Baron de Dossou

Whilst perusing Cheesman's The Armorial of Haiti, we noticed one of Haitian kingdom's barons was named Dossou. This name, which seems to come from the area of modern Benin, survived in Haiti. We couldn't find anything else about the Baron de Dossou, but we wonder if he was another African-born dignitary of Christophe's kingdom.

Black Crown

Paul Clammer's Black Crown: Henry Christophe, the Haitian Revolution and the Caribbean's Forgotten Kingdom is a meticulously researched biography of one of the central figures in the annals of the Haitian Revolution and 19th century Haiti. Based on a mixture of all available sources, Clammer, who has written travel literature on Haiti, has consulted archives, visited the sites associated with Christophe's state, and used European, Haitian, and US sources to reconstruct the life of Christophe. As one might expect, his early origins in Grenada remain shrouded in mystery. Even his participation in the struggle for US independence remains a mystery. However, Christophe, once in Le Cap, was able to establish himself and build connections. During the Haitian Revolution, he rose to positions of ever greater importance until he became one of the upper echelon of military officials under Toussaint Louverture. Joining with Dessalines, he fought for Haitian independence against Leclerc and Rochambeau. Clammer, based on surviving correspondence of Christophe and other sources, favors the argument that Christophe was not directly involved in the assassination of Dessalines, and once the deed was done, was positioning himself strategically. The conflict with Petion and the South subsequently divided Haiti into two separate states, with Christophe as the essentially uncontested leader in the Nord. By the time he declared himself king, Christophe had neutralized potential competitors (even doing so during the Haitian Revolution against maroon leader Sans Souci and others).

The most interesting chapters of the biography cover the reign of Christophe as king. Ruling the Kingdom of Haiti, Christophe sponsored the construction of beautiful palaces like Sans Souci, promoted plantation agriculture, instituted legal codes that at least, in theory, guaranteed certain rights for cultivators, and engaged in all the theatricality of power and magnificence to present an image of Haiti as a civilized land making progress for Western audiences. Clammer's deftly written and detailed accounts of Christophe's diplomatic engagements with Britain and Europe on the one hand, and the struggles he engaged with against his own subjects and the republic to the South, make for engaging and fascinating reading. Unfortunately, the surviving source are not as rich as one would like for understanding a more complete portrait of the kingdom. Surviving ledgers give tantalizing clues about sugar and coffee production, with the state-enforced plantation system falling behind on sugar. Indeed, near the end of his reign, Christophe began distributing land to soldiers, perhaps as many as 8000 in one letter cited by Clammer. However, the vast majority of the land grants were for tiny farms, although Christophe did appear to have engaged in broadening land ownership and creating more titled nobles. Sadly, Christophe was unable to suppress a revolt that began in Saint-Marc and was supported by Jean-Pierre Richard, an African-born leader of Cap Henry who had been imprisoned by Christophe at the Citadel and forced to do hard labor. 

Since his stroke appears to have inspired malcontents and rebels to take action, and once loyal subordinates chose to do nothing or join in the rebellion, Christophe knew his end was near. The black king who sought to create a strong nation, was overthrown. The North was reunified with the rest of the country and Haiti as we know was consolidated. The Christophe experiment, however, represented the last of the revolutionary era leadership who were at least somewhat successful at maintaining export-oriented plantation agriculture. Christophe's state, which sparked resistance from local cultivators (though his frequent tours of the countryside and audiences suggests he must have at least occasionally ensured the Code Henry's protections for workers were respected), represented another path for national development. More successful than the southern republic, at least for a short while, the Christophean experiment offers us a view of what Haiti could have become had Christophe been able to balance the desires of the rural majority and perhaps had not treated some of his own subordinates so harshly or capriciously. 

The Government of King Henri Christophe

Hénock Trouillot's Le gouvernement du roi Henri Christophe offers a broad overview of the kingdom of Haiti under Henri Christophe. Based on archival sources, newspaper accounts written in the Republic to the South, and the descriptions of travelers and writers like Dumesle, Trouillot endeavored to reconstruct the history of Christophe's state. Recognizing that most of our writings on Christophe from the Republic were authored by ideological and political opponents of the kingdom, Trouillot attempted to offer a balanced assessment of Christophe's government. Instead of seeing him as a bloodthirsty tyrant, Christophe's state was a totalitarianism avant la lettre which sought to build a modern black nation through a strong economy and well-ordered polity. One sees this through Christophe's fortifications and national defense policy, protection of national commerce and promotion of Haitian industry and labor, and economic, educational and political policies that regulated social life while creating clear hierarchies in which the rights of the cultivateur were, at least on paper, protected. 

