The Origins of Haitian Underdevelopment

For some strange reason, it took us a few years to finally complete Benoit Joachim's classic work on Haitian economic history, Les racines du sous-développement en Haïti. Joachim's analysis covers everything from colonial slavery to the semi-feudal, bourgoisie d'affaires who coexist to control a parasitic independent state suffering from neocolonialism. But while this already sounds familiar to the scholarship of other Haitians, particularly on the nefarious impact of the bord de mer on Haiti's economic development and the imperialist actions of the Western powers (France, USA, Germany, Britain), Joachim raises a number of interesting questions and problems.

For instance, Haiti's economy in the period 1804-1915 did experience growth. However, it was never enough to alter the backward agricultural production, pillaging of the coffers by the state, the lack of industrialization or the toxic power of the international & local bourgoisie d'affaires who engaged in constant forms of corruption, graft, loans, fake indemnities, financing revolutions and outright thievery. Nonetheless, Joachim raises a number of intriguing questions by shifting attention, momentarily, to the Haitian internal markets and consumption. Thus, the levels of exports are not entirely useful for a holistic view of Haiti's economy (and not solely due to widespread contraband and illegal exports). After all, local production of subsistence crops and the large local use of coffee, sirop, tafia, tobacco and other crops grown within Haiti appear to have grown after independence. Similarly, in his critique of the 19th century Haitian intellectuals who believed the country lacked sufficient workers, Joachim called attention to the underestimated impact of immigration on Haiti. While it remains a topic for further research, it is probable that a large part of the Haitian population descend, at least in part, from foreigners who came after 1804. This would include African Americans, West Indians, Europeans, Levantines, Latin Americans, and even a few Africans. 

Joachim also sought to elucidate the development of social classes within the Haitian economy burdened by neo-colonialism/international capitalism and the "feudal" landowning class, professionals (above all lawyers and other educated people who occasionally hailed from petite bourgoiesie or even the popular masses) and the Haitian elites. It was an alliance frequently shaken by competing claims to power and control of the government (to pilfer the nation), and sometimes operated with colorist biases but never seriously meaning to reform the state and economy. This negatively impacted the paysans, the urban poor, the small, embryonic working-class, and the petite bourgeoisie. Unsurprisingly, paysan resistance, often flaring up when coffee prices were low in the international markets and the economic repercussions led to crises and an increase in suffering for the Haitian lower class, upon whose backs the state lived, but the peasantry never could completely undermine the three-part powers that be without being coopted or snuffed out. That said, Joachim appears to put himself in the camp of Haitian intellectuals who believe that the Cacos active in 1911-1915 represented a real revolution that was thwarted by the US Occupation in 1915. If, however, the Cacos did represent a real revolution and the US had not invaded, perhaps some reforms or actual changes in the Haitian state and economy could have taken place. Undoubtedly, this would have been more meaningful and radical than the "talk" of reforms and the mild changes recommended by the intellectuals of the period who usually limited themselves to education, agricultural tools, and industry.

Colonial Borno Economy

Yakubu Mukhtar's Trade, Merchants and the State in Borno, c. 1893-1939 is an excellent analysis of the economy of Borno during the first few decades of British colonialism. Mukhtar's study endeavors to examine the question of trade and economy in colonial Borno in the context of northern Nigeria's economic reorientation to the coast and the thorny issues of dependency theory and vent for surplus theory. Relying on oral sources, colonial reports, and previous scholarship, Mukhtar found the Borno case to not support either theory strongly. Moreover, he found that the colonial state and its reliance on indirect rule, plus issues of transportation and prices for Borno's exports, made Borno rather late in terms of becoming a major exporter of commodities like gum arabic, cattle, or groundnuts. The thorny issues of compelling peasant producers to shift to gum arabic, impose taxation in cash rather than in kind, and attempting to work with "traditional" rulers led to problems like the persistence of slavery until the 1930s or widespread smuggling across colonial borders. One can see the frustrations of the colonial officialdom who sought to make administration of Borno pay for itself despite the troubled economy inherited from Rabeh. 

Indeed, while British colonialism did not bring Borno into the international capitalist system (that already happened through trans-Saharan trade and Sudanic trade in commodities that linked precolonial Borno to Europe and the Mediterranean), British rule did gradually lead to a more thoroughly monetized economy with closer integration into the world capitalist system. With the extension of the railway to Kano and the 1930 extension to Nguru, Borno's hides, skins, gum arabic, cattle, and natron more easily reached Lagos and other regions. European and Levantine commercial firms began to increase their operations in Borno and northeast Nigeria, particularly important as an important node in trade of cattle, kola nuts, cloth, salt, and textiles with the French colonies of Niger and Chad. Again, much of this was not new. Borno had long been a center of Sudanic commerce and its role in the production and distribution of salt, dried fish, livestock, textiles, natron, kola nuts, and other commodities had made it the most important area of the Central Sudan before the Sokoto Caliphate's rise. What British rule did was improve security and, gradually, with the railroad, modern roads, and lorries, increase the scale of trade. Borno remained a peripheral part of Northern Nigeria in comparison to Kano, but the quantity and amount of goods exported to Lagos and beyond gradually led to more local consumers of imported European goods and an indigenous merchant class.

