Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race and Underdevelopment Since 1700

I recently read this gem of an overview of Haitian history by Alex Dupuy. Perhaps the reason I enjoyed it so much is that its in agreement with my own preconceived notions of Haitian underdevelopment as a product of a plantation model or dependency theory in economic relations with the North. However, after reading the text, it is hard to take seriously the neoliberal remedies for Haitian development, or, for that matter, development in a broader Caribbean and African context. Dupuy's thesis is best stated by him on the fifth page of the text:

I argue that Haiti’s underdevelopment stems from its incorporation into the capitalist world-system since the end of the seventeenth century as a peripheral economy specializing in the production of primarily agricultural crops for export and late some manufactured goods. In addition, the emergence of specific class, racial/color, and political relations and structures during the colonial period and after independence reinforced the economy’s dependence on foreign capital and it’s extroverted and unintegrated characteristics.

Hard to disagree with that, eh? It explains the structural flaws of the Haitian economy (and likewise, much of Latin America and Africa) as a product of unequal exchange in a capitalist world-system on the peripheries. Similarly, class and racial factors entrenched unequal economic and power relationships with Europe and North America that have perpetuated Haitian poverty. Fortunately, Dupuy does not attribute most of Haitian economic and political turmoil to the color question, since he spends a considerable amount of time in each chapter on Haitian history detailing the common interests of black and mulatto elites against the peasantry. 

For instance, the transformation of the interests of black military leaders during the Haitian Revolution from the same as the ex-slaves to resembling more and more those of their affranchi elites illustrates the flaws of attributing Haitian social inequality solely to color (57). Of course, one should not assume this was always the case, since Toussaint's nephew, Moise, was believed to have had a role in organizing a revolt against his uncle that sought land reform in favor of the ex-slaves (65). Also, I am not certain how dependable Dupuy's estimate is, but the Haitian War of Independence cost Haiti 1, 144, 258, 948 francs, an astronomical figure (74)! 

There are some moments where I question Dupuy's assessment of Haitian leaders, though. For example, he claims that the main goal of Dessalines was to establish the black elite as the uncontested leaders of Haiti (81). I don't buy that. Dessalines was willing to marry his daughter to one of the mulatto leaders of Haiti and, assuming we take Charles Mackenzie as a credible source, Dessalines was very trusting of Alexandre Pétion. This alleged pro-nouveaux libres policy of Dessalines was continued under Christophe, even though we know anciens libres were represented in his court and enjoyed positions of prestige and influence (86). Apparently workers fled Christophe's state for the republic to pursue their own subsistence and small landholding production, which suggests the sharecropping and peasant autonomy were stronger than in the north, which is not too surprising given Christophe's maintenance of large estates (88). I just wish Dupuy had some additional sources or figures for the numbers of people who fled Christophe's state for  Pétion's.

Anyway, moving back to the broader structural and economic underpinnings of the Haitian state, race and the particular path taken to Haitian independence hindered development due to diplomatic isolation. As Dupuy rightfully so argues, lack of full diplomatic relations prevented the Haitian bourgeoisie from engaging in complete financial and commercial transactions, limiting the amount of technology, access to markets, and sources of credit from the metropoles (93). Thus, the quest by Boyer to procure French recognition of Haitian independence, and thereby assuring other European powers would follow suit, was closely tied to attempts to restore export-oriented, latifundia-styled agricultural production (92). Now, we know things did not quite turn out well for him, with Boyer's Code Rural being a disaster and his several attempts to prevent the the proliferation of small farms and the sale of national lands, Boyer in 1821, 1832, 1837, 1835, and 1838 by suspending sales (94). 

This aforementioned struggle between peasants and small landholders to control their own productivity and have some degree of autonomy did not stop the merchant bourgeoisie from adopting a predatory position as speculators and merchants who underpaid producers of coffee, cacao and other exports while overcharging them for imported goods (103). Since Haitian rural communities were usually not entirely self-sufficient, they had to work through the merchant bourgeoisie which controlled access to foreign goods and the exchange of items in the port towns, creating a dependency that over time impoverished the peasantry (102). Although the divisions within the peasantry left room for class mobility, over time the conjunction of the merchant bourgeoisie setting prices for Haitian exports and cheating peasant producers, as well as the state's excessive taxation, resulted in greater poverty over the course of the 19th century (103). Added to the fluctuating prices for raw exports such as coffee, Haiti's economy could weaken tremendously if global prices fell, as was the case during the Great Depression (144). 

