Melissa Harris-Perry's Finer Moment

For a long time my favorite MHP moment from her show on MSNBC is keeping it real with some business-minded corporate hack guest who tried to defend the 'job creators' and '1%' who take risks financially and 'create jobs' and 'wealth.' She keeps it real and talks from personal experience with the realities of life for low-income black communities in New Orleans to demonstrate that being poor is a greater risk (for schooling, jobs, safety, mental and physical health, the list goes on to other disadvantages and risks not mentioned by MHP). Unfortunately, the crisis of poverty will likely not be alleviated anytime soon, but props to MHP for saying something of substance and more meaningful than, say, defending Obama and the Dems. 

Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race and Underdevelopment Since 1700

I recently read this gem of an overview of Haitian history by Alex Dupuy. Perhaps the reason I enjoyed it so much is that its in agreement with my own preconceived notions of Haitian underdevelopment as a product of a plantation model or dependency theory in economic relations with the North. However, after reading the text, it is hard to take seriously the neoliberal remedies for Haitian development, or, for that matter, development in a broader Caribbean and African context. Dupuy's thesis is best stated by him on the fifth page of the text:

I argue that Haiti’s underdevelopment stems from its incorporation into the capitalist world-system since the end of the seventeenth century as a peripheral economy specializing in the production of primarily agricultural crops for export and late some manufactured goods. In addition, the emergence of specific class, racial/color, and political relations and structures during the colonial period and after independence reinforced the economy’s dependence on foreign capital and it’s extroverted and unintegrated characteristics.

Hard to disagree with that, eh? It explains the structural flaws of the Haitian economy (and likewise, much of Latin America and Africa) as a product of unequal exchange in a capitalist world-system on the peripheries. Similarly, class and racial factors entrenched unequal economic and power relationships with Europe and North America that have perpetuated Haitian poverty. Fortunately, Dupuy does not attribute most of Haitian economic and political turmoil to the color question, since he spends a considerable amount of time in each chapter on Haitian history detailing the common interests of black and mulatto elites against the peasantry. 

For instance, the transformation of the interests of black military leaders during the Haitian Revolution from the same as the ex-slaves to resembling more and more those of their affranchi elites illustrates the flaws of attributing Haitian social inequality solely to color (57). Of course, one should not assume this was always the case, since Toussaint's nephew, Moise, was believed to have had a role in organizing a revolt against his uncle that sought land reform in favor of the ex-slaves (65). Also, I am not certain how dependable Dupuy's estimate is, but the Haitian War of Independence cost Haiti 1, 144, 258, 948 francs, an astronomical figure (74)! 

There are some moments where I question Dupuy's assessment of Haitian leaders, though. For example, he claims that the main goal of Dessalines was to establish the black elite as the uncontested leaders of Haiti (81). I don't buy that. Dessalines was willing to marry his daughter to one of the mulatto leaders of Haiti and, assuming we take Charles Mackenzie as a credible source, Dessalines was very trusting of Alexandre Pétion. This alleged pro-nouveaux libres policy of Dessalines was continued under Christophe, even though we know anciens libres were represented in his court and enjoyed positions of prestige and influence (86). Apparently workers fled Christophe's state for the republic to pursue their own subsistence and small landholding production, which suggests the sharecropping and peasant autonomy were stronger than in the north, which is not too surprising given Christophe's maintenance of large estates (88). I just wish Dupuy had some additional sources or figures for the numbers of people who fled Christophe's state for  Pétion's.

Anyway, moving back to the broader structural and economic underpinnings of the Haitian state, race and the particular path taken to Haitian independence hindered development due to diplomatic isolation. As Dupuy rightfully so argues, lack of full diplomatic relations prevented the Haitian bourgeoisie from engaging in complete financial and commercial transactions, limiting the amount of technology, access to markets, and sources of credit from the metropoles (93). Thus, the quest by Boyer to procure French recognition of Haitian independence, and thereby assuring other European powers would follow suit, was closely tied to attempts to restore export-oriented, latifundia-styled agricultural production (92). Now, we know things did not quite turn out well for him, with Boyer's Code Rural being a disaster and his several attempts to prevent the the proliferation of small farms and the sale of national lands, Boyer in 1821, 1832, 1837, 1835, and 1838 by suspending sales (94). 