What is most interesting about Mukhtar's study of Borno's economy in the colonial transition is the issue of continuity and change from precolonial patterns. Slavery, as previously mentioned, continued despite British crackdown on slave traders. The system of indirect rule also led to attempts to work with the Shehu and his administration, albeit changing the titled nobility from absentee to settled ones in the villages and towns outside the capital. Borno Resident officials like H.R. Palmer were active in promoting possible exports for Borno, such as gum arabic, while persuading the Shehu to promote gum arabic to the peasantry and engage in trade with European firms, like the Niger Company. Indigenous merchants of Kanuri and Hausa origin, or the once dominant North African traders, also continued to operate in Borno with some enjoying close relations with the traditional authorities. North Africans gradually lost their position of prominence due to the decline of the trans-Saharan trade. While trans-Saharan trade routes connecting Tripolitania with Kano and Zinder sometimes included a stopover to Borno, the second decade of the 20th century saw an end to that. North Africans began to shift to Lagos and working as agents of European firms. Nonetheless, they continued to enjoy a prominent role that led to the establishment of the Fezzan ward of Maiduguri and religious, cultural, and social relations to Borno's authorities. Levantines and even Yemeni traders also entered Borno during this period, sometimes also becoming agents of European firms. Access to credit gave the Levantines an advantage over local traders, who competing with African merchants buying and selling the same commodities. Nonetheless, a number of Hausa, Kanuri and other West African traders became prosperous through kola nuts, cattle, hides, and cotton cloth trade. Their unfamiliarity with bookkeeping, lack of access to credit, and perhaps Islamic and cultural practices that impeded the chances for their businesses to survive the founder's death made it harder for them to maintain a position comparable to that of the Levantines.

Ultimately, the question of Borno's economy and the colonial transition was a mix of moderate improvements and frustrated hopes. New exports like gum arabic and groundnuts replaced slaves, ivory and ostrich plumes, which definitely represented a major shift in Borno's non-Sudanic trade. However, the improvements in transportation were not as widespread or quick enough to have facilitated the development of these exports earlier in the colonial period. Furthermore the persistent problem of food supply and the delicate ecology of the area meant it was not guaranteed that Kanuri peasants would dedicate themselves to gum arabic instead of subsistence crops or groundnuts. Of course, Borno's distance from Lagos and the Atlantic also contributed to its importance. So, while remaining a periphery of Kano and Lagos, Borno was actually hugely important for the trade in cattle and natron from Chad and Niger. Wadai's cattle, for example, were often shipped through Borno to reach Southern Nigeria. Borno was likewise important in producing grain for trade to Niger and Chad. Borno's economic position was thus something of a paradox. It benefited from its geographic position while also suffering from it. The region appears to have experienced something of a boom after 1939 with some exports, but never to have developed the type of successful indigenous business class of Kano. Certainly the benefits of Borno's gradually improved economic situation were also felt unevenly. Peasants and the lower classes may have benefited from access to cash and more affordable imports from Europe, but ongoing issues of transportation, price fluctuations and the depression years must have limited the positive outcomes of this era.

Haiti From Independence to US Occupation

"In the end Haiti was undone by a combination of imperialist intrigue by the United States, abusive behaviour by the core and an economic model that was too dependent on coffee and customs duties."

Victor Thomas-Bulmer's "Haiti From Independence to US Occupation" is a worthwhile read on Haitian economic history from independence to 1915. His work demolishes some of the silly myths for understanding Haitian economic underdevelopment by placing Haiti into a broader Caribbean and Latin American framework as well as discussing foreign merchant communities and imperialist core powers intervening in Haitian affairs. Foreigners had multiple ways of maneuvering around laws prohibiting foreign ownership, Haiti was actually paying debts on a consistent basis, and yes, political instability and poor governance played a role, but the economic impact of the political instability was usually limited and the extent to which the foreign community fomented or contributed to Haiti's economic troubles does not get acknowledged. In the end, Haitian economic underdevelopment is a result of both internal and external factors, which Thomas-Bulmer's work defends. Moreover, for most of the 19th century, Haiti's economic output was not as abysmal or horrific as one would think, actually faring quite well if one excludes Cuba from the Caribbean average. It seems that only by the 1890s and assuredy by 1910 that Haiti can be seen as "lagging" by many indicators in comparison to Latin America, the Dominican Republic, and the Caribbean. Even then, some argue that Haiti's economic stability and 'vibrance' lasted into the 1930s, when the Dominican Republic began to surpass Haiti in terms of revenue (Bernardo Vega discusses this here) and only in terms of education and other indicators did the Dominican Republic began to pass Haiti only in the 1950s and 1960s (read).