Haitian piquets, or rebel peasants, such as the movement led by Acaau in the 1840s, tried to resist some of these entrenched patterns in Haitian society by asking for higher prices on their products, but ultimately failed or were incorporated within the state (97). Perhaps the fact that it was the wealthier peasants, usually of the peasant elite and 'middle class,' played a role in weakening the path for radical change in rural Haiti, since the landless or rural proletariat that survived on selling its labor, as well as the poorer tenant farmers, did not arrive at leadership positions within these uprisings (110-111). This lack of a single goal or shared interest among peasantry likely contributed to the lack of a centralized or united revolutionary movement during the various uprisings of cacos and piquets.

Regardless, Dupuy is correct in challenging Lundahl's pro-capitalist stance on Haitian poverty, which suggests that the root causes of poverty are not to be found in the market system when the market and state interact in a vicious way that perpetuates poverty, hunger, and unequal social relations (105). To quote Dupuy, "Lundahl rightly stresses the political marginalization of the peasantry and their exploitation by the state but overlooks how ‘the market’ itself is a product of class relations and the conditions of existence that structured the population into dominant and subordinate groups, expressed through market exchanges" (106). Basically, the market and the state are not separable factors, and the critical role of foreign capital and the merchant bourgeoisie in dictating the rules of the state, comprising the state, and furthering dependency reveal the insidious bias of Lundahl and other European and North American economists who wish to attribute the underdevelopment of the Global South to internal causes not pertinent to capitalism. For this reason alone, Dupuy's text is of immense import for challenging dominant narratives of poverty in the so-called "Third World." 

Dupuy also dismantles the myth of overpopulation as a cause of Haitian underdevelopment when high birthrates are actually a product of that poverty. In cases of hunger, too, high population density does not explain hunger in societies with high income inequality (110). So instead of attributing Haitian underdevelopment to the high birthrates or looking at population density per cultivated acre, one should aim to diminish or eliminate the underlying causes, which, in the case of Haiti, would be income inequality, the market system, etc. Such a view aligns well with my critiques of the plethora of annoying North Americans and Europeans who believe that if only (insert poor country or poor continent) had fewer children, then everything would be okay or they could 'develop.'

Like the peasantry, even the merchant bourgeoisie and speculators were not impervious to foreign penetration and dependency. Described by countless scholars, such as Plummer, who analyzes the rise of "Syrians" as well as Europeans (particularly Germans) in controlling internal trade in Haiti and replacing the merchant bourgeoisie by the end of the 19th century (116). Clearly, by the end of the first century of Haitian independence, dependency, debt, foreign meddling, internal divisions, and a vested state interest in what some describe as a plantation model of economic growth, Haiti was firmly on the path of underdevelopment and ripe for US occupation. Though there were attempts to foster industry, education, modern technological innovations and transportation, it did not alter the pattern of Haitian turmoil, poverty, and dependency.

On the question of 20th century (and with some relevance to 21st century Haitian development plans), Dupuy, in my opinion, correctly reveals the inadequacy of light-manufacturing in urban Haiti as a possible solution to unemployment. These initiatives fueled rural to urban migration, thereby worsening overcrowding and the urban infrastructure of Port-au-Prince while only employing a marginal percentage of the workforce (178). Similarly, it reinforced Haitian dependency on foreign capital to establish the factories (175). Indeed, for every dollar of profit earned in Haiti from the manufacturing industries, 85 cents went to the US and a yearly average of 50 million USD of private capital was transferred to the US between 1977 and 1984, which illustrates the insanity of putting faith in what are really sweatshops as a pathway to Haitian development (179). The industrial park project, Caracol, for instance, has proven itself to be a disappointment and waste of time and money in a region of Haiti barely affected by the recent earthquake.

The following articles from Al-Jazeera and The New York Times are worthwhile reads for illuminating the lack of change in the US approach to Haitian underdevelopment. Essentially the same as the sweatshop industries supported in the 1970s and 1980s, which, as one can see from above, failed spectacularly. If the plan for 'reconstruction' is to expand textile factories due to low wages and the lack of unions, then Haiti could resemble the Dominican Republic in some ways, where egregious violations of workers' rights and low wages is the pattern at industrial parks there. Indeed, one can already see the development strategies favored by Martelly's government as a replica of some of the Dominican Republic's, such as tourism.

