Manifeste du Parti d'Entente Populaire

Alexis

The Parti d'Entente Populaire's Manifeste is a precious document for understanding how Alexis and other Haitian intellectuals viewed Marxism and the struggle of national liberation and development. While undoubtedly a Marxist and believing that the "New Independence" of Haiti must center the working classes, Alexis was a pragmatist who saw the extreme backwardness of the Haitian economy and the weakness of its working-class as major impediments to any type of socialist revolution. Instead, inter-class alliances uniting the peasantry (the vast majority of the population in the mid-20th century), the unemployed and poor urban masses, the tiny working-class, middle-class elements (despite being, on average, the most conservative, some of them and the middle-class intellectuals should be included in a united national front), and the bourgeoisie nationale should be the goal. With this broad coalition, Alexis and the PEP believed that the semi-feudal and imperialist conditions in which Haiti had languished for 150 years could finally be overturned. Already by this period, Haiti's conditions were dire and the writing was on the wall on the lack of any viable economic or social future. Consequently, the workers, peasants, progressive-minded Haitians and members of the bourgeoisie eager to industrialize Haiti or safely invest their capital in the country must cooperate to create a democratic, liberal state. 

Naturally, the PEP's program for this future state included active state intervention in the economy and a number of protections for workers, landless peasants, a plan for economic development that welcomed the national bourgeoisie and sought to limit the negative impact of US imperialism. But before any type of socialist revolution could take place, a bourgeoisie nationale must be included in a progressive coalition to overturn "feudalism" and imperialism. This reading of Haitian political history and the solution to the problems of Haiti led to a generally positive view of the Liberals of the 19th century and the champions of civil government and liberal reforms, including Edmond Paul and Firmin as intellectuals who correctly identified some of the solutions for Haiti. However, since the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois progressives in the 1840s, 1870s, and other moments ultimately sided with the "feudal" landowners, military generals, and imperialist forces at other moments when the semi-feudal, imperialist conditions of Haiti were threatened, the PEP promoted inter-class solidarity for a united front while placing less emphasis on their Marxist influences or believe in the next stage or mode. Through education, collaboration, and protecting Haitian commerce and industry, the PEP would win over progressives of the bourgeoisie whose long-term interests meant an end to the feudal conditions of Haiti. 

Of course, one wonders why conditions in the 1950s and 1960s would be any different from past experiences where Haiti's bourgeoisie chose to side with the retrograde "feudal" forces. Seeing their long-term class interests requires rational thought and a willingness to forego immediate profits while also risking everything in moments of unrest, arson or looting. Duvalierism itself also represented something new that, though obviously based on the "ancient Haitian tradition" of governance and corruption, was more extreme and authoritarian (arguably not so obvious in 1959). One assumes Alexis saw this, and perhaps was increasingly drawn to the Cuban model and Castro for their successes in seizing government and instituting a number of reforms and protections for the poor. Indeed, Mao and the Chinese Revolution were clearly another source of influence on how Alexis's political ideology and programs may have changed had he lived longer or the PEP was able to take power. And looking at Haiti today, with its apocalyptic conditions and nonviable economic, social and political conditions, one can see that no inter-class coalition that united the national bourgeoisie, workers, peasants, and the middle classes was able to institute a state with durable liberal governance. Although the political system did open up to include those from the lower classes and middle class, Haiti has been beset by various crises, foreign interventions, and now, a complete hollowing out of the state. One wonders how horrified Alexis would be today if he had lived to see what became of our island, and perhaps how far from fruition even some of the basic ideas in the PEP's program are.

The Development of the Inca State

Brian Bauer's The Development of the Inca State pushes against the standard narrative of the rise of the Inca state. Instead of accepting the c.1438 date and the legendary exploits of Pachacuti against the Chancas and his role in forming the Inca state, Bauer suggests literal interpretations of narratives from the Spanish chronicles contain mytho-historical elements that require careful interpretation and, when possible, archaeological evidence. Thus, instead of viewing the rise of an Inca state and its dominion extending beyond Cuzco during the 15th century reign of Pachacuti, it is likely that the rise of an Inca state was a gradual one that likely developed over centuries. This incipient Inca state may be seen in the Cuzco region, including Paruro (an area whose ethnic groups were part of the Inca by  privilege status), through the widespread appearance of Killke ceramics, certain iconography shared across them, and the persistence of settlement patterns over a period from c.1000-1400 (and beyond) as revealed through ayllus and moiety structures verified by colonial-era administrative reports and ethnographic evidence. 

