Whilst perusing Staatliche Museen zu Berlin's website for pictures of objects brought back to Europe by Gustav Nachtigal, we came across a color photo of one of the beautiful basket covers. Nachtigal's Sahara and Sudan includes sketches of basket covers Nachtigal saw in Borno in the 19th century. One of them bears a resemblance to the basket cover below, sitting in Germany. Nachtigal also brought back basket covers from Darfur which are quite exquisite, too.
Saturday, November 7, 2026
Sunday, October 11, 2026
Agisymba and the Ngizim?
Whilst continuing our early forays into the Teda, Daza and Kanuri languages, we randomly wondered if Agisymba was perhaps a reference to the Ngizim. Lange and others have mentioned this, although Murray Last made the point more explicit through reference to the Teda and Daza languages. If the Garamantes referred to the distant land of Agisymba by a name heard from people speaking an early form of the Teda language (possible due to the Tibetsi region likely being in contact with the Garamantes in some form), it is plausible for the Ngizim to have been the ethnonym in question. Basically, the addition of -ba at the end of word would have meant "people of" (as in the -bu in Kanembu, although modern Kanuri seems to use -wu). So Agisymba would have meant A (perhaps the -ng initial sound was difficult to render in the Berber and Greek languages) + ngisym + -ba.
This theory, of course, assumes the continuity of the "Ngizim" name for 2000 years, so it is highly speculative. To our knowledge, the earliest written source referring to the Ngizim dates to the 16th century. When a French source mentions them at the end of the 17th, they were referred to as "Enghzeum." If oral traditions east of Lake Chad and clan affiliations are anything to go by, the Nguedjem (or Ngizim) were also once living in what is today Chad, in Kanem (and as part of the Bulala sultanate in Fitri, perhaps contributing to Carbou's confusion about their origins). While some ethnonyms in the Lake Chad region have persisted for several centuries (Kuri, for instance, or Bade), Ngizim would have to had survived as a name for over a thousand years before its attestation in the 1500s and 1600s.
Naturally, one would also have to account for Ptolemy's description of Agisymba seeming to imply it was near mountains. Was this meant to refer to an area closer to Air? Tibetsi? Assuming the Garamantes would have traveled south through Kawar and reached the Lake Chad area, the land of Agisymba with rhinoceroses and mountains (nearby?) had to have been to the east or west without necessarily traveling too far. The Air massif to the west is an intriguing idea, but presumably the ancestors of the Teda and Daza may have known the region in or near Kanem more intimately if they approached it from the Tibetsi and Borku regions. Again, if one assumes the Garamantes were in contact with peoples who spoke a language like that of the Teda and Daza since the days of Herodotus, and the latter groups likely knew of Kanem or Lake Chad, it is possible the presumably Berber-speaking Garamantes adopted words for southern peoples acquired through them.
Ultimately, the Agisymba as Ngizim remains just a theory. For it to be true requires one to make a number of unproven assumptions that the current data do not fully support. We assume that ancient peoples who spoke an early form of the Teda, Daza, and Kanuri languages in the central Sahara or Tibetsi were referring to a group as something like Ngizim nearly 2000 years ago. Then, through their contacts with the Garamantes, the latter referred to the Ngizim in a way that was later recorded in ancient sources as Agisymba. If the Ngizim and Bade (Bedde) were perhaps both living near Lake Chad in antiquity, then the name Agisymba could be a deformation of something like Ngizimba, referring to a region near Lake Chad, probably Kanem. One must also assume the Ngijem in Kanem are related to the Ngizim west of the lake, even though traditions in the late 1800s and early colonial period connected them to the Bulala.
Saturday, October 10, 2026
A Novice Speculating on KAKRH and Early Kanem
al-Ya'qubi's description of Kanem translated in the Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History (edited by Levtzion and Hopkins).
Wednesday, October 7, 2026
Writing the Qur'an in Borno
Although we have definitely watched this documentary before, we found it fascinating upon our second viewing. Entitled "Borno calligraphy - Creating hand-written Qur'an in northeast Nigeria" and featuring Goni Aminami, Malam Tahir Abba, and Dmitry Bondarev, the scribe explains the process of writing by hand a Qur'an in Borno.
Wednesday, September 23, 2026
Choisi Moussa of Borno and Trinidad (1813)
Whilst reading in The Guardian about the digitized and index records of slaves in the British colonies, we decided to search for anyone from Borno. From perusing demographic studies of plantation societies in the British Caribbean during this period, we knew there were likely to be a few Africans from Borno toiling in the West Indies. We were able to find one in Trinidad named Choisi Moussa. Based on the name Choisi, we assume he came to Trinidad from a French island? Anyway, he was owned by Peter Joseph Girod and Peter Vandom, the proprietors of La Remise, a plantation. In 1813, the plantation had slaves from "nations" like Congo, Mandingo, Arada, Chamba, Kissi, and Ibo. Choisi Moussa was the only one from Borno and perhaps the only Muslim (although the Mandinga captive may have been Muslim). The register also tells us that Moussa had country marks on his face and back and was about 40 years old. If the relative age is accurate, he was born in c. 1773. Without learning more about his background before 1813, however, we cannot say when he was trafficked to the coast and experienced the trans-Atlantic voyage.
Tuesday, September 15, 2026
al-Kanemi and the Berawuna
Saturday, August 1, 2026
Dynamics of Administrative Change in pre-colonial Borno: A Comparative Study of the Sayfawa and Kanemi Dynasties
Kyari Tijani's Dynamics of Administrative Change in pre-colonial Borno: A Comparative Study of the Sayfawa and Kanemi Dynasties is one of those essential studies of Borno history we have been waiting to read for three or four years. Inaccessible and difficult to access, it is a reprint of Tijani's thesis from the 1970s. As such, the publishers chose not to update the text, but they should have at least used an editor to correct the numerous mistakes or typos. That said, nothing is extreme enough to hinder comprehension for the reader. But doing so could have perhaps removed part of the lengthy introduction in which Tijani sought to apply Systems Theory to pre-colonial Borno. Or at the very least, trimmed some of it away. Nonetheless, Tijani's critical study was based on a combination of fieldwork across Borno and into Mandara (in today's Cameroon) as well as the use of local Arabic manuscripts such as the works of Muhammad Yanbu. Although Tijani himself did not read Arabic, he was able to procure translations for some of these rare sources that were products of local Borno writers and scholars in pre-colonial times. His weakness in French and German and the failure of his attempt to visit Mao in Kanem to interview locals were major flaws. This contributed to one of the weaknesses of his study, which often lacked adequate empirical evidence to support his analysis. Without the requisite language skills for deeper source analysis or criticism, some of the examples used by Tijani may not sufficiently substantiate his model.
First, what was the theoretical approach taken by Tijani? Noticing the flaws in the "Great Man" model of Barth, Brenner, Denham and Nachtigal, as well as the weaknesses in Brenner's analysis of the rise of al-Kanemi as shehu of Borno (Tijani was also quite critical of the way Brenner sought to incorporate a conflict theory model of classes), Tijani wanted to understand the nature of Sayfawa longevity and the reasons for dynastic change in the turbulent 19th century. This is a reasonable research question: Why was a single dynasty able to persist for several centuries across time and space? And why was this dynasty, the longest lasting in African history, unable to meet the challenges of the late 1700s and early 1800s? Lastly, what were the conditions of the time and the administrative or political challenges that made a figure like Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi a candidate for leading Borno?