Agricultural policies of the US have also devastated the Haitian economy through cheap rice imports that weaken Haitian producers who cannot compete, the elimination of black pigs in the 1980s over an alleged swine flu outbreak that destroyed pig production, and other cheap food imports which has led to Haiti importing twice of what it exports (181, 183) In other words, a very poor country is getting worse and worse while other parts of Latin America are booming or at remaining static. 

The remainder of the text looks at Duvalier regimes, 20th century Haitian politics and the question or class and color, and contains some insignful commentary on 'black nationalism' and the dynamics of race and class that could easily pertain to the rest of the Caribbean or the US. At one point Dupuy seemingly becomes a class reductionist who sees race as a product of class dynamics, which seemingly contradicts his earlier position on race and class as mutually influencing each other (155). I find it odd that Dupuy never tackles the broader question of a less naive and fully informed by class form of black nationalism. Perhaps something along the lines of black nationalist strands of leftist economics and social movements in Trinidad or even among some segments of the US Black Power Movement. But I digress, this book is essential for mainstream readers. It can dispel so many of the myths we receive in the media, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the US government on root causes of poverty. Keep in mind that Dupuy never obfuscates the role of Haitians themselves in perpetuating these problems, but the critical role of the European powers and the US certainly have not made any improvements. 

16 comments:

  1. Where did you get hold of this book? I can't find it at the public library and the price on Amazon is too rich for me, same goes for Lundahl's book. A good review as far as I can tell. Dessalines's desire to marry his daughter to Petion was a political decision to buttress his regime. The title of this book seems to imply that nothing could have been done to foster industrialization, I don't buy that. "Of course, one should not assume this was always the case, since Toussaint's nephew, Moise, was believed to have had a role in organizing a revolt against his uncle that sought land reform in favor of the ex-slaves (65)." That claim is debunked by the first court martial of Moise which found him innocent of conspiring with the insurrectionists. Toussaint, fearing a potential political rival in Moise, decided to get rid of him by having the original verdict reversed. Not being a moralist, I nonetheless can help seeing Toussaint's fate as karmic retribution for that crime. The most intriguing question for me is what happened to the liberation army of 1804? how did it become the plaything of the generals, black and mulatto, that led it? I also regret the fact that it wasn't used to spread education and other necessary skills to the people. Would a Moise led Haiti based on small proprietors and a strong army that saw the need to make the reforms in education and industry that Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe tried to make while hanging on to the plantation model have been more successful? Where I would strongly disagree with Dupuy is in his take on the black leaders Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe. I agree that it was stupid to try to hold on to the plantations, they did make real efforts to defend the nation and educate it with schemes such as Toussaint's attempt to have Gregoire's National Church send priests to the island to educate the people and Christophe's collaboration with Wilberforce et al to do the same.

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    1. I found it at my university library, one of the few benefits really of being a student at these over-priced institutions. The book is old, so I'll cut some slack on Dupuy being wrong about Moise's role in the conspiracy, maybe that's something more recent historians have discovered.

      I think a Moise-led Haiti based on small proprietors probably would've been better, but you're right, Toussaint and Christophe did try to support education, etc. Dupuy does acknowledge that in Toussaint's constitution for the colony, which mandated all children attend schools, but is otherwise not too taken with the revolutionary military leaders.

      What I loved about his work is the prophetic failure of sweatshops/textile industry he describes in the 1970s and 1980s, which seems to be the case for the Caracol industrial park in the north of Haiti. I think he's much more dependable and realistic than Lundahl on the role of the state and market forces, both internal and external, as a cause of Haitian underdevelopment. Though there is somewhat of a disbelief in the possibility of industrialization, Dupuy does comment positively on steps taken by the Geffrard government and Haitian industrialists and businessmen to build small and medium industries. I think he did believe in the potential for small-scale industrialization in some form, but overall the role of class, race, and the plantation model favored by the state and merchant bourgeoisie ensured little to none.

      It's a pretty good book overall, definitely worth the read. I think Dupuy is Haitian, too, so nice to read a book on Haiti's problems by a Haitian instead of Americans or Europeans. Not that I'm saying you have to be Haitian to write about the country, but too often people from the country are silenced or ignored in preference for foreign observations or analysis.

