The Horse in West African History

Robin Law's The Horse in West African History is one of the indispensable studies anyone with an interest in Borno history must read. Although encompassing the entirety of West Africa, Borno frequently appears as one of the centers of the West African equestrian tradition. Not only was the imported, superior horse pivotal in the military expansion of Kanem and later Borno, but Borno became a center of horse breeding that likely was pivotal for the expansion of the Islamic-influenced technology to other regions, like Hausaland. The horse, as Law convincingly demonstrates, permitted a significant enlargement of the scale of political organization. The mounted warriors of states like Kanem-Borno were able to cover more ground quickly, pursue fleeing captives or defeated opponents, and, to at least a limited extent, build the power and prestige of rulers who provided horses or expensive equipment (quilted cloth armor, imported chainmail, saddles, stirrups). While horses must have been known in Kanem before the reign of Dunama Dibalemi in the 1200s, it was the introduction of stirrups and new technology that made the cavalry units of states like Mali and Kanem-Borno so powerful. Law's study elucidates this process with some provocative conclusions on the relationship of technology, tradition, and the state.

Although horses have been in West Africa for several centuries and a pre-Islamic tradition of horsemanship developed in areas of the northern savanna and the Jos Plateau, the widespread adoption of horses for military purposes in even the forested regions of West Africa illustrate the significance of the animal and new technology in the political economy of various states. States created by or at least associated with mounted warriors appeared among the Mossi and other parts of West Africa. Oyo, the subject of Law's dissertation, represents another example. In this case, a large Yorubaland state emerged whose expansion owed much to cavalry forces used with great success. Horses were so important and prestigious in West Africa that they became symbols of status for rituals, ceremonies, and even, as among the Igbo, objects of sacrifice. Due to their expense, especially in the forest regions where a reduced life expectancy meant replacements were always required, the horse became rightly associated with wealth, status, and power. The costs associated with feeding and maintenance could also be astronomical, again conveying the association of horses with political power and wealth. 

In our beloved Borno, where the horse was bred by groups like the Shuwa, the horse was less expensive but a superior one with the finest equipment was still largely the preserve of the wealthy (and their free clients or slaves). After all, if Leo Africanus's confused account of Borno is reliable, fine horses acquired via the trans-Saharan trade were intimately linked to the slave trade, which in turn was linked to the state and its military apparatus in the procurement of captives for export. In fact, Law speculates that access to Dongola breed horses via Arabs migrating into the Lake Chad region may have been an additional factor in the Bulala driving the Sayfawa dynasty out of Kanem in the 1380s. So, clearly horses have played a huge role in the rise and fall of the Sayawa. In order to acquire the best quality of horses and equipment like chainmail, a brutal cycle of horse-slave trading developed. The horse becomes a key component of the political economy of war or the "ownership of the means of destruction" in which kings and powerful nobles armed warriors with the necessary mounts to produce the captives who then brought in more horses or luxury imports that could be redistributed to dependents or re-exported. This may have explanatory value for the "Sudanic" state in other parts of the Central Sudan and the savanna lands, even if it is not a perfect example of Aristotle's oligarchy nor a "feudal" system per se. One finds parallels for sure with Bagirmi, Wadai, and Darfur. 

What is most interesting about this is the pioneer role of Kanem-Borno in the rise and fall of the horse's military importance. Kanem was likely one of the first of the early kingdoms to adopt stirrups and acquire access to North African or Dongola horses. And while Dunama Dibalemi's expansion of Kanem is also mentioned in the context of the vast number of horses he held, earlier rulers of Kanem may have possibly initiated the process of increasingly vital cavalry units for military purposes or lightning-quick raids on decentralized or political fragmented societies. Since Kanem was associated with the trans-Saharan slave trade as early as the 9th century, one would think horses were in use for at least slave raids if not in other military ventures. Unfortunately, until archaeological evidence or new textual sources emerge, our theory of Kanem as a pioneer is impossible to prove. Nonetheless, Kanem was certainly one of the early West African states identified by Law to adopt the mounted warrior as a central component of its army, which occurred by the 13th century. States in the Kanem-Borno sphere of influence in turn adopted or adapted cavalry in ways that reflect Kanuri influence, at least in the case of Bagirmi and perhaps Hausaland.

Borno under the Sayfawa were also pioneers in the early use of firearms. Everyone knows of Idris Alooma's use of muskets and even Turkish specialists brought in to assist with their implementation. Unfortunately, subsequent mais of Borno appear to have lost interest or the resources to maintain an important musketry corps in the army, although the occasional gift of muskets from Tripoli arrived during the reign of Idris Alooma's grandson. Soon, according to Law, the western part of West Africa and the coastal zones were the first to successfully make a permanent transition to firearms in the 1700s and 1800s. But Borno preceded these zones as early as the late 1500s, only to continue its reliance on horse warriors even into the second half of the 1800s. Why did Borno not maintain an active or at least notable musketry corps? The guns were still cheaper than fully equipped horses, and could have been utilized with enslaved soldiers to further centralize political power. Perhaps, as O'Fahey suggested in the case of Darfur, the greater mobility of cavalry was the primary factor. It is interesting, however, to note that the debate on political centralization and its relationship with a dominant cavalry or musketry is more complicated, but Borno, for a moment, was, during at least part of its "Golden Age" able to draw on both. The effective combination of the two could have cemented political centralization under the Sayfawa, although a corps of enslaved musketeers may have been too much of a threat to the dominant position of the cavalry and regional elites who supplied horses. 