Indeed, the Incas of Cuzco may have already dominated the valley and nearby regions like Paruro long before Pachacuti and his father in the 1400s. The chapter on ceramic evidence points to the widespread finds of Killke pottery styles in Paruro and across the Cuzco valley to argue that this distribution across a vast region and some of the shared designs and patterns may point to Cuzco domination or rule possibly as early as the 1100s and 1200s. The radiocarbon dates are inconclusive but he also claims from settlement pattern analysis from the so-called Killke period sites to sites he labels as "Inca" (he means imperial Inca from the 1400s on) support the idea that the area of Paruro (including Pacariqtambo) was included within the Inca de Privilegio category. Furthermore, there are practically no Killke sites with fortifications, pushing against the idea that before Incas like Pachacuti or his father, Viracocha, the Cuzco region was torn apart by chronic warfare between different communities. This suggests that the Cuzco region may have already been under the control or influence of Cuzco's rulers in the Killke era, perhaps through nonmilitary means. This subordination of areas like Pacariqtambo's ethnic groups then used the myth of Manco Capac to justify the overlordship of the Incas by blood, who later constructed Maukallaqta to commemorate Manco Capac and the Pacariqtambo origin myth.

Bauer claims at least 8 Inca-period sites in Paruro (by Inca period he means after 1400) were the sites of ayllus relocated by the reducciones of Viceroy Toledo in 1571 or 1572. He further speculates that these are the ayllus of the Tambo group/ethnic group and that moieties and ayllu structures in this region appear to have been continued from the Killke sites/ceramic traditions. Unknown, but incipient state formation could have happened as early as 1000 CE. with a long-term continuity in settlement-subsistence patterns and village level organization. The only Inca period sites with stone monuments appear to have no administrative capacity, suggesting the area of Pacariqtamo and surrounding regions may have long been incorporated into the Inca state. With the imperial period, perhaps Incas by Privilege were then used in the administration of the Empire or resettled in conquered provinces. Yet, there is no evidence of Inca-period resettlements in Paruro, again suggestive of a region that had long been part of the Cuzco state before its imperial phase. 

Jesuits in the Kingdom of Prester John

Des jésuites au royaume du prêtre Jean (Ethiopie): stratégies, rencontres et tentatives d'implantation, 1495-1633 by Hervé Pennec is another study of the Jesuits and the mission in Ethiopia. Since the scholarly literature and written sources on the topic is vast, Pennec proposes new interpretations and questions about the subject. While revisiting the sources and challenging readers to reconsider the strategies and tactics employed by both the Jesuits and ruler Susenyos, one can see that the topic of the Jesuits in Ethiopia and this transformation of Prester John of myth into the "real" Ethiopia which the Latin West engaged in the Early Modern Period still raises many questions.

The first third of the book begins with Portugal's early relations with the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia, and how Ignatius of Loyola (and others) mistakenly assumed the Abyssinian ruler was ready to submit to Christ. Relying on outdated information from Alvares, plus the issue of Bermudes and his claim to be Roman Catholic patriarch, confusion abounded. Despite being well-informed on some aspects of Ethiopia, the founder of the Jesuit order wrongly believed that Ethiopia was ready for submission to the papacy. Of course, Galadewos had no interest in doing such a thing, and the early wave of Jesuits in Ethiopia found themselves largely on the periphery. Still, despite their small numbers in the second half of the 16th century, Ethiopian religious literature engaged in a Christological written (and oral) debate with the Jesuit missionaries, particularly once Susenyos converted to Catholicism in 1622. Despite their complete lack of success in converting Ethiopian rulers, the early Jesuits did proselytize and preach to Luso-Ethiopians, maintaining Roman Catholicism among descendants of Portuguese in Abyssinia. Moreover, Goa, as the capital of Portuguese India and center of the Jesuit missions in the Orient, was also an early example of a periphery being arguably more important or essential for the survival of the Jesuit mission in Ethiopia than Rome, Portugal and Spain. Goa, much closer to the Jesuit missions and capable of receiving and sending information more quickly, shaped the decisions on personnel who were ultimately sent to Ethiopia. This was no simple matter, since Ottoman control of the Red Sea made the matter more difficult.

