A Case for Smallholder Production
Economic policies regarding agriculture in 19th century Latin American states that continued to inhibit economic, social, political and agricultural development remained in effect into the 20th century. The path of development chosen by states throughout the region favored landholder elites, who possessed most of the available farming land, which was justified by governments because concentration of land among the few was believed to favor development in the long run. However, the case of the Bajío during the insurgency period of the independence wars and decades after proves that smallholder production was a viable alternative to agriculture dominated by latifundia as family-oriented rancheros seized control of haciendas such as Puerto de Nieto in the Bajío. Smallholder production provided rural workers and farmers with land, subsistence, more egalitarian social relations and the best route to economic development, which could have prevented many of the crises of the 20th century.
For both rancheros and tenant farmers in Bajío and sharecroppers and worker in the province of Cautín in Chile, an equitable distribution of land among poor farming families who worked individual plots was the ideal for production. Though the Chilean case occurred in the 1950s, their petition for land redistribution for sharecroppers was justified by lack of employment, subsistence and the inappropriate use of arable land.[1] In Mexico, on the other hand, the insurgency that began with the Hidalgo Revolt of 1810 led to an increase in prices for foodstuffs and a decrease in wages, which led to many estate workers joining the insurgents’ cause.[2] Thus, in both examples, desperation and poverty motivated their respective endeavors to control production through land redistribution. By owning their own lands, or in the Bajío after 1820, when hacendado land rights were respected again, controlling production by choosing what to grow but paying rent to estate proprietors, rural workers and farmers could produce enough food for their own consumption.[3] Furthermore, the colonial tendency to hoard crops in granaries until times of drought and famine to maximize profit could not be done.[4] Local markets in the region, Mexico City and in the nearby silver mining center of Guanajuato could import the staple crop, maize, which had replaced wheat as the most profitable crop.[5]
The distribution of land on estates similar to Puerto de Nieto also allowed modest and prosperous rancheros the opportunity to purchase tools and industrial products like textiles from Querétaro and other towns in the region, which demonstrates that combining commercial and subsistence agriculture to meet local needs promoted industrialization.[6] Clearly this class was capable of buying locally produced manufactured goods, something Latin American farmers and workers could not afford to do well into the 1900s because of low wages.[7] Moreover, ranchero farmers’ control of production reduced dependence on cash crops for external markets, which would have been better for all Latin American countries since their value in Europe and the United States changed once those regions could produce them internally.[8] Similarly, the use of the fundo, El Plumo, for raising livestock and only employing 5 to 6 families, did not utilize available land.[9] Large cattle ranches and single-crop plantations did not employ the growing landless population of Latin America, which caused rural flight into cities lacking industrial sectors that could employ migrants.[10]
As for the traditional theory of capital accumulation among the few, smallholder production would have been better in the long run because that is the same model of economic growth of the northern United States and Canada, the most developed regions of the Americas.[11] Shown in the case of the Bajío from approximately 1810 to the 1850s, the growing industrial sectors of textiles in Querétaro and silver mining in Guanajuato, which improved through mechanization, led to one of the following scenarios of change in per capita production: small decline, modest growth or a steady rate of progress.[12] Like the northern United States, new markets with many participants led to an increase in per capita production in region of Bajío.[13] Unfortunately, Mexico lost territory to the United States and the mountainous terrain inhibited interregional economic exchange, causing a loss of land, labor and trade for the nation as a whole.[14] The concentration of wealth among elites hurt popular welfare and states throughout Latin America that were once able to produce enough for local consumption were forced to rely on food imports to feed their populations.[15] As a result of land concentration among elites, and contrary to tradition capitalist ethos, landholders had little incentive to change the system due to their profits, causing industrial and agricultural technology to fall behind American and European technology since plantations had no need to fully employ rural populations.[16] The workers that were employed could be paid through concessions, including pasture for animals.[17] This method of controlling workers and sharecroppers on estates limited their purchasing power, since those concessions could not buy new agricultural tools and manufactures.