Haiti in the Early 1970s

Haiti one year after Papa Doc's Death (early 1970s) in a 60 Minutes Special. Worth watching for the not quite accurate US narrator's summary of Haitian history and the use of 'transformation industries' as a phrase to describe sweatshops. Naturally, it's hardly an authoritative source, but another example of the many ways the US media approaches the subject of Haiti through exoticizing, primitive lens. It's frightening how so many of the same economic policies introduced under Baby Doc are being attempted again by the current Haitian government, although one can be glad that there is no longer a business in selling Haitian plasma and cadavers anymore (good riddance, Luckner Cambronne).

Haitian Exports From Thomas Madiou

 I believe the data speaks for itself in some ways, although it's unclear what unit of measurement export items are in (pounds? feet?) and I am unsure of how to convert Haitian gourdes to US dollars or British sterling. Like most years of the Boyer dictatorship from 1833-1843, the central goverment spent more than it took in. 

Haitian Exports in 1860

Haitian exports by weight and numbers in 1860, table taken from Hepburn's Haiti As It Is, a rather sympathetic description of his impressions of the early Geffrard years. Note that compared to 1838 and 1839, the weight of coffee exports is actually much smaller, around 22 million lbs. versus an average of over 43 million lbs. for 1838 and 1839. What went wrong? Also, tobacco is no longer an export, but other exports such as logwood remained more constant. Could the decline in coffee exports be attributable to competition from Brazil, Java (Indonesia) and elsewhere?

 Also, by 1860, Hepburn states that Haiti imported nearly twice the value of its exports, another sign of increasing dependency, especially on the US, the principal trading partner who provided mostly provisions (a similar economic relationship existed for the British colonies in the Caribbean, such as Jamaica, whose markets often relied on US provisions and exports for sustenance). Since the state derived most of its revenue from duties on imports and exports, clearly the masses felt the blow as they paid more for imports from the US, France, Germany, and Britain while receiving less and less in exchange for their own products. Because the most essential export product of peasant and rural communities remained coffee, but less coffee was being exported, one can see how the process of greater poverty and dependency began to appear.

There are some interesting what-ifs in Hepburn's overly optimistic and pro-Geffrard travel narrative. I am still reading, but there was talks between an Anglo-French company and the Haitian government to tap into Haiti's deposits of lignum vitae, which, according to Hepburn, was another source of energy, like coal, for the 19th century. According to him, this foreign company and Geffrard's government were discussing the establishment of a railway in the area of Haiti with vast deposits and connecting it to the nearest port town, as well as the transfer of industrial technology for such a project. That such an idea was in discussion under Geffrard was part of Hepburn's overwhelmingly pro-Geffrard narrative, because he saw Soulouque as causing a decline in Haitian civilization whereas Geffrard was able, wise, just, interested in education and industrialization, and preparing to remove the militarized form of the Haitian state to usher in progress and prosperity. He also got the Haitian government its first steam boats, each one named for the president! Moreover, Geffrard lessened the amount of time soldiers were expected to be on duty in order to support agriculture. 

Haiti's principal trading partner was the United States, and provisions were the majority of American exports to Haiti. Indeed, if Hepburn is to be taken seriously on this matter, Haiti, like Jamaica and other British colonies in the Caribbean, was quite dependent on US foodstuffs, such as flour, rice, pork, etc. France provided wine, Britain dry goods, and Germany, sausage, cheese and manufactured products. Unfortunately, Hepburn does not provide data on the values or weight and numbers of foreign products in Haiti. 

 Needless to say, Geffrard did not live up to the great praise and expectations of Hepburn, of being such a hero and progressive leader in mid-19th century Haiti. Instead, he retained a military system in governance and relied upon the British to put down an uprising against his regime before exile in Jamaica. I will write a follow-up post after I finish perusing Hepburn for additional insights or commentary on Haiti in the early 1860s. 

Haiti in the Last Years Under Boyer

It's refreshing to read John Candler's account of Haiti in the early 1840s. Unlike Brown and Franklin, with their white supremacist outlook and seemingly pro-slavery stance, ( by the way, Candler's Brief Notices of Hayti can be accessed here), Candler, a Quaker abolitionist who visits Haiti with his wife, offers an optimistic and positive view of the situation on the island. The following are some areas where Candler offers some important commentary or enlightening facts and figures on Haiti in the last years under Boyer.