In Tijani's eye, Systems Theory is applicable or relevant for addressing this question. To quote Tijani, "By using its conceptual aparatii, such as the interrelations of interacting, interpenetrating units and the role and significance of legitimation processes and ideology, we have a conceptual model and methodological aparati that can cope with the dynamics of the whole system and would, therefore, enable us understand, describe, and explain Borno political development more adequately" (43). In other words, this theoretical model allows for complex nuances in terms of the interaction of ideology, administrative structure, and the military functions of the state in a heterogeneous, ecologically diverse landscape such as Kanem-Borno. In this case, religio-ideological factors such as the universalist faith of Islam were tied to state legitimation by the Sayfawa (and the subsequent al-Kanemi dynasty). Additionally, the importance of genealogy, clan or lineage affiliations, and the dynastic principle of governance tied to the legend of descent from Sayf b. Dhi Yazan were essential tools in the administrative structures of the Sayfawa. This was so even in the Kanem phase of the Sayfawa state, although Tijani's lack of success in engaging in fieldwork in Mao made his interpretations of the early centuries speculative.
Over time, the Sayfawa adapted their administrative structure to better the standing of the central government and ensure the cultural (ideological) hegemony of the ruling house. Tijani's study traces these changes over time to understand why the Sayfawa state eventually came to an end and a new political order began with al-Kanemi. Indeed, Tijani wrote, "In this case our hypothesis is that change in such a system would be more in the sphere of administration while the political changes would be limited to restatement of pre-existing ideal goals. Change becomes necessary and tolerable when authoritative action neither matches the ideal goals stated nor meets the felt needs of the people or both." Thus, Tijani believed that the type of change that did occur with the rise of al-Kanemi was mostly in the sphere of administration as al-Kanemi restored a more centralized state. Simultaneously, he did not personally take for himself the position of mai, nor did he deviate from the Islamic ideals that were the basis of political legitimacy for the Sayfawa.
How did Tijani prove his theory in the case of Borno? And were his conclusions on the nature of al-Kanemi's political ascent accurate or more compelling than Brenner's study of the al-Kanemi line? Before addressing that, he reviewed the source material. Some of his citations are of unpublished Arabic manuscripts from Borno. He also cited some of the materials from Nigerian archives in Kaduna and conducted fieldwork to record and engage in conversation with locals in Marte, the area of Gazargamo (Gazargumo in his spelling), Kukawa, Maiduguri, and other places. Tijani clearly saw Muhammad Yanbu's Al-Idara Fi Nizam al-Mamlaka Wa 'l-Imara as an exceptional source. A copy was procured for him by Abubakar al-Miskin, a Sayfawa descendant. Assuming Yanbu's text is an authentic work of the 18th or early 19th century, the text outlines the palace administration of Gazargamo in great detail. Unsurprisingly, Tijani also relied heavily on Palmer, the chronicles of Ahmad b. Furtu, and a famous poem by Shaykh al-Tahir b. Ibrahim. Besides these, occasional references to an unpublished Arabic text on the Fulani of Borno, some of al-Kanemi's writings, and a Mandara chronicle, or kirgam, written about that kingdom's war with Borno in c. 1781 abound. Undoubtedly, Tijani's greatest contribution here is his status as a local, fluent speaker of Kanuri with access to various local notables to discuss the past. By drawing upon oral traditions from across Borno, Tijani can begin to synthesize the two different types of source materials (oral sources and written texts) for Borno. Sadly, not being able to visit Kanem restricted what Tijani could accomplish there. Perhaps a lack of French reading comprehension placed another limitation on what Tijani could have done with Landeroin, Zeltner, and Lange.
In terms of applying or adapting Systems Theory to Kanem-Borno, Tijani is weakest on the Kanem centuries. He emphasized the "dynastic character" of Sayfawa administration in Kanem without being able to strongly support it. Based on the meager data from the external Arabic sources and certain speculations on the nature of lineage groups and the retention of power or control over people or territory based on lineage ties to the Sayfawa ruling group, the Sayfawa state in Kanem emphasized its dynastic character. This shaped the administration since relatives of the maiwa were apparently assigned powerful posts in the central government and provincial administration. Unsurprisingly, this later led to problems of fission as these groups descended from the Sayfawa administered distant territories or principalities within the larger Kanem empire, particularly after Dunama Dibalemi's reign. But much of this is difficult to illustrate with specific examples besides what was recounted in the Diwan. Outside observers who never went to Kanem, like al-Maqrizi, may be referenced for what became a decentralized administrative structure, yet Tijani did not deeply explore the rise of the Bulala as a competing lineage group. Nor was there any attempt to understand this in terms of social relations with medieval Kanem or the possible role of slaves and caste groups in this process. Ultimately, the Kanem phase of the Sayfawa appeared to have been little more than a prelude to the central area of Tijani's analysis: Borno.
Once the Sayfawa had relocated permanently to Borno and experienced a consolidation under Ali Gaji (Ali b. Dunama), Tijani's analysis improves. With Ali Gaji, who Tijani unfortunately thought was the mai who went to war with the Kanta of Kebbi, one notes the development of a full dynastic structure of government including the koguna class. However, Ali Gaji replaced Sayfawa relatives with slave officials in some of the key military posts, ending the period of troubles in the 1200s, 1300s and 1400s when powerful officials related to the dynasty could trigger civil wars or coups. Using the example of Ali Gaji's campaign against Logone, dated to c. 1501/2 (although this was likely earlier, if one uses Lange's chronology), or the establishment of a permanent capital at Gazargamo, Tijani perceived Ali Gaji as establishing the conditions for a stronger state to emerge within Borno and the Central Sudan. Although the kogunawa later took on more administrative responsibility for the subsequent maiwa, Ali Gaji's council of state, enslaved officials, and building of a new capital tied to trade, Islamic education, and stability laid the foundation for the Sayfawa state's longevity in Borno. Even the sending of Yerima Musa against Logone was portrayed by Tijani as an instance in which the mai used dangerous campaigns as an opportunity to rid himself of political threats. Ali Gaji's victory against the Bulala at Lada was similarly important for showing the resurgence of the Sayfawa with a strong center.
After Ali b. Dunama, Idris Alauma (Idris b. Ali) was seen as the next great statesman of the dynasty. According to Tijani, the increasing dichotomization between the center and periphery in Borno was not a problem until Idris Alauma's successors. Instead, during his reign, a greater degree of centralization took place with a modicum of political realism. Idris b. Ali took action against residual Sau populations, intervened in the succession and affairs of Mandara, Kanem, the Ngizim, and asserted Sayfawa rights to protect subject populations like the Fulani from Tuareg raids. By actively intervening within Borno and its frontier to defend subjects, promoting Islam among the Ngizim and others, resisting banditry and external enemies, and campaigning against the Bulala in Kanem, Idris b. Ali ensured the periphery was not cut off from Gazargamo. And due to the logistical and ecological difficulties of holding together a vast empire, Tijani saw Idris Alauma as a realist who acknowledged that some regions, like Kanem, would have to remain autonomous or semi-autonomous. His active military campaigns, suppression of insecurity, and ongoing commitment to Islamic standards of legitimacy and a dynastic right to rule as a Sayfawa promoted the administration's religious, political, and cultural hegemony. In fact, Idris Alauma's reign was the apogee of Borno for Tijani. In a segmented administrative structure ruling a heterogeneous population with ecological diversity, Idris Alauma promoted a robust central government whilst being politically realist. The state responded to the peripheries, provided protection, pacified the Sau, yet acknowledged the need to leave Mandara and Kanem as autonomous vassals.