Pennec likewise focuses on how the Jesuits, once able to establish a foothold again in 1603, particularly with the arrival of Pero Paes. Whilst it would take several more years before an Ethiopian ruler converted to Catholicism, one can begin to see here the Jesuits establishing stone churches and residences (with Ethiopian workers and at least one Indian). By erecting churches in stone, some beautifully designed, the Jesuits were implanting themselves in the kingdom on a more permanent basis. By doing so, they were also increasingly drawn into what Pennec sees as royally-sponsored churches. Gifts of land (gult), money, supplies, and the involvement of Susenyos in the ceremony culminating the completion of churches was partly a way for Susenyos to assert his power. This meat that Susenyos, and his brother who converted to Catholicism before him, were incorporating the Jesuits into a familiar patter of royal sponsorship and assertions of power, particularly in Gojjam and around Lake Tana. While the Jesuits undoubtedly benefitted from receiving lands, supplies, funds, and elite backers, they were also part of a strategy of Ethiopian rulers to express their power, which even included enlisting the Jesuits (or the masons among them) to construct stone palaces and monumental architecture for him. This complex process was followed by the Jesuit experience in Ethiopia after the conversion of Susenyos. Part of this complex relationship was also due to Susenyos's desire for Spanish troops to be sent to Ethiopia to help him as a prerequisite for converting, while the Jesuits told him he would have to submit to the papacy before any European troops would come to his aid.

With the 1620s, Pero Paes died but Susenyos's conversion gave the Jesuits their legitimacy and renewed the mission by the arrival of more missionaries. Although a failure within ten years, as Susenyos abdicated and his son, Fasiladas, later exiled the Jesuits, one can see this experience as the zenith of the mission. More missionaries on the ground, conversions of more Ethiopians (although the numbers given by the Jesuits are problematic, it seems that Gojjam had more converts), and Susenyos sidelining his Catholic brother as a supporter of the Catholics. Nonetheless, the mission's short-lived success came to an end with Susenyos's abdication. Pennec's study is less focused on this period, highlighting how Paes and d'Almeida's histories of Ethiopia must be analyzed carefully for the ways in which the authors engaged with Ethiopian written sources, especially the royal chronicle on the reign of Susenyos. Paes especially, despite his nearly 20 years spent in Ethiopia and his familiarity with ge'ez and Amharic, must be interpreted for the ways they cite, paraphrase, and refute Ethiopian sources. For instance, the question of the metropolitan accused of fathering children, drinking, and abusing his ecclesiastical authority in Paes's redaction of the chronicle of Susenyos, and being involved in a revolt in 1617 against the king, may not necessarily be an insertion by Paes. It is possible that later versions of the chronicle after Susenyos's reign censored that segment of the chronicle, but Paes, who was of course biased against the metropolitan sent from Egypt, may have been closer to the truth.

Cholo Soy

A Peruvian musical gem by Luis Abanto Morales.

On the Pedraza (Pedrasa)

Although the documentary trail is incomplete, it looks like one of our forebears was a descendant a family that frequently married cousins in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Pedraza. The earliest one we can find is a Lorenzo Pedraza, who died in 1812. His wife, Rafaela de Arroyo, passed away in 1800, in Caguas. We also know that a son of this couple, Hilario Pedrasa de Arroyo, married a Dorotea de Sierra Pedrasa in 1788 (also in Caguas). Since Dorotea's mother was a Juana Pedrasa and Hilario's father also a Pedrasa, we think the two were probably related. 

We believe that Hilario Pedrasa and Dorotea de Sierra were the parents of the Ramona Pedraza we are interested in. According to the parish books of San Lorenzo, a Ramona Pedraza, daughter of Hilario and Dorotea, married Domingo Montanez (son of Juan and Maria Reyes) in 1813. The Montanez and Pedraza have a long history in the 18th and 19th centuries, at least in the area of Caguas and San Lorenzo. We believe the daughter of Domingo Montanez and Ramona Pedraza, married a Montanez who likely descends from the same lineage. 