This aforementioned struggle between peasants and small landholders to control their own productivity and have some degree of autonomy did not stop the merchant bourgeoisie from adopting a predatory position as speculators and merchants who underpaid producers of coffee, cacao and other exports while overcharging them for imported goods (103). Since Haitian rural communities were usually not entirely self-sufficient, they had to work through the merchant bourgeoisie which controlled access to foreign goods and the exchange of items in the port towns, creating a dependency that over time impoverished the peasantry (102). Although the divisions within the peasantry left room for class mobility, over time the conjunction of the merchant bourgeoisie setting prices for Haitian exports and cheating peasant producers, as well as the state's excessive taxation, resulted in greater poverty over the course of the 19th century (103). Added to the fluctuating prices for raw exports such as coffee, Haiti's economy could weaken tremendously if global prices fell, as was the case during the Great Depression (144). 

Haitian piquets, or rebel peasants, such as the movement led by Acaau in the 1840s, tried to resist some of these entrenched patterns in Haitian society by asking for higher prices on their products, but ultimately failed or were incorporated within the state (97). Perhaps the fact that it was the wealthier peasants, usually of the peasant elite and 'middle class,' played a role in weakening the path for radical change in rural Haiti, since the landless or rural proletariat that survived on selling its labor, as well as the poorer tenant farmers, did not arrive at leadership positions within these uprisings (110-111). This lack of a single goal or shared interest among peasantry likely contributed to the lack of a centralized or united revolutionary movement during the various uprisings of cacos and piquets.

Regardless, Dupuy is correct in challenging Lundahl's pro-capitalist stance on Haitian poverty, which suggests that the root causes of poverty are not to be found in the market system when the market and state interact in a vicious way that perpetuates poverty, hunger, and unequal social relations (105). To quote Dupuy, "Lundahl rightly stresses the political marginalization of the peasantry and their exploitation by the state but overlooks how ‘the market’ itself is a product of class relations and the conditions of existence that structured the population into dominant and subordinate groups, expressed through market exchanges" (106). Basically, the market and the state are not separable factors, and the critical role of foreign capital and the merchant bourgeoisie in dictating the rules of the state, comprising the state, and furthering dependency reveal the insidious bias of Lundahl and other European and North American economists who wish to attribute the underdevelopment of the Global South to internal causes not pertinent to capitalism. For this reason alone, Dupuy's text is of immense import for challenging dominant narratives of poverty in the so-called "Third World." 

Dupuy also dismantles the myth of overpopulation as a cause of Haitian underdevelopment when high birthrates are actually a product of that poverty. In cases of hunger, too, high population density does not explain hunger in societies with high income inequality (110). So instead of attributing Haitian underdevelopment to the high birthrates or looking at population density per cultivated acre, one should aim to diminish or eliminate the underlying causes, which, in the case of Haiti, would be income inequality, the market system, etc. Such a view aligns well with my critiques of the plethora of annoying North Americans and Europeans who believe that if only (insert poor country or poor continent) had fewer children, then everything would be okay or they could 'develop.'

Like the peasantry, even the merchant bourgeoisie and speculators were not impervious to foreign penetration and dependency. Described by countless scholars, such as Plummer, who analyzes the rise of "Syrians" as well as Europeans (particularly Germans) in controlling internal trade in Haiti and replacing the merchant bourgeoisie by the end of the 19th century (116). Clearly, by the end of the first century of Haitian independence, dependency, debt, foreign meddling, internal divisions, and a vested state interest in what some describe as a plantation model of economic growth, Haiti was firmly on the path of underdevelopment and ripe for US occupation. Though there were attempts to foster industry, education, modern technological innovations and transportation, it did not alter the pattern of Haitian turmoil, poverty, and dependency.

On the question of 20th century (and with some relevance to 21st century Haitian development plans), Dupuy, in my opinion, correctly reveals the inadequacy of light-manufacturing in urban Haiti as a possible solution to unemployment. These initiatives fueled rural to urban migration, thereby worsening overcrowding and the urban infrastructure of Port-au-Prince while only employing a marginal percentage of the workforce (178). Similarly, it reinforced Haitian dependency on foreign capital to establish the factories (175). Indeed, for every dollar of profit earned in Haiti from the manufacturing industries, 85 cents went to the US and a yearly average of 50 million USD of private capital was transferred to the US between 1977 and 1984, which illustrates the insanity of putting faith in what are really sweatshops as a pathway to Haitian development (179). The industrial park project, Caracol, for instance, has proven itself to be a disappointment and waste of time and money in a region of Haiti barely affected by the recent earthquake.