After Idris Alauma, Tijani traced the development of greater dichotomies between center and periphery. Although the aforementioned autonomous provinces like Kanem under the Bulala sultans were understandably not integrated into the central administration of Gazargamo, subsequent maiwa accelerated the problem. As a result, multiple new frontier polities were promoted or created as vassals and buffers for Borno's frontiers, particularly the alifa in Mao (Kanem), the Galtima (galadima) of Nguru, the theocratic state of the Koyam shaykh, or Muniyo. Whilst this strategy created a defensive buffer for Borno to protect the territory from raiding activities of nomadic peoples like the Tuareg or Tubu, later Sayfawa administrations were less successful at maintaining close supervisory control of the vassal states. Over time, local chiefs or kings began to decide succession without consulting Gazargamo (which sometimes confirmed their decisions without interfering in the process). As the Sayfawa were less involved in active administration and less invested in conducting military campaigns themselves, they were also less likely to be able to offer adequate protection or support to some of these autonomous or semi-autonomous provinces. Indeed, Tijani accused these later Sayfawa rulers of changing to emphasize far more heavily the Islamic faith as their basis for legitimacy. Certainly, maiwa who engaged in long periods of ritual seclusion, Islamic studies, or lengthy travel abroad to perform the pilgrimage were less likely to be able to effectively or immediately address political concerns directly. Consequently, the administrative system relied on more intermediaries, thereby lengthening the chains in government as the distance between ruler and ruled increased. With this pattern acceleration over time, it very well could have led to poor governance or more corruption and exploitation of the ruled through chima gana or other officials.
As the 17th and 18th centuries progressed, Tijani divided Borno (and its empire) into areas of Sayfawa sovereignty and Sayfawa hegemony. In the former, the Sayfawa state, or central administration, was in direct control. In areas of hegemony, on the other hand, the influence of Borno was often expressed through the cultural and religious stature of the Sayfawa across much of the Central Sudan. This would be areas under the rule of the local dynasties in Marte, Dikwa, Muniyo, Damagaram, Kanem, Gumel, Mandara, Logone, Deya, Gulfe, Ngala, and the galadima. Due to their long history and promotion of Islam, Borno enjoyed a degree of regional hegemony without necessarily possessing administrative structures to integrate autonomous and semi-autonomous principalities. One sees this in Marte, the hometown of Tijani. There the first king, Kadiri Arsomi, was said to have been a brother of Ali Umarmi (Ali b. Umar?) and from the Sayfawa-Maghumi clan. Whilst the genealogy raises more questions, it is significant that the Martema claimed common origin with the Sayfawa dynasty as part of its own local legitimacy. In another case, Dikwa, descent from a maina of Gazargamo is claimed. In the Dikwama case, they also had to contend with non-Muslim Gamergu peoples who offered resistance to Borno. In both cases, these chiefly lineages claimed a common origin with the Sayfawa. But they became more autonomous over time in various matters. Even Logone, which sent "gifts" to Borno, saw these sandi as non-obligatory. They were intended for buying peace and cooperation. Likewise, the other principalities who sent gifts to Gazargamo expected to be reciprocated with even greater gifts.
Once nomadic and semi-nomadic groups and immigrants to Borno in the Late Sayfawa Period are considered, the inability of the central government to adapt to new conditions became clear. As the Shuwa began to migrate to Borno due to pressures from Wadai and Bagirmi, their local leaders were sometimes able to become the fugu of their respective communities. These Shuwa representatives of the central government often represented their local Shuwa group much more than Gazargamo. It did not help that, per Tijani, maiwa after Idris Alauma did not sustain the goodwill of the Shuwa Arabs. Hence, the Shuwa groups who were in Borno in the 1700s were not particularly close to the government. As cattle herders eager to avoid raids and excessive taxation, they needed to court advantageous relationships with governments and local farmers. In the case of Borno, however, the mid-1700s actually witnessed a local war over Kabela. Initially held by the Fulata, the Shuwa seized it for three years, eventually losing it to the Fulata. Unfortunately, Tijani did not provide a clear indication of how the Sayfawa government responded to this conflict between two nomadic groups. Clearly, it shows tensions over resources. The Fulani Wodabe and Bororo'en groups were often under the authority of the galadima based in Nguru while others were under the authority of Deya, one of the vassal polities. They too had a strained relationship with Gazargamo that the burgeoning parasitism of the central bureaucracy could not address. Subject to expropriation or conflicts with other groups in Borno, the Shuwa, Fulani, and others sought to better their situation. Therefore, it is not surprising that these two groups came to play a large role in the events of the 19th century, albeit on opposing sides. One could add the Kanembu migrants to Borno in this category as well.
In order to further buttress his view of the bloated administration of the later Sayfawa maiwa, Tijani heavily relied on Muhammad Yanbu. Again, assuming this text is a reliable and authentic view of Sayfawa bureaucracy in the 1700s or early 1800s, it is quite revealing. For example, Tijani believed one reading of Yanbu supports the notion of the Sayfawa relinquishing more power to the wazirs. Much of the first part of Yanbu's text also shows the many types of palace servants, such as the Servants of the Apartment, or the Masters of the Sandals. Besides these, Yanbu's text listed leatherworkers, Masters of the Saddles, Masters of the Horse Armor, Masters of the Stirrups, Masters of the Cushion, and more. The central government even included a Secret Chancery that provided intelligence services and royal guards. Yet the famous chima system is suspiciously absent in Yanbu's text. If anything, Yanbu shows that, to some extent, the Sayfawa had become accustomed to a life of luxury and tranquility in their capital. They may have returned to past customs in government appointments which were so costly to their forebears. According to Yanbu, "Each of them deploys the army, which follows him, and no one is appointed to this rank other than sons or other relatives of the king" (300). This claim, which Tijani believed served as evidence of the Sayfawa appointing their close relatives as kaigama, was a step backwards. Yanbu is even cited for further Sayfawa disengagement with military matters since there was a "king's substitute" who took the place of the mai in battle.
Of course, Yanbu's text may not be reliable on all these matters as the kaigama mentioned in Borno traditions during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama did not appear to be a Sayfawa descendant. Nor could one say Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama did not risk his life in military ventures. After all, Landeroin's report on Koyam traditions recorded him receiving an arrow wound in the battle with Mandara (not to mention the Mandara kirgam mentioning the mai fleeing for his life on horseback as Wandala soldiers pursued him). For similar reasons, readers may take issue with Tijani's views on the reign of Ali b. Umar (c. 1639-1677). To Tijani, Ali b. Umar's numerous trips to the East led to Kashim Biri's revolt and the development of overly powerful officials. This included Tuareg attacks that reached Gazargamo. But not mentioned here was the context in which a faction in Borno invited Agadez to send troops. And even as Ali b. Umar took five pilgrimages, his reign is often portrayed in the academic literature as Borno at its zenith.
Mandara's war with Borno in the 18th century is another problem for analysis. Tijani heavily relied on the biased Mandara kirgam written several years after the event. Since a copy of the chronicle was found for him by a notable in Borno, Tijani assumed that the text was taken seriously as an accurate chronicle by Borno ulama. That leap in reasoning may be valid, but without taking into account local Borno texts mentioning Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama's war with Mandara, Tijani made the mistake of relying too much on a single source. The incredibly biased kirgam written decades after the event it described must be treated with greater caution. Consulting local Arabic texts from Borno that were written during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama would have provided the necessary balance to evaluate what triggered the war.