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    2. "The book is old, so I'll cut some slack on Dupuy being wrong about Moise's role in the conspiracy, maybe that's something more recent historians have discovered." My claim, that Moise was innocent of insurrection, is based on the book Citizen Toussaint, published in 1945. I suspect Dupuy of adhering to a leftist variation of the mulatto legend, where all the early leaders were equally blame worthy. You know I don't buy that claim based on the actions of Petion and Boyer in their negotiations with France.

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    3. Ah, excuse my ignorance then! I think that's a little harsh, I doubt Dupuy sympathizes with elites of any color for the most part in Haitian history. Have you read some of his stuff published in newspapers? He's been on point criticizing the "NGO-ification" of Haiti.

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    4. "Dupuy's thesis is best stated by him on the fifth page of the text: I argue that Haiti’s underdevelopment stems from its incorporation into the capitalist world-system since the end of the seventeenth century as a peripheral economy specializing in the production of primarily agricultural crops for export and late some manufactured goods. In addition, the emergence of specific class, racial/color, and political relations and structures during the colonial period and after independence reinforced the economy’s dependence on foreign capital and it’s extroverted and unintegrated characteristics." After reading that statement several times, I still find it hard to get what Dupuy is saying. Apparently, you seem to have grasped his meaning since you wrote the following: "Hard to disagree with that, eh? It explains the structural flaws of the Haitian economy (and likewise, much of Latin America and Africa) as a product of unequal exchange in a capitalist world-system on the peripheries. Similarly, class and racial factors entrenched unequal economic and power relationships with Europe and North America that have perpetuated Haitian poverty." How did racial/color and class factors impede Haiti's development? we know that neither race nor color were bars to Haitian citizenship from its inception. Comparing Haiti with many other Latin American countries of the 19th century would not show much difference as far as class and racial/color goes. They were mostly countries run by Westernized elites allied to European and later, US capital. These elites depended on the labor of masses who were non-European and kept away from levers of power. All the elites of that region dreamed of Whitening their nations through the importation of white immigrants. Argentina is the most successful implementer of that policy. Japan, a non white nation managed to develop into a top tier capitalist nation with very little natural resources. I fail to see how Dupuy's statement accounts for the contrast between these variants. Would you care to explain? How did
      japan manage to create an internal market that allowed it to raise the capital necessary to buy the technology it needed to catch up with the West?

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    5. Great question. I interpreted the 'racial' part of his analysis as one where race factored into establishing the type of relationship between European powers and Haiti (and likewise, much of the colonized world) where racial slavery and associated ideas or racial inequality structured into economic, technological, and other forms of innovation and exchange. Haiti is not too different from Latin America in the aforementioned aspects, but the unique birth of Haitian independence and white fear and racism definitely worked against Haiti in weakening or lowering the chances for industrialization and more equal economic/political relations. That same racism obviously was directed at other black populations and societies in Africa and the Americas. Basically, I interpreted the race factor as inhibiting development because of stigmatization and isolation. And because of a lack of closer ties between foreign and local capital that could have fueled local innovation, Dupuy's 'merchant bourgeoisie' were trapped in dependent and stagnant economic relationships with US and European powers. Thus, Haiti did not industrialize on any large scale since industrialization was not necessary to continue the same plantation model that had defined its existence since the colonial days. Why bother investing in more modern agricultural techniques or industry when at the end of the day, there was not enough foreign capital or investments into said industries and foreign traders and merchants got what they wanted already, while also replacing local merchants in domestic trade? They could easily come in, get what they wanted (coffee, cacao, wood, whatever), the prices were based on their home countries, and didn't have to invest in innovation because the potential for great profit of Haitian underdevelopment meant little initial costs and kept Haiti in a cycle of underdevelopment and dependency on western Europe and the US for manufactured goods?

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    6. I'm not sure if what I'm saying is what Dupuy would agree with, but that seems to make more sense based on his combination of race and class as factors in Haitian underdevelopment. He does acknowledge moments of 'development' or the growth of industries, but tempers it against the much larger structural background of Haiti's role in the world economy. Race and class were/are integral to defining the Haitian social structure and its peripheral status to the increasingly global European and American hegemonic forces. I also think Dupuy would acknowledge the Haitian agency in assuring this development-resistant system, but he sees race as a contributing factor in shaping European perceptions of Haiti and their willingness to exploit and dominate the island while also playing into how Europeans saw Haitians as inferior and less worthy of the benefits of railroads, factories, modern agrarian technology, and perhaps in many cases, incapable of achieving such things and better left to depend on whites for manufactures.