The "aristocracy of the skin" lived on under independent Haitian governments. For instance, in certain areas of the country, such as Port-au-Prince, mulattoes nearly monopolized the under-funded schools of the city. Candler also describes a Haitian mulattress who speaks ill of blacks and wishes there was a way to compel them to labor. Overall, Candler does not describe too much colorism in Boyer's Haiti (while Jonathan Brown asserts that Boyer's regime did everything it could to prevent an ascendancy of blacks in the government), but it's clear that mulattoes were disproportionately powerful in the regime. On the question of social relations between blacks and mulattoes, there is mention of most mulatto women never marrying black men, since producing children with darker skin than themselves is not generally seen as a positive thing. Yet, while in Jacmel, Candler met a mulatto widow whose husband was a black man, so black-mulatto marriages were far from unheard of. On the other hand, whites still enjoyed special privileges in Haiti. Indeed, despite prohibitions on whites owning property in Haiti and citizenship rights, a white American became the mayor of the town of St. Marc!

On the question of the economy, Candler is more optimistic than most. Haiti, based on exports to the US, was the third largest exporter to the US economy at the time, and tobacco production, coffee, and mahogany/wood were the most important exports.  In defense of independent Haiti, we see that coffee production only went down by perhaps 12 million from its zenith in Saint Domingue, an example of Haitian economic success without slave labor. Based on his relationship with prominent Haitians in the government, such as Inginac, Candler was given official government documents and uses those to arrive at estimates for government revenues over the years. Based on Haiti's small population and the amount or value of exports, Candler comes to the conclusion that the reality of Haitian exports and commerce are actually quite impressive. On the question of Haitian peasants, he is more mixed than most, defending their liberty and autonomy more so than others, yet blaming heathenism, ignorance, the lack of education, and superstition (some of which is encouraged by Catholic priests, according to this Quaker writer) for languishing agriculture:

 

Candler is quite disturbed by public nudity of children, the absence of proper medical coverage and religious or moral instruction, and clearly is too focused on the export-oriented model of economic development. However, as a product of his time and eager to see a future of profitable but non-slave British colonies in the Caribbean, individuals such as Candler saw Haiti as an experiment on the possibility of free black labor in the hemisphere. Perhaps this may come into play in his seemingly admirable words on the relatively equal manners or relations between landholders and their workers in Haiti, proving that less hierarchical or unequal power relations in agriculture could still be workable or profitable. Therefore, profitable plantations and small estates tied with an export economy remained essential for proving the beneficial future of non-slave societies in the British West Indies. The following selection from Candler's text is quite illustrative of the profitability of Haiti and the importance of its exports to the United States:

The over-sized military budget and Boyer's agreement to compensate former French planters of Saint-Domingue were a great burden on the Haitian economy, however. The standing army was reduced to about 25,000 in 1840, but it was a constant drain on the budget. Candler urges for a further reduction of the military, since those men's labor could be used in agriculture or industry and therefore remove additional financial burdens on the state (and needless to say, the average Haitian soldier was not well-paid!). Out of a perhaps total population on the island of 850,000 (overwhelmingly on the western side), Candler estimates that nearly 1 out of 15 people were in some shape or form engaged or called up to be engaged in the military or guard of Haiti. 

In addition to problems with the military, Candler does not hesitate to criticize the weakness and incompetence of the courts, the military fueling petty crime and theft, and during an interview with Boyer, who emphasizes the youth of the Haitian nation, is defensive of the progress made in Haiti. Since he did not visit the Spanish-speaking provinces, Candler offers little commentary, but he does speak highly of the increased tobacco production and exports from the area around Santiago and of population increase in that part of the island. Thus, Candler's account of Haiti in 1841 is one that, though largely silent on the Spanish side, does reveal some admiration and appreciation of Haitian progress and abolition. As a Protestant, he is not too positive on Catholics, since some Catholic officials perpetuate superstition among the peasants or overcharge for services such as baptisms, and of course one would not expect Candler to be fond of Vodou. Yet, compared to Jonathan Brown, his account of Haiti is not racist and speaks to an optimism that much of the international abolitionist community believed. Indeed, while traveling in parts of Haiti, Candler, who also met two American abolitionists, comments on the hypocrisy of America and Great Britain for their practices of slavery yet proclaiming themselves the freest countries of humanity. 

Interestingly, like many other European and white travelers in Haiti at the time, we see a mulatto-centered history of Haiti emerge. Black leaders such as Dessalines and Christophe are disparaged, insulted, or seen as nothing but tyrants. Fortunately, unlike Mackenzie and others, Candler has a more nuanced version of that period in Haitian history, and speaks highly of the education system established by Christophe in Cap Haitien. Candler basically sees Haiti as an experiment on the moral necessity of abolition and human progress, in accordance with his Quaker sympathies. The Boyer regime must get it together by prioritizing funding for education (especially for girls) and many other things (infrastructure, reforming civil institutions, etc.), but Candler's account gives no prediction of the 1843 revolution.