Finally, readers may question Tijani's stark views. Even Heinrich Barth saw in Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama a mai who was active on multiple fronts. It is too hasty to dismiss the later Sayfawa mais of the 1600s and 1700s as being dedicated to Islamic piety or scholarship and removing themselves from practical considerations of governance. Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama is an illustrative case. Not only was he active against Mandara, but he also sought to defend the frontier from Tuareg raiders and support those buffer states. Other 18th century mai may have been active on the frontier with Kano during the 1730s or with groups like the Kurata in Kanem to the east. Without providing empirical examples from the various rulers of the 1600s and 1700s, Tijani ran the risk of sounding like Yves Urvoy, Barth, and past scholars who dismissed these maiwa.
The remainder of Tijani's study focuses on the effects of the Jihad, the ascent of al-Kanemi, and the return to what he saw as a more centralized administrative structure. The unresolved tensions and political climate for the Fulata led to hostilities in 1799. Bi Abdur, Ardo Lerlima and Ibrahim Zaki led Fulata communities against the galadima, Dunoma of Nguru. Tensions continued, culminating in the 1808 attack on Gazargamo led by Goni Mukhtar. Meanwhile, al-Kanemi, the son of a Kanembu and a Fezzani Arab, had settled in Ngala. Gaining renown as a scholar and due to his own Kanembu background, al-Kanemi was able to cultivate a support base from the Kanembu and Shuwa. Like him, some were migrants to Borno (although Tijani stressed that most in Borno would not have perceived al-Kanemi as a foreigner). Since respected mallams often became a source of leadership and community guidance in times of trouble, it was no surprise that al-Kanemi generated genuine legitimacy among various groups in Borno. His standing led to the defeated Sayfawa requesting his aid in driving the Fulata out of Gazargamo. Despite his success against the Fulata groups, Gazargamo was abandoned and the Sayfawa themselves were internally divided.
In this period of clear failure on the part of the Sayfawa to respond to the military threat of the jihadists, al-Kanemi began to expand his power base. With a court moved to Ngorno, al-Kanemi received courtiers from the Sayfawa (they later followed him to Kukawa). A part of al-Kanemi's reforms was to weaken or remove autonomous local rulers. This entailed actions against the galadima, which decreased the area under his administration. Then Marte, Mintar, Ngala and others were subjects of al-Kanemi's attention. Part of al-Kanemi's vision here was a desire to more fully integrate the southern parts of Borno into the state. These areas were exposed to threats from Bagirmi, Mandara and Wadai yet contained rich, fertile soils. Through his slave military official, Barka Gana, who was assigned the Kotoko states, Borno's central administration was actively attempting to integrate this region. The shaykh depended on enslaved military officials, his kachellawa, to make this happen. He waged similar campaigns against groups reluctant to recognize his authority, like the "Black Shuwa" in Damaturu or the Manga who revolted in the 1820s. Whilst engaged in these military campaigns to subdue autonomous or rebellious local leadership, al-Kanemi relied on a small Council of State which included prominent individuals tied to the Shuwa and Kanembu.
Undoubtedly, one must ask the following: why did al-Kanemi never remove the Sayfawa or officially usurp the throne? Tijani suggested an answer when he wrote, "The reality perhaps was that the religio-ideological power and authority of the Sayfawa, if not necessarily their political and military power, had developed to cover extensive areas in the Central Sudan" (412). In response to this longstanding ideological power, al-Kanemi, whose source of authority was also partly based in religion, may have chosen to merely act in defense of Sayfawa. Unlike them, he was able to combine military leadership with this religio-ideological authority. After rejecting the rationale for the jihad in his correspondence with Sokoto leaders and defending the Islamic legitimacy of Borno's government (though still imperfect), it is not surprising al-Kanemi was never interested in eradicating or replacing them with a new dynasty.
Nonetheless, more skeptical or pessimistic readers may take issue with this period of transition. While Louis Brenner may have overemphasized the personal ambition and court politics as a factor, it is probable that al-Kanemi intervened in Sayfawa succession disputes to his own advantage. To what extent he played a role in the deposition of Muhammad Ngileruma should be explored. It is possible al-Kanemi merely sought to become the delegated authority of the Sayfawa in administration while the ancient dynasty retained its Islamic and historical symbolic power. In other words, al-Kanemi may have wanted to occupy a position similar to the shogunates of Japan who wielded effective power on behalf of the imperial family. Due to their political longevity and renown across much of the Central Sudan, it was better to keep them, even as figureheads, than to remove them outright. When viewed through this lens, al-Kanemi likely was driven by personal ambition. Yet it was ultimately based on restoring and defending Borno as a centralized state and in a position of prominence within the Central Sudan and Islamic worlds. Indeed, completely replacing the Sayfawa would have been tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of the jihadist critiques of Borno.
Despite our issues with Tijani's work, it remains a significant work. Attempting to use a grand theory with enough nuance to elucidate the longevity of the Sayfawa, Tijani faced a number of problems. First, the lack of field research in Kanem weakened his analysis. Although there probably would have been insurmountable obstacles to researching medieval Kanem in the 1970s based on oral tradition, the lack of that perspective leaves the early chapter without the same level of evidentiary basis. The later chapters, on the Borno phase, are much richer. Closer in time to the present and with the benefit of oral traditions as well as more written sources, Tijani can trace the waxing and waning of the Sayfawa from the 1400s to 1808. The main problem is the falling back on generalizations or certain assumptions about the structure without close scrutiny of the maiwa of the 1600s and 1700s. The lack of nuance on certain reigns, like that of Ali b. Umar or Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, hinders the author's point about the Sayfawa emphasizing their religious or Islamic claims to legitimacy and hegemony. Lastly, the reliance on what were translations of Arabic manuscripts and French sources created another problem for the author's use of this material. Without being able to read Arabic, he faced limitations in terms of close textual analysis, source criticism, and the question of authenticity. Unable to use French placed additional obstacles for accessing more source materials on Kanem, Kawar, the Manga, Bagirmi, Wadai, and Agadez. Fortunately, Tijani's local connections, Kanuri fluency, and travels across Borno did allow for some balance of written and oral sources. This did allow for more of the required nuance in elucidating the areas of Sayfawa sovereignty versus Sayfawa hegemony and the Mai Mbauji.
Wednesday, June 17, 2026
Kanem-Borno and the Fazzan: Reconsidering the Relations Between the Sahara and Sudan
The
Fazzan, a large part of the Central Sahara, has an ancient history stretching
back to the Garamantian civilization. With the coming of Islam, the area’s
central location on one of the shortest routes for trans-Saharan trade made it
even more significant for the growing connections between the Lake Chad Basin
and the Mediterranean. As a region of the Sahara once incorporated into a
Sudanic state, Kanem, that period has yet to be satisfactorily analyzed. Said
to have begun during the reign of Dunama Dibalemi in the 13th century,
scholars disagreed when Sayfawa rule this far north ended. Similarly, there is
a debate about the Kanemi provincial ruler, based at Traghen, becoming
autonomous and thus ending direct rule from Kanem sometime in the 14th
century. Even as direct rule faded, Kanem’s institutional and cultural legacy
endured well into the medieval and early modern periods. This brief article
will explore this theme through the external written sources, oral and written
traditions of Borno, and the traditions of the Fazzan. It shall be
demonstrated that Kanem's conquest of the Fazzan established a durable Kanuri
institutional presence that outlasted direct Sayfawa rule and shaped the
character of the Awlad Muhammad state — making the Fazzan, from the 13th
through the 18th century, a northern extension of the Sudanic
political world. Therefore, the period of Kanem rule and ongoing relations
between Borno and the Awlad Muhammad dynasty of the Fazzan that followed established
Kanem and Bornoan influences over a Saharan region that were deep, of great
longevity, and multifaceted. Doing so challenges conventional narratives of the
Sahara as an impenetrable barrier whilst highlighting how a Sudanic state from
the south exerted influence on a northern Saharan space for several centuries
from the medieval to Early Modern periods.