      I think Japan is very, very different from the type of societies that Latin Americanists or Africanists see as fitting into a dependency model or 'plantation model,' since Japan was never officially 'colonized' nor established as an export-oriented dependent sphere. Also, Japan was, despite being behind the US and Western Europe technologically speaking in the 19th century, on a more equal footing because of its long and unique history of development from its feudal past that actually surpassed most of Europe until the Industrial Revolution. So, I think Dupuy would say Japan was not incorporated into the world system as a dependent export colony, unlike a place like Haiti, which was, for the most part, unable to escape that type of relationship with the European powers (and later US capital). Also, I think Japan was producing more luxury products and higher valued items instead of cash crops dependent on fluctuations largely controlled by Western Europe and the US. This in turn led to more adaptations of western industries and eventually an emulation of Western imperialism against other parts of Asia for raw goods. But that's my interpretation of Dupuy, and of course things are a little more complex. I agree broadly with Dupuy's overall structural argument for underdevelopment in much of the Global South, and naturally notions of race and class interact in a dialectical process in reinforcing and reproducing said underdevelopment internally and externally.

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    7. It would be interesting to contact him directly about Japan though...I will try to find his info and ask for his perspective.

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    8. "I interpreted the 'racial' part of his analysis as one where race factored into establishing the type of relationship between European powers and Haiti (and likewise, much of the colonized world) where racial slavery and associated ideas or racial inequality structured into economic, technological, and other forms of innovation and exchange." According to your reading of Dupuy the history of slavery and the ideology of racial inferiority made it impossible for whites to trade with Haiti on an equal footing, Am I reading you correctly so far? If I am, that would mean that they would under pay for Haitian goods and over price goods sold to Haitians, correct? How then do you account for the claim that Christophe's treasury accumulated from 20 to 60 million in gold and silver? Hell he was even contemplating buying the eastern side of the island from Spain before he died. "Basically, I interpreted the race factor as inhibiting development because of stigmatization and isolation. And because of a lack of closer ties between foreign and local capital that could have fueled local innovation, Dupuy's 'merchant bourgeoisie' were trapped in dependent and stagnant economic relationships with US and European powers. Thus, Haiti did not industrialize on any large scale since industrialization was not necessary to continue the same plantation model that had defined its existence since the colonial days. Why bother investing in more modern agricultural techniques or industry when at the end of the day, there was not enough foreign capital or investments into said industries and foreign traders and merchants got what they wanted already, while also replacing local merchants in domestic trade? They could easily come in, get what they wanted (coffee, cacao, wood, whatever), the prices were based on their home countries, and didn't have to invest in innovation because the potential for great profit of Haitian underdevelopment meant little initial costs and kept Haiti in a cycle of underdevelopment and dependency on western Europe and the US for manufactured goods?" The plantation model was irreparably broken by the revolution, Cuba became the new St-Domingue after that event. The way I see it Haiti had only three choices, the New England model of small farms and industry, the Japanese close door policy led by a military regime that would keep tight control over the nation while selectively allowing the necessary knowledge and people strictly required to educate and build the manufactures necessary for defense and commerce, or they could pay blackmail and open the Haitian market wide open. The first choice would have been appropriate had Moise's approach been tried. What I call the Japanese close door policy is akin to what Christophe tried to do and the last course is the Boyer road taken. As for foreign and local capital cooperating to fuel local innovation and the merchant bourgeoisie being trapped in dependent economic relationships with US and European powers, I would point out to you one individual who seemed to have defied that stereotypical image of the Haitian bourgeois, our old friend Sylla Volsant Laraque. He was apprenticed to a Yankee trader who trained him as a coffee and stock speculator and left him his business when he died. As I've pointed out to you elsewhere this Haitian capitalist left Haiti with a fortune reputed to be in the $20 million range making him the third richest man of France in 1885. He may have been the exception to the rule but the fact that he existed gives the lie to an unbridgeable gap between Haitians and foreigners.