Due to Trouillot's desire to shed a more positive light on Christophe's kingdom, one can see how every policy pursued by Christophe, even before the death of Dessalines, was connected to establishing a firm foundation for a wealthy, civilized, and well-defended state. Surrounded by slaveholding powers in a hostile world, Christophe, like Toussaint and Dessalines, believed the island's fate lied in reestablishing agriculture and industry. Christophe accomplished this with a system in which the large estates were preserved and distributed to a nobility appointed by him. Paying 1/4 of the proceeds of the estates to the state and 1/4 to the laborers, Christophe instituted a system of taxation and strict controls to ensure the recipients of land grants performed their duty of producing sugar, coffee, and other exports. Christophe's state relied on the military and police to ensure the laborers did not leave the estates without permission, too. However, the laborers were, at least in theory, the recipients had access to government redress in cases of exploitation. In addition, Christophe's state was wealthy. The successful system of production adopted in the kingdom, based on that of the earlier system used by Dessalines, Toussaint and Sonthonax, left about 30 million gourdes in the state treasury. This wealth came from sound economic policies and a system of land tenure in which the state was ever-ready to ensure consistent production and pursue international trade (most favorably with Britain). 

In addition to Christophe's system of land administration, he promoted national industry and commerce. Christophe spent dearly for foreign teachers, artisans, expertise and technicians to train local Haitians. His educational policy, which appears to have still been in a limited form by the time of his death in 1820, included an ambitious program that would have, if he had the time, probably reached all corners of the state. Nonetheless, his policies did succeed in promoting the training of a cadre of Haitian artisans and technicians. Indeed, even what at first seems like a waste of funds on Christophe's fine palaces, chateaux and monuments, was actually an expenditure that mostly employed Haitian labor and artisans. This further encouraged the development of Haitian skilled labor while also ensuring that the appointed nobility would also employ or seek the services of Haitian skilled laborers on their own projects. Christophe's success in this regard, combined with the success of higher agricultural production, ensured his state was far wealthier than the southern republic. One can see how his lavish palaces and monuments were spent in ways that could support local industry and the development of a local economy.

Sadly, the lack of additional sources, particularly on taxation and imports and exports, prohibits a deeper understanding of Christophean state's political economy. Nonetheless, with what has survived and made it into the Haitian National Archives, Trouillot's analysis affirms the kingdom's economic wealth. It was exactly the type of state which, despite its internal problems (the use of forced labor, the limitations on the movement of cultivateurs and the attempts to prohibit Vodou) was likely to build and consolidate a strong nation-state in a sea of hostile powers. Unlike the republic to the south, Christophe's kingdom was a centralized administration in which the state played a direct role in nearly every area. Christophe's success could be seen in that his treasury contained an estimated 30 million gourdes when he died, with most of it looted and pillaged by his disloyal subjects, leaving only an estimated 9 million for Boyer's government (according to Trouillot). His grandiose vision had even included a plan to recruit 40,000 African recaptives through negotiations with the British, presumably using these Africans to supplement his army. This was a brilliant strategy that, if there had been sufficient time, could have helped save Christophe from the rebels who pushed him to commit suicide. Lamentably, Christophe's regime perished and a reunified Haiti, under Boyer, agreed to the onerous indemnification of France.

Harvey On the Collapse of Christophe's Kingdom

After finally reading Harvey's Sketches of Hayti, I feel that I have a somewhat better idea of how exactly Christophe's kingdom in the northern part of Haiti collapsed. Obviously, Harvey is only one source and a European with his own biases and incomplete view, but he is more reliable in some ways than other sources on Christophe's state, such as the Baron de Vastey, who Harvey accuses of exaggeration (as well as a slew of other negative character flaws). Nevertheless, the author himself prefaces his account by alluding to a certain degree of censorship, and his own views of Africa and blacks (though he is quick to point to the barbarity of the negro being a result of slavery's effects rather than any innate racial inferiority) and the superiority of western European cultures certainly helps elucidate part of his rather defensive portrait of Christophe's state. 