Kanem and the Fazzan
Much
of the standard overview of the history of the Fazzan is based on traditions
that are occasionally contradictory for the medieval and Early Modern eras.[1]
For example, J. Despois, in his work on the human geography of the region in
the Mission scientifique du Fezzan, was told that the Guend er Roum
fortress near Traghen was used by the Banu Khorman before Kanem's conquest of
the Fazzan.[2]
But Henri Duveyrier, who traveled in the region during the 19th century, was
told the Traghen fortress ruins were associated with the Banu Nasur dynasty
from Kanem.[3]
Does this mean the area's fortifications predate Kanem's northward expansion in
the 13th century? And were the Banu Khorman also present in this
part of the Fazzan at this early date? Similarly, J. Chapelle, whose study of
the Tubu populations, Nomades noires du Sahara, is a major
work, suggested that Dunama Dibalemi installed a Tubu lieutenant to oversee the
Fazzan at Traghan in c. 1258.[4]
Once again, this is contradicted by the best chronology for the Sayfawa
dynasty, Lange's, which indicates Dibalemi's reign likely ended by c. 1248.
Furthermore,
Ahmad b. Furtu's chronicle of Idris Alooma's Kanem campaigns referred
to hostility between Dunama Dibalemi and the Tubu. Although based on oral
tradition, Ahmad b. Furtu's informants spoke of a war between the Tubu and the
ruler of Kanem that lasted 7 years, 7 months and 7 days.[5]
Consequently, it seems rather unlikely that Dibalemi would have appointed a
Tubu leader of the Fazzan at Traghen. Moreover, the frequent Kanuri toponyms in
Traghen may be a more reliable indicator of a Kanembu governor posted there.[6]
Clearly, there is a problem in the early scholarship on this period. Assuming
Dunama Dibalemi had to have been the one who ordered the killing of Qaraqush's
son in Waddan and then established Kanem's hegemony in the Fazzan in 1258 cannot
be sustained by critical analysis.[7]
What
do the few textual sources in this period tell us? The earliest, the
geographical text of Ibn Sa'id, was based on a lost account by Ibn Fatima. In
his account, which is largely based on Ibn Fatima's descriptions of Kanem
during Dunama Dibalemi's reign, the Fazzan is included in the domains of the
Sayfawa. This same source, however, repeated the notion that Zawila was the
capital of Fazzan.[8] If
so, one wonders if the decision to move the Kanemi capital to Traghen was made
after Dunama Dibalemi's reign, perhaps when Kaday occupied the throne
(1248-1277). Alternatively, Zawila may have continued to occupy a prominent
position as the commercial capital while the official appointed by the Sayfawa
was based in Traghen. It is unclear exactly how administrative arrangements
functioned and where, but Ibn Sa'id implied Kanemi domination during the reign
of Dunama Dibalemi. Furthermore, Ahmad b. Furtu and the Diwan reveal
this mai owned tens of thousands of horses. It is difficult to
imagine Kanem obtaining so many horses for military purposes without importing
at least some of them through the Fazzan. Thus, it is possible Kanem's sway
over Fazzan began sometime during Dunama's reign. Additional Arabic sources
affirm Kanem's intervention in Waddan by the 1250s. According to al-Tijani, the
king of Kanem intervened in Waddan and had a son of Qaraqush killed in 1258 for
causing discord in the land.[9]
Ibn
Khaldun, for his part, wrote of a gift of a giraffe from Kanem to the Hafsid
ruler of Tunis in 1257. Ibn Khaldun was too brief in his description, yet he
referred to the king of Kanem also as the ruler of Borno and located their
domains to the south of Tripoli.[10]
It is unclear if he meant the domains of the Sayfawa still extended into the
Fazzan in his time or if he was referring to the period in question, but he wrote
in the present tense. Another 14th century writer, al-Umari,
apparently had access to independent sources of information about Kanem. For
instance, he relied on the authority of Abu Abd Allah al-Salaliji who
personally met the ascetic shaykh, Uthman al-Kanimi. This source, whose nisba pointed
to Morocco, presumably met the ascetic shaykh in Egypt or North Africa.
Moreover, al-Umari described Kanem's domains stretching to Zalla in Libya. If
al-Umari had access to informants who spoke with Kanemi ascetics and pilgrims,
one may be able to surmise that his information on the borders of the state was
at least partly updated. The lodge in Cairo where Kanemi pilgrims and students
stayed was still active at this time, too.[11]
Therefore, it is not inconceivable that al-Umari's information on Kanem's
borders to be current. Lastly, al-Maqrizi also implied Kanem's continued
domination of at least parts of the Libyan Sahara. According to him, Barqa was
a northern neighbor of Kanem. This author, who lived from 1364-1442, possessed
a surprisingly detailed amount of knowledge on Kanem, Borno, and neighboring
regions. Indeed, from his use of Kanuri words like Afnu to refer to the Hausa
and various peoples or regions in the Lake Chad area, al-Maqrizi must have had
access to other sources of information on this part of Africa.[12]
Either through lost Arabic sources or from contact with pilgrims or students
from Kanem-Borno, al-Maqrizi should be taken seriously. In contrast to
el-Hesnawi, who was inclined to discount the writings of al-Umari and
al-Maqrizi on Kanem's rule of the Fazzan enduring for an extended period, the topic
is still debatable. Certainly by 1463, however, the qaid of Tripoli received
tribute from the Fazzan that was then sent to the Hafsids.[13]
As
the few external Arabic sources seem to suggest, Kanem's authority over the
Fazzan persisted at least until the end of the 14th century. This
would imply that, despite conflict within the Sayfawa ruling house and wars
with the Bulala and Sao, the rulers never completely lost sight of the
important commercial route that linked them to the larger Islamic world. If the
oral traditions in the Fazzan are accurate, however, things began to fall apart
sometime in the 1300s or 1400s. Duveyrier repeated traditions of the Banu
Khorman defeating the local Kanem administrators.[14]
Gustav Nachtigal, also drawing from tradition, argued that the Banu Nasur
dynasty in Fazzan became autonomous or semi-independent.[15]
Then, a period of lengthy conflict ensued in the Fazzan, for Despois reported
similar traditions on the foundation of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty. Apparently,
the Awlad Muhammad founder sought to unite groups in dispersed gasr fortifications
due to endemic conflict among the Banu Khorman, Nasur, and Jahma.[16]
If this tradition is dependable, the Awlad Muhammad concentrated people at a
Nasur gasr and gradually reestablished a unitary state for the
Fazzan. This may explain why political titles of Kanuri origin were adopted by
the Awlad Muhammad rulers, since their rise to power may have been through an
alliance with remnants of the local Kanemi administration. Intriguingly, J.
Lethielleux reported that the people of the Wadi al-Ajal sent a deputation to
Borno after the fall of the Nasur dynasty due to the incessant conflict with
nomads.[17]
If so, there may have been elements in the Fazzan who solicited the aid of the
Sayfawa for restoring order. It was ultimately achieved by the Awlad Muhammad,
who may have accomplished it with what was left of the Banu Nasur.
