In addition to adding nuance to decades of scholarship on racial
mixture that portrayed it as an attempt to attain whiteness or further
black oppression, this study highlights class differences in how black
Brazilians identify. Working-class black Brazilians, for instance, are
more likely to come from a background where relatives urged them to
marry a white person, but middle-class respondents were mostly in favor
of referring to themselves as negros rather than morenos or pardos, terms
which could imply multiracial, or mixed identity. Moreover, both middle
and lower class black Brazilians expressed pride in their black
identity, but denied any categorical difference between blacks and
whites, differing from South African black consciousness or French
negritude. Furthermore, many respondents came from multiracial
backgrounds but still self-identified as proud blacks, complicating
assumptions about black and mixed identities in contemporary Brazil.
Similarly, both lower and middle-class Afro-Brazilian respondents
identified racial mixture as a solution for tackling racism, largely as a
response to the stigmatization of blackness in Brazil. However,
working-class respondents were more likely to link racial mixture with
whitening while the middle-class connected it to a celebration of
negritude. This supports traditional views of social scientists
regarding racial mixture as a thinly veiled attempt to whiten Brazil’s
black population, although Moraes and Silva claim it was expressed only
by a marginal proportion of working-class blacks. Indeed, they argue
that this celebration of negritude and rejection of a white identity by
self-identifying as negro is a trend among Afro-Brazilians that nevertheless operates within a broader framework of encouraging racial mixture.
While nuancing the standard approach to analyzing Brazilian race
relations, one must retain a certain degree of skepticism. For instance,
should one willingly accept the responses of 160 Afro-Brazilians to a
survey regarding race as representative of all of Brazil? The
demographics of Rio de Janeiro resemble national total racial
proportions, but race and concepts of negritude and racial mixture
likely differ from that of Bahia, a northeastern region with a black and
brown majority with possibly different class dynamics. In addition, the
authors also possess a seemingly hostile attitude regarding “militants”
and the presumed style of racial consciousness the authors seem to
equate with African-Americans, Caribbean negritude, or South African
black consciousness. The inherent value judgments regarding that form of
racial consciousness seem contrary to the goals of the authors whose
work supposedly resists imposing different forms of racial identity onto
African-descended peoples living in other national contexts. They also
fail to provide extensive analysis of gender dynamics that impact how
male and female Afro-Brazilians navigated the murky waters of race
relations in a society where racism runs rampant. Nothing beyond noting
one black woman’s grandmother’s desire for her descendants to marry
white or black women straightening their hair, or black men cutting
their hair short to hide natural hair examines gendered notions of
blackness. Thus, how likely is it for a black man to marry a white woman
in Brazil, or how are black women perceived by Afro-Brazilian men when
such an emphasis on interracial marriage is considered key to combating
racism? Even if interracial marriages are accepted by a large majority,
the authors do not investigate its impact on relationships among
Afro-Brazilians.
They
also cite studies that have shown that black and brown Brazilians,
regardless of degrees of mixed racial identity, occupy a similar place
socioeconomically, below that of whites. If both black and brown
Brazilians are statistically the same based on indicators of wealth and
status, perhaps this trend of Brazilian negritude can work to unite both
groups of Afro-descended groups against white supremacy without
othering or attacking whiteness and its role in Brazilian national
identity. Consequently, black and brown Brazilian relations would
resemble a common intergroup identity model wherein a broadly shared
African origin in a broader context of white supremacy would lead to
both groups forming an alliance. Moraes and Silva hint toward this in
their data which shows a trend of multiracial Afro-Brazilians to
identify as black or negro.
However, if the goal of Brazilian negritude is to remain tied to
interracial relationships and fluid racial identities, how could an
alliance between black and brown Brazil last if members of each group
continue to seek relationships with whites? The entire project of
national integration and racial mixture as necessary for attaining the
goal of racial democracy automatically limits the longevity of an
alliance between blacks and pardos who,
if they keep mixing with whites, would gradually have more and more
reason to resist redistributive policies or a specific black identity.
This post is a brief commentary and review of the following article:
Moraes et al. 2012. "The multiple dimensions of
racial mixture in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil". Ethnic and Racial Studies, 35:
382-399.
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