Indeed, until the later years of Christophe's reign, Harvey sees his kingdom as the better than the republic in the south because of Christophe's sincere interest in the welfare of the people but also his stern and direct guidance in matters of the economy, labor, and education. Though he never stepped foot in the southern half of Haiti, based on information from a European informant, Harvey concludes that the republic was weakened by the lack of a single, strong and centralized head of government and the constitution's willingness to appease the ex-slave masses (where exactly Harvey gets off concluding that despite the 1816 Constitution empowering Petion to rule as president for life is beyond me...). Basically, Christophe was the strong, paternalistic and demanding father whereas Petion's republic was characterized by a relaxed and less intensive guidance from Port-au-Prince for the populace. 

Petion let the masses fall into their 'African' habits and savagery, more or less (and Harvey alludes to instances of Haitians in the republic being rude to whites because of the color of their skin and falling into vices and savagery wrought by their former conditions of slavery). Now, much of this is based on information provided by a single person, and Harvey contradicts himself by referring to the greater amount of commerce flowing through Port-au-Prince than Le Cap (or Cap Francois, as he calls it, as if it was still the same old colonial city! Interesting sidenote, Harvey says there were more American merchants and traders than any other foreigners in Christophe's state.) and some praise for the republic, but clearly, Christophe was, though about to turn tyrannical, jealous, and paranoid, did more to 'civilize' and contain false notions of liberty entertained by many ex-slaves.

As to the degree of popularity and acceptance of Christophe's rule before its end, Harvey states that Christophe was well-liked among the people, respected, and appreciated for his skills as a statesman and general. Elites were, as a part of his quasi-feudal system of governance, appointed to positions of authority and land (particularly civil officers, the military elite, and a landed aristocracy crafted by Christophe through investiture) and for the most part, qualified individuals (disproportionately mixed-race and more than a few under-educated and corrupt government officials were also part of his system of governance, but Harvey sees this as a result of their so recent conditions of slavery depriving them of education, a remedy for which Christophe was applying to much of the population through the establishment of schools based on the Lancasterian system) to execute his wishes. Naturally, one must be skeptical of how representative Harvey's views were for the lower classes, the workers, artisans, and peasants, but according to him, the peasantry were well-compensated for their work and the masses were proud to have such an able black ruler. 

So what happened? Why did Christophe lose favor with his subjects? Harvey does not provide enough information, which is no surprise given his foreign outlook and lack of close enough ties to some of the elite circles to which he attributes the origin of the coup. He also mentions the incompetence of Christophe's son, though despite his ineptitude for governance, he was popular with the military. This could be a relevant facotr to the demises of Christohe's regime because his son would have succeeded him, which could have later on led to a coup or perhaps motivated some of the elite to replace Christophe during his own lifetime. Christophe's fear, justified based on French talk of reconquering the island, perhaps fed his paranoia and suspicions of his own nobility. This, in turn,  could have fueled his detachment from much of his former advisors, his punishment of some by replacing them with less qualified candidates, and demotions of aristocrats who were formerly part of his inner circle. Maybe, just maybe, Christophe began to see conspiracies against his rule or perhaps French alliances with members of his government. 

Thus, Christophe became increasingly tyrannical, paranoid, and cruel against his own people. Furthermore, Harvey alludes to severe laws such as restrictions on the movement of Europeans in his domains, limiting them to 3 miles into the interior, and a regulation imposed on Europeans requiring them to submit their papers and documents to government officials for surveillance and security purposes. Whether or not these excessive acts motivated the elite to turn against Christophe, his own laws targeting native Haitians seem to have been the main factor in inciting the revolt. Details are lacking, but Harvey's account begins the fall of Christophe with the story of a few mulatto women from the Cap who refused to submit themselves to some 'severe' law (Harvey does not state which), leading them to pray at a church for some disaster or death of Christophe. Word traveled through the grapevine, reaching Christophe in no time, who then ordered for their execution. The public response was one of outrage and disgust, with much of the elite (who were likely already plotting and waiting for an opportunity to depose Christophe) tapping on the negative public outcry to initiate a revolt. 

Harvey makes it seem like race or color was another factor, with some of the mulatto elites being the first to organize against Christophe. Supposedly, many of these mulatto Haitians had reluctantly acknowledged the authority of Christophe, and barely hid their disdain even during the early years of Christophe's reign. Now, I am not sure how Harvey would know this or be so convinced of its accuracy, and since so many mulattoes were key in the upper posts of Christophe's government, I am skeptical of the veracity of Harvey's claim (though I am sure a handful of these folks may have held the views Harvey attributes to them). 