The Military and Society in Haiti

“This book is a structural and hermeneutic analysis of civil-military relations in Haiti as canvassed through the magnifying lenses of a social anthropologist. My interest in studying this aspect of the security system in Haiti began to develop after the collapse of the Duvalier dynasty, when I reached the conclusion that one cannot understand the behavior of the Haitian political system without paying attention to the military. After all, it is an empirical fact that the majority of Haitian presidential regimes have been headed by generals. This observation leads us to study the military not simply as bureaucracy but also as government.”

Laguerre's analysis of the role of the military in Haitian society is rooted in an equilibrium theory of civil-military relations wherein the stability of  a political system capable of preventing military intervention is the result of 3 sets of balanced relationships, premised on 3 relationships: between military and civil society, between the military and civil government, and between the civil society and civilian government. Grounding his approach in this equilibrium theory, Laguerre's structural analysis is encompassing of the dynamics of civil and military society in Haiti. 

In order to examine the exchange between the military and civil society in Haiti as an interstate system, Laguerre studies the historical evolution of the military in Haiti, which, as he illustrates, was never powerful enough to act on its own without civil society (just as distinctions between civil and military rule were often blurred or unclear). Indeed, Laguerre discusses numerous examples of the overlap in this interstate system of Haiti, such as Masonic groups, military officials holding power in civil society and vice versa, family ties, businesses, and professions.

Due to social segmentation along class, color, and regional lines, the interstate system exhibited some of the weaknesses of the Haitian state apparatus that allowed factions from the military and/or civil society to capitalize on or spark political instability. Furthermore, as a result of the Haitian Revolution, this military state system emerged as the earliest political model, which evolved into a series of military dictators who ruled in Port-au-Prince but used lower ranking military leaders to administer the rest of the country, a process that contributed to regional competition and coups.

Thus, the various coups that characterized Haiti from 1843-1915, or perhaps, the political instability throughout its history, can be seen as rooted in the failure of a balance between military and civil society, civil society and civilian goverment, and civil society and civilian government. Indeed, Mimi Sheller has made similar arguments about the problems of the Haitian state system from the Revolution to now: the failure of the civil society and civilian government to subordinate the military appartus to civilian interests. Nothing serves to demonstrate this better than directly from Laguerre describing the 19th century military in Haiti on page 18:

The central argument is that because the army served both as the government and a bureaucratic institution of the state and because of the militarization of civil society, the coup d’etat was the outcome of an alliance between regional military units and segments of the civilian population under their aegis. The coup d’etat came about during a crisis period when the government was loosing its support from at least a regional military unit and a segment of the general civilian population; Therefore civilian support is seen as an important factor for the success of a coup d’etat.

Changes wrought by US Occupation eroded some of the militarization of civil government and strengthened political centralization of the military and government in Port-au-Prince (US Occupation also professionalized the military, profoundly transforming it from the largely unprofessional 19th century Haitian army). This played a role in the weakening of regional demarcations that contributed to instability and the frequency of coup d'etats. Laguerre argues that the rise of civilian militias under Duvalier further counterbalanced the supremacy of the military, but Baby Doc's changes in Duvalierism brought the military/state dynamic further into the center, thereby paving the way for the military to eventually have the power to stage another coup in 1986.

Laguerre's book adequately and with great detail eludicates the motivations and structural inadequecies that fueled political instability and the lack of democratization in Haiti. The conflict over the 'spoils' of the presidency, the willingness of civil Haitian elites and power-brokers to form coalitions with certain military leaders for power, the high rates of coups and rebellions, weaker military centralization and professionalization encouraged corruption, and the need to maintain and protect Haitian sovereignty in the first place (though the Haitian military was for more engaged in attacks on Haiti rather than external enemies) combined to prevent Haitian democratization and development. Foreign businesses and legations backing coups, and civil elites willing to side with various factions of the military also contributed to the predicament of cyclic coups and regional conflicts that characterized Haiti before 1915. Laguerre describes the military/civil relationship as being altered by Occupation, but the basic systemic problems remained in place or worsened as centralization in Port-au-Prince and the reconstituted Haitian army (Garde) were more organized, but no less corrupt as the institution took on a bureaucratic form.

This is not to suggest the military could not assume a 'guardian' relationship with civil society, and the 1940s and 1950s saw just that as broad-based military-civil coalitions unseated Lescot and propped up successors. According to Laguerre, Papa Doc depoliticized the military by attaining supremacy over it, and through his paramilitary organization, was able to draw in military and civilian society. By 1986, the military-civil dynamic reverted to a stronger military, which is partly analyzed by Laguerre for the late '80s. One would love to see read Laguerre's opinions on what followed in the 1990s with Raoul Cedras, the elimination of Haiti's army, and conditions on the ground today as Martelly has voiced a wish to revive the Haitian army. An interesting follow-up to Laguerre's work on Haiti from Aristide to Martelly would be enlightening since former military officials and paramilitary groups have clearly engaged in human rights abuses and violence for political ends. The same dynamic continues as descendants of the Haitian military with civil class and political allies continue to subordinate the development of democratization.

Other interesting aspects of the text abound. Laguerre even discusses the role of Vodou in the Haitian military (as a source of power, divine providence and legitimacy for military leaders such as Merisier Jeannis, Hyppolite, and Henri Christophe). Specific praetorian guards, military specialization, military academies, the institutionalization of corruption and abuse, and how the militarized governance fostered endemic instability are convincingly explained. One can see how Firmin's goals in reforming Haiti's politics failed in the face of increasing instability and economic decline, and how even he was forced to take a military title for his unsucessful attempts to become President.