The Military and Society in Haiti

“This book is a structural and hermeneutic analysis of civil-military relations in Haiti as canvassed through the magnifying lenses of a social anthropologist. My interest in studying this aspect of the security system in Haiti began to develop after the collapse of the Duvalier dynasty, when I reached the conclusion that one cannot understand the behavior of the Haitian political system without paying attention to the military. After all, it is an empirical fact that the majority of Haitian presidential regimes have been headed by generals. This observation leads us to study the military not simply as bureaucracy but also as government.”

Laguerre's analysis of the role of the military in Haitian society is rooted in an equilibrium theory of civil-military relations wherein the stability of  a political system capable of preventing military intervention is the result of 3 sets of balanced relationships, premised on 3 relationships: between military and civil society, between the military and civil government, and between the civil society and civilian government. Grounding his approach in this equilibrium theory, Laguerre's structural analysis is encompassing of the dynamics of civil and military society in Haiti. 

In order to examine the exchange between the military and civil society in Haiti as an interstate system, Laguerre studies the historical evolution of the military in Haiti, which, as he illustrates, was never powerful enough to act on its own without civil society (just as distinctions between civil and military rule were often blurred or unclear). Indeed, Laguerre discusses numerous examples of the overlap in this interstate system of Haiti, such as Masonic groups, military officials holding power in civil society and vice versa, family ties, businesses, and professions.

Due to social segmentation along class, color, and regional lines, the interstate system exhibited some of the weaknesses of the Haitian state apparatus that allowed factions from the military and/or civil society to capitalize on or spark political instability. Furthermore, as a result of the Haitian Revolution, this military state system emerged as the earliest political model, which evolved into a series of military dictators who ruled in Port-au-Prince but used lower ranking military leaders to administer the rest of the country, a process that contributed to regional competition and coups.

Thus, the various coups that characterized Haiti from 1843-1915, or perhaps, the political instability throughout its history, can be seen as rooted in the failure of a balance between military and civil society, civil society and civilian goverment, and civil society and civilian government. Indeed, Mimi Sheller has made similar arguments about the problems of the Haitian state system from the Revolution to now: the failure of the civil society and civilian government to subordinate the military appartus to civilian interests. Nothing serves to demonstrate this better than directly from Laguerre describing the 19th century military in Haiti on page 18:

The central argument is that because the army served both as the government and a bureaucratic institution of the state and because of the militarization of civil society, the coup d’etat was the outcome of an alliance between regional military units and segments of the civilian population under their aegis. The coup d’etat came about during a crisis period when the government was loosing its support from at least a regional military unit and a segment of the general civilian population; Therefore civilian support is seen as an important factor for the success of a coup d’etat.

Changes wrought by US Occupation eroded some of the militarization of civil government and strengthened political centralization of the military and government in Port-au-Prince (US Occupation also professionalized the military, profoundly transforming it from the largely unprofessional 19th century Haitian army). This played a role in the weakening of regional demarcations that contributed to instability and the frequency of coup d'etats. Laguerre argues that the rise of civilian militias under Duvalier further counterbalanced the supremacy of the military, but Baby Doc's changes in Duvalierism brought the military/state dynamic further into the center, thereby paving the way for the military to eventually have the power to stage another coup in 1986.

Laguerre's book adequately and with great detail eludicates the motivations and structural inadequecies that fueled political instability and the lack of democratization in Haiti. The conflict over the 'spoils' of the presidency, the willingness of civil Haitian elites and power-brokers to form coalitions with certain military leaders for power, the high rates of coups and rebellions, weaker military centralization and professionalization encouraged corruption, and the need to maintain and protect Haitian sovereignty in the first place (though the Haitian military was for more engaged in attacks on Haiti rather than external enemies) combined to prevent Haitian democratization and development. Foreign businesses and legations backing coups, and civil elites willing to side with various factions of the military also contributed to the predicament of cyclic coups and regional conflicts that characterized Haiti before 1915. Laguerre describes the military/civil relationship as being altered by Occupation, but the basic systemic problems remained in place or worsened as centralization in Port-au-Prince and the reconstituted Haitian army (Garde) were more organized, but no less corrupt as the institution took on a bureaucratic form.

This is not to suggest the military could not assume a 'guardian' relationship with civil society, and the 1940s and 1950s saw just that as broad-based military-civil coalitions unseated Lescot and propped up successors. According to Laguerre, Papa Doc depoliticized the military by attaining supremacy over it, and through his paramilitary organization, was able to draw in military and civilian society. By 1986, the military-civil dynamic reverted to a stronger military, which is partly analyzed by Laguerre for the late '80s. One would love to see read Laguerre's opinions on what followed in the 1990s with Raoul Cedras, the elimination of Haiti's army, and conditions on the ground today as Martelly has voiced a wish to revive the Haitian army. An interesting follow-up to Laguerre's work on Haiti from Aristide to Martelly would be enlightening since former military officials and paramilitary groups have clearly engaged in human rights abuses and violence for political ends. The same dynamic continues as descendants of the Haitian military with civil class and political allies continue to subordinate the development of democratization.

Other interesting aspects of the text abound. Laguerre even discusses the role of Vodou in the Haitian military (as a source of power, divine providence and legitimacy for military leaders such as Merisier Jeannis, Hyppolite, and Henri Christophe). Specific praetorian guards, military specialization, military academies, the institutionalization of corruption and abuse, and how the militarized governance fostered endemic instability are convincingly explained. One can see how Firmin's goals in reforming Haiti's politics failed in the face of increasing instability and economic decline, and how even he was forced to take a military title for his unsucessful attempts to become President.