Regardless of the 'color' question in Christophe's fall, these elites likely came together based on their mutual interest of protecting their wealth and power, and Christophe dug himself into a hole by alienating himself from many if not most of his subjects. The military elite and the common soldiers were convinced to turn against Christophe in order to protect their necks, as well as their own positions of authority. Even Christophe's guard turned against him, leaving him with no options but to either die by their swords or commit suicide, choosing the latter of the two. The degree to which much of the soldiers were actually swayed by the old titled nobility's argument that they too could become targets of Christophe's wrath is unknown, but I am sure many, like the aristocrats, saw a chance and at great risk, took it to attain more power or affluence.

That's how it all ended, according to Harvey's rather less detailed narrative. The very same group that initiated the coup could never decide upon which form of government to pursue afterwards, and reunion with Boyer's republic in the south became the most attractive proposal after the temporarily selected ruler, Romaine, became despotic. I will have to conduct more research into how it exactly all came to an end, but this certianly added some depth to my comprehension of Christophe's fall. 

The Citadel of Haiti and Architectural Wonders of Christophe

While perusing an old article I found lying around the house, "The Forgotten Eighth Wonder of the World," by Victor-Emmanuel Roberto Wilson, I realized I had to do a quick introductory post to the famous Citadel in the north of Haiti. Based on that article, here are some key points and interesting facts about this famous structure as well as other wondrous architectural pieces across Christophe's kingdom.

1. The Citadel lies 3000 feet atop Mount Bonnet-a-l'Eveque,  an altitude where one can see for a distance of almost 50 km the entire valley, the city of Cap-Haitien, and the northwest shoreline as far as Monte-Christi and the border with the Dominican Republic. The strategic military importance is obvious then, since such a height would allow Haitians to defend themselves in the mountains while also having the advantage over French incursions since they could see them coming from miles away.

2. Construction of the Citadel began in 1804 under Dessalines. Christophe's reign as king of the northern part of Haiti led to a continued effort in completing the Citadel as well as other structures. The city of Cap-Haitien was rebuilt, the gourd established as currency, total exports from Haiti added up to more than 130 million pounds of various local goods between 1811-1820, and  he ordered the construction of several castles and palaces. Reading about this era, it's no surprise Haitian folktales contain allusions to castles, kings, and other aspects of what must have been a fascinating period to live in.

3. Dessalines had a French architect who drew up the original plans, La Ferriere. When Christophe was crowned, he commissioned a Haitian architect, Henri Barre. The author of the article claims that all bricklayers and able-bodied men were recruited for the project. The amazing part about the construction of the Citadel is the lack of evidence for the use of ramps. But without ramps, how else would these estimated 200,000 workers have been able to carry tons of material and cannons to the top of a mountain on narrow paths? Without ramps how would the guns have been set in place? Much like the ancient pyramids of Egypt, how was this Citadel built? I am skeptical of claims for as many as 200,000 men working on this project, as well as the other claim that 20,000 died doing so, especially since Wilson does not provide citations for his figures. Regardless, thousands of workers were necessary to complete this wonder of the world, and undoubtedly some perished in the process.

4. More than half a million tons of material were needed to finish construction. The interior of the Citadel is a mix of galleries, halls, target practice areas, rooms, powder magazines, barracks, supply rooms, prison cells and water tanks. It included a small palace for the king. According to Wilson, as many as 2300 men could easily live at the Citadel. Christophe's original plan was for 1500 men to be the garrison, capable of withstanding a siege for 3 years. By 1817, the Citadel was complete.

5. Wilson's "educated guess" is that Christophe built 9 palaces and 15 castles. Sans Souci, built near Milot, is the most well-known. The palace included a fountain, classical style, a terrace, gardens nearby where tropical plants were grown, decorated rooms, paintings, tapestries, banquet and reception halls, marble statues, collection of rainwater for water reserves, and air conditioning.

6. In addition, Christophe had all the streets of the capital paved and built roads. Christophe's desire to rebuild Haiti and show the architectural genius and capability of descendants of Africans worked, although lacking the recognition and appreciation it deserves from the rest of the world.