Nevertheless,
some of the traditions are contradictory about the legacy of Kanem's rule. To
Despois, who was told of Kanem forces allegedly destroying Brak el Afia and the
village of Maafen, the blacks of Kanem had a bad reputation.[18]
Lange, however, has proposed that Brak was attacked by Idris Alooma of Borno in
the 16th century, not during the period of Kanem's rule. Lange based
this on Ahmad b. Furtu's chronicle of Idris Alooma's Borno campaigns, referring
to an episode in which the mai returned from the hajj and
attacked a place called Burak. This Burak was likely the Burak in the northern
Fazzan where traditions recall a place destroyed by Kanem. Lange even goes so
far as to suggest Borno may have retained or reinstalled a garrison at Traghen
in the 16th century, from which the attack against Burak was
launched.[19]
Further evidence of this is required, but it would affirm the idea of a more
positive or at least neutral view of Kanem's authority in the 13th
and 14th centuries. For instance, El-Hesnawi was told a tradition by
a Fazzani elder of Aqar which reflects a more positive view of Kanem's period
of rule. According to this informant, a large delegation of Fazzanis, from 6
nomadic groups, arrived in the capital of the ruler of Kanem to ask for Kanemi
families to revive agriculture. This problematic account could be referring to
the settlement of slaves to work in the date-groves of the Fazzan.
Alternatively, it may contain a kernel of historical veracity on the
large-scale movement of free people from Kanem into Fazzan during the 13th
and 14th centuries. Either way, it represents a positive tradition
of Kanem for its settling of 6000 men and their families into the Fazzan and a
revival of agriculture after the politically tumultuous years following the
fall of the Banu Khattab of Zawila in the late 12th century. The
shared tie of Islam also paved the way for peaceful communication since the
Fazzani delegation was initially assumed to be invading infidels by Kanem.
Fortunately, the traditioned reported, "But when the Kanemis saw the
Fazzanis camped near their capital, performed the daily prayers and showed no
signs of hostility, they recognized them as Muslims creating no danger."[20]
Ultimately, the annexation of the Fazzan under Dunama Dibalemi may have been
welcomed for providing political stability, security, and the revival of the
economy.
But
what was the nature of the Kanemi authority of the Fazzan? Some possible clues
may be seen in the political structure of the Sayfawa state. Lamentably, our
sources are richer for the Borno phase of this dynasty. Nonetheless, the
survival of Kanuri political titles under the Awlad Muhammad sultans may be a
clue. Thus, they too had a yarima, kaigama, and galadima.
It is possible that the local Kanemi administration used such titles like the
Sayfawa court within the Fazzan. It is also possible that the idea of a
dignitary whose title followed a cardinal direction may have been in place. The
Awlad Muhammad, for instance, posted a brother of the sultan at Traghen as
"Sultan of the East," or "Sultan el Shirghi." Furthermore,
the local administration may have utilized the chima system
for land grants and tribute collection on date-groves and gardens. The Banu
Nasur may have also successfully, for a time at least, rebuilt or
maintained gasr fortifications at key sites in the Fazzan.
Traghen, their political capital, certainly benefited from this. Zalla and
other important sites for the trade and pilgrimage traffic through the Fazzan
would have necessitated security.
Additionally,
Lyon, when traveling in the Fazzan in the early 19th century, heard
the story of 500 donkeys that perished during the construction of Traghen's
citadel.[21]
Whether or not the citadel was erected by the Banu Nasur or a later dynasty, it
may be an instance of how population movements during the period of Kanem’s
hegemony shaped the wider region. Undoubtedly, the large-scale immigration of
people in conditions of security must have been the greatest contribution to
the region's prosperity. With security for trade routes, free and enslaved
people could move to or through the Fazzan, as well as restore and expand oasis
settlements. This may be the origin of the Oualad Kassoun of Traghen, a group
Despois identified as the most ancient lineage there.[22]
Such families with deep roots in sites like Traghen also reshaped the towns and
villages of the area based on their town and villages in Kanem and Borno. Perhaps
this would explain the preponderance of Kanuri terms for castles, wells, springs,
and other place names. It would also elucidate the appearance of a dendal at
Murzuk. Further ties to Kanem and Borno may have developed through the Tura
traders holding the position of Zeilama, who may have contributed
to the growth of the trade in horses for Kanem's military expansion in the
1200s.
In
summation, sufficient evidence for the survival of Kanem's rule in the Fazzan
into the late 14th or early 15th centuries has been preserved. The
administration at Traghen likely mirrored aspects of the Sayfawa court and it
is possible that the Awlad Muhammad partly borrowed Sayfawa court titles via
the example of the Banu Nasur dynasty. Exactly when they became autonomous is
ambiguous, but a breakdown of state authority must have occurred by the early
15th century. Due to distance and the frequent conflicts of the
Sayfawa with the Sao and Bulala in the 1300s, the Kanemi official posted at
Traghen was possibly quite autonomous from an early date. His position may have
been like the later galadimas of Borno who possessed great
local autonomy on Borno's frontier. Then, the enigmatic Banu Khorman, who
may have been of Berber or Arab extraction, were said to have defeated the Banu
Nasur and made Zawila their capital. Traditions collected by Despois, however,
hint at a possible alliance of the Awlad Muhammad and the Banu Nasur. The
period of Kanem's rule in the Fazzan may have also facilitated economic growth
with immigration and increases in trade through this vital trans-Saharan route.
Since the oral traditions, sadly, are contradictory, much of the precise nature
and developments that took place during the era of Kanem’s hegemony in the
Fazzan cannot be explored further. Despite their limitations, they do,
nonetheless, provide evidence for a relatively durable Kanemi government which
shaped the subsequent Fazzani regime, the Awlad Muhammad. The few external
Arabic sources on Kanem during this era likewise affirm a long-lasting Kanemi
influence on the Fazzan.
Borno and the Fazzan
Moving
into the period of the Sayfawa state in Borno, an era when direct rule over the
Fazzan was brief or limited, the Fazzan remained entwined with the south. Beginning
with Kanuri placenames, political titles used by the Awlad Muhammad, and
possible political legacies in the region, it is abundantly clear that the
Fazzan retained its close links to Borno from the 16th to 19th
centuries. Unfortunately, like the case of Kanem and the Fazzan, detailed
sources on the specific nature of relations between the Awlad Muhammad and Borno
are sadly limited in the details. Additional research is necessary,
particularly revisiting written sources from the period of the Awlad Muhammad
dynasty's period of power. Doing so may illuminate further aspects of the Awlad
Muhammad as a "Sudanic" state in the middle of the Sahara.
First,
the Kanuri toponyms in the Fazzan. Henri Duveyrier, traveling through the
region in the 19th century, found Kanuri placenames in use in the
southern Fazzan. As examples he listed the following: Ngouroutou, Karakoura,
Kerekerimi, Kangaroua and various wells with Kanuri names in Traghen.[23]
In addition, Duveyrier mentions Barnawy cotton cultivated in the Fazzan, yet
another aspect of cultural influence from the south. The famous tomb of the
Sayfawa mai, Idris b. Ali, who died in the Fazzan in 1696, was also remembered
by residents of Traghen and venerated.[24]
Other parts of the southern Fazzan, unsurprisingly, have close ties to the
Kanuri and Tubu. For instance, Lyon found Kanuri to be more widely spoken than
Arabic in Gatrun. Tegerry was similar.[25]
In addition, Murzuk, the capital of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty, had a dendal like Kanuri cities. Duveyrier was
also told that the mode of the country was "black" under the Awlad
Muhammad. Thus, the sultan had a black guard, Kanuri was spoken, and the city
was very much shaped by the south.[26]
According to Lethielleux, Murzuk even had a quarter along a street named after
Kanem: Zenquet el-Kanmi.[27]
Besides
places with Kanuri-derived names, the Fazzan's Awlad Muhammad dynasty was at
least partly influenced by the Sayfawa state in its administrative structure.
