms, was flexible and able to adapt to different conditions. For instance, the adoption of horses and mules under Mesle in the years 1554-1662 represented an innovation in Oromo military tactics. Thus, it is less surprising to understand how and why the Oromo migrations of the 16th century were so successful, despite occasional internal disputes or divisions. 

The success of the Oromo and the Solomonic dynasty's struggles to contain them during the 16th century remind us of other African states facing similar problems during the same era. The infamous "Jagas" of Kongo, for instance, appear to have formed effective warbands that allowed them to threaten Kongo and other kingdoms in West Central Africa. The Songhai, in West Africa, had Fulani marauders and other issues. Borno, under the Sayfawa dynasty, was also dealing with ongoing rebellions or insecurity near Lake Chad. According to Ahmad b. Furtu, whose chronicles of Idris b. Ali's military campaigns in Kanem and Borno have survived for posterity, the Sayfawa mais had to deal with the rebellious Bulala in Kanem, Tuareg incursions, Kano raids, and attacks from Sao populations near the imperial capital. Like Sarsa Dengel, Idris b. Ali appears to have been quite effective as a military leader. The displaced populations, war captives, and nearly exterminated peoples who felt the wrath of Borno were, for the most part, pacified or reduced to tributary status. 

Unlike the Solomonic rulers, Borno appears to have been far more effective at securing its internal borders by the late 16th century. Part of this must have been due to the different socioeconomic structures of their respective enemies, as well as internal factors like military tactics, adoption of firearms, and administrative practices. One wonders what the Sayfawa would have done if faced with an enemy comparable to the Oromo peoples of the 16th century. The closest enemy might have been the Tuareg along the northwestern border and some of the Tubu and Arab populations in Kanem who were initially aligned with the Bulala sultans. We know Idris b. Ali, at least, won over some of the latter two groups and was able to force some of the Tuareg raiders into vassal status.