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  2. "Race and class were/are integral to defining the Haitian social structure and its peripheral status to the increasingly global European and American hegemonic forces. I also think Dupuy would acknowledge the Haitian agency in assuring this development-resistant system, but he sees race as a contributing factor in shaping European perceptions of Haiti and their willingness to exploit and dominate the island while also playing into how Europeans saw Haitians as inferior and less worthy of the benefits of railroads, factories, modern agrarian technology, and perhaps in many cases, incapable of achieving such things and better left to depend on whites for manufactures." There was nothing hegemonic about the USA circa 1804, the possibility of doing business with it was real. Toussaint even got the Congress to pass a clause exempting St-Domingue from a US embargo of trade with French held territories. You make way too much of race. Dessalines is reputed to have said that white merchants would walk pass a hanged white to get at a sack of coffee. The fact that trade with Haiti continued after the expendable French whites were put to the sword shows he knew what he was talking about. Show me a country where race and class aren't integral to the social structure, that claim proves nothing since race and class could have and was integrated into the social structure differently under Petion/Boyer than it was under Christophe. Railroads were introduced into Haiti by Haitian capitalists.

    "I think Japan is very, very different from the type of societies that Latin Americanists or Africanists see as fitting into a dependency model or 'plantation model,' since Japan was never officially 'colonized' nor established as an export-oriented dependent sphere. Also, Japan was, despite being behind the US and Western Europe technologically speaking in the 19th century, on a more equal footing because of its long and unique history of development from its feudal past that actually surpassed most of Europe until the Industrial Revolution. So, I think Dupuy would say Japan was not incorporated into the world system as a dependent export colony, unlike a place like Haiti, which was, for the most part, unable to escape that type of relationship with the European powers (and later US capital). Also, I think Japan was producing more luxury products and higher valued items instead of cash crops dependent on fluctuations largely controlled by Western Europe and the US." China was even more sophisticated than Japan and yet it succumbed to the pressures of the western powers. What allowed Japan to escape the trap China fell into was the fact that under the Tokugawa Shogunate it kept western ideologies out all the while engaging in rangaku i.e "Dutch learning" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rangaku from 1600 to 1868. Unlike the Chinese, they didn't sneer at the barbarians but learned what was most valuable from them. A "feudal" system like Christophe's might have achieved a similar feat in a more compressed time period because European languages were available to the people if the will to educate them existed. Given the achievements of some Haitian engineers in the 20th century I don't doubt that their fathers could have done as well as they did. http://www.projectblackman.com/GreatBlackMenInHistory.aspx?notablePersonId=131
    http://www.cedmagic.com/mem/whos-who/alphonse-gerard.html

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    1. I reached out to Professor Dupuy, and he said I did well covering his book though he would disagree with some of what I attributed to him. I think I overemphasize race in some ways compared to Dupuy, too. As the Wu Tang Clan said, "cash rules everything around me," so money and the pursuit of it could and often did look beyond race. But 'race' and ideologies of race did work against Haiti in terms of foreign debts and loans, wasn't that and the history as a slave colony part of the reason for the French indemnity? The unique 'racial' and historical background to Haiti certainly helps explain part of the international community's abuse, neglect, and dehumanizing attitudes, right? And I believe that the peculiarities of race and the structural positioning of power in Haitian society were similar enough under Christophe and Petion. I think that's one of the main points of Dupuy's book (as well as Nicholls, despite the latter's obsession with color or race), that black and mixed-race elites in Haiti were largely one and the same and fought amongst themselves with nonsensical justifications based on 'legitimacy' from looking like the majority of the country or being the most able (educated, Westernized, etc.). That form of debate and conflict among the elite over race certainly worked against the majority of the population in terms of ignoring (for the most part) social programs, education, or other things. But in the grand scheme of things, race alone is not the main contributor to Haitian underdevelopment. But the much broader question on the relationship between race and class is something still so contentious.

      Are you sure about Haitian capitalists being behind railroads? I thought it was foreign investors? And I recall a white American being placed in charge of railroad development (and also being given rights to the land surrounding the lines). I beleive Laraque did come up, and a handful of others. Laraque was not the one who purchased steam ships and operated a steamship line in multiple Haitian cities in the 19th century, was he?