According to Hornemann, this ruling dynasty used Kanuri-derived political
titles like kaigama. Although the
actual wielders of power in the state by the late 18th century were
mamelukes of European descent and various black slaves, Hornemann's travels in
the region reveal the dynasty's upper echelons included officials with names of
Kanuri or Kanem-Borno origin.[28]
Something similar can be found in Agades, the Hausa states, Kotoko states,
Bagirmi, and even as far as Darfur, where titles of Kanuri origin were found.[29]
Nonetheless, the Awlad Muhammad dynasty of the Fazzan may have adopted and
adapted these titles through direct contact with Kanem-Borno, perhaps beginning
with the local Banu Nasur dynasty installed by Kanem in the 13th
century. In addition, the title of yerima
was similarly used by the Awlad Muhammad dynasty according to documents
translated by el-Hesnawi.[30]
Possible evidence of the creation of titled officials based on the cardinal
directions may have also existed in the Fazzan. The main evidence for it,
however, is the position of "Sultan of the East" at Traghen, a post
held by the brother of the sultan. George Francis Lyon described this post as
"Sultan el Shirghi."[31]
This may be an echo of an old official in Kanem-Borno under the Sayfawa, the mustrema.
Besides
influencing the administrative structure of the Awlad Muhammad rulers, the
Kanuri influence may have even shaped the rise of the dynasty to power.
According to problematic traditions collected by Despois in the 1940s, Murzuk
rose to prominence from a gasr of the Banu Nasr, who were said to have been in
conflict with the Banu Khorman.[32]
This suggests that the early rise to power of the Awlad Muhammad may have
involved an alliance with pro-Nasur forces against the Khorman and Jahma, the
latter an unknown group or faction vying for control of the region. An early
alliance with a faction of Kanuri origin could elucidate the laying out of
Murzuk with a dendal, the adoption of titles of Kanuri origin, and the
close relationship the Awlad Muhammad had with Borno. In fact, such a notion
was supported by oral traditions from Chati collected by Lethielleux, who was
told the Awlad Muhammad received support from Borno.[33]
Local Fazzan forces of southern origins likely played a pivotal role in this
process, too. Indeed, families with descent from the era of Kanem's suzerainty
may have still been around at Traghen and other sites. The “black” Oualad
Kassoun of Traghen, for example, were considered the most ancient lineage group
there when Despois conducted his research.[34]
Lethiellux, on the other hand, reported a qabila Nessour family near Wadi
'atba.[35]
Was this a branch of the Banu Nasur dynasty?
Of
course, the Awlad Muhammad's own origins in the west as holy figures and sharifs
placed them in an advantageous position to be mediators for the restoration of
peace in the Fazzan. Indeed, Despois found that many towns or settlements in
the region included marabout lineages claiming origins in the west, often the
area of Morocco or modern Mauritania. For instance, the Oulad Tameur (or Awlad
Tamir) of Traghen, were said to be the descendants of a marabout who settled in
the region by the 1400s, according to el-Hesnawi. The arrival of prominent
lineages of Islamic clerics and descendants of the Prophet attests to the
region's importance for both the pilgrimage traffic to Mecca as well as its
commercial importance. A close alliance with the Sayfawa to the south made
perfect sense for securing the commercial and pilgrim routes. The fact that
they were able to maintain stability and security for trade routes passing
through this vital trans-Saharan artery, often against nomadic groups (Tubu,
Arab, and Tuareg) and intervention from Tripoli is a testament to their
effectiveness as rulers. Islamic scholarship and pilgrimage would
unquestionably have played a role in positive relations between the Awlad
Muhammad and the Sayfawa, too.
Although
later sources allude to Katsina and occasionally Agadez as frequent places of
refuge for the Awlad Muhammad dynasty during its conflicts with the Pashalik of
Tripoli, the relationship with Borno was undoubtedly maintained. Indeed,
Lemaire, the French consul at Tripoli, was told by the Fazzan's sultan that
Borno's mai was his “cousin.”[36]
Moreover, in the late 16th century, Idris b. Ali of Borno attacked
Brak (Burak) and requested the Ottomans cede a Fazzan fortress to him.[37]
In other words, the Sayfawa dynasty continued to intervene in the Fazzan and
close economic ties necessitated Bornoan communication with the Awlad Muhammad
rulers to the north. While those relations were occasionally strained and no
marriage alliance or tributary relationship between the Fazzan and Borno has
been found for the 1500s and 1600s, the evidence for an ongoing Kanuri
influence is undeniable. Particularly strong in Murzuk, Traghen, Gatrun, and
Tejeri, Borno continued to influence the Fazzan. A cultural influence may also
be found in the use of ostrich eggs to ornament mosques and graves. In the
Fazzan, Lyon noted its use for such reasons in cities like Waddan. In Murzuk,
Lyon similarly noticed the use of ostrich eggs to decorate mosques.[38]
In Borno, ostrich eggs were placed on the top of homes, although the use of it
in the Fazzan may have deviated from Borno influences.[39]
In
conclusion, the autonomy of the Awlad Muhammad from Borno did not cease
influences from the south. Indeed, the Awlad Muhammad may have risen to power
through an alliance with forces aligned with Borno. Ongoing economic, cultural,
and political relations were maintained throughout the Fazzani dynasty’s
existence. Some of the political or administrative structure and the layout of
the capital evince signs of Bornoan influence. While they were usually
tributaries of the Pashalik of Tripoli, the Awlad Muhammad formed a Saharan
state at least partly indebted to Borno’s legacy in the region.
Reflecting on the Fazzan and
Kanem-Borno
Upon
examination of the history of the Fazzan and Kanem-Borno from the 1200s to the
early 1800s, one sees a clear instance of how a southern state’s political
expansion to the north heavily influenced a Saharan region. As the late John
Lavers has questioned, the Fazzan as a Sudanic or Saharan state is an important
question related to the centuries-long relations with Kanem and, later, Borno.
In circumstances that remain understudied, Kanem during the 13th century
incorporated Fazzan into its vast domains. This period of Kanemi suzerainty of
the region led to the establishment of a local dynasty of rulers based in
Traghen. Although the exact chronology remains unknown, by the late 1400s, the
Fazzan was no longer a tributary region or zone of the Sayfawa state in Kanem.
But, during the interlude between the fall of the Banu Nasur rulers based in
Traghen and the rise of the Awlad Muhammad, a faction possibly of Kanemi or
Bornoan origin may have assisted the Awlad Muhammad. Signs of this influence
can be found in Kanuri toponyms in parts of the Fazzan, the use of the Kanuri
language, and in the political titles used by the Awlad Muhammad court. In
addition, the use of ostrich eggs on buildings, the establishment of a dendal in the capital of Murzuk, and
ongoing economic, religious, and political ties made the Kanuri influence one
that was continuous over many centuries. Even as the Awlad Muhammad fell into
the orbit of the Ottoman Pashalik of Tripoli, ties with the south remained of
paramount importance for the revenue to pay tribute. In moments of conflict,
several Awlad Muhammad rulers even fled to the south (although usually Katsina
or Agades, with the one known example of a ruler fleeing to Borno culminating
in his execution during the reign of Umar b. Idris (r. 1619-1639).