Another reason in favor of smallholder production is the improvement in social relations, mainly gender and labor. The more egalitarian society constructed by insurgent farmers on haciendas in Mexico still possessed inequitable distribution of land and income, but for the rancheros of Puerto de Nieto in 1820, the year Espinosa reasserted ownership, only 20 percent paid 10 pesos or less in rent, illustrating that only 14 were at the margins of subsistence.[18] The majority paid from anywhere from 11-50 pesos in rent, meaning they lived comfortably compared to their former status as landless workers on the estate. Moreover, the poorest tenants recruited by managers found seasonal labor by working for prosperous commercial rancheros so they did not have to face to starvation.[19] Besides, during the period of insurgency, 1810-1820, tenants on estates paid lower rent to rebel leaders, one of the reasons why the rebellion was supported by rural workers.[20] Above all, the rebellion gave men the chance to gain subsistence by seizing estates owned often owned by absentee elites, which is shown to be the case for Puerto de Nieto because in May 1811, 75 employees and tenants of the estate were involved in rebel attacks on the hacienda.[21] The next step for ranchero economies was an expanded role of women, who were excluded from wages during the colonial period to maintain dependency of workers on estates.[22] Though women were excluded in the Chilean petition for land reform and by the definition of the Chilean citizen as a male head with a productive job, women emerged as important rancheras in Mexico.[23] The growth of female landholders and tenants, underrepresented among the poorest of tenants, shows the full use of rural workers as tenants and led to fewer men seeking employment from estate managers because female heads of households were able to support males.[24] Finally, land redistribution of some estates was less threatening to the wealth of elites than one would think. Antonio Kind, owner of El Plumo and other fundos in southern Chile would not have suffered so much from the loss of one fundo.[25] Likewise in the Mexican case, Espinosa owned several estates and earnings from rents paid by tenants did not produce as much profit, but maintained his status as a wealthy landholder.[26]
In short, smallholder production is more beneficial to Latin American agriculture and economies and by extension, societies and politics. Smallholders with a hand in production are less likely to be roused by the promises of extremist or authoritarian governments. The Cuban Revolution for example, Mexico under Porfirio Diaz, or Pinochet’s 1973 coup could have been avoided by more equitable distributions of income and land for rural workers. Smallholder production would have favored early industrialization and economic development as well because smallholders could have produced enough food for local and regional markets and use their surplus to purchase national manufactures, tools and textiles. Of course, land use would have been more appropriate and productive since large cattle ranches and plantations centered on single cash crops would not have been so numerous in the region. Small producers, however, did not wish to renounce patriarchal relations and their emphasis on family-based cultivation of individual plots of land conflicted with indigenous visions of land utility. The Chilean petitioners also attempted to achieve their goal through legal means, while Bajío farmers took control during the chaos of the wars of independence. Both the Chilean petitioners and Bajío rancheros resisted the state’s preference for elite and foreign interests, the two forces in Latin American economies that always determined the course of action for governments. In spite of the failed request of the petitioners and the return to ownership of Puerto de Nieto to the owner, both cases illustrate attempts to create an independent rural workforce capable of self-sustainment and the problems of export-oriented production’s bias in favor of foreign ownership and investment in land and support for elite control of agriculture.
Bibliography
Chonchol, Jacques. “Land Tenure and Development in Latin America.” In Obstacles to Change in Latin America, edited by Claudio Veliz. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
“Petition by 75 Members of a Committee of Small Agriculturalists to the President of the Republic, asking for the expropriation of the estates of El Plumo and Lobería, and Related Documents,” Province of Cautín, Chile, January 1954. Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización, Providencias 1956, Vol. 18, N. 6704, ff. 1-1v, 12-12v, 15-20.
Tutino, John. “The Revolution in Mexican Independence: Insurgency and the Renegotiation of Property, Production, and Patriarchy in the Bajío, 1800-1855,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 78:3 (1998): 367-418.
1. “Petition by 75 Members of a Committee of Small Agriculturalists to the President of the Republic, asking for the expropriation of the estates of El Plumo and Lobería, and Related Documents,” Province of Cautín, Chile, January 1954. Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización, Providencias 1956, Vol. 18, No 6704, ff. 1-1v, 12-12v, 15-20: 412.
9. “Petition by 75 Members of a Committee of Small Agriculturalists to the President of the Republic, asking for the expropriation of the estates of El Plumo and Lobería, and Related Documents,” Province of Cautín, Chile, January 1954. Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización, Providencias 1956, Vol. 18, No 6704, ff. 1-1v, 12-12v, 15-20: 412.
23. “Petition by 75 Members of a Committee of Small Agriculturalists to the President of the Republic, asking for the expropriation of the estates of El Plumo and Lobería, and Related Documents,” Province of Cautín, Chile, January 1954. Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización, Providencias 1956, Vol. 18, No 6704, ff. 1-1v, 12-12v, 15-20: 412.
24. “Petition by 75 Members of a Committee of Small Agriculturalists to the President of the Republic, asking for the expropriation of the estates of El Plumo and Lobería, and Related Documents,” Province of Cautín, Chile, January 1954. Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización, Providencias 1956, Vol. 18, No 6704, ff. 1-1v, 12-12v, 15-20: 412.
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