      I am fascinated by your comparison of Tokugawa-era Japan to Christophe's state...there are certainly some parallels. And Haiti's militarized social structure and Christophe's interest in technological innovation, etc. would suggest some similarities. I'm not sure how sustainable Christophe's model was, if, as Dupuy and others have noted, workers fled to Petion's 'republic' and the attempts to create a similar type of economic system failed for Boyer. Though distinct from Christophe's state in key ways, Dupuy would probably place Boyer's attempts to revive plantation agriculture as akin to Christophe, Dessalines, Toussaint, and Sonthonax. But then again, Christophe's system worked for at least a while and he was contemplating buying parts of the east, so who knows? You're right to separate Boyer's model for Haitian 'development' from Christophe's, but the export-oriented latifundia-styled agricultural system was the main goal of both, so I can see why others might be tempted to simply place them in the same category.

      Interesting point about Japan and China, Chinese isolationism was much worse for China than the Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate because at least the latter kept an open mind to European technology.

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    2. "I reached out to Professor Dupuy, and he said I did well covering his book though he would disagree with some of what I attributed to him." Good job! Are you going to do an interview with the man?
      "But 'race' and ideologies of race did work against Haiti in terms of foreign debts and loans, wasn't that and the history as a slave colony part of the reason for the French indemnity? The unique 'racial' and historical background to Haiti certainly helps explain part of the international community's abuse, neglect, and dehumanizing attitudes, right?" I can't agree with you on these assertions, Haiti suffered the fate of all small countries in world politics. Thucydides (c. 460 – c. 395 BC) described Haiti's or any other small country's fate succinctly in the Melian dialogue when he wrote ""Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Note that he was writing about Greeks fighting Greeks. The tendency to drag "race" into every thing as an explanation is an unfortunate one. Haitians, if they didn't want to suffer the fate of the weak needed to become strong. Even after their defeats in WW II Germany and Japan were too important to the world economy not to be rebuilt on an equal footing to the victors of the war.
      " And I believe that the peculiarities of race and the structural positioning of power in Haitian society were similar enough under Christophe and Petion." You are entitled to your belief, I disagree, Christophe's regime was rich, Petion's was bankrupt, education was encouraged and plans made to expand it in the kingdom while the republic treated it as a rare commodity belonging to the favored few. We already had that debate, so I won't say any more on this matter.
      " I think that's one of the main points of Dupuy's book (as well as Nicholls, despite the latter's obsession with color or race), that black and mixed-race elites in Haiti were largely one and the same and fought amongst themselves with nonsensical justifications based on 'legitimacy' from looking like the majority of the country or being the most able (educated, Westernized, etc.). That form of debate and conflict among the elite over race certainly worked against the majority of the population in terms of ignoring (for the most part) social programs, education, or other things." This claim is true only for the Petion/Boyer led republic and untrue for Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe. I don't recall any of them claiming the right to rule because they looked like the majority.
      "Are you sure about Haitian capitalists being behind railroads? I thought it was foreign investors?" It was both. In 1899 a group calling its self la Société des Chemins de Fer du Nord made up of 25 Haitian investors raised half a million dollars for railway construction. Cincinnatus Leconte, a descendent of J-J Dessalines and President in 1912, was one of the investors.
      "I am fascinated by your comparison of Tokugawa-era Japan to Christophe's state...there are certainly some parallels. And Haiti's militarized social structure and Christophe's interest in technological innovation, etc. would suggest some similarities." I'm glad to read that you found my comparison fascinating. You might look into the matter further to compare and contrast Tokugawa's rangaku policy and Christophe's attempt to catch up with western technology. The time factor, 268 years for Japan, as opposed to 13 years for Christophe would explain why the latter's effort is perceived as merely quixotic.

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    3. 1. Hmm. Interviews with established and well-known scholars would certainly help stimulate more interesting discussions and further nuance our perspectives on various phases in Haitian history. I'll think about it, though I'm not sure if folks like Dupuy would want to take the time to be interviewed by me. I'll get back to you on my decision.
      2. I hear you, Haiti was/is a small country, but race was certainly part of Haiti's diplomatic and economic woes as an unrecognized state or despised part of the world. Those very same racial fears and beliefs on the part of the superpowers certainly contributed to the position of Haiti in the world system. I aint saying it's the main factor or anything, but certainly a contributory factor at play.
      3. Yes, I agree with you that given the option of choosing one of the two, Christophe's state was better in many ways, but both were despotic regimes rooted in a military dictatorships and Christophe's state survived on trying to revive the Saint-Domingue or Toussaint-era economy of the island. Christophe's state was rich, yes, but remained an producer of raw materials that survived based on latifundia-styled estates and a semi-feudal social order. Again, I'm not saying Christophe was worse than Petion, and your comparison to Tokugawa Japan would certainly bolster Christophe's image in some ways, but if it's true that Christophe's regime created a pull factor of Haitians from the north to Petion's republic, and the land redistribution under Petion ensured him some degree of subaltern support, both sides come out as almost equally 'bad.' Don't forget Petion's support for education, too, even though it was not universal or democratic by any means. Anyway, I'm going to read Harvey on Christophe for a contemporary view of the kingdom. Naturally, things are more nuanced than all this.