The following articles from Al-Jazeera and The New York Times are worthwhile reads for illuminating the lack of change in the US approach to Haitian underdevelopment. Essentially the same as the sweatshop industries supported in the 1970s and 1980s, which, as one can see from above, failed spectacularly. If the plan for 'reconstruction' is to expand textile factories due to low wages and the lack of unions, then Haiti could resemble the Dominican Republic in some ways, where egregious violations of workers' rights and low wages is the pattern at industrial parks there. Indeed, one can already see the development strategies favored by Martelly's government as a replica of some of the Dominican Republic's, such as tourism.

Agricultural policies of the US have also devastated the Haitian economy through cheap rice imports that weaken Haitian producers who cannot compete, the elimination of black pigs in the 1980s over an alleged swine flu outbreak that destroyed pig production, and other cheap food imports which has led to Haiti importing twice of what it exports (181, 183) In other words, a very poor country is getting worse and worse while other parts of Latin America are booming or at remaining static. 

The remainder of the text looks at Duvalier regimes, 20th century Haitian politics and the question or class and color, and contains some insignful commentary on 'black nationalism' and the dynamics of race and class that could easily pertain to the rest of the Caribbean or the US. At one point Dupuy seemingly becomes a class reductionist who sees race as a product of class dynamics, which seemingly contradicts his earlier position on race and class as mutually influencing each other (155). I find it odd that Dupuy never tackles the broader question of a less naive and fully informed by class form of black nationalism. Perhaps something along the lines of black nationalist strands of leftist economics and social movements in Trinidad or even among some segments of the US Black Power Movement. But I digress, this book is essential for mainstream readers. It can dispel so many of the myths we receive in the media, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the US government on root causes of poverty. Keep in mind that Dupuy never obfuscates the role of Haitians themselves in perpetuating these problems, but the critical role of the European powers and the US certainly have not made any improvements. 

Kenneth

I spoke with Kenneth, a nice homeless man who sits outside near a tree on Main Road, on the same block as a Pick and Pay supermarket in Obseravatory. He speaks Afrikaans and English and can be difficult to understand at times, but is generally kind-hearted. His motehr was Chinese and when she died, his sisters took everything she left behind and now he doesn’t know what happened to them. Also, he doesn’t want to know about his sisters’ whereabouts. He sleeps in cardboard outside when he can, but he told me about skollies who harass him, take his shelter and whatever money he can get from begging, and about rats who gnaw on one’s ears and lips if you sleep outside in the open. I have to admit, I began our conversation very poorly, asking him how he is doing after giving him five rand. Of course, he did not respond well to that and started ranting about his life and the abuse, insults, and neglect from others because of his homelessness and poverty. I must admit, it was sometimes very difficult to understand him, partly because of his accent and partly because of his way of speaking very quickly. Anyway, Kenneth is afraid he may have Alzheimer’s, though he is 58. Being homeless and getting older will likely only make his forgetfulness and senility worse in due time. Alas, he expressed racist sentiments toward “Africans” at one point, referring to them as “kaffirs” for being mean-spirited people, bringing chaos, and causing many white South Africans to flee to New Zealand, Australia, etc.

Also, he does not have a high opinion of South Africans in general, telling me more than once to stay away from them, especially “Africans.” He also complained about the honking cars of the minibus drivers, which he claims contributes to crime, also saying that under apartheid drivers would get ticketed or arrested by the police. He didn’t seem to realize Coloured people seem to control or dominate the minibus game in Cape Town, not the “Africans” he dislikes, but who am I to challenge the racist discourse of a homeless man of Coloured and Chinese extraction, even though his life was certainly horrible under apartheid, too. But he was right, the seeming collapse of social control and the flight of white South Africans in the post-apartheid era are troubling and emblematic of many social ills and disorder. Regardless, Kenneth is a bitter, mentally ill male in need of help but does not receive it. He told me about people promising or telling him they will buy food, but they don’t, or people talking about him in their own languages pejoratively. Clearly, there are few attempts from the government to really tackle poverty and homelessness, which probably contributes to Kenneth’s disdain for South Africa generally and “Africans” particularly. I cannot help but think of him in relation to post-apartheid Coloured identity as described by scholars such as UCT’s Mohamed Adhikari, who explains Coloureds as being “not white enough under apartheid, not black enough in the New South Africa.” What many don’t realize is how little things have changed for many Black South Africans, too, so Coloureds are hardly alone when it comes to declining quality of life, etc. And Kenneth’s beliefs about South Africa and black-majority rule in South Africa are clearly negative, understandably so given his socioeconomic position.