Despite this hiccup in relations, the need for the Fazzan as a secure zone for the trans-Saharan trade and pilgrim traffic required the Awlad Muhammad to be secure and able administrators. Their central position between Borno and Tripoli, the shortest trans-Saharan route, was undoubtedly another factor in the interests of Kanem and Borno in the Saharan region. Through cultural, economic, political, and religious ties, Kanem (and later, Borno) were able to maintain a durable Kanem and Bornoan influence in the Fazzan that persisted for centuries while shaping the character of a local dynasty claiming descent from a sharif from the west. In so doing, Kanem-Borno helped establish the Fazzan as a northern extension of the Sudanic world, thereby exemplifying the Sahara as a connective space in which influences from the south could be just as potent as those from north.
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[1] This is to be expected when
traditions collected in the 1800s and 1900s were several centuries removed from
the earliest period taken into consideration here. Nevertheless, careful
consideration of these traditions as reported by Lyon, Duveyrier, Barth,
Nachtigal, Despois and others is unavoidable. At the very least, they indicate
how Fazzani people in recent times remember the distant past. For the last five
centuries or so, chronicles, letters, and other sources provide a better
picture of historical developments in the region. Sadly, the specific nature of
Kanem’s period of rule in the Fazzan, occurring in the medieval period, is not
represented well in the extant corpus. For relations with Borno, scholars
benefit from the more voluminous written sources which survive, including
European language materials touching upon Borno in relation to Tripoli and the
Fazzan. Thus, B.G. Martin’s study of the Fazzan route in connection with
Kanem-Borno is relatively strong on the Borno phase of the Sayfawa state, but relatively
weaker on the earlier Kanem sultanate. This article endeavors to explore,
albeit speculatively based on the available sources, the earlier phase of Kanem
rule as establishing a pattern of longue durée changes in the Fazzan that
persisted into the early 19th century. Careful consideration of the
traditions recorded by European travelers, researchers, and colonial officials
can be cautiously triangulated with written sources and traditions on Kanem and
Borno to attempt a more comprehensive history of Kanem-Borno’s relations with
the Fazzan.
[2] Jean Despois, Géographie
humaine in Mémoires de la Mission scientifique du Fezzân, Vol. 3, 96.
[3] Henri Duveyrier, Les
Touareg du Nord, 276.
[4] Jean Chapelle, Nomades
noirs du Sahara, 50.
[5] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese
Memoirs: Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Arabic Manuscripts Relating
to the Central and Western Sudan, Vol 1, 50. For Lange’s study of the Diwan, see Le Dīwān Des Sultans Du
(Kānem) Bornū: Chronologie Et Histoire D'un Royaume Africain (de La Fin Du Xe
Siècle Jusqu'à 1808.
[6] But even this is ambiguous. The
Kanuri toponyms may have come into use more recently, perhaps during the period
when the Sayfawa had permanently relocated to Borno.
[7] Naturally, this is assuming the
chronology of Lange is likely accurate, and that the account of Ibn Fatima was
describing Kanem during the reign of Dunama Dibalemi.
[8] Ibn Sa’id in J.F.P. Hopkins, and
Nehemia Levtzion (editors), Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West
African History, 188, 194. Although Ibn Sa’id had not
traveled to Kanem, he repeated information from a source which had been to
Kanem earlier in the 1200s. Thus, his testimony is precious for reconstructing
a sketch of what medieval Kanem at its apogee looked like.
[9] Ibid., 215.
[10] Ibid., 337.
[11] Ibid., 260-261.
[12] Ibid., 354.
[13] H.W. El-Hesnawi, Fazzan under
the rule of Awlad Muhammad. A Study in Political, Economic, Social and
Intellectual History, 320, 322.
Due to the severe nature of the political crises, civil wars, and conflict with
the Bulala, it is likely that the Sayfawa lost the Fazzan by the second half of
the 1400s.
[14] Henri Duveyrier, Les
Touareg du Nord, 277.
[15] Gustav Nachtigal and J. Gourdault
(trans). Sahara et Soudan,
103.
[16] Jean Despois, Géographie
humaine in Mémoires de la Mission scientifique du Fezzân, Vol. 3, 108.
[17] J. Lethielleux, Le Fezzan, ses
jardins, ses palmiers, 17.
[18] Jean Despois, Géographie
humaine in Mémoires de la Mission scientifique du Fezzân, Vol. 3, 61.
[19] Lange, Dierk. A
Sudanic Chronicle: The Borno Expeditions of Idrīs Alauma (1564-1576) According
to the Account of Aḥmad B. Furṭū : Arabic Text, English Translation,
Commentary and Geographical Gazetteer,
117-118. It is highly likely the place in the Fazzan referred to by Ahmad b.
Furtu and the attack from “Kanem” remembered in Fazzan tradition refer to the
same incident, although the association of it with “Kanem” rather than Borno
leaves open the possibility of an earlier attack.
[20] H.W. El-Hesnawi, Fazzan under
the rule of Awlad Muhammad. A Study in Political, Economic, Social and
Intellectual History, 318.
[21] George Francis Lyon, A
Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818, 19 and 20,
Accompanied by Geographical Notices of Soudan and the Course of the Niger, 207.
[22] Jean Despois, Géographie
humaine in Mémoires de la Mission scientifique du Fezzân, Vol. 3, 250.
[23] Henri Duveyrier, Les
Touareg du Nord, 279.
[24] Dierk Lange, “Les lieux de
sépulture des rois Sēfuwa (Kānem-Bornū): textes écrits et traditions orales,”
156.
[25] George Francis Lyon, A
Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818, 19 and 20,
Accompanied by Geographical Notices of Soudan and the Course of the Niger, 224, 238.
[26] Henri Duveyrier, Les
Touareg du Nord, 280.
[27] J. Lethielleux, Le Fezzan, ses
jardins, ses palmiers, 19.
[28] Friedrich Hornemann, The
Journal of Frederick Hornemann's Travels, from Cairo to Mourzouk: The Capital
of the Kingdom of Fezzan, in Africa in the Years 1797-1798, 67. As mentioned previously, some of these
titles may have been introduced in the region by the Banu Nasur dynasty during
the height of medieval Kanem in the 13th century.
[29] This dissemination of court titles
likely derived from Kanem or Borno in many parts of the Central Sudan and as
far east as Darfur was unquestionably a complex process.
[30] el-Hesnawi’s thesis includes
several translated official documents from the period of the Awlad Muhammad’s
reign in the Fazzan. Included is a document referring to the passage through
the Fazzan of Ali b. Umar of Borno during one of his pilgrimages to Mecca.
[31] George Francis Lyon, A
Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818, 19 and 20,
Accompanied by Geographical Notices of Soudan and the Course of the Niger, 207.
[32] Jean Despois, Géographie
humaine in Mémoires de la Mission scientifique du Fezzân, Vol. 3, 108.
[34] Jean Despois, Géographie
humaine in Mémoires de la Mission scientifique du Fezzân, Vol. 3, 250.
[35] J. Lethielleux, Le Fezzan, ses
jardins, ses palmiers, 18.
[36] Richard Gray, “Christian Traces
and a Franciscan Mission in the Central Sudan, 1700-1711,” 384.
[37] B.G. Martin, “Kanem, Bornu, and
the Fazzan: Notes on the Political History of a Trade Route,” 24. The issue of
Brak or Burak has been raised earlier in the essay in the context of Fazzani
historical memories of Kanem.
[38] George Francis Lyon, A
Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818, 19 and 20,
Accompanied by Geographical Notices of Soudan and the Course of the Niger, 76, 99.
[39] Travelers such as Heinrich Barth
noted the decorative use of ostrich eggs on buildings in the Central Sudan.
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