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    4. 4. Not only the Petion/Boyer regimes, but later political parties and regimes also tried to play that 'race' or 'color/caste' game.
      5. Ah, thank you, I believe Dupuy and perhpas a few other scholars I've read allude to that group.
      6. I've read about rangaku, though only snippets from the internet. I'm fascinated by Japan, perhaps a comparative analysis of Haiti and Japan is in order! Or perhaps a look at other islands like Hispaniola which are divided between two islands? Maybe Indonesia and East Timor? Or Greek and Turkish Cyprus? Now I'm just rambling, but a Japan-Haiti comparison would be fascinating to read.

      Have you read Nicholls? Or Harvey? The latter is a 19th century English traveler who lived through the last days of Christophe's kingdom, I'll write a little review of his work soon which will shed some more light on what the kingdom looked like/how it operated.

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    5. Article 24 of Dessalines's 1805 constitution states, " Education is free. Primary education is compulsory. Public education is free at all levels. " while article 14 of the 4th of July 1820 law under Boyer states, "In order to admit a child to a primary school, a petition attesting to the services rendered to the State by the father of said child will be submitted to the commission for public instruction . Said petition will be forwarded to the President of Haiti, and by his orders, the Commission will permit the admission of the child, if circumstances allow it." I don't know about you, but to me these two statements are like night and day in intent. "Don't forget Petion's support for education, too, even though it was not universal or democratic by any means." You have a wicked sense of humor, comparing one Lycée for the elite to a plan for universal education! You keep on harping about race without ever defining just what you mean. If you mean racism, just say so, you won't get any argument from me. The indemnity was forced down the throat of the Haitian people because they were unfortunate enough to have a leader like Boyer who was willing to play ball with France by reducing the nation to debt slavery. Contrast the US leaders' reaction to Britain's impressment of their citizens into its navy, they went to war with the mightiest power at the time and even suffered the indignity of having Washington D.C. burned but when the war ended their right was respected. As I've said before, it's up to you to judge both as equally bad, whatever that means. I judge them based on whether they took measures to strengthen or weaken the nation. Are you aware that Tokugawa was a feudal militarist state that oppressed the peasants, women, etc.? I'm sure you are, and yet your tone indicates admiration, if not approval for that state, and yet you look down at Christophe's stab at the same thing, as not democratic, why is that? When I mentioned the Petion/Boyer led republic I also intended their heirs to be included as practitioners of their policies on color. You seem to judge every social institution based on whether it is democratic or not, do you realize how limiting that optic is? What was democratic about the industrial revolution taking place around the time of the Haitian revolution? Not a damn thing, the Luddites were shot , hanged and deported for opposing this step forward in the mastery of nature. If you really intend to study history you need to be able to identify what's essential for the moment in question, democracy isn't essential, it's just a moment in the development of humanity like all the other forms that preceded it, survival is. The human race developed without democracy for thousands of years, and will invent other modes of governance in the future that build upon democracy. The essential thing is the development of people, any regime, feudal, semi-feudal, democratic,etc. has my approval as long as they make the people healthier, smarter, etc. The only thing wrong with Christophe's kingdom was that it failed. "but if it's true that Christophe's regime created a pull factor of Haitians from the north to Petion's republic, and the land redistribution under Petion ensured him some degree of subaltern support, both sides come out as almost equally 'bad.'" Land redistribution happened in the republic and the kingdom. I'm about to read Nicholls, I've not heard of Harvey.

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  3. " Laraque was not the one who purchased steam ships and operated a steamship line in multiple Haitian cities in the 19th century, was he?" No, that was another Haitian moneybag named Bien-Aime Riviere. Louis Joseph Janvier mentions him in his book, La république d'Haïti et ses visiteurs.

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