This daughter, Isabel or Ysabel Montanez Pedraza, married a Guillermo Diaz of Guayama. According to the little we could find in the parish books, Guillermo Diaz was a hijo natural of a Isabel Diaz. We know both were pardos or morenos. Fortunately, a number of documents assert that the parents of Ysabel Montanez Pedraza were Domingo and Ramona Pedraza, pardos libres. Ysabel's death certificate from the late 1800s also identifies her father as a Domingo Montanez. 

To make things even more confusing, a Maria Ramona Pedraza was said to have married a Ramon Benitez in 1821. Get this, Maria Ramona Pedraza's parents were listed by the parish priest in San Lorenzo as Hilario and a Teodora (Dorotea?) Sierra! Perhaps Ramona remarried then or there was a mix-up  on the part of the parish priest.

If our theory is correct, then Domingo Montanez's parents were Juan Montanez and Maria Reyes. Now we need to find out the origins of Isabel Diaz, Guillermo's mother. The Pedraza and Montanez appear to have been related and marrying each other since the second half of the 1700s, but the origins of the Diaz line remains a mystery. Furthermore, we were unable to determine the origins of Lorenzo Pedraza, the father of Hilario. 

The Khmers

Royal parade reliefs

The Khmers by Ian Mabbett and David Chandler is mostly an overview of over 2000 years of Cambodian history, the vast majority of the text covering the period before the fall of Angkor. Mabbett, writing an introductory overview, appears to cite secondary sources and translations of primary source materials (Chinese, Sanskrit, Old Khmer) whilst drawing on insights by archaeologists and scholars of Khmer art architecture to bring this ancient civilization to life. As it was published in the 1990s, some of the more recent advances in the field are not present here, yet Mabbett and Chandler wrote a fine introduction to the complex history of the Khmer. 

Many questions still remain about the period of "Indianization" in this part of mainland Southeast Asia, but Mabbett correctly emphasizes that the rise of urbanization, trade and some degree of social stratification already occurred before Indianization. This was followed by the shadowy polities of Funan and Zhenla, who are best known from problematic external sources (mainly Chinese). If, however, scholars are correct that these were not centralized kingdoms but perhaps temporarily dominant polities in southern Cambodia, then we must wait until the late 8th century and early 9th century to see a sense of Khmer unity. Even so, Khmer provincial elites continued to assert their independence and the unity of the Khmer realm during the Angkorian period was not guaranteed. Indeed, Rajendravarman was said to be essential in the process of centralizing the state in the mid-10th century. 

Unfortunately, the enigmatic fall of Angkor and what transpired in the Cambodian kingdom afterward is poorly served by our sources. Few rulers after Jayavarman VII left behind inscriptions, and the kings shifted away from grandiose Hindu and Hindu/Buddhist temples to lesss ostentatious displays of merit and piety. While Mabbett and others believe the spread of Theravada Buddhism shaped this process, much remains unknown about the decline of the Angkorian state. Conflict with Siam is attested as early as the late 13th century. The decline of irrigation systems and the complex waterworks of Angkor could have also contributed to the eventual abandonment of the site as a royal capital in the 15th century. Perhaps to better understand this period of change will require a new look at Siamese and Cambodian royal chronicles as well as an examination of the pull of trade and economic shifts to the coasts from inland centers. One also wonders if the kings and old temples endowed with thousands of servants or servile populations and lands may have also lost much of their power with the gradual shift to Theravada Buddhism, leading to a shift from wealth based on agricultural exploitation for elites to a more commercial orientation. It may be interesting to look here for clues as to the Chinese, Malay, Cham, or other traders active in the late Angkorian period and afterwards for clues.

The remainder of the text is essentially two short chapters offering a condensed version of Chandler's coverage of Cambodia after Angkor in his general history of the nation. Readers are recommended to consult that larger, more detailed work for Cambodia from c.1500 to the 1990s.

Sakara Music

 

Sakara music recorded in Benin in the 1950s. The singing is quite engaging while the insistent rhythm of the drums and the droning stringed-instrument or violin make this quite the alluring song. According to Wikipedia, this genre of music among the Yoruba has Islamic influences, and the goje instrument used in it has some resemblance to similar instruments among West African cultures of the Sahel.