Djibo Hamani's exhaustive Au carrefour du Soudan et de la Berbérie: le sultanat touareg de l'Ayar is a careful analysis of the "Istambulawa" dynasty of kings in Agadez for about 5 centuries, from c.1405 to 1905. Hamani's history of the sultanate begins with a geographical overview, some theories on Berber migrations to the Sahel and Sudanic region and some of the early polities and trading centers in and near Ayar, such as early ties to Tadamakka, Tigidda and its copper, the Azna and Gobirawa in the region, Marandet and the "white Berber" sultans of the area mentioned by al-Umari in the 14th century. Hamani's use of external medieval Arabic sources, local traditions, al-Suyuti and al-Maghili, the Timbuktu Chronicles, Palmer's translations or collection of sources and the famous manuscripts of the Chroniques of Agadez (mostly the same material translated by Urvoy and utilized by H.T. Norris) with some possible dates for them allow for some suggestive and probable theories on the early spread of the Tuareg into and near Ayar from the west and the north. The early ties to the Berber trading center and kingdom of Tadmakka to the west, suggested by the sources like Ibn Hawqal, point to the importance of trade and links to ancient Gao (Kawkaw) as well as Maranda and Marawa.
Then the rest of the book shifts to the specifics of the "Istambulawa" dynasty's obscure origins (needless to say, they are not descendants of a Turkish prince of Constantinople, but more likely can trace their origins to an imam or religious figure from the west who was appointed or chosen by the major Tuareg confederations in Ayar) and the centuries-long struggle of the sultans to assert their authority beyond the control of the Tuareg elector tribes or their attempts to prevent a strong, centralized state from emerging. Intriguingly, some of the traditions collected by Hamani attribute part of the desire for a sultan or arbiter of the clans was due to Borno raids, something a little hard to imagine considering the difficulties the Sayfawa faced in Kanem and Borno during the late 1300s and early 1400s. But if these traditions can be relied on in a general sense, external factors like Borno and Songhay could have put pressure on Tuareg for some degree of political centralization, especially due to preexisting trade that an be traced back to the ancient Ghana to Egypt trade that traversed the region since the 9th century.
Undoubtedly, the desire for a regional sultan to arbitrate inter-tribal Tuareg conflicts and help unite the clans against external foes was complemented by the growing economic importance of Hausaland in trans-Saharan and West African trade. As Hamani emphatically insists throughout the text, Agadez's rise was linked to its geographical role as the northern "port" of Hausaland with North Africa and the Mediterranean. Hausa exports of textiles, grains, slaves, and other goods helped supply the Tuareg of Ayar (and later Adar) while also making Agadez an important trading center and the basis of the wealth for the Istambulawa dynasty who derived some of their revenue from the trans-Saharan trade. Indeed, the Hausa contributions to the formation and longevity of the Istambulawa dynasty can also be found in the terms used for the royal administration, the spoken language in Agadez, and the Azna and Gobirawa indigenous populations in and near Ayar. Indeed, influences from the Songhay and Borno can also be found in the region, but the economic significance of Ayar was directly linked to the Hausa states. Islam also played a role, as Islamic rulers of Ayar, Katsina, Kano, Borno, and Songhay in the late 1400s could use religion as a bridge between trading communities and, despite the weak Islamization of some of the Tuareg in the massif, introduce some changes or new sources of political legitimacy.
According to Hamani, the early sultans of Agadez were likely weak and faced constant threats of deposition and coups. Over the course of the late 1400s, the dynasty established their capital in Agadez and, by the 1600s, succeeded in practicing patrilineal succession to the throne and greater political stability. Indeed, by the reigns of Muhammad al-Mubarek and his son, Muhammad Agabba, the sultans of Ayar conquered Adar, threatened Borno, attacked Zanfara, and appear to have had, for the most part, exerted their authority over warring Tuareg clans of Ayar. Unfortunately, just as the state had entered an expansionist phase and seemed to be moving in the direction of greater centralization, Muhammad Agabba was dethroned in 1720 and fled to Adar. The Adar sultans continued to recognize the authority of the main Istambulawa king to the north, but the rulers of Ayar lost more power and influence over the Tuareg factions during the 18th and 19th centuries.
Kings were deposed or endeavored to pit clans against each other but often deposed or overthrown. The declining state of affairs manifested in the decline of Agadez as a center for trade and the movement of several members of the dynasty to Hausaland. This sorry state of affairs continued in the 19th century as effective authority, to the extent it existed, was in the hands of Tuareg chiefs or charismatic warriors who then faced the threat of Awlad Sulayman raids, Tubu bandits, the shifting political alignments of the post-jihad Central Sudan, and, finally, French colonial conquest. According to Hamani, the authority of the sultanate was severely weakened by Tuareg clans prohibiting it their own military force. Moreover, since their authority was not established based on conquest, the Kel Ayar never fully submitted to the institution and the geographic and climactic conditions in the massif likely contributed to the great local autonomy of the various groups. Perhaps, if the sultanate had been able to develop Adar as a source of revenue (based on its peasant cultivator population) and raise troops, the sultanate under Muhammad Agabba and his children could have maintained a centralized population and resisted the elector tribes who reasserted their control of succession. Alas, such a development was blocked by the Kel Ayar and the Istambulawa often became irrelevant players in Ayar and the Central Sudan.
While there is much to learn in his lengthy history of Ayar and the Sultanate, Hamani's interpretations and arguments do raise some questions. For instance, his view on the Bilma salt caravan and conflicts with Borno in Kawar seem to view it as just a minor affair with local Tubu. One is also not sure of the antiquity of the Bilma salt caravan or the Kel Away's role in it. Indeed, we thought Lovejoy's interpretation of the conflicts between Borno and Ayar over the salt trade in the mid-1700s was perhaps closer to reality. Moreover, it became rather difficult to keep track of the various alliances and shifting conflicts of the Kel Ayar. Perhaps the last 2 sections of the book could have been shortened or a timeline for the various confederations could have been of use to aid the reader. As for the "racial" question of the Tuareg and the "Sudanese" or Hausa populations of Ayar and Adar, Hamani criticizes Heinrich Barth for his racial if not racist reading of the history of Ayar, but Hamani also finds evidence of this in some of the sources, like the Y Tarichi and some of the animosity directed against the Kel Away (more sedentary and perhaps "mixed" than other Kel Ayar) from other Tuareg. Perhaps more recent research has delved deeper into the question of "race" in the sultanate and the ways in which Tuareg society and that of Agadez diverged.
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